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Abstract 
The powers of Central and East European presidents have been subject to a number studies. 
Paradoxically, only few scholars have tried to explain how presidents actually use them. This 
thesis maps and explains patterns in the activism of democratic presidents in Central and East-
ern Europe (CEE). It proposes a new theoretical framework for the study of presidential activ-
ism, defined as the discretionary use of formal presidential powers, and argues that it can be 
explained by the constitutional setting and the political environment. To test these hypotheses, 
the study employs a nested analysis approach. Thereby, the patterns of presidential activism are 
assessed using an original data set on the use of presidents’ legislative powers in nine CEE de-
mocracies between 1990 and 2010, and the thesis provides one of the first cross-country empiri-
cal analyses of the actual use of presidents’ reactive powers to date. Based on the predictions of 
the statistical model 12 president-cabinet pairings from four countries (Estonia, Hungary, Po-
land, 4.) are selected for in-depth case studies. The qualitative analysis then uses the results of 
65 semi-structured elite interviews and ample source material to examine the validity of the sta-
tistical results. A particular focus is placed on the use of presidential vetoes and presidential ac-
tivism in government formation, censure and dismissal. The study finds most of the hypotheses 
confirmed. Most prominently, the findings show that popular presidential elections, cohabitation 
between president and government as well as a low seat share of the government are the most 
important predictors of presidential activism. These factors are not only strongly correlated with 
a more frequent use of powers, but the mechanisms of effect are also demonstrated in case stud-
ies. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis suggests intra-governmental divisions as an additional 
explanatory factor which should be included in future studies of presidential activism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  veto, vetare, vetavi, vetatus – to reject, forbid, prevent, prohibit 
peto, petere, petivi, petitus – to request, demand, ask, desire 
 
 
The democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after 1989 has produced 
a multitude of political systems in which presidents possess more than just ceremonial 
powers. The new constitutions have vested presidents with the right to veto legislation 
or forward it to the Constitutional Court and some have even been granted the right of 
legislative initiative. More than half of the presidents are elected by popular vote and 
play a role in government formation and dismissal or enjoy prerogatives in foreign and 
defence policy. Political practice has shown that presidents made very different use of 
their powers. Some individual office holders appeared to be more active than others and 
particular countries exhibited either very active incumbents who made frequent use of 
their powers or inactive presidents who refrained from involving themselves in day-to-
day political decision-making. 
Presidents and their powers have traditionally been discussed in the literature with 
regard  to  regime  types  and  their  definition.  Particularly  the  introduction  of  semi-
presidentialism as a ‘third’ regime type between presidentialism and parliamentarism by 
Maurice Duverger (1978; 1980) spawned great discussion. As Duverger’s (1978; 1980) 
definition of semi-presidentialism hinged on the notion that the president ‘possesses  
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quite considerable powers’ (Duverger 1980, 166)
1, several political scientists have sug-
gested (re-)definitions and interpretations of the term (Shugart and Carey 1992; O’Neill 
1993; Linz 1994; Sartori 1997; Bahro, Bayerlein and Veser 1998; Elgie 1998; Elgie 
2004).  Elgie’s  (1999b)  suggestion  to  exclude  the  criterion  of  ‘considerable  powers’ 
from the definition has now become the academic standard
2, yet a great number of polit-
ical scientists have still developed a variety of ways to measure presidential powers 
(Shugart and Carey 1992; Roper 2002; Siaroff 2003; with  specific reference to CEE: 
McGregor 1994; Hellmann 1996; Frye 1997; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; Metcalf 2000; 
2002; Krouwel 2003). Typically, these measuring schemes were developed  as part of 
definitions of new regime types or alternative classifications (Shugart and Carey 1992; 
Krouwel 2003; Siaroff 2003) as well as to study the impact of presidential power on 
democratic consolidation and regime stability (Frye 1997; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; 
Metcalf 2000; Roper 2002; Krouwel 2003; Beliaev 2006) or economic  development 
(Hellmann 1996; Frye 1997).  
Despite the prominence of presidential powers in academic debates, the study of how 
presidents actually use them is still very limited. While there are a number of valuable 
case studies that explore the functioning of different regime types or the politics of indi-
vidual presidents in Central and Eastern Europe  (e.g. chapters in Taras 1997; Elgie 
1999a; Elgie and Moestrup 2008a; Hloušek 2013a), the use of presidential powers is 
rarely their main focus and directly elected presidents tend to receive more scholarly 
attention than those elected by parliament. Empirical cross-country studies almost only 
exist in the area of presidential involvement in government formation in Western and 
Eastern  European  democracies  (Neto  and  Strøm  2006;  Schleiter  and  Morgan-Jones 
                                                 
1 ‘(1) The president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable 
powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and 
governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them’ 
(Duverger 1980, 166). 
2 This thesis therefore also uses the term ‘semi-presidentialism’ in this way.  
17 
2009b; 2010; Tavits 2008). Yet, these studies are confined to using the share of non-
partisan cabinet ministers as a proxy for measuring presidential activity and thus, too, 
do not  analyse the actual  use of presidential  powers. With the exception of Tavits’ 
(2008) study of the effect of the president’s mode of election on presidential activism as 
well as the divisiveness of presidential elections and political disillusionment, there are 
no comprehensive comparative studies that deal specifically with the use of presidential 
powers and that attempt to explain differences in presidential activism more generally. 
Unfortunately, Tavits (2008), too, partly relies on proxies rather than direct indicators of 
presidential activism. The use of presidential powers in (European) parliamentary and 
semi-presidential systems thus remains understudied. There is a need to develop theo-
retical explanations as well as to gather new quantitative and qualitative data that allows 
for an adequate test of traditional assumptions and new hypotheses. 
Studying how presidents make use of their powers also has a practical and very cur-
rent relevance. Presidents have become the most common head of state among the de-
mocracies of the world. Only few states operate a presidential system in which the pres-
ident is the sole executive; more often, presidents share executive power with Prime 
Ministers and their governments (Siaroff 2003). Even though countries differ greatly in 
how much power is vested in the presidency, presidents always possess at least some 
power and even the least powerful presidents play an important functional and proce-
dural role in their political systems apart from ceremonial duties (Tavits 2008). Presi-
dents sign acts passed by parliament and proclaim new laws and are thus the last check-
and-balance on the legislative process (Strohmeier 2010). Even when constitutions do 
not mention it explicitly, legal scholars have argued that they still have the right to re-
fuse their signature under bills that would violate the constitution (Degenhardt 2008). 
Furthermore, constitutional rules leave room for interpretation and presidents just as  
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other political actors have the possibility to fill these gaps through their practice (Baylis 
1996; Protsyk 2006; de Raadt 2009). Due to their prominent position, presidents can 
also influence political decisions through statements, speeches and other kinds of public 
appearances (Kaltefleiter 1970; Hager and Sullivan 1994; Tavits 2008).  
Presidents and the way they become active thus matter fundamentally for the func-
tioning of any republican political system. Conflicts between president and government 
and presidential interference in legislative matters can not only lead to ineffectiveness in 
governing but also to a slowdown of the legislative process and delay of political re-
forms (Protsyk 2005a). Presidents can also complicate government formation (Neto and 
Strøm 2006; Tavits 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b) with largely the same ef-
fect. Finally, intense discussions about the role of the presidency and – more specifical-
ly – the mode of the election of the president surface regularly, particularly in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The question of how the head of state should be elected was one of 
the key discussions surrounding the creation of the presidencies (Ismayr 2010b; see also 
case studies in Zielonka 2001) and resurfaced repeatedly in Estonia (Lagerspetz and 
Maier  2010),  Hungary  (Körösény,  Fodor  and  Dieringer  2010),  Lithuania  (Protsyk 
2005b)  and  Bulgaria  (Ganev  1999).  Following  public  demand,  the  Czech  Republic 
changed its mode of presidential elections from indirect to direct elections in 2013 (No-
v￡ček 2011; Hloušek 2013b), after popular elections had already been introduced in 
Slovakia in 1999 (Kipke 2010). The discussions about the mode of election were there-
by also always connected to the way in which office holders used their powers or would 
use under the new system. 
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A study of presidential activism in Central and Eastern Europe 
The aim of this thesis is to map and explain patterns in the activism of presidents in the 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
 The question at the heart of this study asks 
why presidents become active and use their powers and what determines their decisions 
to do so. Although a sizeable amount of literature has been devoted to the study of pres-
idents, this crucial question has not been satisfactorily answered yet. In providing an 
answer to this question, this thesis seeks to make a number of important contributions to 
the study of presidential activism on a theoretical, empirical, and methodological level. 
First, this thesis proposes a new theoretical framework for explaining presidential ac-
tivism. It is argued that presidential activism is determined by a combination of consti-
tutional factors – the mode of presidential election, term limits, and the electoral cycle – 
and variations in the political environment, i.e. the relationship between president, gov-
ernment, and parliament as well as the relative strength and resources of these actors. 
While these arguments have been used in previous studies of presidential activism in 
parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential systems, it is the first time that they 
are united in a coherent framework and that underlying assumptions about presidential 
motivations are spelled out and clearly defined. Furthermore, this study provides for the 
first time a clear and non-normative definition of presidential activism. 
Second, this thesis relies on original and comprehensive quantitative and qualitative 
data on presidential activism. I will use a new quantitative data set on the use of presi-
dents’ legislative powers covering nine countries between 1990 and 2010. As further 
outlined below, the data set not only contains data of exceptional detail about when and 
how often presidents used their powers but also about the respective political conditions 
and institutional settings under which activism occurred. My analysis is also based on 
the results of 65 semi-structured interviews with relevant political elites that allow for  
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unprecedented insights into the working mechanisms and practices behind the use of 
presidential powers. Thereby, this study provides the first empirical cross-country anal-
ysis of the actual use of presidential powers to date and is able to assess the validity of a 
number of assumptions and hypotheses which could hitherto only imperfectly be tested 
empirically. 
Third,  this  thesis  employs  nested  analysis  (Lieberman  2005),  a  genuine  mixed-
methods approach that integrates the use of quantitative and qualitative methods into a 
coherent framework. While Tavits (2008) also uses both regression analysis and qualita-
tive case studies in her study of presidential activism, nested analysis is built on a more 
sophisticated three-step process to ensure a clear link between the purposes of different 
methods. The results of each method are used to improve the application of the respec-
tive other method and the interpretation of results. At the same time, nested analysis al-
so  possesses  all  advantages  that  have  traditionally  been  associated  with  mixed-
approaches. By combining two different methodologies it helps to overcome the inher-
ent deficiencies of each approach and increases the validity and reliability of findings 
(Coppedge 1999; Lieberman 2005; Bryman 2006). 
Finally, this thesis will contribute to the recently revived debate on the effects of the 
mode of election on presidential activism and its results allow for reassessing traditional 
assumptions about the working of different regime types and the consequences of re-
gime choice and constitutional reform. It will also significantly expand existing scholar-
ship on presidents more generally by highlighting new avenues of research across polit-
ical systems. Last, explaining why, when and how presidents exercise their powers has 
implications not only for presidential studies but it also helps to understand how politi-
cal actors in general act within a given institutional context and how external influences 
change their paths of actions.  
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The democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
3 are particularly suited for studying 
presidential activism as part of a comparative analysis. Their new political systems were 
all created during the same, comparatively short period of time after the f all of Com-
munism between 1989 and 1993. Since then, these countries have shared a common tra-
jectory of development and were confronted with similar challenges. Domestically, po-
litical actors had to accustom themselves to the new ‘rules of the game’ and implement 
economic reforms to complete the transformation from planned to market economy. In 
seeking to gain accession to NATO and the EU all states also faced analogous external 
pressures. These similarities, paired with the regional closeness, hold the political con-
text and other factors such as history and culture relatively constant. Finally, after more 
than 20 years of democratic consolidation it is possible to analyse patterns of presiden-
tial activism rather than only individual examples of the use of powers as well as to 
achieve meaningful and generalizable results through the use of quantitative methods. 
Table 1: Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-2010 
Country  Inauguration of first 
democratic president  Mode of election  Number of 
incumbents 
Bulgaria  08/1990  Direct*  3 
Czech Republic  01/1993  Indirect  2 
Estonia  10/1992  Indirect  3 
Hungary  08/1990  Indirect  4 
Latvia  07/1993  Indirect  3 
Lithuania  10/1992  Direct  4 
Poland  12/1990  Direct  4 
Romania  05/1990  Direct  3 
Slovakia  02/1993  Indirect (1993-98) 
Direct (1999-present) 
1 
2 
Slovenia  12/1991  Direct  3 
  * Since 01/1992; the first election was still held in the Constitutional Assembly. 
   
                                                 
3 For the purpose of this study, I define ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ as those countries that joined the EU 
as part of its Eastern enlargement in 2004/2007, i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
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A study focussing on such similar cases inevitably shares some of the features of 
Przeworski and Teune’s (1979) most similar systems design. Yet at the same time this 
set of countries is characterised by considerable variation on all variables that have been 
associated with presidential activism – ranging from the constitutional setting to the po-
litical environment – as well as the extent to which individual president have actually 
used  their  powers.  As  variation  on  independent  and  dependent  variables  is  key  to 
achieving meaningful results (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994), the presi-
dencies of CEE present the ideal basis to test hypotheses on presidential activism.  
 
Defining presidential activism 
Despite the frequent use of the term in the literature, no universal definition of ‘presi-
dential activism’ exists. It is most commonly used in the context of the U.S.-American 
presidency and either refers to the use of the presidential veto, executive decrees or oth-
er formal powers (Spitzer 1988; Deering and Maltzman 1999) or it describes policy ini-
tiatives and appointments – often with regard to their comparatively high or low number 
(Cohen 1982; Beck 1987; Tichenor 1999; Cohen and Krause 2000; Krent 2005; Ed-
wards 2009a). Some authors use the term to refer to undesirably extensive use of presi-
dential powers (Murphy 1984; Schlesinger 1997) or the success of presidential initia-
tives and the president’s personal commitment to the office (Greenstein 1979). With 
regard to parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, however, the term is most fre-
quently used to describe the ‘intense use of presidential discretionary powers’ (Tavits 
2008, 30; emphasis added) or presidents’ informal exercise of influence over policy. 
Presidential activism is also often equated with objectionable interference in legislative 
affairs or government formation (Nousiainen 2001; Almeida and Cho 2003; Kristinsson 
2009) or a means for presidents to accumulate power by non-democratic means (Sedeli- 
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us 2006). The only common denominator of these definitions is that they all focus on 
presidential behaviour apart from ceremonial duties, i.e. their discretionary actions. In 
addition to the ambiguous overall use of the term, it carries a strong normative compo-
nent (particularly in the European context) and the discussion often focuses on the pos-
sible negative consequences of activism rather than its causes.  
A systematic assessment and explanation of presidential activism requires a clearer 
specification  of  the  scope  of  the  definition  and  stripping  the  term  of  its  norma-
tive/negative connotations. For the purpose of this study I will therefore define presi-
dential activism as the discretionary use of formal presidential powers by the president. 
Thereby, the focus on discretionary action incorporates the largest commonality of ex-
isting research and excludes any actions required of a president by law or constitutional 
practice.
4 Defining presidential activism as the use of formal powers, i.e. those granted 
by the constitution, also facilitates operationalisation as it can be unambiguously dete r-
mined when a power has been used. As sometimes even the mere threat to exercise a 
certain power can be as effective as their actual use (see e.g. Spitzer 198 8; Deen and 
Arnold 2002; Kernell and Kim 2006) the term ‘use of powers’ is to be understood as 
both the actual exercise of a formal presidential power and the threat or public declara-
tion to do so. Due to limitations in terms of data and the lack of previous systematic re-
search in the European context, this study will only be able to provide limited evidence 
on such threats.
5 Nevertheless, only the the actual use of powers can guarantee the de-
sired effect.
6 Thus, focussing on the actual use of formal powers as an indicator of pres-
idential activism seems justified – although it naturally imposes some limitations (e.g. 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, the refusal to perform such duties might arguably qualify as activism. 
5 Findings should however still provide a sufficient basis for future studies of presidential threats. 
6 Furthermore, contrary to the actual use of powers, threats or public declarations to use powers can be 
made with varying degrees of intensity and sincerity (e.g. Polish president Kaczyńsky’s threat to veto all 
bills of a government [PAP 2006] versus a threat to veto very specific bills [PAP 2008]), which makes a 
systematic assessment within the framework of this study even more difficult.  
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underestimation of the total amount of presidential activism). These issues will still be 
considered in more detail at a later point in this thesis (see Chapter 1.3 ‘Discussion: 
Scope and limitations’). Finally, given that it is presidents’ prerogative to use these 
powers, incumbents cannot objectively ‘over-use’ them or employ them to an objec-
tionable extent. By adopting such a definition, this study does not aim to make any 
normative judgement about whether the exercise of presidential powers is positive or 
negative (e.g. if activism is dangerous or beneficial for democratisation or the policy 
process). It focusses on the determinants of the use of presidential powers and leaves it 
to future research to investigate such questions. 
A number of political scientists have produced lists of formal presidential powers –
typically with the intention to describe or measure presidential power in some way (Du-
verger 1978; Shugart and Carey 1992; Lucky 1994; McGregor 1994; Hellmann 1996; 
Frye 1997; Metcalf 2000). However, most lists are dominated by powers that are only 
significant in states of emergency or describe presidential duties rather than real powers 
which presidents can exercise at their discretion. Shugart and Carey’s (1992) list of 
‘basic’ powers (which they devise as part of their measurement scheme of presidential 
power) and the additions by Metcalf (2000) provide the most useful basis for this study. 
It is not only parsimonious enough to guide the study at hand but also only includes 
powers in whose exercise presidents have a margin of discretion. 
Table 2: Basic presidential powers in Shugart and Carey (1992) and Metcalf (2000) 
Legislative Powers  Non-legislative Powers 
Package Veto 
Partial Veto 
Decree 
Budgetary Powers 
Legislative Initiative (reserved policy areas) 
Proposal of Referenda 
Judicial Review * 
Cabinet Formation 
Cabinet Dismissal 
Censure 
Dissolution of Assembly 
 
 
 
Notes: * Power added by Metcalf (2000). 
Source: Shugart and Carey (1992); Metcalf (2000).    
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To account for the specific constitutional stipulations in Central and Eastern Europe, 
I adapt the list with the following modifications. First, decree powers and budgetary 
powers have not been granted to any Central and East European president and their use 
cannot be investigated here. Second, vetoes will be included as a single category (no 
president in my sample has a constitutionally guaranteed partial veto).
7 Furthermore, all 
types of legislative initiatives will be included in this study (not only  those in reserved 
policy areaS).
8 Referenda also have to be excluded from this study as only very few 
presidents can call referenda at will, otherwise presidents only call them on request of 
parliament and/or government (making it almost a ceremonial duty rather than a discre-
tionary power). Finally, I follow Shugart and Haggard (2001) by dividing presidential 
powers into ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ powers. While presidents can use the former at 
any point in time, the latter can only be used in reaction to certain circumstances or 
events.
9 The final selection of powers considered in this study is summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3: Presidential powers under consideration in this study 
Type of power  Legislative Powers  Non-legislative Powers 
Proactive 
 
Legislative Initiative 
 
n/a 
Reactive 
Package Veto 
Judicial Review 
Cabinet Formation 
Cabinet Dismissal 
Censure 
Dissolution of Assembly 
Source: Own compilation based on Shugart and Carey (1992, 150); Metcalf (2000, 669f); Shugart 
and Haggard (2001, 99). 
   
                                                 
7 Although it can be argued that the Bulgarian president possesses a partial veto (Tsebelis and Rizova 
2007), this right is not codified in the constitution and only present in parliamentary standing orders. 
8 Shugart and Carey (1992) only exclude other types of initiative s as their aim is to measure power of 
presidents rather than enumerate their prerogatives. 
9 As I will outline in Chapter 1.2.2, the use of each group of powers may be associated with different po-
litical conditions.  
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Research design, data and methods  
This study relies on the ‘nested analysis’ approach by Evan Lieberman (2005). Nested 
analysis is a mixed-methods approach that integrates the use of quantitative and qualita-
tive methods into one coherent sequential research design. The combination of two dif-
ferent methodologies in one study generally increases the reliability and validity of find-
ings. It allows for excluding rival explanations and can considerably enhance the use of 
particular methods and the interpretation of their results (Bryman 2006), thereby in-
creasing ‘overall confidence in the central findings of a study’ (Liebermann 2005, 436). 
The benefits of each methodological strand help to offset the inherent drawbacks of the 
other which enables researchers to arrive at both generalizable conclusions and an in-
depth understanding of the phenomenon in question (Creswell and Plano-Clark 2011; 
Berg-Schlosser 2012).  Lieberman’s (2005)  nested analysis  approach is  currently the 
best-developed and most versatile mixed-methods framework for comparative cross-
country research, even though some pitfalls in its application have been reported (Rohlf-
ing 2008). 
By employing a mixed-methods approach this study will not only be able to arrive at 
more reliable and valid conclusion but it addresses an essential shortcoming of existing 
scholarship on presidential activism. Previous studies of presidential politics in parlia-
mentary and semi-presidential systems have mostly been conducted as case studies of 
particular countries (see chapters in Elgie 1999a; Elgie and Moestrup 2008a; Hloušek 
2013a) or individual presidents (Simpson 1996; Taras 1997; Zubek 1997; Millard 2000; 
Dieringer 2005; Kim 2013) and it is thus unclear to what extent the resulting specific 
explanations of presidential behaviour can be generalised. By the same token, existing 
studies that look at presidential activity in quantitative cross-country studies (Neto and 
Strøm  2006;  Schleiter  and  Morgan-Jones  2009b;  2010)  do  not  allow  for  assessing  
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whether their more general findings can also explain specific instances of presidential 
activism. Even studies that use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Tavits 2008) do not clearly show the relationship between the results of each method. 
The supreme advantage of using the nested analysis approach is that it allows for estab-
lishing a strong and clear link between the purpose and the results of both quantitative 
and qualitative methods. Qualitative case studies are not used for mere illustration or 
employed on an ad-hoc basis to explain unexpected results, but they are an integral part 
of the research design and are used to validate and develop the statistical models. 
 
The logic of nested analysis 
Lieberman’s (2005) nested analysis approach generally consists of three main steps that 
are implemented throughout a study. The first step consists of a preliminary large-N 
analysis (LNA) which tests initial and ideally deductively derived hypotheses.
10 The 
results are then assessed in terms of model fit and whether they confirm the expect a-
tions of the theoretical model. The second step of the analysis c onsists of a small-N 
analysis (SNA) which differs in procedure and objective depending on the results of the 
LNA. If the model is robust (i.e. exhibits a satisfactory goodness of fit) and the results 
confirm the initial hypotheses, one continues with so -called ‘model-testing’ small-N 
analysis (Mt-SNA). Hereby, qualitative case studies are used to further test the robust-
ness of the model and the analysis aims at establishing whether ‘a particular causal 
model or theory actually “worked” in the manner specified by the model’ (Lieberman 
2005,  442).  If  the  results  of  the  large-N  analysis  do  not  confirm  initial  hypotheses 
and/or model fit is poor, one uses ‘model-building’ small-N analysis (Mb-SNA). The 
objective is thereby to establish inductively an alternative account of the (cross-country) 
                                                 
10 The LNA is in so far preliminary as Lieberman (2005) allows for a more exploratory character of the 
analysis than one would use in a single-method study and the following qualitative analysis can still point 
out errors in model design.  
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variation of the phenomenon in question which may later be tested in another large-N 
analysis (Lieberman 2005, 443).
11 Last, depending on the nature of the research que s-
tion and/or data availability there might also be parts of the research question which are 
deliberately left for the SNA to answer and explore (Lieberman 2005, 440). 
Lieberman (2005) argues that researchers should select cases for Mt -SNA that were 
comparatively well-predicted by the initial statistical model and focus the subsequent 
analysis only on the variables that proved to be significant in the LNA, disregarding 
those variables that did not show significant coefficient estimates. Yet, as Rohlfing 
(2008) argues this presents one of the greatest pitfalls of nested analysis as it severely 
restricts the researcher’s ability to detect misspecification of the statistical model, par-
ticularly  whether  important  variables  have  been  excluded.  In  order  to  take  full  ad-
vantage of the nested analysis approach, researchers should attempt to assess all possi-
ble factors that could have influenced the dependent variable and not guide the analysis 
by potentially spurious statistical significance (Rohlfing 2008, 1948ff, 1505f). The case 
selection for Mb-SNA is less problematic – as this mode of analysis is used in case of 
unsatisfactory LNA results, the model prediction can be disregarded and cases for in-
depth analysis should be chosen based on their potential to yield generalizable results 
through inductive analysis. 
The third step of nested analysis is a final comparative assessment and synthesis of 
qualitative  and  quantitative  results.  Despite  presenting  the  endpoint  of  most  studies 
conducted within a nested analysis framework, Lieberman (2005) does unfortunately 
not elaborate on the details on this assessment yet rather focusses on its potential out-
comes. If the Mt-SNA was able to plausibly demonstrate the existence causal links be-
tween the dependent and independent variables, the analysis is terminated. The same 
                                                 
11 It would theoretically also be possible to start the whole analysis using Mb-SNA and then use and LNA 
to test the generalizability of findings (Lieberman 2005, 436).  
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applies if Mb-SNA has not suggested an alternative theoretical model that could be test-
ed in a LNA. Otherwise, it is possible to continue with Mt-SNA and Mb-SNA until a 
new model is found or the lack of appropriate data makes the test of such a model im-
possible (Liebermann 2005, 448-450). 
 
Original quantitative and qualitative data 
This reserach uses original quantitative and qualitative data collected specifically for the 
purpose of the study at hand. Until now, statistical analyses of the actual use of presi-
dential powers were mostly restricted to the use of presidential vetoes in the United 
States (e.g. Lee 1975; Rohde and Simon 1985; Hoff 1991; McCarty and Poole 1995; 
Shields and Huang 1995; 1997; Gilmour 2002). In the European context, studies were 
typically confined to proxies, such as the share of non-partisan ministers to gauge presi-
dential  involvement  in  government  formation  (Neto  and  Strøm  2006;  Tavits  2008; 
Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b; 2010), or descriptive statistics (almost always con-
fined  to  one  specific  country;  Protsyk  2004;  Haspel,  Remington  and  Smith  2006; 
Krupavičius  2008;  Neto  and  Lobo  2009;  see  also  case  studies  in  Tavits  2008  and 
Hloušek 2013a). To address shortcomings of previous research, I will therefore use an 
entirely new quantitative data set on presidential activism which was created specifical-
ly for this study. It contains data of unprecedented detail on the actual use of president’s 
legislative powers – vetoes, judicial review requests, and legislative initiatives – in nine 
Central and East European democracies from 1990 to 2010 as well as on the political 
conditions and institutional settings under which activism occurred. While until now the 
lack of appropriate cross-country data made it very difficult to test hypotheses on presi-
dential  activism, this  data set  allows for the  first  time to  adequately  assess  the im-
portance of the various factors assumed to influence the use of presidential powers. The  
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new data set will thus serve as the basis for the quantitative analysis of this study and 
the first step in the nested analysis approach. It is one of the first longitudinal cross-
sectional data sets on the use of presidential powers and already presents a valuable con-
tribution to existing scholarship in its own right. 
The purpose of the qualitative case studies, the second step of nested analysis, is to 
validate the existence of general causal links between variables and/or explore alterna-
tive explanations for presidential activism. The cases for in-depth analysis are selected 
specifically for their ability to provide insights into the connections between variables 
that produced a particular result. It follows that it is also necessary to collect and analyse 
new qualitative data to effectively corroborate the results of the statistical model or de-
tect alternative causal paths. Therefore, I conducted 65 semi-structured elite interviews 
with high-ranking presidential advisors, cabinet members, deputies and national experts 
who were specifically selected for their knowledge of and/or insight in the specific cas-
es selected for in-depth analysis. Elite interviews with the actors involved present the 
most effective way to gather the required case-specific data (Richards 1996; Dexter 
[1970] 2006; Beamer 2002; Burnham et al. 2008) which goes beyond the information 
provided by the body of existing country-case studies of presidential politics. The elite 
interviews produced even more detailed insights into the use of presidential powers and 
the decision-making patterns of presidents and their staff. These would not have been 
available from any other source and allow for drawing more reliable and nuanced con-
clusions. 
Interviews were conducted based on best practice and suggestions from the relevant 
theoretical literature (Kvale 1996; Patton 2002) and researchers’ reflections on elite in-
terviews (e.g. Peabody et al. 1990; Richards 1996; Herod 1999; Berry 2002; Goldstein 
2002; Rivera, Kozyreva and Sarovskii 2002; Lilleker 2003; Dexter [1970] 2006; Morris  
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2009; Mikecz 2012). Due to the fact that the use of presidential powers and the behav-
iour of particular presidents in office is still a contentious issue in Central and Eastern 
European politics, respondents were guaranteed confidentiality. None of their answers 
are thus used in a way that they can be personally attributed or would make individual 
responents identifiable as the source. This was not only essential to establishing trust 
and increasing rapport with respondents but also necessary to protect respondents from 
any type of harm to their reputation or future career arising from the publication of their 
answers (Dexter [1970] 2006, 60ff; 81). Nevertheless, each respondent consented to the 
inclusion of their name in the list of respondents (following the bibliography) under the 
condition of non-attribution outlined above.
12 
Figure 1: Overview of research design 
   
                                                 
12 Further details about respondent sampling, interview length and location can be found in Appendix A3. 
Large-N Analysis 
Test of general hypotheses on presidential activism 
through descriptive statistics and regression analysis 
Assessment of findings & case selection 
Are the results robust and do they confirm the hypotheses? 
Case selection for in-depth analysis based on predictions of best-fitting statistical model 
Small-N Analysis 
Validation of findings from the statistical analysis through in-depth analysis of selected cases 
Exploration of potential additional factors and variables that could not be tested quantitatively 
 
 
 
Synthesis of findings 
Final comparative assessment of quantitative and qualitative result 
Do the independent variables work in the way assumed by the theoretical framework? 
Do patterns found in the statistical analysis of presidential activism correspond to political practice? 
Are there additional explanations for presidential activism or how could the model be improved? 
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Overview of thesis structure and results 
This thesis is divided into three parts which correspond to the three steps in the nested 
analysis approach outlined above.  
 
Part I: Patterns of presidential activism 
The first part deals with cross-country patterns of the use of formal presidential powers 
and consists of two chapters. The first chapter provides a focussed review of the exist-
ing literature on presidential activism and critically discusses the factors that have hith-
erto been argued to influence presidents’ activities. Given the fact that the use of formal 
presidential powers is generally understudied in the context of European parliamentary 
and  semi-presidential  systems,  it  also  draws  on  insights  from  the  study  of  U.S.-
American presidents where such research has already been successfully conducted. The 
discussion shows that despite obvious differences in the respective regime type, Ameri-
can and European scholars have found fairly similar factors to account for presidential 
activism, yet they often fail to spell out basic assumptions about presidential motiva-
tions. Building on the literature review, I develop a new and more coherent theoretical 
framework to explain presidential activism and formulate eight hypotheses that provide 
the basis for investigation in the remainder of this study. I argue that presidential activ-
ism is primarily determined by constitutional factors (such as the mode of presidential 
election, term limits and the electoral cycle) and the political environment (degree of 
consensus over policy between institutions and actors’ relative strength). 
The second chapter provides a test of these hypotheses using an original data set on 
the use of presidents’ legislative powers in nine Central and East European democracies 
between 1990 and 2010. Given the lack of adequate quantitative data, the analysis of 
presidential activism in government formation, censure and dismissal is deliberately left  
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for the qualitative analysis. Using descriptive statistics, negative binomial regression 
models and event history analysis, I assess both the general occurrence of presidential 
activism as well as its frequency over time. The results for the use of presidential vetoes 
are very robust and confirm most of my hypotheses. Most prominently, it is shown that 
directly elected presidents use their veto power significantly more often than their indi-
rectly elected counterparts and that cohabitation increases both the number of vetoes 
and their incidence rate. The analysis of presidents’ use of judicial review requests and 
legislative initiatives brings mixed results. It is complicated by the fact that the former 
power is only extremely rarely used and the latter only granted to four presidents in my 
sample. Therefore, presidential vetoes are chosen as the further focus of the study. The 
remainder of the second chapter then deals with the selection of cases for in-depth anal-
ysis. I select 12 episodes – short time periods of specific presidents-cabinet pairings – 
from four countries (Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) as cases for the subse-
quent qualitative model-testing analysis. 
 
Part II: Presidential activism in practice 
The second part (Chapters 3 and 4) provides an in-depth analysis of the selected cases. 
Its aim is to validate the results of the statistical model by tracing the assumed causal 
relationships between variables and exploring other factors that could have influenced 
presidential activism in legislation. The validation of the statatistical model is focussed 
specifically on the selected episodes, whereas presidential activism in government for-
mation is assessed on a country-basis and has a more exploratory character. 
After an introduction to the stipulations and political practice regarding presidents’ 
powers in Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the third chapter provides an in-depth 
analysis of presidential veto use during the selected episodes in two ‘most different’  
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country pairs. The third chapter analyses presidential activism in Estonia (weak presi-
dency; indirect presidential elections) and Poland (powerful presidency; direct presiden-
tial elections). The fourth chapter juxtaposes presidential activism in Hungary (powerful 
president; indirect election) and Slovakia (weak president; directly elected). It also dis-
cusses the effects of changing the mode of presidential election from indirect to direct 
elections in Slovakia in 1999. The analysis of presidential vetoes largely confirms the 
expectations of my theoretical framework. Through the combination of my interview 
results, presidents’ justifications for their vetoes and parliamentary records as well as a 
great number of secondary sources I am able to demonstrate the causal links between 
presidential activism and the majority of my independent variables. While not all epi-
sodes can show the effect of each variable, the analysis consistently suggests a number 
of additional factors for the explanation of presidential activism. The analysis of presi-
dential activism in government formation and dismissal likewise produces valuable and 
very interesting results. Apart from Poland, presidential activism in this area is very ra-
re. Furthermore, the analysis gives strong reasons to doubt the reliability of the share of 
non-partisan ministers as an indicator for presidential activism – Polish presidents most 
frequently installed trusted co-partisans in government, whereas Hungarian presidents 
have evidentially never become active in government formation despite over 30% of 
cabinet members being non-partisans. 
 
Part III: Synthesis of results – understanding presidential activism 
The third part of the thesis integrates the results of the quantitative and qualitative anal-
ysis of presidential activism and subjects them to a final comparative assessment (fifth 
chapter) before proceeding to the conclusion. 
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The synthesis of results confirms the overall importance and explanatory power of 
the variables included in the statistical analysis and produces five key findings. First and 
foremost, it is shown that the mode of presidential elections matters fundamentally for 
presidential  activism.  The  regression  models  as  well  as  the  qualitative  case  studies 
showed that popular elections are associated with an increase in presidential activism 
irrespective of other factors and there is strong evidence that the reasons for this are ad-
equately described by the theoretical framework. Second, the relationship between pres-
ident and cabinet and the parliamentary strength of the government emerge as the most 
reliable predictors of presidential activism that relate to the political environment. Alt-
hough there is some evidence that their effects are weakened by intra-governmental di-
visions and exceptionally high veto override thresholds, this does not affect the general 
results. Third, parliamentary fragmentation and the size of presidents’ support base in 
parliament only become relevant in combination with specific constitutional stipulations 
or when they interact with the government’s seat share. Fourth, from the additional ex-
planatory factors suggested by the qualitative analysis, the divisions within and between 
government parties appears to be the most promising. Although this factor, too, only 
becomes relevant in interaction with the governmental seat share it significantly in-
creases the explanatory power of the theoretical framework and should be included in 
future studies. Finally, the analysis finds no clear patterns regarding the influence of 
president-centred factors. While there is some evidence suggesting that they have the 
potential to contribute to understanding and explaining presidential activism, more re-
search based on strong theory is needed before these explanations can effectively be in-
corporated into a more general theoretical framework. 
The conclusion summarises the findings of this study and relates them to the existing 
body of research on presidents and presidential activism in parliamentary and semi- 
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presidential systems. The contributions of the study and its implications are discussed 
and an agenda for future research on presidential activism that builds on the results of 
and data collected for this thesis is presented. 
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PATTERNS OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVISM 
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1 
EXPLAINING PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVISM 
 
Studies of presidential activism in Europe and the United States generally employ very 
similar explanatory approaches. Despite the differences between regime types authors 
have  generally found the same independent  variables  to  be significant  predictors  of 
presidential activism. Until now both strands of the literature have not been used to in-
form each other, although the combination of insights promises to improve the under-
standing of presidents’ use of their powers. The incorporation of scholarship on the 
American president helps to fill gaps in the literature, particularly with regard to Euro-
pean presidents’ activism in legislative affairs which remains understudied, and helps to 
lay a stronger foundation for the formulation of a coherent and parsimonious theoretical 
framework.
13 
This chapter discusses the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the use of 
presidential powers and presents a new theoretical framework for the analysis of presi-
dential activism in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. The review of the liter-
ature is generally focussed on comparative cross-country studies, yet also includes find-
ings from  relevant case studies. It shows that explanations for presidential activism 
based on institutional variables and changes in the political environment are generally 
not only better developed on a theoretical level but also  tend to find greater empirical 
support than those relying on presidents’ individual characteristics. Nevertheless, as-
sumptions about presidents’ motivations are often implicit and hypotheses are frequent-
                                                 
13 The application of American concepts on other political systems is not new. Studies of divided gov-
ernment (Elgie 2001) and political leadership (e.g. Helms 2005; Sebaldt and Gast 2010) have shown that 
the combination of insights from different political systems can greatly enhance the understanding of the 
respective phenomenon.   
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ly  not  part  of  a  unified  approach.  My  theoretical  framework  attempts  to  take  these 
shortcomings into account and thus is built on a careful and explicit definition of presi-
dential motivations. Based on these and the insights gained from the preceding review 
of the literature, I develop a new and coherent theoretical framework for the explanation 
of presidential activism and formulate eight hypotheses which will guide the analysis in 
the remainder of this study. Last, I discuss potential limitations of my approach and 
their implications for this study. 
 
1.1  Studies of presidential activism in the U.S. and Europe 
Scholarship on U.S.-American presidents has traditionally been conducted in the form 
of biographical and psychological analyses of previous office-holders (e.g. George and 
George 1956; George 1974; Hargrove 1966; 1993; Barber 2009). Authors thereby ad-
vanced a variety of situational factors or individual characteristics of office holders to 
explain presidential behaviour in office. The activities of European presidents were (and 
still  are)  usually  discussed  as  part  of  country-specific  case  studies  (Hartman/Kempf 
1989; Elgie 1999a; Protsyk 2004; Haspel et al. 2006; Elgie and Moestrup 2008a; Neto 
and Lobo 2009; Hloušek 2013a). Alternatively, scholars gave general overviews of the 
politics of individual presidents, whereby most works focus on post-communist presi-
dents (Simpson 1996; Taras 1997; Zubek 1997; Millard 2000; Dieringer 2005; Kim 
2013). The systematic explanation of presidential activism and empirical testing of hy-
potheses is a relatively new development in this subfield of study. In the U.S., empirical 
studies mostly focussed on the interactions between president and Congress, and most 
prominently  on  the  use  of  vetoes  (Lee  1975;  Rohde  and  Simon  1985;  Hoff  1991; 
McCarty and Poole 1995; Shields and Huang 1995; 1997; Gilmour 2002; Kelley and 
Marshall 2009). Empirical studies of European presidents on the other hand usually  
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dealt  with  presidents’  role  in  intra-executive  conflict  (Protsyk  2006;  Sedelius  2006; 
Sedelius and Ekman 2010) and with their involvement in government formation (Neto 
and  Strøm  2006;  Tavits  2008;  Schleiter  and  Morgan-Jones  2009b;  2010).  Although 
there is some work on presidents’ decree powers (Protsyk 2004; Haspel et al. 2006) and 
the aforementioned case study literature takes all types of powers into account, the focus 
usually lies on the more widespread reactive presidential powers. 
The following review of the literature is structured by the distinction between ‘presi-
dency-centred’  and  ‘president-centred’  explanatory  factors.  Presidency-centred  ap-
proaches explain presidential activism by referring to constitutional features and chang-
es in the political environment which alter the costs and benefits associated with differ-
ent paths of action. President-centred approaches focus on the president as an individual 
and assert that presidents’ personalities and individual abilities rather than outside fac-
tors are decisive for presidential activism (Gilmour 2002, 198). This distinction has 
been  established  in  the  American  literature  (Hager  and  Sullivan  1994;  Shields  and 
Huang 1995; 1997; Gilmour 2002), yet it is flexible enough to accommodate a variety 
of explanatory variables irrespective of the political system. 
 
1.1.1  Presidency-centred explanations 
Presidency-centred explanations see presidential activism as a function of the institu-
tional setting and resulting outside pressures (Gilmour 2002, 198); they rely on rational 
choice theory and – although rather implicitly – on the rational choice variant of institu-
tionalist theory (Peters 1999; Shepsle 2006; Moe 1993; 2009). A common assumption is 
therefore  that  presidents  and  other  political  actors  act  rationally  and  are  utility-
maximizing. Presidents are constrained in their actions by the institutional setting and 
their activism is determined by factors that lie outside their control. Variations in the  
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political environment impact presidents’ utility function and create different incentives 
for activism. Thus, it is assumed that ‘most presidents would behave similarly in similar 
contexts’ (Hager and Sullivan 1994, 1081). Equally implicit is the assumption that pres-
idents will always be active and use their powers in their interest. Nevertheless, no 
agreement exists on the nature of the exact motivation underlying presidential behav-
iour. Scholars have often assumed that presidents are motivated by either office or poli-
cy (Tavits 2008, 35). However, research on both European party leaders (Strøm and 
Müller 1999) and the American president (Aldrich 1993; Sinclair 1993) has shown that 
assuming a single motivation is difficult and that actors should rely on a combination of 
goals (see also Neto and Strøm 2006). Changing assumptions about presidential motiva-
tions should invariably change hypotheses about the use of presidential powers. Unfor-
tunately, research on this important issue is still very limited and hindered by the fact 
that not all authors make their assumptions about presidents’ motivations explicit. 
 
Constitutional factors 
Constitutional factors present the first group of independent variables commonly used in 
presidency-centred explanations. These factors are inherent in the political system and 
are usually laid down in constitutions or organic law. Due to high hurdles to change 
them, they are relatively stable, i.e. factors can vary over time, yet they typically remain 
constant for periods of several years. In the following, I will discuss three main sub-
groups – the mode of presidential election, presidential powers, and the electoral cycle. 
 
Mode of election 
The mode of election presents the most prominent constitutional factor. It is traditional-
ly argued that directly elected presidents are more active than their indirectly elected  
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counterparts. This assumption is commonly justified by arguing that directly elected 
presidents  enjoy  greater  legitimacy  (Duverger  1978;  1980;  Metcalf  2002;  see  also 
Tavits  2008). The legitimacy-argument was  already  advanced by Maurice Duverger 
(1978; 1980) who argued that indirectly elected presidents were ‘without legitimacy 
comparable to that of deputies’ (Duverger 1978, 29; translation by the author). Popular-
ly elected presidents on the other hand have their own source of legitimacy and can 
therefore act more independently. This assumption is shared by most of the later work 
on presidents (Linz 1990; Shugart 1993; Bunce 1997; Elster 1997; Elgie 1999a; Metcalf 
2002; Siaroff 2003; Protsyk 2005a).
 However, the mechanism through which increased 
legitimacy should increase presidential activism is not always clear. Several authors ar-
gue that directly elected presidents are more active because they think that their powers 
are falling short of representing the prominent position they and their office occupy in 
the polity (Baylis 1996; Elster 1997; Lijphart 1999; Protsyk 2005a). According to Tavits 
(2008), this argument is insufficient as the electoral mandate of directly elected presi-
dents  ‘is  still  tied  to  the  specific  constitutionally  prescribed  tasks  of  the  president’ 
(Tavits 2008, 33). Asserting that presidents’ paths of action are constrained by constitu-
tional stipulation would conform to the assumptions underlying presidency-centred ap-
proaches. However, while constitutions may define when presidents can make use of 
some powers (e.g. the dismissal of the Prime Minister after a vote of no-confidence in 
parliament) they still enjoy some discretion (e.g. appointing the candidate proposed by 
parties or proposing somebody else). Furthermore, there are typically no restrictions on 
how often office holders can use other powers, such as the presidential veto, judicial 
review requests or legislative initiatives. Thus, even though the stipulation of specific 
tasks will determine certain patterns of authority
14 within a political system, it does not 
                                                 
14 This is a notion shared by the majority of definitions of regime types that take presidential powers into  
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necessarily affect levels of presidential activism. Moreover, constitutional regulations 
are rarely definite so that political actors can still have considerable room for manoeu-
vre in their actions (de Raadt 2009). 
A related group of arguments relies on the logic of principal-agent models to model 
the greater independence of popularly elected presidents from parliament and govern-
ment. Although they are not all directly concerned with presidential activism as an ef-
fect of such independence, Tavits (2008) argues that it presents a way to formalise the 
traditional argument. Depending on their mode of election, presidents are either agents 
of parliament or the voting population and depend on these different principals for re-
election (Elster 1997, 227; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b, 667, 670; Samuels and 
Shugart 2010, 26-30). Based on this logic, indirectly elected presidents should be less 
active and confrontational with parliament and government in order to ensure their re-
election.  Directly  elected  presidents,  on  the  other  hand,  lack  these  constraints  and 
should be more active, e.g. by confronting the government on unpopular policies, in or-
der to maintain the approval of the public and thereby ensure their re-election (Elster 
1997, 227; Tavits 2008, 33f). Tavits (2008) contends that the weakness of the approach 
lies in the fact that both directly and indirectly elected presidents usually serve fixed 
terms and are difficult to impeach, meaning that they enjoy a similar degree of inde-
pendence. She furthermore asserts that due to non-concurrent elections ‘the assembly 
that puts an indirectly elected president into power is not the same assembly that de-
cides on his or her reappointment’ (Tavits 2008, 34f). As indirectly elected presidents 
can therefore not be ‘punished’ for being active, it is difficult to apply principal-agent 
models. However, this critique does not take into account that large majorities are need-
ed to elect a president by parliament as well as the low degree of turnover in parliamen-
                                                                                                                                               
account (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1993; Krouwel 2003; Siaroff 2003).  
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tary membership. Presidents need the support of several parties (which do not necessari-
ly have to be part of the governing majority) to be elected. When the parliamentary 
composition changes, it is likely that the alliance of parties that elected a president in the 
first place still disposes of enough votes for a re-election (or at least enough seats to 
block the election of another candidate). Furthermore, legislative turnover – at least in 
European democracies – tends to be relatively low (Mattland and Studlar 2004) so that 
even if the partisan composition of parliament changes between elections, a majority of 
MPs  would  still  participate  in  both  initial  election  and  re-election.  Thus,  indirectly 
elected presidents still risk punishment by the assembly just as directly elected presi-
dents can be denied re-election by the general electorate. The principal-agent model also 
offers an additional way of explaining differences between the activism of directly and 
indirectly elected presidents. Elster (1997) argues that parliament has a strong incentive 
to elect a ‘weak’ (less ambitious or influential) president as it will expect less interfer-
ence from such a candidate. Continuing the argument one might assume that popularly 
elected presidents are chosen by voters on the basis that they promise a more active in-
volvement in legislative and executive affairs. Differences in the activism of directly 
and indirectly elected presidents should thus exist based on different criteria for agent-
selection. 
Unfortunately, hardly any empirical tests of the various arguments concerning the 
mode of presidential election exist as many scholars have taken the effect of direct pres-
idential elections for granted (see Tavits 2008, 7-8). Until now, tests have been limited 
to a selection of comparative case studies (Tavits 2008) and studies of presidents’ influ-
ence  and  involvement  in  the  formation  of  European  governments  (Neto  and  Strøm  
2006; Tavits 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b). Neto and Strøm (2006) argue 
that Prime Ministers will always prefer co-partisans (or representatives of their coalition  
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partners) as cabinet members. Presidents on the other hand will not always prefer parti-
san cabinet members. When presidents are not able to appoint candidates from their 
own party to cabinet posts or when they want to appeal to a wider range of voters than 
those of the government coalition, non-partisan ministers present a way to solve intra-
executive conflicts over government composition. Due to the fact that popularly elected 
presidents are independent from the assembly, they can rather afford to intervene in the 
government formation process than their indirectly elected counterparts. The legitimacy 
of a directly elected president is also higher than the legitimacy of the Prime Minister 
(who is elected by parliament), which is assumed to give the president more influence 
over government composition. Direct elections should thus lead to more presidential 
involvement and a higher share of non-partisan ministers (Neto and Strøm 2006, 634). 
Neto and Strøm (2006) find direct presidential elections to be significantly and posi-
tively associated with presidential interference in government formation. Schleiter and 
Morgan-Jones’ (2009b) analysis of party control of European cabinets corroborates Ne-
to and Strøm’s (2006) findings as their descriptive statistics show that presidents’ influ-
ence over government composition appears to be greater under semi-presidentialism. 
Tavits (2008) expands the data set and runs a model with covariates similar to Neto and 
Strøm (2006). In her analysis, however, the variable for direct elections does not reach 
statistical significance (see also discussion in the next section). As Tavits (2008, 57) al-
so notes herself, a great problem with these analyses is that not the actual involvement 
of presidents in the government formation process is used as a dependent variable. The 
share of non-partisan ministers measures the success of assumed (i.e. not directly ob-
served) presidential interference in government formation, rather than actual activism; it 
is not possible to ascertain whether the presence of non-partisans in cabinet is due to 
presidential activism or other factors. Therefore and because of the divergence between  
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Tavits’ (2008) findings from the results of Neto and Strøm (2006) and Schleiter and 
Morgan Jones (2009b) there is a need to test the effect of the mode of presidential elec-
tion on presidential activism with different and more adequate data.  
 
Presidential powers 
A  second  argument  about  constitutional  features  and  presidential  activism  concerns 
presidential  powers.  With  regard  to  the  aforementioned  analysis  of  presidential  in-
volvement in government formation, Tavits (2008, 46) argues that presidents are more 
active the more powers they have been granted. Tavits (2008) tests this hypothesis by 
including different measures of presidential power by Metcalf (2000) and Siaroff (2003) 
into her statistical models and finds her argument confirmed as presidential power is 
positively and significantly associated with  a larger share of non-partisan ministers. 
However, there are several problems with this argument and the tests performed. First, 
the argument made is close to being tautological as more powers naturally lead to a 
higher number of incidents of presidential activism. Second, Neto and Strøm (2006) on-
ly argue that more formal prerogatives will increase presidents’ leverage in the bargain-
ing process and thus also the share of non-partisan ministers, whereas Tavits (2008) 
equates  this  success  with  activism  and  the  use  of  presidents’  powers.  Third,  Tavits 
(2008, 53) herself concedes that directly elected presidents are usually more powerful 
than their indirectly elected counterparts.
15 Although the coefficient for popular ele c-
tions does not reach statistical significance when variables on presidential powers are 
dropped from her model, (Tavits 2008, 53) this does not sufficiently disprove the effect 
of direct elections on the actual use of presidential powers. Finally, both measures of 
presidential powers used by Tavits (2008) measure more than just the number of pow-
                                                 
15 This has also been the result of a number of other studies (e.g. Metcalf 2002; Strohmeier 2010).  
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ers. Scores derived from Metcalf’s (2000) scheme also mirror respective limitations on 
the use of particular powers, yet it is possible that these specific stipulations have inde-
pendent effects on presidential activism or interact with other variables.
16 Furthermore, 
Siaroff’s (2003) scores  are not only based on constitutional stipulations but also on 
prevalent political practice. As this inevitably also includes the level of presidential ac-
tivism, they are not particularly suited as explanatory variables. 
 
Electoral cycle 
A third group of constitutional factors is related to the electoral cycle. Although early 
parliamentary elections can be called in all European democracies, the regular length of 
parliamentary terms is determined by the constitution and presidential terms are fixed. 
In European democracies non-concurrent elections are the norm; i.e. presidential and 
parliamentary elections are held at different times and coincide only infrequently (Prot-
syk  2005b).  Protsyk  (2005b)  argues  with  regard  to  government  formation  in  semi-
presidential systems that the temporal sequence of presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions can explain the extent of presidential leverage over the government formation pro-
cess and their activity in it. The more recently elected body will claim to have ‘political 
superiority’ based on a ‘fresher legitimacy’ and therefore dominate the process. Schlei-
ter and Morgan-Jones (2009a) adopt a similar reasoning for explaining early govern-
ment termination by assuming that fresh legitimation will increase presidents’ bargain-
ing power and result in a higher likelihood of termination. Their statistical analysis only 
shows a statistically significant effect for directly elected presidents which they explain 
by arguing that the governing majority usually elects an indirectly elected presidents 
                                                 
16 Tsebelis and Rizova (2008) for instance look more closely at the stipulations guiding the use of presi-
dential vetoes in post-communist countries. However, as their aim is to show under which conditions 
presidents can become conditional agenda setters, they do not give any indication of when presidents are 
more likely to use their powers.  
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and elections thus ‘reflect the parliamentary balance of powers rather than changing it’ 
(Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009a, 508). Nevertheless, they only use a dummy varia-
ble to control for the presence of the president’s party in government (which does not 
reach statistical significance), not if the election of the president was supported by the 
government majority. With regard to the use of decrees by Ukrainian and Russian pres-
idents, Protsyk (2004) argues that presidents should be more active shortly before and 
after presidential elections, yet his results do not unequivocally support his hypotheses. 
Haspel et al. (2006) on the other hand find that Russian presidents use their decrees 
more frequently before presidential elections as presidents try to use them to pass legis-
lation benefitting their electorate. 
A number of studies of the American president have also used the electoral cycle to 
explain presidential activism. Authors have argued that presidents should veto more 
frequently in election years in order to highlight differences between parties (Rohde and 
Simon 1985, 404) and because presidents’ nationally-oriented agenda will clash with 
the more constituency-oriented concerns of members of Congress engaged in the elec-
tion campaign (Shields and Huang 1997, 437). This effect has generally been confirmed 
for mid-term elections, yet not for years of presidential elections (Rohde and Simon 
1985; Woolley 1991; Shields and Huang 1995; 1997). McCarty (1997) shows that there 
is a possibility that presidents will not veto bills in the first months of their term (‘hon-
eymoon period’). Presidents have strong incentives to use their veto early in their in or-
der to build a reputation that would allow them to extract concessions in the future. 
However, Congress will anticipate this motivation and refrain from passing bills that are 
objectionable to the president in the first months; only later will more controversial bills 
be put on the legislative agenda (McCarty 1997, 2-3). The findings from American and 
European studies do not entirely coincide, yet it becomes apparent that the electoral cy- 
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cle needs to be incorporated into explanations of presidential activism. Abovementioned 
studies of presidential activism in the United States only use dummy variables for elec-
tions years. However, unlike in the United States elections in parliamentary systems do 
not always take place in regular intervals and at the same time of year, and electoral cy-
cles vary from country to country. It would therefore seem reasonable to use a measure 
of the closeness of the next election rather than dummy variables. 
 
The political environment 
The group of factors relating to the political environment encompasses a broader variety 
of variables than constitutional factors. This group mainly consists of variables relating 
to the constellation of parties in parliament, government and presidency and the respec-
tive strength and resources of political actors. Environmental factors change more fre-
quently than constitutional factors – usually on a monthly and sometimes even weekly 
basis – and variations lie outside the immediate control of the president. They also rep-
resent the main focus of explanations in both the U.S.-American and the European con-
text. Even Margit Tavits’ (2008) political opportunity framework – the hitherto only 
attempt to create a general theoretical account of presidential activism in parliamentary 
and semi-presidential systems – is based on such environmental factors. Although she 
argues that the effect of constitutional factors (in particular the mode of election) is 
eclipsed by the political environment, her approach presents a useful basis to review 
environmental factors and discuss factors used in other studies that fall into this catego-
ry. In the following, I will therefore first present Tavits’ (2008) political opportunity 
framework and then discuss other frequently used independent variables. 
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The political opportunity framework and other environmental factors 
Margit Tavits (2008) builds her opportunity framework on the logic of studies of intra-
executive conflict and proposes a more general, rather than power-specific explanation 
of presidential activism. She argues that variations in environmental factors – the rela-
tive ‘strength of other political institutions and the constellation of political forces in 
government and parliament’ (Tavits 2008, 35) – determine the level of consensus be-
tween the president and other institutions and thereby create opportunities for presidents 
to make use of their powers. The lower the consensus between president and govern-
ment or parliament, respectively, ‘the greater the incentive and opportunity for presi-
dents to assert their influence’ (Tavits 2008, 36). Thereby, Tavits (2008, 35) assumes 
that presidents are motivated by policy. Thus, presidents have the greatest incentive to 
become  active  during  cohabitation  when  presidential  and  government  policy  prefer-
ences are the least likely to coincide. On the other hand, presidents should have less or 
no incentive for activism when they face no partisan opposition in government and/or 
parliament. Incentives for presidential activism also arise when parliament and govern-
ment are weakened. Fragmented or minority governments will have greater difficulties 
to organise a majority against the president, which makes activism more likely. The 
same logic applies to a highly fragmented parliament – the higher parliamentary frag-
mentation, the more difficult it is for parties to coordinate resistance against presidential 
activism and presidents will use this opportunity to become active. 
Tavits (2008) finds most of the expectations of the political opportunity framework 
confirmed in her own analysis, i.e. the analysis of the share of non-partisan ministers 
and a selection of country case studies. While she argues that political opportunities will 
eclipse any effect of the mode of election (Tavits 2008, 35), the effects of her environ-
mental variables have also been included in other empirical studies that do not share this  
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assumption. In the aforementioned studies of presidential involvement in government 
formation, Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009b) and Neto and Strøm (2006) argue that 
cohabitation, defined as a situation when the presidential party is not part of the gov-
ernment, should result in a higher share of non-partisan ministers (and thus presidential 
involvement) as neither Prime Minister nor president are able to appoint their most pre-
ferred candidates. However, when the presidential party is part of the government, this 
conflict ceases to exist or at least minimises. In their analysis of presidential vetoes and 
decrees in Russia, Haspel et al. (2006) similarly argue that presidents should be less ac-
tive when the policy difference between president and the median legislator is small. 
Some authors have also assumed that fragmentation of parliament should influence the 
share of non-partisan ministers but disagree on whether it should increase or decrease it. 
Similar to Tavits (2008), Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009b; 2010) argue that frag-
mentation should increase presidential involvement in government formation because it 
is more difficult for parties to act collectively and form a government. Neto and Strøm 
(2006) on the other hand assert that high parliamentary fragmentation decreases activ-
ism in government formation as this makes it less likely that a new coalition will form 
to  replace  the  incumbent  Prime  Minister.  The  results  of  the  empirical  analyses  are 
mixed – Tavits (2008) finds that fragmentation is negatively associated with the share of 
non-partisan ministers, yet it increases the share according to Schleiter and Morgan-
Jones (2009b; 2010), and Neto and Strøm (2006) find no statistically significant effect 
of fragmentation. In contrast, all authors find that minority government significantly 
increases presidential involvement as it weakens the government’s ability to withstand 
activism. 
Unfortunately, these studies do not generally discuss problems associated with the 
definition of cohabitation and non-partisan presidents. The authors use a dichotomous  
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differentiation so that every a situation in which the president’s party is not part of the 
government is automatically seen as cohabitation – even when the president is not affil-
iated with a political party. Typically, non-partisan presidents will neither fully oppose 
nor support the government but take a neutral position. The relationship between the 
government and a non-partisan president can therefore not be determined by default but 
has to be established for each case individually. A threefold distinction of president 
government relations that adds a ‘neutral’ category would appear more precise and sen-
sible. 
Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010) and Neto and Strøm (2006) also include a varia-
ble for the existence of recession in their models. They argue that both presidents and 
Prime Ministers will then place a higher value on government efficiency and engage in 
less confrontational behaviour. Moreover, Neto and Strøm (2006) also include variables 
for electoral volatility and the number of parties in government in their model. They ar-
gue that electoral volatility is positively associated with activism as Prime Ministers 
grow uncertain about their re-election. Therefore, they are expected to try to avoid intra-
executive conflict and rather give in to the president’s demands. Likewise, activism 
should increase with the number of parties in the government as this, too, increases the 
Prime Minister’s uncertainty about re-election. Tavits (2008) on the other hand argues 
that analogously to the effect of fragmentation on parliament’s ability to withstand pres-
idential activism, fragmentation of the cabinet should increase presidential activism be-
cause it weakens the government. These three factors are very much focussed on ex-
plaining the success of presidential activism in government and it is not clear to what 
extent they apply to  presidential  activism in  the area of legislation. Particularly the 
working mechanisms of electoral volatility and economic recession are not easily ob-
servable and more tests should be conducted to verify the theoretical claims associated  
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with them. Finally, Tavits (2008) also finds that parliamentary fragmentation and cabi-
net fragmentation are correlated so that it needs to be considered to what extent it may 
be useful to include both measures in the same model. 
 
Environmental factors in the American literature 
The American literature has identified very similar environmental factors to explain 
presidential activism. Furthermore, there is a stronger focus on the actual use of powers 
(mostly the presidential veto) so that results might be more applicable given the defini-
tion of presidential activism adopted in this study. Scholars have found that partisan op-
position in Senate or House is positively and significantly associated with the use of ve-
toes and argue that this is because it increases the likelihood of legislation being passed 
which is opposed by the president (Gilmour 2002; Lee 1975; Rhode and Simon 1985; 
Shields and Huang 1995; 1997). Applying the same logic it is argued that a larger seat 
share of the presidential party increases the likelihood that bills passed by Congress co-
incide  with  presidential  policy  preferences,  thus  decreasing  the  number  of  vetoes 
(Rhode and Simon 1985; Shields and Huang 1995; 1997). This is largely similar to the 
arguments made by Tavits (2008), Neto and Strøm (2006) and Schleiter and Morgan-
Jones (2009b) about the effects of cohabitation. Similar to Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 
(2010) and Neto and Strøm (2006), several authors have included variables on the state 
of the economy. However, the empirical support for this hypothesis as well as for an 
assumed influence of the existence of military conflict – which is argued to divert presi-
dents’ attention from domestic politics – has been mixed and often fails to reach statisti-
cal significance (Gilmour 2002; Lee 1975; Rhode and Simon 1985; Shields and Huang 
1995; 1997). Finally, several studies use presidential popularity as an additional inde- 
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pendent variable related to the political environment.
17 Increased popularity is argued to 
give presidents more leverage when negotiating with Congress and helps them to shape 
policy in accordance with their interests. The assumption that popular presidents should 
therefore be less active is confirmed by some studies (Rhode and Simon 1985; Wooley 
1991; Shields and Huang 1995; 1997), yet others argue that a different direction of ef-
fect exists (Groseclose and McCarty 2001). Groseclose and McCarty (2001) show that 
instead of low public approval causing more vetoes, vetoes of major bills can decrease 
presidential popularity. Popularity could theoretically also be used as an independent 
variable in the European context; nevertheless, due to the different institutional structure 
the popularity of the government as the second (and typically dominant) executive actor 
would need to be taken into account.
18 
 
1.1.2  President-centred explanations 
President-centred explanations are often presented as the rival explanation to presiden-
cy-centred  accounts  (Hager  and  Sullivan  1994;  Shields  and  Huang  1997;  Gilmour 
2002). Assuming that presidents have relative broad discretion in their actions, these 
explanatory approaches focus on the person/personality of presidents, their background 
and individual abilities (Hager and Sullivan 1994). Contrary to presidency-centred ex-
planations, president-centred accounts do not usually claim supreme explanatory power. 
They acknowledge that structural and institutional factors can limit presidential deci-
sion-making  and try to  understand in  how far  presidents  can still a be independent 
‘leaders’ instead of ‘clerks’ (Neustadt 1980), i.e. act discretionarily instead of merely 
responding to outside pressures and demands. Due to their less exclusive and less theo-
                                                 
17 Presidents cannot ‘choose to be popular’ (Gilmour 2002, 207) so that popularity has to be seen as a 
factor beyond their control rather than a president-centred variable. 
18 A few case studies of Central and East European presidents also refer to the p opularity of presidents 
(Jasiewicz 1997; Cholova 2013; Toomla 2013) yet only Jasiewicz (1997) links it with activism. He i m-
plies that the activism of Polish president Wałęsa led to a decrease in his public approval.   
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rised approach, it is difficult to outline president-centred explanations as such. Scholars 
rely on varying sets of president-related variables in an attempt to account for variation 
that cannot be explained by environmental factors. In the following, I will discuss these 
variables in three groups – presidential background, personality/character, and presi-
dents’ perceptions of their office. Variables from the former two categories are more 
frequently used to explain presidential activism in the U.S., whereas the latter is almost 
exclusively used to account for European presidents’ behaviour in office. Nevertheless, 
variables are still partially interconnected across groups, creating a certain overlap. 
 
Presidential background 
A number of authors advance presidents’ professional and political background as ex-
planations for presidential activism. Lee (1975) argues with regard to presidential vetoes 
in the U.S. that presidents should be less active if they previously served as members of 
Congress. On the one hand, former Congressmen and Senators are more familiar with 
the workings of the legislature and can influence legislation informally. On the other 
hand, Congress might be more likely to anticipate the demands of one of its former 
members, thus decreasing the amount of objectionable legislations. Furthermore, Lee 
(1975) asserts that former governors should be more active as they are accustomed to 
using their veto powers more frequently. Similarly, Hager and Sullivan (1994) argue 
that political experience should decrease presidents’ public activities. This is because 
political insiders are rather able to reach informal agreements, whereas ‘outsiders’ need 
to resort to activism to get what they want (Hager and Sullivan 1994, 1082f). Finally, 
Lee (1975) hypothesises that Democrats as presidents should veto more frequently than 
Republicans as the latter typically hold ‘the belief that law-making should be left to the 
Congress’ (Lee 1975, 532). Lee (1975) finds his hypotheses on Democrats as presidents  
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and Congressional experience confirmed, yet his results also show that former gover-
nors did not veto more frequently than others. Hager and Sullivan’s (1994) research 
does not show the expected effects – the ‘outsiders’ in their sample (presidents Carter 
and Reagan) were not significantly more active than other office holders. 
In the European context, Baylis (1996) points out that different personal backgrounds 
possibly contributed to intra-executive conflicts in the early years of democratisation in 
CEE. Presidents such as Havel in the Czech Republic and Wałęsa in Poland had been 
prominent members of the democratic opposition and therefore felt more legitimised 
than Prime Ministers with less political experience and/or a lower public profile. Baylis 
(1996) also mentions Wałęsa’s working-class background in connection with his activ-
ism, but does not elaborate on the connection. Pradetto and Weckmüller (2004) also use 
presidents’ social background, education and political experience to highlight differ-
ences between post/communist office holders. However, as their work is only descrip-
tive and the categories they devise are also based on presidents’ behaviour in office, it 
would be difficult to derive hypotheses on presidential activism from it. 
 
Presidential personality and character 
President-centred accounts of presidential activism frequently argue that all presidents 
generally differ in their likelihood to use their powers because of their (unique) person-
ality. The latter is assumed to be influenced by factors such as their childhood and up-
bringing, professional background or the aforementioned political experience (Hargrove 
1993; Hager and Sullivan 1994; Shields and Huang 1995; 1997; Gilmour 2002; Barber 
2009). The most prominent approach in this regard is  Barbers’ (2009) work on the 
‘character’ of American presidents. Barber (2009) argues that presidents’ performance 
in office can be predicted on the basis of their socialisation and experience in child- and  
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early adulthood. He proposes a fourfold distinction that distinguishes presidential char-
acters on an active-passive dimension (high vs. low energy commitment to their work) 
and a positive-negative dimension (high vs. low personal/emotional value attached to 
political work (Barber 2009, 8-10). Unfortunately, Barber does not relate his work to 
other authors and the general scholarly debate (Edwards 2009b, vi-vii) and fails to fully 
explain the mechanisms of effect. Furthermore, as his aim is to predict which candidates 
would be ‘good’ presidents in the future, rather than presidential activism, it is difficult 
to derive testable hypotheses. 
Hager and Sullivan (1994) include dummy variables for the different combinations 
of character types in their statistical model of presidents’ public activities (whereby they 
assume that the ‘active’ and ‘positive’ types will be more active) as well as for individ-
ual presidents. However, they find that presidential activity can better be explained by 
presidency-centred variables. Other empirical tests of the effects personality/character 
of American presidents are typically limited to dummy variables for individual presi-
dents. Coefficients usually only reach statistical significance when they are included in 
interaction terms with presidency-centred variables (e.g. approval ratings or the unem-
ployment rate) and even then no president is consistently found to have been signifi-
cantly more active (Hager and Sullivan 1994; Shields and Huang 1997; Gilmour 2002). 
As Tavits (2008) also notes, apart from the lacking empirical evidence a problem of us-
ing presidents’ personality as an explanation for activism is that these are at risk of be-
ing ‘tautological unless the concept of “personality” is restricted to certain traits’ (Tavits 
2008, 135). In the European context presidential ‘character’ or ‘personality have only 
rarely been used to explain presidential activism. In their study of Hungarian presidents 
Dobos, Gyulai and Horv￡th (2013) argue that presidents’ personalities can explain dif- 
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ferences in activism, yet fail to elaborate on the mechanisms of effect or define the dif-
ferent character traits they mention. 
 
Presidential perceptions of their role 
Presidents’ perceptions of their office, i.e. how they perceive their role and its limita-
tions, are one of the most prominent president-centred factors used by studies of Euro-
pean presidents. Perceptions are assumed (albeit often implicitly) to be influenced by 
presidents’ background and character so that this concept partly overlaps with the two 
previous categories. 
Baylis (1996) asserts that ‘[r]ather than ideology, what seems to be critical [for their 
behaviour in office] is how presidents perceive their role’ (Baylis 1996, 308). He argues 
that the activism of the first generation of presidents in CEE was influenced almost as 
much by the perceptions they held of their office (based on background and personality) 
as by constitutional stipulations. Similarly, other authors also use presidents’ percep-
tions (or conceptions – terms are used interchangeably) of their office to account for 
their  activism  (e.g.  Linz  1997;  Wolchik  1997;  Gallagher  1999;  Kristinsson  1999; 
Frison-Roche 2007; McMenamin 2008). McMenamin (2008) for instance writes that 
Polish president ‘Lech Wałęsa had a politically hyperactive conception of the presiden-
cy’ while his successor Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s conception of the office was ‘con-
sensual and strategic’ (McMenamin 2008, 125). Wolchik (1997) on the other hand uses 
V￡clav Havel’s ‘dual conception of the function of the president’ (Wolchik 1997, 174) 
to explain his behaviour in office. 
The aforementioned studies mostly use perceptions as a complementary explanation 
to account for presidential activism that is left unexplained by presidency-centred fac-
tors (yet also sometimes takes previous activism into account). Unfortunately, authors  
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do not specify the origin and exact nature of presidential perceptions or do not show to 
what extent they interact with presidency-centred factors (or potentially eclipse them). 
Furthermore, perceptions are almost exclusively advanced as part of country- or presi-
dents-specific case studies. Apart from Baylis (1996) they are not used in comparative 
work which makes the development of general hypotheses more difficult. Finally, as 
presidents’ perceptions are likely also based on constitutional stipulations (such as the 
mode of election or the powers vested in the presidency), their effect might effectively 
be absorbed by these presidency-centred factors.  
 
1.1.3  Summary 
The above discussion has shown that both the European and American literature have 
identified fairly similar or at least reasonably compatible explanatory factors to explain 
presidential activism. Presidency-centred factors are generally better developed on a 
theoretical level and enjoy greater empirical support, whereas president-centred expla-
nations still suffer from a lack of a strong theoretical foundation which makes the for-
mulation of testable hypotheses difficult. The most frequently used indicator of presi-
dential activism – the share of non-partisan ministers – does not measure presidential 
activism but rather the success of assumed presidential intervention and the different 
studies that use it do not always produce the same results. Apart from a few exceptions 
the actual use of presidential powers by European presidents has not been studied be-
yond country- or president-specific case studies. Thus, several hypotheses – most prom-
inently  the  assumption  that  popularly  elected  presidents  are  more  active  than  those 
elected by parliament – have not been satisfactorily tested yet. Work on the presidential 
activity in the United States has demonstrated that the use of presidential vetoes is a  
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more direct indicator for activism; vetoes are also consistently well-explained by presi-
dency-centred variables across different studies. 
In the light of these findings it appears that presidency-centred factors offer a more 
promising  basis  for  the  development  of  a  theoretical  framework.  Thereby,  Tavits’ 
(2008) political opportunity framework presents the most useful starting point due to its 
more general, rather than powers-specific approach in explaining presidential activism. 
Nevertheless, as her argumentation with regard to the effect of popular presidential elec-
tions is not as convincing as rivalling accounts, considerations about the effect of con-
stitutional factors need to be revised. 
 
1.2  A unified theoretical framework of presidential activism 
Explanations of presidential activism are still underdeveloped and there is a need for a 
new, coherent theoretical framework that explains the use of presidential powers. Until 
now, explanations in the U.S.-American context resemble a patchwork rather than a co-
herent theoretical framework as authors use a number of explanatory factors which are 
well-substantiated individually but not derived from or embedded in basic assumptions 
about  presidents’  motivations.  With  regard  to  European  parliamentary  and  semi-
presidential system, well-formulated explanations focus only on the success of the (as-
sumed) use of presidential powers during government formation (Neto and Strøm 2006; 
Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b; 2010) and thus not on presidential activism per se. 
Finally, the only more general explanatory framework (Tavits 2008) excludes constitu-
tional factors entirely, although they have been shown to be important predictors of 
presidential activism in other studies. Nevertheless, the review of the literature has still 
demonstrated that presidential activism can at present be best explained by constitution-
al stipulations and the political environment. Factors related to the president as an indi- 
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vidual – although popular – do not lend themselves particularly well to theorising and 
enjoy as yet only limited empirical support. 
The explanatory framework I propose therefore builds on these presidency-centred 
factors and unites them into one coherent approach. Hereby, my assumptions build on 
rational institutionalist theory (Peters 1999; Shepsle 2006) and I use Tavits’ (2008) po-
litical opportunity framework as the central building block. The resulting theory does 
not attempt to explain every presidential action but is limited to the explanation of the 
discretionary use of formal presidential powers by the president.
19 Furthermore, it is 
restricted to democratic parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Finally, as men-
tioned above the literature on proactive presidential powers (i.e.  those that presidents 
can use without any restrictions) is still very limited so that my focus in this section will 
be to explain the use of the more common reactive powers of presidents. Nevertheless, I 
will also consider potential differences for proacti ve powers where appropriate.  Alt-
hough necessary to retain a certain degree of parsimony and to allow for the develo p-
ment of hypotheses that can be tested with available data, these choices naturally i m-
pose some restrictions on the applicability and accuracy of this explanatory framework. 
In the following, I will first present the basic theoretical assumptions and mechanisms 
underlying my theoretical framework. In a second step, I will then outline presidential 
motivations to become active in more det ail and formulate a set of eight hypotheses 
which will be the focus of analysis in this study. Last, I discuss potential limitations of 
my approach and its implications for this study. 
   
                                                 
19 For the reasons outlined in the introduction, my focus will thereby lie on the actual use of powers rather 
than on threats or public declarations to use them. See also section 1.3 ‘Discussion: Scope and limita-
tions’ in this chapter.  
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1.2.1  Rationality, individual goals and relative importance of explanatory factors 
In accordance with most other scholars of American and European presidential studies, 
I assume that presidents  are rational  and utility-maximizing actors. This  means  that 
faced with the choice of several courses of action, they will always chose the option that 
fulfils their individual goals most effectively (Laver 1997, 20). Therefore, I assume that 
individuals’ decision to run for the presidential office and incumbents’ behaviour in of-
fice is the outcome of cost-benefit calculations by the respective political actors. Actors 
thus seek to increase their personal utility outside of as well as within the institution of 
the presidential office (Peters 1999, 49). Yet, in order to determine the costs and bene-
fits presidents attribute to certain paths of action, it is necessary to analyse the nature 
and strength of their underlying motivations. 
 
Presidential goals and motivation 
In determining their course of action, presidents do not attempt to realise one goal alone 
but are driven by combination of different, partially competing goals which they pursue 
with varying intensity. Hereby, they can value their goals either intrinsically, i.e. for 
their own sake, or instrumentally as a means to achieve an intrinsically valued goal (La-
ver 1997, 25). As Müller and Strøm (1999) show with regard to party leaders, politi-
cians’ goals can be subsumed under three categories – votes, office and policy. Due to 
its proven usefulness and parsimony and its similarity to approaches used explicitly or 
implicitly in American scholarship (e.g. Aldrich 1993; Sinclair 1993), I adopt their cat-
egorisation for the purpose of my study with some modifications. Accordingly, I also 
assume that presidents  cannot pursue all goals  with maximum intensity but have to 
make trade-offs between the different goals. Müller and Strøm (1999) conceptualise this 
relation between the goals as a three-dimensional space in which each goal is represent- 
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ed as one dimension (Figure 2). Consequently, the importance presidents attach to these 
goals and thus the intensity with which they pursue them can vary. Nevertheless, in 
congruence with Müller and Strøm (1999) I assume that presidents value each goal at 
least to a minimal extent. As I will show below, in the political contexts to which this 
theoretical framework is applicable this variation is above all tied to the possibility of 
re-election of the president. The consequences of this variation for how and when presi-
dents use their formal powers on the other hand are dependent on whether the president 
is elected directly or indirectly. 
 
Source: Müller and Strøm (1999, 13). 
Müller and Strøm’s framework was developed to analyse the behaviour of parties and 
explain the motivations of party leaders who strive for governmental or parliamentary 
office. These positions allow for continuous re-election whereas – at least in the Euro-
pean context – incumbency of the presidency tends to be limited to two consecutive 
terms or two terms overall (Köker 2013). The framework therefore needs be adapted as 
the goal to win as many votes as possible in the next election can only be applied to the 
first presidential term. A more general goal, which applies to both presidential terms, is 
presidents’ popularity with their respective electorates, i.e. the public for directly elected 
Figure 2: Range of feasible party behaviours 
Office  Policy 
Votes 
B  C 
A  
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presidents and deputies for indirectly elected presidents. In the first term, popularity-
seeking behaviour is primarily aimed at gaining a sufficient number of votes in the next 
election. During the second term or when incumbents do not seek re-election, popularity 
improves presidents’ bargaining position vis-à-vis the government and/or parliament. 
While the American literature shares the assumption that popularity increases presi-
dents’ bargaining weight (Rhode and Simon 1985; Shields and Huang 1995; 1997), it 
should be noted that this mechanism works differently for directly and indirectly elected 
presidents. Popularly elected presidents court the same electorate that decides about the 
composition of parliament and – in effect – government. The president’s leverage thus 
results from the government’s and parliament’s fear of punishment by the electorate if 
they do not give into the demands of a popular president. Conversely, if a president is 
unpopular their bargaining weight decreases as government and parliament have less or 
no incentive to cooperate with them. Indirectly elected presidents on the other hand will 
attempt to act in conformity with the expectations of deputies (particularly during the 
first term). If parliament or government then support certain presidential actions it is as 
a reward for previous and incentive for future behaviour in accordance with the assem-
bly’s or the government’s wishes. Based on the above assumptions, presidential terms 
and term limits then influence the relative importance that presidents place on populari-
ty, office, and policy as follows. 
Popularity with respective electorate. Presidents always and exclusively value this 
goal  instrumentally  as  it  either  enables  them  to  stay  in  office  (given  they  seek  re-
election) or gives them leverage to implement their preferred policies.
20 In their first 
term in office, presidents will mainly stress the vote-gaining aspect of popularity. Dur-
ing a second term, however, the vote-seeking motive ceases to apply and presidents will 
                                                 
20 Similarly, Müller and Strøm (1999, 11) also assume that ‘votes’ can only be an instrumentally valued 
goal.  
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attempt to fulfil the expectations of their respective electorates in order to implement or 
at least influence certain policies. Directly elected presidents will fulfil the expectations 
of the public to increase their leverage, whereas indirectly elected presidents should be-
have in accordance with deputies’ expectations to improve relations with the assembly 
and thereby gain greater room for manoeuvre. Thereby, the intensity with presidents 
pursue popularity with their electorates slightly decreases from the first to the second 
term. This is because in the first term, popularity is valuable to presidents with regards 
to both re-election and policy-implementation, yet in the second term only with regards 
to the latter.  
Office. Contrary to popularity with the electorate, presidents’ office-motivation can 
be both intrinsic – to enjoy the spoils of office
21 for the longest time possible  – or in-
strumental as a means to further influence policy. In the first term, the instrumental and 
the intrinsic motivations are fairly balanced. In the second term, office overall loses its 
importance for presidents as re-election is no longer possible. Thereby, the intrinsic mo-
tivation remains relatively strong due to the fact that the spoils of office are still the 
same. The instrumental motivation, however, decreases in the second term as continued 
influence over policy can only satisfy an intrinsic motivation and not yield any more 
votes.
22 
Policy. While I have assumed that presidents can be instrumentally as well as intrin-
sically office-seeking, I argue that presidents will always value policy intrinsically to a 
considerable extent (which does not exclude that policy is in addition also valued in-
                                                 
21 These include material gains such as remuneration and other privileges (residence, office, official car 
etc.) as well as non-material benefits, e.g. prestige and guaranteed public attention. 
22 Owing to the high visibility of the presidential office, the opportunities for post -presidency spoils (e.g. 
book contracts, speaking engagements etc.) should be largely the same for presidents serving one term  or 
two terms. Pensions and other privileges of retired presidents also tend to be unaffected by the number of 
terms served in office. However, one can assume that presidents will still prefer ‘in-office’ spoils of a 
second term over ‘post-office’ spoils due to their policy motivation and the benefits mentioned in the pre-
vious footnote. 
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strumentally). This, together with the spoils of office can explain why political actors 
would join an institution which does not allow them unlimited re-election in the first 
place. Consequently, the overall value presidents place on policy should remain stable 
between terms as it is only the degree to which presidents value (and use) policy in-
strumentally that decreases. 
 
The relative importance of explanatory factors 
Before turning to the more specific hypotheses on presidential activism, I will briefly 
outline  the  relative  importance  of  my  explanatory  factors  and  how  their  underlying 
mechanisms gear into each other. I assume that presidential activism – defined as the 
discretionary use of formal presidential powers by the president – is influenced by con-
stitutional provisions and the political environment. The constitutional/institutional or-
der of a state – particularly the relationship between president, government, and parlia-
ment as well as the powers these institutions hold vis-à-vis each other – is only rarely 
amended in a fundamental way. It tends to be relatively stable for the majority of Euro-
pean countries and several years pass between amendments (Elkins, Ginsburg and Mel-
ton 2009). As such, constitutional provisions can be assumed to account for a general 
‘baseline’ of presidential activism, i.e. an overall relative frequency with which presi-
dential powers are used under different constellations of provisions. In contrast to con-
stitutional features, factors relating to the political environment vary more frequently, 
most of them even on a weekly or monthly basis. As such, changes in the political envi-
ronment create more specific opportunities for presidents to become active (see also 
Tavits 2008). These changes either enable presidents to either make use of their own 
increased influence and/or bargaining power or exploit the weakened position of other 
political actors, i.e. parliament and government. Opportunities also arise from the vary- 
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ing level of consensus between the institutions and depending on said level presidents 
will either use their powers or stay inactive. Thus, variations in the political environ-
ment determine the more particular conditions (in addition to the ‘baseline’ factors) un-
der which presidents use their powers. 
My theoretical framework defines presidents as rational, utility-maximising actors 
who are motivated by popularity with their electorate, office and policy. Given the same 
set of constitutional and environmental factors they should perform similar cost-benefit 
calculations and ‘behave similarly in similar contexts’ (Hager and Sullivan 1994, 1081). 
This represents a presidency-centred perspective and thus assumes that there should be 
little variation due to factors related to individual office-holders. Nevertheless, given the 
popularity of president-centred factors in part of the literature I will still follow Har-
grove’s (1993) suggestion here and assess at a later point in my analysis ‘whether per-
sonality  adds  to  the  understanding  of  [presidents’]  behaviour’  (Hargrove  1993,  86). 
While this assessment will not be able to fully gauge the explanatory power of presi-
dent-centred factors, it will provide sufficient insights to point out whether and in what 
ways the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter or future studies could benefit 
from including them. 
 
1.2.2  Hypotheses on presidential activism 
In the following, I will present my central assumptions and hypotheses about the use of 
formal presidential powers by presidents. For the sake of parsimony this will not in-
clude all possible factors mentioned in the literature review but only those which appear 
most relevant and where the mechanism of effect emerges or can be derived from the 
assumptions made above. Nevertheless, a number of selected variables will still be giv-
en consideration in the qualitative part of this study. I will also discuss potential further  
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limitations of my approach and their implications for this study in a designated discus-
sion section after the presentation of my hypotheses. As in my literature review, the fol-
lowing argument and presentation is divided into constitutional and environmental fac-
tors. 
 
Constitutional factors 
Constitutional factors present the baseline determinants of presidential activism. I will 
include two groups of constitutional factors in my theoretical framework – the mode of 
presidential elections and terms and the electoral cycle. 
 
The mode of presidential election and presidential terms 
The mode of election of the president is the most important ‘baseline’-factors of presi-
dential activism. As shown above, popularly elected presidents are often assumed to be 
more active due to their increased independence and/or legitimacy. Tavits (2008) argues 
that its effect is eclipsed by variations in the political environment; however, neither the 
existence nor the lack of such an influence of the mode of election has been convincing-
ly demonstrated yet. Furthermore, explanations that argue that direct elections matter 
for presidential activism (Elster 1997; Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-
Jones 2009b) make an overall more convincing point, especially when complemented 
by the above considerations on presidential motivations. As posited by principal-agent 
models, I assume that popularly elected presidents enjoy greater independence from par-
liament and government and do not have to fear any ‘punishment’ when confronting 
them (Elster 1997; Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b; Samuels 
and Shugart 2010, 26-30; see also Duverger 1978). Moreover, they do not only have the 
possibility to be more active than their indirectly elected counterparts but also a certain  
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duty. It appears plausible that people elect them with the expectation that they play an 
active part in politics and directly presidents thus need to be active to show their com-
mitment to the promises made during the electoral campaign.
23 In order to remain popu-
lar with their electorate, directly presidents will thus become active and use their formal 
powers. As outlined above, the pursuit of popularity with the public is essential to d i-
rectly elected presidents both in their first term (to be re-elected) and in the second term 
(to increase their bargaining weight when confronting parliament and gover nment). In 
contrast, indirectly elected presidents do not usually have an explicit policy programme 
prepared which they need to implement in order to be re -elected (Tavits 2008, 139f). 
Also, indirectly elected presidents are faced with different expectations than their popu-
larly elected counterparts when dealing with their electorate. As they are elected by par-
liament, it is expected that they refrain from interfering in the assembly’s work and can-
didates are chosen under the premise that they remain inactive (Elster 1997). Similarly 
to directly elected presidents, however, indirectly elected presidents will also try to fulfil 
voter expectations during their second term in office as the thereby gained popularity 
improves their position vis-à-vis parliament and government. By introducing popularity 
with the electorate as a motivation for presidential behaviour the logic of principal-agent 
models can thus be fully applied to presidential activism. From this follows the first hy-
pothesis: 
H1: Directly elected presidents are more active than indirectly elected presidents. 
 
Another important baseline factor for presidential activism are presidential terms in 
office. I argue here that presidential terms have a similar effect on directly and indirect-
ly elected presidents and assume in particular that they will be more active in their first 
                                                 
23 Unfortunately, there is no comparative research on such voter expectations in semi-presidential systems 
yet. However, Jalali (2012) shows that the incumbency advantage of directly elected presidents is often 
partially attributed to the fact that they can use their powers to win voters.  
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term in office than in a second term. However, the mechanisms and strategies underly-
ing this behaviour are not the same but partially differ with regard to the mode of presi-
dential elections. As argued above, popularly elected presidents need to be active and 
use their powers in order to appeal to their electorate. It is sensible to assume that in or-
der to ensure re-election incumbents will not only try to retain popularity among those 
who elected them in the first place but they will also attempt to appeal to a wider audi-
ence (see also Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b, 667). Yet in their second term, popu-
larity among the electorate loses its importance and is now only used to increase presi-
dents’ bargaining weight. Furthermore, in their pursuit of policy presidents now do not 
need use their formal powers as often as in their second term. This is because presidents 
value policy in their second term almost exclusively intrinsically. Rather than using 
their powers to appeal to a wider range of voters, they will limit their activism to in-
stances where they personally care about policy. 
Indirectly elected presidents have to appeal to their electorate as well; yet as I have 
shown above, they face other expectations from their voters than their directly elected 
counterparts. Nevertheless, indirectly elected presidents also show a higher degree of 
activism in their first term than in their second term in office. As presidential terms are 
usually longer or at least non-concurrent with the parliamentary election cycle the com-
position of the assembly and the majority situation is likely to change during a presi-
dent’s term in office (Tavits 2008). To ensure re-election, indirectly elected presidents 
thus need to appeal to all possible electors in the assembly – not only to those who 
elected them in the first place. By using their formal powers, presidents can direct atten-
tion to their own policy positions and their closeness to specific parties. Furthermore, 
incumbents can use activism to gain popularity in the general public. At the end of the 
first term this becomes an important resource as government and parliament fear pun- 
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ishment by their respective electorate in case they do not re-elect a popular president. In 
a second term in office, indirectly elected presidents will be significantly less active as 
they no longer need to worry about their re-election. Similarly, presidents’ predominant 
intrinsic policy motivation is also satisfied by using their powers only then when they 
personally care about certain policies. 
Hence: 
H2: Presidents are less active in their second term than in their first term in office. 
 
The electoral cycle 
A further important constitutional factor in determining presidential activism is the tim-
ing of parliamentary and presidential elections. Authors generally agree on the effect of 
parliamentary elections, yet arguments about the effect of presidential elections are less 
clear. In both cases only dummy variables are used to test these effects, yet as already 
mentioned a continuous variable would promise better results. In the American and Eu-
ropean context it is argued that presidents should be more active as parliamentary elec-
tions approach. This is because presidents want to highlight policy differences between 
parties (Rohde and Simon 1985, 404) and because presidents can claim ‘fresher legiti-
macy’  in  comparison  with  parliament  (Protsyk  2005b;  Schleiter  and  Morgan-Jones 
2009a). Furthermore, presidents might attempt to exploit that deputies are occupied with 
the election campaign and that the limited number of parliamentary sessions will de-
crease the likelihood of a veto override.
24 These arguments have been confirmed in em-
pirical analyses and their logic applies irrespective of presidents’ mode of election or 
the political system. Therefore, my third hypothesis reads as follows: 
H3: Presidents become more active in the run-up to parliamentary elections.   
                                                 
24 In some countries presidential vetoes can also not be overridden after parliamentary elections which 
puts further time constraints on parliament.  
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The effect of presidential elections on presidential activism is less clear and empiri-
cal findings are mixed. Rohde and Simon (1985) argue that American presidents should 
be more active towards the end of their term as there would be greater conflict between 
the pan-national interests of the president and the local interests of individual legisla-
tors. However, they find that presidents veto significantly less in years of presidential 
elections than during mid-term elections. McCarty (1997) on the other hand argues that 
American presidents veto less in the beginning of their term due to a ‘veto honeymoon’. 
For parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, Schleiter and Morgan Jones (2009a) 
argue that fresher legitimacy of a president will increase the likelihood of government 
termination due to presidential interference but only find an effect for directly elected 
presidents.  
A  ‘honeymoon  period’  (McCarty  1997)  appears  less  likely  in  parliamentary  and 
semi-presidential systems; not the president but the government is the dominant execu-
tive actor and also typically holds a majority in parliament so that deputies will not hold 
back legislation that is unfavourable to the president. Nevertheless, presidents still have 
the same incentive as in a presidential system to build a reputation for vetoing in order 
to extract concessions later on (Cameron 2009, 376). This would lead to higher activism 
in the beginning of the term, which would also coincide with the argument about ‘fresh-
er’ legitimacy made above. Towards the end of their term presidents will be less active 
as – due to non-concurrent elections – parliament and government will have been elect-
ed more recently. Furthermore, towards the end or their first term, directly elected pres-
idents will likely be occupied with their re-election campaign and therefore be less ac-
tive. Irrespective of their mode of election, presidents will also be less active to appeal 
to a larger number of voters or deputies. Indirectly elected presidents will try to present 
themselves as supra-partisan candidates to receive the required super-majority for elec- 
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tion. Directly elected presidents on the other hand must usually anticipate a second 
round of voting and then need to appeal to those voters whose candidate did not make it 
into the second round. This is easier if they do not veto policy that is favoured by the 
voters of their opponents. As argued above, presidents will generally be less active dur-
ing a second term in office – their legitimacy is less ‘fresh’ and they increasingly con-
centrate on enjoying the spoils of office. Thus they should also become less active in the 
run-up to presidential elections the end of their second term when re-election is no long-
er an option. 
H4: Presidents become less active in the run-up to presidential elections. 
 
The political environment 
With regard to the influence of environmental factors on presidential activism, my theo-
retical  framework  builds  on  the  political  opportunity  framework  by  Margit  Tavits 
(2008). According to Tavits (2008), presidential activism is determined by political op-
portunities which are created through the relative ‘strength of other political institutions 
and [the level of consensus between institutions determined by] the constellation of po-
litical forces in government and parliament’ (Tavits 2008, 35; insertion by the author). 
Hereby, she argues that activism should generally increase when consensus is low and 
other institutions are weak. In contrast to Tavits (2008), I do not assume that these fac-
tors eclipse the effect of the mode of election but argue that elections and the political 
environment both determine presidential activism. Furthermore, I argue that presidents 
derive benefit from the use of their powers not only when their activism is successful, 
e.g. a veto is not overridden or a legislative initiative is accepted. Due to the fact that the 
use of formal powers is visible to the public, presidents also use their powers when the 
failure is foreseeable in order to send messages to their respective electorate (and in the  
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case of indirectly elected presidents also the general public). The benefit derived from 
activism that failed to achieve its ultimate goal is considerably lower; therefore, there 
should be significantly less activism under unfavourable circumstances, yet presidents 
will not cease to be active entirely. 
 
The strength of parliament and government 
The relative strength of parliament and government influences presidential activism by 
altering  president’s  chances  of  success  when  using  their  powers.  The  strength  and 
weakness of parliament is usually measured by the degree of fragmentation, with great-
er fragmentation indicating parliamentary weakness (Tavits 2008; Schleiter and Mor-
gan-Jones 2009b). Authors thereby argue that higher fragmentation will increase presi-
dents’ use of their powers as it increases parties’ coordination costs and they are less 
likely to muster a majority to withstand activism. While the literature review has shown 
that the results of empirical studies with regard to fragmentation are mixed, authors 
agree that it should play a role for the use of presidential power and must be controlled 
for. Furthermore, fragmentation might be more salient in the use of presidents’ legisla-
tive powers than in government formation. Hence: 
H 5: Presidents are more active when parliamentary fragmentation is high.  
 
Similarly to the weakness of parliament, the weakness of government is assumed to 
lead to more presidential activism. Typically, governmental strength is operationalised 
as the size of the seat share and whether governments hold a majority of seats in the as-
sembly (Neto and Strøm 2006; Tavits 2008). If the government is in the minority it is 
considered weak as it will struggle to muster a majority against presidential actions. 
This in turn increases presidents’ chances of success and creates opportunities to be-
come active. Nevertheless, a division between minority/majority governments might be  
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too simple. A very large seat share of the government might be a greater deterrent for 
the president just as  a  particularly small seat  share  will further increase presidents’ 
chances of success. Therefore, I posit the following: 
H 6: Presidents are more active when the government’s seat share is small. 
 
The constellation of partisan forces 
The constellation of partisan forces in parliament, government and the presidency influ-
ences the degree to which these institutions/their representatives agree on policy (Tavits 
2008). The level of policy consensus between institutions can thus explain when presi-
dents attempt to block policies or initiate policy change themselves. The two most im-
portant factors here are the relationship between president and government and the size 
of presidents’ support base in parliament. 
When the president’s (preferred) party is part of the government or when there is a 
significant overlap in the ideological orientation of government and president (in case 
the  latter  is  an  independent),  consensus  between  president  and  government  is  at  its 
highest. Both executive actors agree on most policies and presidents have only little in-
centive to become active as their policy preferences are already being implemented. 
Presidential activism becomes more likely if the presidents’ party is not part of the gov-
ernment and when the ideological differences between president and government be-
come greater. This lowers the consensus between actors and presidents have an incen-
tive to become active. This argument has not only been made by Tavits (2008) but is 
also used by Neto and Strøm (2006) as well as Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009b). 
The American literature, too, has found that partisan opposition in House or Senate in-
creases the likelihood of presidential vetoes (Lee 1975; Rhode and Simon 1985; Shields 
and Huang 1995; 1997; Gilmour 2002). From this follows:  
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H 7: Presidents are most active during cohabitation, less often when relations with the 
government are neutral and least often when relations are unified. 
 
Consensus between president and parliament on the other hand is linked to the size 
of the presidents’ support base in parliament. Studies of the American president have 
argued that a larger seat share of the presidential party in either chamber of Congress 
increases the likelihood of legislation being passed that is favourable to the president. 
According to a logic similar to the one presented above, activism decreases as with an 
increasing presidential seat share as presidents’ preferences are already being imple-
mented without their interference (Rhode and Simon 1985; Shields and Huang 1995; 
1997). Although the American two-party system simplifies the mechanism of effect, it 
can still be assumed that a larger seat share of the president’s party will reduce presiden-
tial activism in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Presidents can influence 
bills at earlier stages of the legislative process through their party and thereby ensure 
compatibility with their own objectives rather than only reacting to policy after it has 
been passed. Therefore I argue that: 
H8: Presidents are more active if their party’s seat share is small or if they have no 
parliamentary support base. 
 
Additional considerations for proactive powers 
The hypotheses formulated above have focussed on explaining the use of powers that 
presidents use in reaction to actions by other actors. These powers are more common 
and I could thus rely on a greater amount of literature to build my theoretical frame-
work. The use of presidents’ proactive powers (such as legislative initiatives) is still un-
derstudied and the fact that only few presidents are vested with such powers makes the 
formulation of hypotheses difficult. Nevertheless, except for the hypotheses H7 and H8  
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all  considerations  should  also  apply  to  pro-active  powers.  The  relationship  between 
president and government as well as the size of presidents’ seat share should have the 
opposite effect on presidents’ use of these powers. Only if consensus between president 
and government and president and parliament is high will presidential initiatives stand a 
chance of being accepted and presidents should thus use their proactive powers more 
frequently under these conditions. Yet, given the lack of empirical evidence on this sub-
ject these considerations should be considered tentative and their empirical test as ex-
ploratory. 
Table 4: Summary of hypotheses 
Constitutional factors 
H1: Directly elected presidents are more active than indirectly elected presidents. 
H2: Presidents are less active in their second term than in their first term in office. 
H3: Presidents become more active in the run-up to parliamentary elections. 
H4: Presidents become less active in the run-up to presidential elections. 
Political environment 
H 5: Presidents are more active when parliamentary fragmentation is high.  
H 6: Presidents are more active when the government’s seat share is small. 
H 7: Presidents are most active during cohabitation, less often when relations with the government are 
neutral and least often when relations are unified.* 
H8:  Presidents are more active if their party’s seat share is small or if they have no parliamentary sup-
port base.* 
Notes: * The opposite should apply for proactive presidential powers. 
 
1.3 Discussion: Scope and limitations 
The theoretical framework developed above aims to explain the discretionary use of 
formal presidential powers by the president. It contains eight hypotheses that will guide 
the analysis in the remainder of this study. For the sake of parsimony and feasibility of 
subsequent testing, the framework could not consider all potential influences on presi-
dential activism and hypotheses present the ‘most likely’ effect of the variables in ques-
tion. While these choices therefore seem justified within the framework of this study,  
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they  also  impose  certain  limitations  whose  consequences  need  to  be  addressed  and 
acknowledged. Not all limitations can be easily counteracted. Nevertheless, the mixed-
methods design of this study promises to provide sufficient insights to gauge the extent 
to which these issues impact overall findings. 
My theoretical framework focusses on the use of seven ‘basic’ presidential powers 
which I identified based on the exisiting literature (Shugart and Carey 1992; Metcalf 
2002) and ‘reactive’ powers in particular. However, presidents can also become active 
using other powers.
25 While most other presidential powers can be classified as duties 
rather than actual powers (e.g. awarding state honours, appointing high-level state offi-
cials, announcing election dates) they still carry some potential for activism. The use of 
such powers as well as the refusal to perform such duties (or diverging in their perfor-
mance from established patterns) would arguably also qualify as activism.
26 Thus, there 
is a possibility that this study underestimates the total amount of activism . Should the 
use of these powers simply follow the assumptions of the theoretical framework about 
the variables’ effect on lower and higher activity and presidents use both types of pow-
ers side by side, this would not necessarily affect the validity of overall results as pat-
terns would still be the same. It would be more problematic if presidents used these ad-
ditional powers instead of the seven ‘basic’ powers considered in this study, or if presi-
dents, instead of being less active, simply used other powers when conditions are unfa-
vourable for the use of the ‘basic’ powers. These scenarios could lead to faulty conclu-
sions and impact the overall findings of this study. Nevertheless, it needs to be consid-
ered the vast majority of additional powers and responsibilities can be classified as reac-
tive and can only be used or refused when specific – and relatively rare - circumstances 
                                                 
25 For further powers see lists in Duveger (1978), Lucky (1994), McGregor (1996) and Frye (1997). 
26 Presidential speeches and types of action not defined in the constitution could theoretically also be add-
ed to this list. Nevertheless, stretching the term presidential activism so far as to include all presidential 
action would be undesireable as it would hinder the development of sound theory and the test of hypothe-
ses.  
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give them the opportunity to do so. Even if presidents wanted to, they cannot use these 
powers at any time they desire, reducing the potential to distort overall findings. Thus, 
although some potential for spurious conclusions exist which needs to be taken into ac-
count for the analysis, it should not excessively distort the overall findings. Further-
more, the qualitative case studies are likely to flag up problematic cases in this regard. 
My definition also classifies threats to use powers as presidential activism. Threats 
can be issued with varying degrees of intensity and sincerity and research on them in the 
context of European parliamentary and semi-presidential systems is limited to anecdotal 
evidence. Therefore, they are not included in my theoretical framework. While this limi-
tation seems justified here, it still holds the potential for skewing the eventual results of 
this study. Instead of actually using their powers, presidents might only threaten to use 
them (particularly their veto power as it has the highest threat potential) and thereby 
achieve their desired result. Particularly when constellations in the political environment 
are favourable to presidential activism, this might lead to superficially lower levels of 
activism although presidents are in fact very active.
27 A similar problem might exist 
when parliament and government – knowing that they cannot withstand presidential ac-
tivism – acquiesce to presidents’ wishes (e.g. by changing legislation) in anticipatory 
obedience. Furthermore, actors might strike informal deals to avoid the use of powers or 
presidents might decide not to become active in order to to be able to press concessions 
at another time. These problems cannot easily be counteracted in the statistical tests of 
my hypotheses and must be kept in mind when interpreting their results. Nevertheless, 
the qualitative case studies in the second part of this thesis can be expected to provide 
sufficient insights to assess the potential for underestimating presidential activism here 
as well as to revise the theoretical framework accordingly if necessary. 
                                                 
27 In particular, this might distort the effects of presidential and governmental seat shares and parliamen-
tary fragmentation.  
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Last, my framework currently assumes that all explanatory factors have an independ-
ent and constant effect. Yet, some interdependencies between variables might exist and 
considerations regarding these are not included in the theoretical framework. Neverthe-
less, for the sake of parsimony and following the logic of nested analysis (Lieberman 
2005) only a general theoretical framework is proposed at this stage. Insights from the 
qualitative part of this study can be used to further modify it if necessary at a later point 
 
1.4  Conclusion 
Presidents comprise the majority of heads of states in European democracies. Although 
presidential politics has been discussed more generally in a variety of country-specific 
case studies, the actual use of presidential powers is still understudied – particularly in 
comparative perspective. Drawing on insights from studies of presidential activism in 
the United States can help to structure and focus the discussion of relevant factors as 
well as to gain a better understanding of the factors that determine the use of presidents’ 
formal powers. Irrespective of the political system concerned, scholars have explained 
presidential activism using presidency-centred and president-centred approaches. The 
former focus on constitutional variables and the political environment and are generally 
better developed on a theoretical level while the latter focus on presidents as individuals 
and still suffer from a lack of a solid theoretical foundation. The theoretical framework 
that I have developed in this chapter therefore adopts a presidency-centred perspective. 
It assumes that the mode of presidential election, presidential terms and the electoral 
cycle present ‘baseline’ influences that determine general levels of presidential activ-
ism, while variations in factors related to the political environment – the constellation of 
partisan forces and the relative strength of institutions – create the more specific condi-
tions (in addition to the ‘baseline’ factors) under which presidents become active. Based  
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on these arguments I have formulated eight hypotheses (Table 4) on presidential activ-
ism in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Last, I discussed potential limita-
tions of the theoretical framework and their implications for this study. Some potential 
for underestimating the overall amount of presidential activism exists which cannot eas-
ily be counteracted in the statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the qualitative insights from 
the second part of this thesis can be expected to providue a sound basis for assessing the 
degree to which these issues impact the eventual findings of this study. The following 
chapters will test these using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The mixture of 
methodologies will help to show to what extent the hypotheses can explain larger pat-
terns in the use of presidential powers as well as specific instances of activism and in-
sights gained from the different methods will be used to improve upon this framework. 
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2 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
ACTIVISM IN LEGISLATION 
 
The empirical study of presidential activism has until now suffered from the fact that 
comparative and comprehensive data on the use of presidential powers– except for pres-
idential vetoes in the United States – was hardly available. Consequently, scholars had 
to  analyse  activism  using  descriptive  statistics  only  (often  confined  to  one  specific 
country; Protsyk 2004; Haspel et al. 2006; Krupavičius 2008; Neto and Lobo 2009; see 
also case studies in Tavits 2008 and Hloušek 2013a) or they made use of imperfect 
proxies which rather measured the success of assumed presidential involvement in gov-
ernment formation than actual activism (Neto and Strøm 2006; Tavits 2008; Schleiter 
and Morgan-Jones 2009b; 2010). The lack of appropriate data has made it very difficult 
to adequately test hypotheses on presidential activism and assess the importance of the 
various factors assumed to influence the use of presidential powers. In the chapter at 
hand, I will use an entirely new quantitative data set created specifically for this study to 
address these shortcomings. It contains data of unprecedented detail on the actual use of 
legislative presidential powers in nine Central and East European democracies between 
1990 and 2010 as well as the respective political conditions and institutional circum-
stances under which activism occurred. Building on this data set, I seek to address some 
of the deficiencies of earlier studies and provide one of the first comprehensive statisti-
cal, cross-country analyses of the actual use of presidential powers in parliamentary and 
semi-presidential systems. 
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The statistical analysis of presidential activism presents the first step of the nested 
analysis approach (Lieberman 2005). I test my hypotheses using large-N analysis to as-
sess the general applicability of my theoretical framework. The results lay the basis for 
the subsequent in-depth analysis and determine its focus, i.e. model-testing analysis if 
the results of the statistical models are robust and confirm the hypotheses and model-
building analysis if the hypotheses are not confirmed and alternative explanations are 
needed. In the following, I will first briefly describe my data set. Using descriptive sta-
tistics I will then provide a first overview of the use of presidential powers in Central 
and Eastern Europe and assess whether observable patterns of presidential activism ex-
ist. Building on these insights, I proceed to test my hypotheses in two steps. First, I will 
analyse the occurrence of presidential activism per month using count regression mod-
els. Second, I will use event history analysis to assess how the factors presented in my 
theoretical framework influence the length of time periods between the uses of powers. 
In both models, I mainly focus on the use of presidential vetoes as it is not only the most 
prominent but also the most frequently used power. The results of the statistical models 
confirm the majority of my hypotheses, so that the last part of the chapter is concerned 
with selecting cases for in-depth, model-testing analysis based on the predictions of the 
statistical models. 
 
2.1  A new data set of presidential activism 
The data set used in this chapter is one of the first cross-country collections of data on 
the actual use of presidential powers in European parliamentary and semi-presidential 
democracies.  Previous  analyses  of  presidential  activism  focused  on  president’s  in-
volvement in government formation and thereby used the share of non-partisan cabinet 
ministers as a proxy for activism (Neto and Strøm 2006; Tavits 2008; Schleiter and  
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Morgan-Jones 2009b; 2010). Nevertheless, this tends to be a very indirect measure of 
presidential activism as it measures the success rate of assumed involvement by the 
president rather than the actual use of powers. Consequently, data that captures the ac-
tual use of presidential powers is needed which is why the data set used in this study 
relies on the use of president’s legislative powers – the presidential veto, requests for 
judicial review and the right to introduce legislative initiatives. The use of these powers 
is always publicly documented and it can thus be easily determined when presidents 
were active.
28 Despite certain limitations imposed by the fact that not all presidents pos-
sess these powers (although they are still in the majority), dismissing them for that re a-
son (see Tavits 2008) would not be adequate. In contrast to almost all other presidential 
powers, the use of the legislative powers included in this study is always discretionary 
and never a ceremonial requirement. This makes them a valid and reliable ind icator of 
presidential activism, particularly in the sense of the definition adopted by this study. 
Finally, presidents can use their legislative powers at any point during their term in o f-
fice (or at least every time parliament passes a bill). Governments  are only formed on 
comparatively rare occasions and presidents’ discretion in using their non-legislative 
powers might thereby be severely restricted by election results and the composition of 
parliament. 
The  data  set  covers  nine  of  the  ten  Central  and  Eastern  European  EU  member 
states.
29 It contains data from the inauguration of the first democratically elected pres i-
dents in the early 1990s until the end of December 2010 for seven of these countries. 
Due to restricted data availability, only the presidency  of Georgi Parvanov (in office 
from 01/2002) is covered for Bulgaria. Also due to limitations on available and reliable 
                                                 
28 As discussed in the previous chapter (section 1.3 ‘Discussion: Scope and limitations’), it can unfortu-
nately not be excluded that presidents are active without actually using their powers (e.g. by the way of 
threats). 
29 Unfortunatley, Slovenia has to be excluded as the president does not possess any legislative powers.  
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data, the data set only contains information on the use vetoes by Romanian presidents 
since October 2004.
30 Despite these restrictions, the data set still contains 92% of its 
target observations and is thus more than sufficient to adequately test the hypotheses of 
my theoretical framework. For each month  – the smallest observational unit sensibly 
possible given variations in data availability and accuracy – during the period of obser-
vation the data set contains country-specific information on the use of each of the three 
presidential powers, president-Prime Minister pairings, the nature of the intra-executive 
relationship, the exact composition of parliament and government as well as the sizes of 
the governmental and presidential seat share, the closeness of parliamentary and presi-
dential elections, and the number of bills passed by parliament. The monthly specifica-
tion of each variable is a great improvement over other data sets (e.g. Volkens et al. 
2006; Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2006) which usually only specify these factors for 
the start of a legislative period or a particular cabinet and do not provide information 
about subsequent changes unless a new cabinet is formed. 
To guarantee a high degree of accuracy, data on the use of presidential powers, the 
number of bills passed by parliament and the composition of the legislature has been 
collected from primary sources, such as online databases of the respective parliaments 
and presidential offices, parliamentary publications, national law gazettes and reports of 
the parliamentary research offices. Secondary sources such as scholarly publications 
and newspaper articles have only been used to validate this data; in case of discrepan-
cies data was confirmed through contact with national parliaments and presidential of-
fices. Dates of presidential and legislative terms as well as the composition and duration 
                                                 
30 The Romanian president returns bills to either the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) or Senate (upper 
house) of parliament, depending on where they have been passed. The government is however only re-
sponsible to the Chamber of Deputies. In this chapter I will only take bills returned to the first chamber 
into account as the inclusion of bills returned to either Chamber – amongst others due to their different 
composition – would be difficult to model. While this underestimates the total number of vetoes by presi-
dent Basescu, the relative frequency with regard to legislation passed by parliament stays the same.  
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of particular governments are based on information from national governments’ web-
sites, the country-specific chapters in Ismayr (2010a) and the Political Science Data 
Yearbook. If not indicated otherwise, my examples of specific incidences of presidential 
activism  in  the  following  analyses  are  taken  from  this  data  set  and  based  on  the 
knowledge gained while assembling it. 
Table 5: Geographical and temporal coverage of the data set 
Country 
Mode of 
election 
Time period covered 
Monthly 
observations 
Total number of 
vetoes / review requests / initiatives 
Bulgaria  Direct  01/2002 – 12/2010  107  24  5  – 
Czech Republic  Indirect  01/1993 – 12/2010  215  75  11  – 
Estonia  Indirect  10/1992 – 12/2010  219  59  11  – 
Hungary  Indirect  08/1990 – 12/2010  245  39   37  3 
Latvia  Indirect  07/1993 – 12/2010  209  35  1  16 
Lithuania  Direct  10/1992 – 12/2010  214  175  2  149 
Poland  Direct  01/1991 – 12/2010  240  76  47  106 
Romania  Direct  05/1990 – 12/2010  246  25*  9  – 
Slovakia  Indirect  02/1993 – 05/1999  75  27  7  – 
Direct  06/1999 – 12/2010  139  168  4  – 
Total      1909  705  134  274 
Notes: ‘–’ means that the president does not have the respective power; * vetoes of legislation from the 
Chamber of Deputies during 10/2004 – 12/2010 only. 
 
2.2  Patterns of presidential activism 
Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that presidents in CEE made very different use of 
their powers, whereby some countries and incumbents seemed to be prone to presiden-
tial activism whereas others were not (Ismayr 2010b; Tavits 2008; Hloušek 2013b).
31 At 
least with regard to cross-country differences, this is corroborated by the data summary 
given in Table 5. However, the problem with evidence such as this is that it only relies 
on the number of instances of presidential activism. Tables as the one presented above 
suffice to describe very general patterns of presidential activism; yet, they do not allow 
for drawing inference about why such differences in the use of presidential powers ex-
                                                 
31 See also case studies in Taras (1997), Elgie (1999a), Elgie and Moestrup (2008a), Ismayr (2010a) and 
Hloušek (2013a).  
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ist. To do so, descriptive statistics of presidential activism must incorporate contextual 
factors such as the relationship between president and government to make them com-
parable within countries (as for instance in Krupavičius 2008; Tavits 2008; K￶r￶s￩nyi, 
Tóth and Török 2009) or between them. To increase the degree of comparability, I in-
troduce an additional variable that until now has almost only been used in the study of 
the U.S.-American president, i.e. the number of bills passed by parliament (Hoff 1991; 
Woolley 1991; Shields and Huang 1995; 1997; Sp￡č 2013). The use of reactive presi-
dential powers in the legislative arena is necessarily linked to the amount of legislation 
passed by parliament (Shields and Huang 1997, 440f). Presidents can only exercise their 
veto power or refer bills to the Constitutional Court when parliament passes legislation 
and forwards it to the president for signature. The amount of legislation passed by par-
liament is an important variable that needs to be considered as it varies not only greatly 
among countries but also provides a control for times when parliament is out of session 
(e.g. due to summer/winter recess or parliamentary elections). The use of legislative ini-
tiatives is not tied to any requirements, yet here the number of all legislative initiatives 
submitted to parliament provides an appropriate control. Unfortunately, detailed data on 
the number legislative initiatives is not available for Hungary, yet the following analysis 
will still incorporate them as far as possible. 
 
Country differences in the use of presidential powers 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the abovementioned variation in the use of presidential powers 
between countries. If one compares the percentage of legislation subject to presidential 
vetoes or requests for judicial review (Figure 3) no uniform pattern emerges at first 
glance. Directly elected presidents in Slovakia vetoed the highest amount of legislation 
in my sample; indirectly elected presidents in Latvia on the other hand vetoed least fre-
quently when taking parliament’s legislative output in account. Yet apart from these two  
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extremes, there are a number of countries with indirectly presidential elections where 
presidents used their power veto just as often as or even more frequently than their di-
rectly elected counterparts in other countries. Czech and Slovak presidents (the latter 
even independently from their mode of election) vetoed the highest percentage of legis-
lation. They are followed by Lithuanian and Polish presidents but then again the indi-
rectly elected presidents of Estonia and Hungary vetoed a higher proportion of bills than 
the presidents of Bulgaria and Romania.
32 
Figure 3: The use of vetoes and review requests by Central and East European presidents 
 
Notes: Data for Bulgaria refers to 01/2002-12/2010 only; veto data for Romania refers to legislation from 
the Lower Chamber during 10/2004 – 12/2010 only. 
Source: Own compilation   
                                                 
32 Note that data Bulgaria and Romania is incomplete and the numbers presented here are not as indica-
tive as for the other countries. 
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A similar lack of a coherent pattern can be found in the use of judicial review re-
quests. It appears that indirectly elected presidents refer a higher amount of legislation 
to Constitutional Court than their popularly elected counterparts, yet Polish presidents 
still requested review for the same percentage of bills as Hungarian presidents and indi-
rectly elected presidents in Slovakia. Country differences for the use of legislative ini-
tiatives (Figure 4) show an equally varied picture as there are great differences between 
countries. However, the directly elected presidents in Poland and Lithuania used their 
powers significantly more often than their indirectly elected counterparts in Hungary 
and Latvia. These differences between countries present part of the empirical puzzle 
that this thesis tries to explain. 
Figure 4: The use of legislative initiatives by Central and East European presidents 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Presidential activism and president-government relations 
The comparison above has not yet taken into account explanatory factors from my theo-
retical framework. The mode of election and the relationship with president and gov-
ernment are two of the most frequently used explanatory factors and in contrast to other 
variables (such as the electoral cycle) easy to include in cross-tables. For the following 
tables, I have divided the relationship between president and government into three cat-
egories – unified, neutral, and cohabitation – to give a better overview of president-
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political party represented in parliament or cut ties with their respective parties upon 
inauguration (Ismayr 2010b). Nevertheless, this does not mean that they were by defini-
tion opposed to the policies of the government, i.e. a differentiation between unified re-
lations and cohabitation only (which would classify any relationship involving a non-
partisan president as cohabitation) would be too simplistic. Periods of unified relations 
were only coded when the president’s party was part of the government or a president 
without party affiliation actively endorsed a given government and/or its policies. A 
neutral relationship was coded when the president’s party was not part of the govern-
ment but tolerated it or when a non-partisan president was at variance over certain top-
ics but not in opposition to each other. Cohabitation was coded when the president’s 
party was in opposition to the government or an independent president’s ideological 
orientation was strongly opposed to the position of the government. In case of doubt, 
the neutral category was chosen. Unfortunately, this means that there is a somewhat 
higher variance in this category with regard to the exact nature of president-government 
relations. Coding was based on the secondary literature on presidents in CEE and media 
reports. To avoid tautologies, coding decisions were solely based on presidents’ policy 
orientations rather than evidence from the use of their powers. 
Table 6: The use of vetoes by Central and East European presidents 
  Mode of election  Total 
Direct  Indirect   
  % of bills vetoed / vetoes per month (total) 
% of bills/ 
per month (total) 
President-
government 
relations 
Unified    1.58 / 0.36 (114)  1.01 / 0.16 (57)  1.33 / 0.25 (171) 
Neutral    5.06 / 0.97 (259)  2.18 / 0.24 (83)  3.83 / 0.56 (342) 
Cohabitation  3.49 / 0.52 (97)  3.08 / 0.35 (95)  3.28 / 0.41 (192) 
Total    3.11 / 0.61 (470)    1.87 / 0.24 (235)  2.55 / 0.41 (705) 
Source: Own compilation 
The presidential veto is – independently from the mode of election – by far the most 
frequently used presidential power (see Table 5). While the differences between coun-
tries still showed great differences, Table 6 clearly shows that directly elected presidents  
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vetoed a higher percentage of legislation than indirectly elected presidents. On average, 
directly elected presidents vetoed 3.11% of all legislation, whereas indirectly elected 
presidents only vetoed 1.87%. The fact that a comparison of monthly averages would 
have greatly overestimated the difference
33 highlights the importance of setting pres i-
dential vetoes in relation with parliament’s legislative output. This pattern also exists 
irrespective of the relationship between president and government – popularly elected 
presidents always use their veto more often than presidents elected by parliament. The 
relationship between president and government also appears to influence the use of ve-
toes. Indirectly elected presidents used their veto as expected most often during cohabi-
tation,  less  frequently  during  neutral  relations,  and  least  often  when  president-
government relations were unified. Veto patterns of directly elected presidents only mir-
ror expectations in so far as they issued the least vetoes during unified relations, yet 
more during neutral relations than under cohabitation. Although potentially indicative of 
the effect of other variables, this could also – at least in part – be ascribed to the adapted 
coding practice described above, where ‘neutral’ was chosen as a default category in 
case of doubts.
34 
Table 7: The use of judicial review requests by Central and East European presidents 
  Mode of election  Total 
Direct  Indirect   
 
% of bills subject to review / review requests 
per month (total number of review requests) 
% of bills/ 
per month (total) 
President-
government 
relations 
Unified    0.22 / 0.05 (24)  0.11 / 0.02 (6)  0.18 / 0.04 (30) 
Neutral  0.08 / 0.01 (5)    0.65 / 0.07 (25)  0.32 / 0.05 (30) 
Cohabitation    1.37 / 0.20 (38)    1.17 / 0.13 (36)  1.26 / 0.44 (74) 
Total    0.35 / 0.07 (66)    0.53 / 0.07 (67)    0.42 / 0.07 (134) 
Source: Own compilation   
                                                 
33 Directly elected presidents vetoed only 1.66 times more bills than indirectly elected presidents, yet a 
comparison of monthly averages would have suggested that directly elected presidents vetoed 2.54 times 
more often than their indirectly elected counterparts. 
34 Nevertheless, the qualitative analysis in the second part of this study should be able to provide more 
differentiated insights here which might not only improve interpretation of these results but could also be 
used to improve coding rules in the future.  
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Apart from vetoing legislation, all presidents in my sample can request the judicial 
review of bills by the Constitutional Court (Supreme Court in Estonia). Here the pat-
terns of activism are not as clear. Indirectly elected presidents requested review more 
often than directly elected presidents, yet once again follow expectations with regards to 
president-government  relations.  Directly  elected  presidents  requested  judicial  review 
most often during cohabitation, yet more frequently during unified relations than when 
president and government were on neutral terms. However, when the requests of direct-
ly  and  indirectly  elected  presidents  are  combined,  they  follow  general  expectations 
about the effect of consensus over policy between president and government. The fact 
that presidents – independently from their mode of election – exercised their right to 
request judicial review considerably less frequently than they used presidential vetoes 
shows a general difference between these powers. Vetoes can be justified by purely po-
litical and/or personal reasons and can be used for virtually any bill. However, a request 
for judicial review must be sufficiently substantiated with evidence that a bill violates 
the constitution (presidents in Estonia can only request judicial review once their veto 
has been overridden by parliament).
35 Finally, involving the Constitutional Court can be 
a great risk for presidents compared to a veto as Court rulings establish objectively 
which side is right or wrong. In contrast to an overridden veto, presidents cannot blame 
their political opponents but likely have to face greater criticism if their requests are re-
jected.    
                                                 
35 Not to mention that the amount of unconstitutional legislation passed by parliament can be expected to 
be relatively low. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal for instance declared less than 2% of all legislation 
passed between 1998 and 2010 as unconstitutional (Polish Constitutional Tribunal 2013; own calcula-
tions).  
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Table 8: The use of legislative initiatives by Central and East European presidents 
  Mode of election  Total 
Direct  Indirect   
 
Initiatives as % of all initiatives /initiatives per 
month (total number of initiatives) 
% of initiatives/ 
per month (total) 
President-
government 
relations 
Unified     1.38 / 0.63 (108)    n/a / 0.03 (7)      n/a / 0.29 (115) 
Neutral  0.62 / 0.55 (88)    n/a / 0.08 (9)    n/a / 0.35 (97) 
Cohabitation  1.27 / 0.48 (59)    n/a / 0.03 (3)    n/a / 0.27 (62) 
Total    0.96 / 0.56 (255)     0.16 / 0.04 (19)     0.71 / 0.30 (274) 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Not all constitutions grant presidents the right to submit legislative initiatives to par-
liament. Among the directly elected presidents, only the Lithuanian and the Polish pres-
idents are allowed to do so; indirectly elected presidents with the right to legislative ini-
tiative can be found in Hungary and Latvia.
36 The differences in the use of legislative 
initiatives by directly and indirectly elected presidents already became evident in Figure 
4 and are thus also reflected in the summary in Table 8. While initiatives by Polish and 
Lithuanian presidents accounted for close to 1% of all legislative initiatives, initiatives 
by Hungarian and Latvian presidents only represent 0.16% of all initiatives. Directly 
elected presidents used their power most often during unified relations as expected by 
my theoretical framework (initiatives are most likely to be accepted by parliament if the 
president’s policy position coincides with the governmental majority), but do not cor-
roborate it otherwise. This also applies to the use of initiatives by indirectly elected 
presidents, yet here the data only relies on 19 submitted initiatives so that it is difficult 
to draw sensible conclusions in any case. 
The descriptive statistics used in the first part of this chapter have shown that some 
discernable patterns of presidential activism exist, even though they are not as clearly 
visible as one might have expected from previous scholarly findings and commonly as-
sumed  generalisations.  Also,  while  patterns  exist  in  aggregate  data,  they  are  not  as 
                                                 
36 Presidents in Bulgaria and Estonia can only submit suggestions for constitutional amendments and are 
therefore not included here.  
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readily identifiable on country level. Nevertheless, it should be noted that aggregates on 
country level do not allow for making generalisations as they do not take into account 
any specific explanatory factors. The next sections of this chapter will therefore use re-
gression analysis to provide a more sophisticated statistical test of my hypotheses. 
 
2.3  Event count models of presidential activism 
The first set of regression models in this chapter will analyse the general frequency of 
presidential vetoes and test to what extent the independent variables specified in my 
theoretical framework are important predictors of their use. This is the most common 
way to analyse the use of individual presidential powers and has mainly been used in 
the study of presidential vetoes in the U.S. For a long time, political scientists have used 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression models to analyse the use of presidential powers 
(Lee 1975; Rhode and Simon 1985; Hoff 1991; Woolley 1991). However, as Shields 
and Huang (1995; 1997) show, OLS models are far from adequate for the type of data 
generated by observing presidential activism, i.e. event count data. The dependent vari-
able is the number of times a power has been used and can thus only take positive inte-
ger values. As OLS regression models would predict values below zero and overesti-
mate coefficients if applied on such data, they cannot be employed and event count 
models need to be used (Shields and Huang 1997). Event count models are based on a 
probability distribution, whereby the simplest such distribution is the Poisson. However, 
a Poisson distribution is only appropriate when the variance of the distribution is not 
greater than its mean, i.e. when there is no overdispersion in the data (Hilbe 2010, 2; 
Shields and Huang 1997, 443). Overdispersed data can be modelled using a negative 
binomial distribution which uses a shape parameter α to account for the heterogeneity of  
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the data (Hilbe 2010, 3).
37 Data for the use of all three powers analysed here are ove r-
dispersed so that negative binomial regression models are an adequate choice for use in 
this study.  
As described above, my d ata uses months as observational units which creates a 
comparatively high number of zeroes in the data (i.e. no use of presidential power ob-
served); these excess zeroes can  potentially skew the results of event count models 
(Hilbe 2011, 346). In case of data on presidential vetoes this does not create any pro b-
lems as there is still a sufficient number of non-zero observations and models account-
ing for excess zeroes do not provide a significant improvement. For data on judicial r e-
view requests and legislative initiatives, however, it is necessary to control for excess 
zeroes in order to achieve robust results. One way is to simply extend the coverage of 
the units of observations.
38 Excess zeroes can also be dealt with by using negative b i-
nomial hurdle models or zero-inflated negative binomial models. These types of models 
use different ways to model the origin of excess zeroes in order to control for them in 
the calculation of coefficients and achieve better results  (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, 
123; Hilbe 2011, 346ff). I will discuss the models I have chosen for the analysis of these 
powers and the way to control for excess zeroes in more detail in the respective discus-
sions below.  
Unfortunately, the general negative binomial model used here does not  easily allow 
for including country-effects (Hilbe 2011, 500). However, negative binomial models 
still represent the best option for analysing this type of data. The negative binomial 
models are not employed as a stand-alone method but used in conjunction with event 
history analysis (EHA). EHA allows for including country effects and for estimating the 
                                                 
37 The Poisson can be derived from the negative binomial distribution as a generalisation; it presents a 
special kind of negative binomial distribution where α = 0. 
38 In their analysis of presidential vetoes in the U.S., Shields and Huang (1995) for instance use congre s-
sional terms as their observational units which minimises the number of zero counts in the data.  
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influence of the different variables on yet another aspect of presidential activism (see 
Chapter 2.4). Also, the results of the quantitative analysis will be complemented by and 
validated through qualitative case studies and thus provide a greater in-depth under-
standing of country differences. Finally, Lieberman (2005) actually suggests not to in-
clude country dummies as part of nested analysis as they are ‘likely to soak up some of 
the cross-country variance’ (Lieberman 2005, 438) so that it is more difficult to explain 
differences in the subsequent qualitative analysis. Therefore, these limitations do not 
pose a problem for the study at hand. 
 
Notes on variable operationalization
39 
The dependent variable in the following models is the number of times that presidents 
used their respective power in a given month.
40 The presidential mode of election and 
the term of the president are included as dummy variables, whereb y direct election and 
the presidents’ first term are coded as ‘1’ and indirect election as well as the second 
term as ‘0’. The closeness of parliamentary and presidential elections is measured in 
months until the election date. In case early elections were called, the number of months 
is corrected from the month onwards in which the new date was announced. Both varia-
bles are entered into the models as their natural logarithm so that relative differences 
between values are more accurately reflected. 
The fragmentation of parliament is measured using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) 
effective number of parties; in its calculation independent deputies are treated as parties 
                                                 
39 See also Appendix A1.1. 
40 An argument could be made that only successful uses of presidential powers should be included in this 
analysis. Nevertheless, determining what a ‘successful’ use of power is can be very difficult. Vetoes for 
instance can be considered successful if they are not overridden, yet even if laws are passed again there 
are  instances  in  which  vetoes  could  still  be  considered  successful.  For  instance,  parliament  may  in-
coroporate some of the president’s suggestions in the bill or pass these in a separate new bill. Furthemore, 
presidents might also simply be interested in stalling the implementation of certain provisions or direct 
public attention to a particular issue. Similar considerations apply to the use of judicial review requests (a 
bill could be declared only partly unconstitutional and/or not due to the reasons given by the president) 
and legislative initiatives (a presidential bill proposal might be passed, but only in a radically altered ver-
sion).  
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with only one seat. Similar to the variables on the electoral cycle, I use the natural loga-
rithm in the model. The seat share of the government is calculated on the basis of all 
parties that officially belonged to a particular government, i.e. codified by a coalition 
treaty. The coding of the seat share of the president is based on whether the president 
continuously  held  membership  in  a  political  party  represented  in  parliament  during 
his/her term. A party was also coded as ‘presidential’ if presidents only suspended party 
membership for the duration of their term, but no seat share was coded when presidents 
publicly severed ties with their old party. The descriptive statistics have suggested that 
the effect of president-government relations might be non-linear. Therefore, I will not 
use an interval variable here but include dummy variables for cohabitation and neutral 
relations instead. I also include the number of bills passed by parliament into the models 
of presidential vetoes and judicial review requests. As outlined above, the passage of 
legislation is the natural prerequisite for the use of these powers and thus an important 
control for the frequency of the use of vetoes and review requests.
41 The inclusion of 
this variable also helps to control for country-specific differences in patterns of legisla-
tive output by parliaments. 
Finally, standard errors in all models will be clustered on episodes of president -
cabinet pairings (Table 9). These are defined on the basis of Müller and Strøm’s (2003) 
definition of cabinets with some additions. A new episode is thus always coded a) when 
there is a ‘change in the set of parties holding cabinet membership’, b) when ‘the identi-
ty of the Prime Minister’ changes, c) after each general election (Müller and Strøm 
2003, 12), d) when the identity of the president changes, and e) after each presidential 
election. The majority of variables in my model will change between different episodes 
                                                 
41  Studies  of  presidential  veto  use  by  the  U.S.-American  president  (Hoff  1991;  Woolley  1991; 
Shields/Huang 1995; 1997) have argued that a higher amount of legislation increases the likelihood of 
presidential vetoes because a higher number of bills should theoretically also be associated with the pas-
sage of more bills that are objectionable to the president.  
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and the use presidential use of powers is therefore likely to be interrelated within a sin-
gle episode rather than within a country or over the duration of a president’s term. 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of president-cabinet episodes 
Country 
Number of 
episodes 
Mean length 
(months) 
Minimum length 
(months) 
Maximum length 
(months) 
Bulgaria  4  26.75  17  42 
Czech Republic  16  16.00  1  47 
Estonia  15  14.60  2  31 
Hungary  14  17.50  2  41 
Latvia  19  11.00  1  30 
Lithuania  15  14.27  1  35 
Poland  24  10.00  1  31 
Romania 
a)  17  14.47  1  48 
Slovakia  12  17.83  5  40 
Total  134  14.33  1  48 
Notes: a) Data on vetoes only available for 6 episodes. 
 
2.3.1  An event count model of presidential vetoes 
All presidents in my sample can veto legislation and they can do so at any time that par-
liament forwards them bills for signature. Regulations regarding presidential vetoes are 
fairly similar and vary slightly with regards to the time presidents have to sign legisla-
tion and which majority is needed to override them (relative or absolute majority). Un-
fortunately, the latter is highly correlated with the mode of election
42 and can therefore 
not be included in the model. As a consequence of this limitation, references to the ex-
planatory power of popular elections in the quantitative part of the thesis must therefore 
be understood as referring to direct elections in combination with  a higher override 
threshold. Ultimately a more varied data sample to  test for separate effects would be 
desirable; nevertheless, thanks to the mixed-methods design of this study the effect of 
different majorities can still be assessed in the qualitative analysis which might  then al-
                                                 
42 With the exception of the Czech Republic, vetoes of all indirectly elected president only require a rela-
tive majority to be overriden, while vetoes of directly elected presidents require an absolute majority or 
supermajority (only in Poland: 1989-1997: relative 2/3 majority; 1997-present: relative 3/5 majority).  
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so suggest different ways of operationalisation. As seen in the first part of this chapter, 
vetoes are the most frequently used and most prominent presidential power; therefore 
their analysis should provide the most meaningful and generalizable results. 
Table 10: Negative binomial regression model of presidential vetoes 
Variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
     
Constitutional factors     
Direct election  0.856  0.185 *** 
President’s first term in office  0.266  0.196 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  -0.141  0.078 * 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -0.015  0.074 
     
Political environment     
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.074  0.190 
Governmental seat share  -1.563  0.711 ** 
Presidential seat share  -1.799  0.843 ** 
President-government relations     
Neutral  0.443  0.261 * 
Cohabitation  0.551  0.240 ** 
No of bills passed (log)  0.295  0.052 *** 
Constant  -1.102  0.724 
     
α (shape parameter)  1.867  0.274 
N = 1738; n (non-zero counts) = 400 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1323.5245 
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0: chibar2(01) = 284.48 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors clustered on president-cabinet episodes. 
 
The results of the negative binomial regression model of presidential vetoes confirm 
the majority of my hypotheses and only three coefficient estimates fail to reach statisti-
cal significance. Most prominently, the model shows that direct presidential elections 
are positively and significantly associated with a more frequent use of presidential ve-
toes, i.e. popularly elected presidents vetoed considerably more often than presidents 
elected by parliament. The model also confirms another hypothesis regarding the influ-
ence of constitutional factors on presidential activism. Presidents vetoed more frequent-
ly as the time period until the next parliamentary election decreased. However, presi-
dents were not significantly more active during their first term in office than during  
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their second term and the closeness of presidential elections did also not lead to a signif-
icant decrease in presidential vetoes as expected. 
All hypotheses regarding factors of the political environment – except expectations 
about the effect of parliamentary fragmentation – are corroborated by the results of the 
model.
 43 Increases in the seat share of the government or the president were both asso-
ciated with a decrease in presidential veto use which confirms the assumption of my 
theoretical  framework.  A  larger  seat  share  of  the  government  makes  veto  overrides 
more likely and is therefore a deterrent for presidential activism. A larger seat share of 
the president’s party gives an office-holder greater influence over legislation before it is 
passed. As policies are thus more likely to coincide with presidents’ policy preferences, 
they do not need to become active and use their powers. Coefficient estimates for both 
neutral president-government relations and cohabitation are also statistically significant 
and both  positively associated with  veto  use. This  corroborates my  expectation  that 
greater differences in policy positions increase the use of presidential vetoes but also 
highlights once again that the relationship (at least in my data) is non-linear. Finally, the 
number of bills passed by parliament is a further significant predictor of presidents’ use 
of vetoes. Presidents vetoed significantly more often when more bills were passed by 
parliament. This confirms my expectations and corroborates findings from American 
presidential studies. 
The size of coefficients in negative binomial regression models can generally be in-
terpreted as representing the change in the logs of the dependent variable for a one-unit 
change in the independent variable (UCLA 2014). A more illustrative interpretation is 
the so-called derivative interpretation by King (1989, 123; see also Shields and Huang 
1997, 446) according to which ‘the effect of each independent variable on the count of 
                                                 
43 Interestingly, the statistical non-significance of parliamentary fragmentation mirrors the results of Neto 
and Strøm (2006) and Tavits (2008) with regard to presidential involvement in government formation.  
101 
vetoes equals its coefficient estimate times the sample mean’ of the dependent variable 
(Shields and Huang 1997, 446). Of course, this interpretation can only be sensibly ap-
plied to those variables in the model that were not included in logarithmic form, but it 
can still give an indication of the effect of popular presidential elections, changes in seat 
shares and president-government relations. The mean of presidential vetoes in my data 
is 0.40564. Based on the derivative interpretation popularly elected presidents can thus 
ceteris paribus be expected to issue 0.347 (0.8560 x 0.40564) more vetoes per month or 
4.16 (0.347 x 12) more vetoes per year than indirectly elected presidents. Similarly, 
presidents will issue 0.224 more vetoes per month (0.551 x 0.40564; 2.688 per year) 
during cohabitation than during neutral and unified relations combined. When interpret-
ing the effect of the number of seats controlled by the government and the president’s 
party one needs to take into account that they are included in the model as a proportion 
of the total number of seats in the legislature. Therefore, it is more sensible to look at 
the effect of increases in the independent variable that are smaller than one full unit. For 
instance, for every 10% increase of the governmental seat share presidents will issue 
0.063 vetoes less per month (-0.1563 x 0.40564) or 0.76 vetoes less per year. When the 
presidents  seat  share  increases  by  10%,  presidents  will  issue  0.073  vetoes  less  per 
month (-0.1799 x 0.40564) or 0.876 less vetoes per year, respectively. Of course, given 
that the data stems from nine different countries this interpretation can only show trends 
and is not a very accurate prediction. Nevertheless, the model results are robust and the 
model overall strongly confirms my theoretical framework. 
 
2.3.2  An event count model of requests for judicial review 
All presidents in my sample can also request the judicial review of bills by the Constitu-
tional or Supreme Court. Generally, the same conditions apply to its use as to presiden- 
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tial vetoes, i.e. presidents can logically only request the judicial review of bills if par-
liament passes legislation, and the respective procedures are almost identical. However, 
Estonia needs to be excluded from the calculations in this model as its exceptional regu-
lations too are difficult to model as part of the regression models used here.
44 Second, as 
discussed above the high number of zeroes in the data (only 6% of observations a re 
non-zero counts) presents a problem for fitting the model. Extending the coverage of 
each unit of observation to three months does not solve the problem entirely as there are 
still too many zeroes in the data.
45 Thus, the issue of excess zeroes has to be addressed 
differently. 
As part of negative binomial regression models, correcting for excess zeroes can be 
accomplished by using either hurdle or zero -inflated models which both share the a s-
sumption that zeroes and event counts are created by two independ ent statistical pro-
cesses (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, 123; Hilbe 2011, 346ff). Hurdle models assume that 
one process is based on the other, meaning that the first process determines whether an 
event generally occurs or not and the second process then decides on the number of ob-
served events. This means that some observations – those that are assigned a zero in the 
first process – are never at risk of experiencing an event whereas the others always 
are.
46 Zero-inflated models on the other hand assume that both processes are independ-
ent (i.e. zeroes and non-zero counts stem from different groups) and their outcomes are 
merely mixed in the data. Furthermore, while ‘hurdle models […] estimate zero counts 
using different distributions, zero-inflated models incorporate zero counts into both the 
                                                 
44 Estonian presidents can only request judicial review after the veto of a bill was overridden. This makes 
their use of review requests conditional on veto overrides. 
45 Three months is the longest period which still allows for adequately capturing variations in the ind e-
pendent variables, so that a further extension would not be sensible. Nevertheless, even when using qua r-
ters as observational units there are still only 78 non-zero counts compared to 510 zero observations. 
46 Cameron and Trivedi (1998, 127) exemplify this using the example of patients’ visits to the doctor 
modelled in Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995). In the first process patients first decide whether they go to the 
doctor or not. In the second process the doctor specifies the intensity of the treatment for those patients 
who decided to come.   
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binary and count processes’ (Hilbe 2011, 370) by mixing them in accordance with their 
proportion in the data (Long and Freese 2001). The zero-inflated model is more ade-
quate here for the following two reasons. First, the assumptions underlying the zero-
inflated model resemble the actual process more closely than the hurdle model. It may 
well be that there is an observation where no judicial review is used even though the 
president would be willing to do so, e.g. when parliament simply does not pass uncon-
stitutional bills. Second, the majority of non-zero observations only record one judicial 
review request (64% of all non-zero observations). The results of a hurdle model would 
therefore hardly be informative as the second step of its calculations is eventually only 
concerned with the observations in which the remaining 36% of judicial reviews oc-
curred (n=28). 
Table 11: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression model of judicial review requests 
Variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
 
Negative binomial part (veto prediction) 
   
Political environment     
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -1.020  0.352 *** 
Governmental seat share  -2.285  1.020 ** 
Presidential seat share  -0.635  0.890 
President-government relations     
Neutral  0.409  0.393 
Cohabitation  1.376  0.318 *** 
No of bills passed (log)  0.242  0.160 
Constant  0.058  1.130 
 
Inflate/excess zero prediction (logit) 
   
Constitutional factors     
Direct election  -0.642  1.061 
President’s first term in office  -0.327  0.914 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  -0.492  0.465 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  1.713  2.487 
Constant  -7.417  6.516 
α (shape parameter)  0.920  0.578 
N = 510; N (non-zero counts) = 78 
Log pseudolikelihood = -267.3847 
Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 2.37  Pr>z = 0.0532 * 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors clustered on president-cabinet episodes.  
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A zero-inflated model requires the specification of variables that are assumed to be 
responsible for creating excess zeroes. These are used to predict the number of zeroes in 
the whole data set with a logistic regression model before a negative binomial regres-
sion model is used to predict the overall number of counts in a subset of the data (non-
zero counts + observations which the logistic model cannot accurately predict as ‘cer-
tain zeroes’). Variables for both parts of the zero-inflated model are usually different as 
it is assumed that both processes are determined by different factors (Long and Freese 
2001). In the case at hand, the identification of such factors is difficult and a sophisti-
cated solution would require more in-depth knowledge of the cases involved.
47 Never-
theless, as a preliminary solution (and keeping in mind that the event history analysis in 
the next subchapter will be able to deal with excess zeroes more effectively) I will pr o-
ceed as follows. As I argued in my theoretical framework, constitutional factors present 
the ‘baseline’ influences on presidential activism and determine the overall likelihood of 
presidents becoming active. For the purpose of this model it can therefore be assumed 
that these factors can help to distinguish between the process creating excess zeroes and 
the process generating ‘non-zero’ and ‘likely non-zero’ observations. I will therefore 
enter the constitutional factors into the logistic part of the model and the variables asso-
ciated with the political environment into the negative binomial part. The results of the 
model (Table 11) show that unfortunately none of the constitutional factors appear to be 
statistically significant predictors of excess zeroes. Nevertheless, the Vuong test shows 
that the zero-inflated model still outperforms a negative binomial model without zero 
inflation (albeit only at p<0.0532) and a log likelihood ratio test shows that the zero-
inflated model still fits better than a general negative binomial model (see Appendix 
                                                 
47 The qualitative case studies in the next chapter will partly be able to provide such insights.  
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A2.1 for a general model). Due to the small number of non-zero counts, the results still 
have to be interpreted with great caution.  
The coefficient estimate for the fragmentation of parliament suggests that a higher 
effective number of parties is negatively associated with the use of judicial review re-
quest. My theoretical framework had assumed the contrary, i.e. that presidents will use 
their powers more often when parliament is fragmented. A tentative explanation for this 
could be that a smaller number of parties is more likely to be associated with the domi-
nance of few parties which then ignore views of the minority or suggestions regarding 
the constitutionality of bills. However, given the great variation in parliamentary frag-
mentation across my sample it could also simply be a country-effect that is not con-
trolled for here. 
Similar to the use of presidential vetoes, a larger seat share of the government is as-
sociated with fewer requests for judicial review. While a smaller seat share does not in-
crease presidents’ chances of success here, requesting judicial review presents an oppor-
tunity for presidents to exploit the general weakness of the government. Furthermore, 
minority governments require the support of other parties to pass their legislation which 
might lead to compromises that introduce legal inconsistencies. Finally, cohabitation is 
positively associated with a higher number of review requests. This corroborates my 
hypothesis that presidents should be more active when there is no consensus over policy 
between president and government. While the above analysis is not able to show to 
what extent presidents use judicial review requests for purely legal or political reasons, 
a decreasing overlap in policy preferences appears to at least increase presidents’ gen-
eral use of this power. The model results lend only very limited support to my theoreti-
cal framework. Nevertheless, the extremely low levels of the use of review requests and  
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the difficulties in modelling them here statistically mean that the results are far from 
definite and need to be interpreted with caution. 
 
2.3.3  An event count model of legislative initiatives 
Legislative initiatives are the only proactive legislative power included in this analysis 
and only four countries in my sample grant presidents the power submit draft bills to 
parliament. The descriptive statistics above have already shown that directly elected 
presidents used this power much more frequently than their indirectly elected counter-
parts, but no clear picture emerged regarding the influence of president-government re-
lations. Once again, the high number of zeroes in the data (only 17% are non-zero 
counts) presents a problem for estimating the negative binomial model correctly. How-
ever, in contrast to data on judicial review requests this can be corrected by merely ex-
tending the coverage of the units of observation from one month to three months. 
As expected, the results of the model show that popular presidential elections are a 
highly significant predictor of presidents’ use of legislative initiatives. The variable also 
exhibits the largest coefficient estimate which according to the derivative interpretation 
would mean that directly elected presidents ceteris paribus submit 2.306 (2.437 x 0.946 
[sample mean]) more legislative initiatives during a three month period (or 9.224 per 
year). Of course, given that the model is based on only four countries this result only 
reflects the general trend already found in the descriptive statistics. In contrast to the 
previous models, the coefficient estimate for presidents’ first term in office now reaches 
statistical significance. This would confirm my assumption that presidents should be 
more active in their first term. However, when looking at how legislative initiatives 
were used by individual office holders, this appears to be a spurious relationship. In 
Hungary, only the first president Árpád Göncz submitted legislative initiatives (three  
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overall from which he withdrew one) and Latvian inaugural president Guntis Ulmanis 
introduced 10 (out of 16 during the whole period of observation) in his first term. A 
similar picture can be drawn for Lithuania (60 out of 149 legislative initiatives were 
submitted by president Algirdas Brazauskas in his first and only term) and Poland (30 
out of 107 initiatives were submitted by the first president, Lech Wałęsa).  
Table 12: Negative binomial model of legislative initiatives 
Variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
     
Constitutional factors     
Direct election  2.437  0.304 *** 
President’s first term in office  0.924  0.285 *** 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  -0.304  0.125 ** 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -.0460  0.133 
     
Political environment     
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  0.224  0.442 
Governmental seat share  -0.625  0.901 
Presidential seat share  0.878  0.810 
President-government relations     
Neutral  0.377  0.325 
Cohabitation  -0.024  0.287 
Constant  -1.903  1.278 
α (shape parameter)  0.941  0.224 
N = 277; N (non-zero counts) = 178 
Log pseudolikelihood = -296.54958 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   68.76 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; ; standard errors clustered on president-cabinet episodes. 
Finally, the model shows that presidents submitted more legislative initiatives to par-
liament when parliamentary elections approached. This confirms my hypothesis that 
presidents should be more active in the run-up to parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, 
as parliament will have less time to consider initiatives submitted closer to elections this 
also presents a certain puzzle and highlights that theory on the use of the use of presi-
dents’ proactive powers needs to be developed further. 
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2.3.4  Preliminary conclusion – Event count models of presidential activism 
The analysis of presidential activism using negative binomial regression models has 
produced several interesting results and confirmed a number of my hypotheses. The 
analysis of the use of presidential vetoes showed the most striking results – the model 
was very robust and confirmed the majority of my hypotheses. Furthermore, the results 
challenge Margit Tavits’ (2008) claim that direct elections do not matter for presidential 
activism. Popular presidential elections were positively and strongly associated with a 
higher numbers of presidential vetoes
48 as well as more legislative initiatives. Neverthe-
less, the models have also demon strated difficulties in the statistical modelling of the 
use of presidential powers. This concerned both the problem that excess zeroes made 
fitting a model more difficult and the fact that while presidential powers can sensibly 
grouped together in theory, they cannot as easily and adequately be Accessed: uniform-
ly using the same set of independent variables. Therefore, the results presented here are 
to some extent preliminary. This does not generally present a problem within the nested 
analysis approach (Lieberman 2005) and particularly in this study as the negative bino-
mial models are complemented not only by in-depth case studies but also by another 
regression method – event history analysis. 
 
2.4  Event history models of presidential activism 
Until now, this chapter has analysed how often presidents generally used their different 
legislative powers and how constitutional and environmental factors influenced these 
levels of activism. I have controlled for the closeness of presidential and parliamentary 
elections and thus already included time-varying components into my models. Event 
count models now allow for analysing the time it takes until presidents use their powers 
                                                 
48 It should be noted once again that the veto override threshold could unfortunately not be included as it 
was highly correlated with the mode of election.  
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for the first time or the time periods between the use of their powers. While the results 
of the analyses above have shown that directly elected presidents are more active, it still 
stands to reason whether they also become active faster than their indirectly counter-
parts once they entered office or how the incidence rates of activism differ for different 
constellations of factors in the political environment. Furthermore, it is also not clear 
whether presidents would have eventually used their powers had only the period of ob-
servation been longer. 
These and other questions cannot be answered by using count regression models. 
Therefore, I will use event history analysis (EHA) to assess the role that time plays in 
presidential activism. EHA (also known as ‘survival analysis’ in the context of biostatis-
tics) is a regression technique that allows for modeling time-to-event data. In EHA, the 
dependent variable is the amount of time until a certain event takes place or the time 
between two events. The aim of the analysis is then to assess which factors influence 
the length of this time period (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The reason why this 
kind of analysis requires its own regression technique lies in the nature of the data that 
is analysed. While the starting point of the period of observation is usually known and 
precisely defined, the actual observation period can end before the event of interest 
takes place.
49 These ‘censored’ (i.e. incomplete) observations would have to be exclud-
ed in traditional regression models as the total duration until the event is unknown. EHA 
on the other hand is able to accommodate these observations as well by basing its esti-
mations always only on those observations which are ‘at risk’ of experiencing an event 
at a given point in time. Even censored observations are thus included in the model up 
to  the  point  where  there  is  no  information  on  their  eventual  termination  (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 16ff). This means that the great number of zeroes in the 
                                                 
49 This is called ‘right-censoring’ data; ‘left-censoring’ on the other hand describes data where the starting 
point of the period observation is not known and is much less common in the non-medical context.  
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monthly observations of presidential activism in my data set is not a problem that needs 
to be addressed by changing the period of observation or excluding observations from 
the eventual calculation. EHA produces more robust and reliable results as these obser-
vations, too, are taken into account. 
 
The Cox proportional hazards model 
The most widely used EHA model introduced by Cox (1972; 1975) assumes that ‘the 
effect of any covariate [has] a proportional and constant effect that is invariant to when 
in the process the value of the covariate changes’ (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 
132). This is called the ‘proportional hazards assumption’ – when calculating the effects 
of covariates the model only assumes this property of the risk-function while not assum-
ing any other restrictions on its shape. The proportional hazards assumption is violated 
when the effect of any independent variable changes over time. As non-proportional 
hazards lead to overestimation of coefficients, checking for violations is imperative and 
part of the model diagnostics (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 132). EHA allows for 
the inclusion of both time-independent (‘fixed’) variables as well as time-dependent 
variables, i.e. variables which change during the period of observation. Therefore, EHA 
is  preferable  to  most  other  regression  models  even  for  uncensored  data  (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 19).  
The interpretation of coefficients in EHA models differs from other regression mod-
els to the extent that coefficients give information about the influence of the individual 
covariates on the time until an event occurs or the time between events (in my case the 
use of a presidential power). Hereby, a positive coefficient means that the risk of such 
an event increases and the period of time decreases with changes in the variable. Nega-
tive signs mean that the risk decreases, i.e. the duration until the event increases (Box- 
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Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 59). The size of the coefficient describes the amount of 
change in the ‘hazard rate’. The hazard rate describes the rate at which events occur by 
time t, given that the observational units have not yet experienced an event; i.e. it gives 
the ‘instantaneous potential’ of event occurrence (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 
14; Kleinbaum and Klein 2005, 10ff). 
Compared to count regression models, EHA has several more advantages which help 
to make full use of the detail of my data. As mentioned above, it is possible to let varia-
bles vary over time; thus the monthly changes of the composition of parliament as well 
as the presidential and governmental seat share find adequate consideration because 
they are included in the model as time-varying covariates. As time in my EHA will be 
measured in days not monthly or quarterly periods, estimates are also more precise. I 
collected these data as part of assembling the event count data set so that a transfor-
mation of the data set for EHA is possible without problems. In all models, standard er-
rors are clustered on episodes of president-cabinet pairings which I already used in my 
negative binomial models (Table 9). Furthermore, in contrast to the event count models 
EHA allows me to control for country effects by entering countries into the models as 
‘strata’ (similar to panels in other regression models) which allow for different ‘baseline 
hazards’ – the unconditional probability of the occurrence of an event within a given 
time period – in each country. Nevertheless, this means in consequence that the findings 
of EHA are unfortunately not directly comparable to the event count models. 
In the following, I will now analyse the effect of my independent variables on inci-
dence rates of presidential activism, i.e. their influence on the time periods between uses 
of each legislative presidential power. For this purpose I will use so-called repeated 
events model which allows for an event to occur (i.e. a presidential power to be used) 
multiple times during one observation (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 153ff). This  
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helps to address an important question which negative binomial models were not able to 
answer. The negative binomial models showed that popularly elected presidents used 
their powers more often, yet it was not clear whether they rather spread their vetoes 
evenly or use them en masse in larger bulks. Especially the latter is a phenomenon that 
became apparent in a number of countries when the data set was assembled. These mul-
tiple uses of powers at the same time will be accounted for by weighting these observa-
tions by the number of times a power was used simultaneously. Naturally, this implies 
the assumption that two vetoes have exactly twice the weight or practical relevance of 
one veto. Nevertheless, this is still the most sensible strategy as weighting them differ-
ently would be difficult to justify on a theoretical level.  
My hypotheses all remain similarly applicable to the EHA models, so that in cases 
where I argued that presidents should be more active the hypotheses are confirmed 
when the variable in question increases the hazard rate and vice versa. Finally, I once 
again include data on the amount of legislation passed by parliament as a control varia-
ble. I also include a control for the number of times a particular power has already been 
used in a particular episode (entered in form of its natural logarithm). 
 
2.4.1  EHA of presidential vetoes 
The negative binomial regression model of presidential vetoes confirmed the majority 
of my hypotheses – most prominently it showed that popular presidential elections were 
associated with a higher number of vetoes. The EHA model, too, shows a very good 
model fit. However, the effect of the variable for approaching parliamentary elections 
appears to violate the proportional hazards assumption (for test see Appendix A2.2), so 
that it is included in the model as part of an interaction term with the natural logarithm 
of time. This does not only control for its non-proportional effect but also increases the  
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accuracy of the model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 136f). A comparison be-
tween models before and after treatment (Appendix A2.3) shows that the inclusion of 
the interaction term has no significant effect on coefficient size, sign and significance. 
The model is thus still very robust and supports a great number of my hypotheses. 
Table 13: EHA of presidential vetoes 
Variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
     
Constitutional factors     
Direct election  1.046  0.187 *** 
President’s first term in office  -0.007  0.115 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)
a)  -0.018  0.012 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -0.118  0.046 *** 
     
Political environment     
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.286  0.164 
Governmental seat share  -1.260  0.466 ** 
Presidential seat share  -0.572  0.436 
President-government relations     
Neutral  -0.057  0.137 
Cohabitation  0.618  0.176 *** 
No of bills passed (log)  -0.343  0.047 *** 
     
Number of previous vetoes in episode (log)  0.432  0.069 *** 
N = 2355;  number of events = 536 
Likelihood ratio test= 219.6  (11 df) *** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors clustered on 128 president-cabinet episodes; a) 
interacted with natural logarithm of time to control for non-proportionality of effect, see Appendix A2.3 
for comparison with untreated model. 
 
First and foremost, the model shows once again that the mode of presidential elec-
tions is an important predictor of presidential activism and popular elections are signifi-
cantly associated with increased levels of presidential activism. As the size of the coef-
ficient can ceteris paribus be interpreted as the change in the hazard rate, the hazard for 
directly elected presidents is by 1.045 higher than for indirectly elected presidents. My 
hypothesis that approaching presidential elections will lead to less presidential activism 
as presidents will either be on the campaign trail, try to present themselves as uncontro-
versial or enjoy the spoils of office at the end of their presidency is not confirmed by the 
EHA model. Rather, a decrease in the time period until the next presidential election  
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increases the hazard rate for presidential vetoes. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate 
for this variable did not reach statistical significance in the event count model, while the 
closeness of parliamentary elections (non-significant here) showed the expected effect. 
From the variables relating to the political environment, estimates for the effects of 
the governmental seat share and cohabitation are significant and confirm my hypothe-
ses. A large seat share of the government significantly decreases the hazard rate for 
presidential vetoes. Cohabitation of president and cabinet on the other hand significant-
ly increase the hazard rate by a factor of 0.611 compared to neutral or unified relations 
and thereby more than half as much as popular presidential elections alone. The number 
of bills passed by parliament appears to be associated with a decrease in the hazard rate 
for presidential vetoes. A potential explanation would that presidents, given limited time 
and resources, will rather sign a bill than veto it and potentially risk an override. Finally, 
the control for the previous use of vetoes in the episode is positively and significantly 
associated with an increase in the hazard rate. This means that office holders who used 
their veto before are likely to veto again and that on average each veto decreases the 
time until the next. In summary, the EHA model has again confirmed my hypotheses 
about the effect of a number of key variables. Popular elections, a decreasing govern-
mental seat share and cohabitation were all significantly associated with an increase in 
the hazard rate for presidential vetoes. Given that I also found these hypotheses con-
firmed in my negative binomial models
50, these findings lend additional support to the 
arguments and assumptions made in my theoretical framework. 
   
                                                 
50 Although one should keep in mind that both models assess different aspects of presidential activism 
and the override threshold could also not be adequately included in this model.  
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2.4.2  EHA of judicial review requests 
Presidents’ use of requests for judicial review proved to be difficult to model in a nega-
tive binomial regression due to excessive number of zero counts in the data. Even after 
extending the coverage of each unit of observation to three months and using a zero-
inflated model, the results were not as robust as in the case of presidential vetoes and 
legislative initiatives.  As outlined above, EHA is unaffected by the number of zero 
counts and can incorporate into the calculation of coefficient estimates. While its results 
can therefore be seen as more robust (although not directly comparable to the negative 
binomial models) the small number of events still limits the extent to which meaningful 
and reliable results can be obtained. Once again, I exclude Estonia from the models as 
presidents cannot request reviews for any bill submitted for signature, but only when 
their initial veto of a bill has been overridden by parliament. In contrast to the EHA 
model of presidential vetoes, tests show no violation of the proportional hazards as-
sumption (see Appendix A2.4). 
Table 14: EHA of judicial review requests 
Variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
     
Constitutional factors     
Direct election  -0.353  0.572 
President’s first term in office  -0.058  0.271 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  0.251  0.129 *  
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -0.258  0.083 *** 
     
Political environment     
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.407  0.243 * 
Governmental seat share  -1.546  1.112 
Presidential seat share  -0.860  0.720 
President-government relations     
Neutral  0.398  0.469  
Cohabitation  0.651  0.291 ** 
No of bills passed (log)  -0.262  0.112 ** 
     
Number  of  previous  review  requests  in  epi-
sode (log) 
0.336  0.239  
N = 1862;  number of events = 117 
Likelihood ratio test= 44.02 (11df) *** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors clustered on 119 president-cabinet episodes.  
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Out of the four constitutional variables, only the closeness of presidential elections 
produces a statistically significant coefficient estimate. In contrast to the assumptions of 
my theoretical framework approaching presidential elections increase the hazard rate, 
i.e. presidents request judicial reviews more frequently when elections come closer ra-
ther than in the beginning of their term. A tentative explanation could be that presidents 
use the often lengthy proceedings before the Constitutional Court as a way to continu-
ously exert influence over policy even after their term in office has ended – be it be-
cause they have reached their term limit or because they failed to be re-elected. In the 
block of variables related to the political environment, statistically significant coeffi-
cients can be found for the presence of cohabitation and the number of bills passed by 
parliament. 
With regard to cohabitation between president and government, the results of the 
EHA model confirm my hypotheses – cohabitation is associated with an increase in the 
hazard rate, i.e. presidents use their power in shorter intervals if there is no overlap in 
their policy position with the policy preferences of the government. Interestingly, the 
coefficient size is only slightly larger than the size of the same coefficient in the EHA 
model of presidential vetoes. Similar to the EHA model of presidential vetoes, the coef-
ficient estimate for the number of bills passed by parliament does not corroborate my 
initial assumptions. Rather than being associated with an increase in the hazard rate, an 
increase in parliaments’ legislative output leads to a decrease in the hazard of judicial 
review requests. This could be due to the fact that a higher legislative output puts pres-
sure on presidents – given deadlines to sign the bill and limited capacity of their admin-
istration they have less time and resources to check bills for constitutionality and rather 
sign bills than risk defeat in court. Finally, the control for previous uses of judicial re-
views in the episode does not reach statistical significance. This does not necessarily  
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mean that a previous use of judicial review requests does not decrease the hazard rate; it 
might be attributed to the general rarity of the passage of unconstitutional legislation. 
 
2.4.3  EHA of legislative initiatives 
Similar to judicial review requests, legislative initiatives were difficult to model in the 
negative binomial regression analysis as here, too, a large number of observations were 
zeroes. Again, the EHA model should be better equipped to deal with the large number 
of zero counts. Only presidents in Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have the right 
to submit legislative initiative and as the descriptive statistics have shown directly elect-
ed presidents did so significantly more often. Due to the great differences in veto use 
between countries it is unfortunately not possible to enter countries as different stratas 
into the model (Kleinbaum and Klein 2005). A further difficulty in fitting the model 
arises from the fact that a number of variables violate the proportional hazards assump-
tion (see Appendix A2.5). Again, these have been interacted with the natural logarithm 
of time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 136f), yet this changes the size and signifi-
cance of a number of coefficients (see Appendix A2.6). The following discussion will 
thus be limited to those variables that were consistently significant before and after the 
addition of interaction terms and coefficient size will only be discussed if it does not 
differ significantly between models. 
The results of the EHA model are generally very similar to those of the negative bi-
nomial model. As expected, the variable for popular presidential elections is significant-
ly associated with an increase in the hazard rate, meaning that directly elected presidents 
submit initiatives in shorter intervals that their indirectly elected counterparts. The effect 
of popular elections on the hazard rate is thereby almost twice as high as in the case of 
presidential vetoes. The first term of presidents only produced a statistically significant  
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coefficient estimate in the untreated model. While this effect would have confirmed my 
hypothesis, I have already pointed out above that this could be due to the great activity 
of the first generation of presidents in all four countries and is not necessarily a conclu-
sion that can be easily generalised. Similarly to the negative binomial model which 
showed that approaching parliamentary elections were associated with more initiatives, 
the results of the EHA model show that the shorter time period also increases the hazard 
rate. This means that presidents become more active in the run-up to elections as ex-
pected, but due to the fact that parliament has less time to pass bills at that point also 
appears slightly counterintuitive. Out of the environmental variables, all variables only 
show a statistically significant effect after interaction with the natural logarithm of time 
(as time is the dependent variable, this result is not surprising and demonstrates why 
these results should not be over-interpreted). Nevertheless, similar to the EHA model of 
presidential vetoes, the control for the previous submission of legislative initiatives in-
creases the hazard rate, i.e. presidents become more likely to submit legislation to par-
liament during an episode if they have done so before. 
Despite the general congruence between findings of the negative binomial and EHA 
models, the fact that only four presidents possess the power to submit legislation, the 
vast differences between directly and indirectly elected presidents as well as between 
the inaugural presidents and their successors show that a general statistical approach 
might not be best suited for the analysis of legislative initiatives. Rather, a country-
specific analysis of these patterns appears to be more adequate. This would then also 
provide a better basis for formulating improved hypotheses about the use of proactive 
presidential powers which still remain understudied. 
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Table 15: EHA of legislative initiatives 
Variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
     
Constitutional factors     
Direct election)  2.205  0.469 *** 
b) 
President’s first term in office  0.374  0.261 
b) 
Time until parliamentary elections (log) 
 a)  -0.044  0.017 *** 
b) 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -0.147  0.076 * 
     
Political environment     
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.814  0.380 ** 
Governmental seat share 
 a)  0.250  0.103 ** 
Presidential seat share 
 a)  -0.373  0.160 ** 
President-government relations     
Neutral
  a)  -0.132  0.057 ** 
Cohabitation
  a)  -0.146  0.038 *** 
     
Number of previous initiatives in episode (log) 
a)  0.069  0.017 *** 
b) 
N = 1170;  number of events = 204 
Likelihood ratio test= 249.5 (10df) *** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors clustered on 72 president-cabinet episodes; a) 
interacted with natural logarithm of time to control for non-proportionality of effect; b) variable with sig-
nificant effect in untreated model; see Appendix A2.6 for comparison of models. 
 
2.4.4  Preliminary Conclusion – EHA of presidential activism 
The results of the EHA models of presidents’ legislative powers largely mirrored those 
of the event count models. The analysis of presidential vetoes in particular confirmed a 
great number of hypotheses – most prominently the relevance of the presidents’ mode 
of election – and provides strong support for my theoretical model. Popular presidential 
elections also increased the hazard rates for the use of legislative initiatives and the 
presence of cohabitation increased hazard rates in all three models. Although the EHA 
was able to handle the high number of zero counts better than the negative binomial 
models and the models confirmed a number of my hypotheses, the results regarding the 
use of judicial reviews and legislative initiatives were not as robust as the model on 
presidential vetoes. Due to the rarity with which presidents use them it is difficult to 
model them statistically. Given that there has also hardly any other theoretical or empir-
ical work on their use so far, it would appear more sensible to study the mechanisms at  
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work in more detail before returning to them as part of a general statistical analysis. In 
contrast, the use of presidential vetoes could be well-explained by the statistical model 
and due to the general prominence of this power presents an ideal opportunity for fur-
ther investigation in this study. 
 
2.5  Discussion and case selection for in-depth analysis 
The assessment of findings from the quantitative analysis is a further important step of 
the nested analysis approach used in this study. It determines the focus of the qualitative 
analysis and guides the selection of cases for in-depth analysis. The central question is 
whether the results of the quantitative analysis provide sufficient evidence that the theo-
retical model adequately explains the phenomenon in question (Lieberman 2005, 439). 
If the answer to this question is yes, the qualitative analysis is carried out in the form of 
‘model-testing’ analysis which seeks to further test the robustness of the model and il-
lustrate the causal mechanisms at work. In case the results do not confirm the hypothe-
ses or there is only a poor model fit, the qualitative analysis is focussed on formulating 
new  hypotheses  with  the  aim  of  eventually  testing  a  new  model  using  quantitative 
methods. 
 
2.5.1  Principles of case selection 
Overall, the results of the statistical analysis supported the majority of my hypotheses. 
The results were most striking and robust with regard to the use of presidential vetoes. 
Results for the use of judicial review requests and legislative initiatives were somewhat 
less conclusive, yet still showed the relevance of a number of key variables in explain-
ing presidential activism. The comparatively rare occurrence of judicial review requests 
and the fact that only four presidents can use legislative initiatives demonstrates that  
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they are not necessarily representative and reliable indicators of presidential activism. 
Presidential vetoes on the other hand are used frequently by both directly and indirectly 
elected presidents. In fact, they are likely the most frequently used of all formal presi-
dential powers and thus represent a key aspect of presidential activity. Furthermore, 
both the negative binomial and the event history models of presidential veto use pro-
duced robust results and strongly supported the expectations of my theoretical frame-
work. Therefore, it is not only adequate to focus the analysis in the remainder of this 
study on vetoes as the most frequently used and prominent presidential power but also 
to engage in ‘model-testing’ analysis to further validate the quantitative findings and 
develop a comprehensive explanation of presidential activism. 
Lieberman (2005, 444) argues that when proceeding with model-testing analysis, the 
cases for in-depth study should be selected based on how they were predicted by the 
statistical model. As Lieberman (2005) restricts the aim of model-testing analysis to 
confirm the causal mechanisms between the dependent variable and the statistically sig-
nificant independent variables in the model, he argues that only cases that are compara-
tively well-predicted by the statistical model should be selected for in-depth analysis. 
Yet, as Rohlfing (2008) argues this way of approaching the qualitative section of nested 
analysis severely restricts its ability to detect misspecification of the statistical model, 
particularly whether important variables have been excluded. To broaden the scope of 
the analysis in this way and increase variance on all variables, it is not only necessary to 
attempt to assess all possible factors that could have influenced the dependent variable 
(Rohlfing 2008, 1505f) but it also seems reasonable to select a number cases for in-
depth analysis that were not very well predicted by the model.
51 
                                                 
51 An example of the successful implementation of such a strategy (albeit only on the basis of two cases) 
can be found in Bäck and Dumont (2007).  
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For my qualitative analysis I will use ‘episodes’ of president-cabinet pairings as cas-
es for investigation (Table 9). The episodes provide the best available option here as 
they are typically short enough to allow for in-depth analysis.
52 At the same time, they 
are still long enough to allow for assessing the effects of intra -case variation of inde-
pendent  variables  on  presidential  activism.  While  some  variables  (e.g.  president -
government-relations) do not change within a single episode, th e moderate length of 
most episodes (compared to a full presidential or legislative term) still allows for includ-
ing these factors in the assessment through comparison with preceding and  subsequent 
episodes. Finally, rather than selecting episodes from all countries included in my mod-
el I will first select a subset of four countries from which the eventual episodes for anal-
ysis – several from each country – are selected. This two-stage process of case selection 
is necessary in order to ensure comparability and draw more robust and insightful con-
clusions (see next section for further discussion).
53 
 
2.5.2  Selection of countries  
Selecting a subset of countries from which episodes for analysis are then chosen in a 
second step has several advantages. It guarantees a degree of variation on the dependent 
and independent variables which is necessary for assessing the existence of links be-
tween variables under different conditions (Lieberman 2005, 444). Selecting episodes 
purely on the accuracy of their predicted scores could potentially lead to a selection bias 
for a particular country or constellation of variables so that a subsequent analysis would 
only be able to give very limited insights. Furthermore, the two-stage selection process 
helps to place the in-depth analysis of individual episodes into a wider context as back-
                                                 
52 In this regard they are superior to case studies focussing on an entire country or a whole presidential 
term. 
53 For a description and discussion of how the qualitative analysis will proceed within countries and ep i-
sodes, see beginning of next chapter.  
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ground information on the respective country and its political system can be more easily 
provided. Having a number of episodes from the same country thereby also facilitates 
the assessment of whether mechanisms found are specific to an individual episode or 
represent a broader pattern (either within an individual country or beyond).  
To select cases that allow me to test my hypotheses and assess the results of the sta-
tistical models I will follow a most different systems design (Przeworski and Teune 
1979). This approach allows for assessing the effect of variables and applicability of 
hypotheses under a diverse set of circumstances as well as for drawing stronger conclu-
sions should their effect/applicability be confirmed across different conditions. Thus, 
the results have greater potential for contributing to the assessment and potential revi-
sion of the general theoretical framework proposed in this study. A most similar sys-
tems design would certainly be informative with regards to uncovering the reasons for 
differences in presidential activism between very similar countries
54, yet the country 
sample in this study already shares a number of similarities.
55 Following a most similar 
systems approach might therefore lead to highly particular findings and would not nec-
essarily facilitate a critical assessmen of the overall validity of the theoretical fram e-
work and statistical model results. 
I will select two countries with directly elected presidents and tw o with indirectly 
elected presidents from my sample. Furthermore, for each pair, I will select one country 
with a relatively powerful president and one country with a relatively weak president. 
These two factors are typically used to classify regime types  and represent important 
‘baseline’ influences on the role of the president within a political system. Selecting 
four countries not only enables me to cover the four main combinations of these varia-
bles but they also present almost half of the entire country sample. Even if two countries 
                                                 
54 Note that some of these advantages will be retained by selecting several episodes from one country. 
55 See Introduction ‘A study of presidential activism in Central and Eastern Europe’.  
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should turn out to be idiosyncratic cases (Liebermann 2005, 448), the results of their 
analysis would still be balanced and accompanied by findings from two other countries. 
In contrast, selecting only two or three countres would make the detection of atypical 
cases more difficult, whereas the selection of five or more cases would undermine the 
advantages of the two-stage case selection process outlined above. 
Among the directly elected presidents in CEE, the Polish, Lithuanian, and Romanian 
president  have  traditionally  been  classified  as  being  comparatively  ‘powerful’  (Frye 
1997; Metcalf 2000; Elgie and Moestrup 2008b). Irrespective of the problems with data 
availability for Romania, Poland is the most suitable choice for the purpose of this 
study. The Polish president is the only president in CEE whose veto requires a higher 
override majority. As discussed in section 2.3.1 of this chapter, this was a factor that 
could not be adequately included in the statistical analysis due to its strong correlation 
with the mode of election and thus requires further investigation. Furthermore, Poland 
also experienced two constitutional changes (in 1992 and 1997) which altered the pow-
ers of the president with regard to both legislation and government formation/dismissal. 
Thus, Poland presents a perfect case for studying the effects of change in formal rules 
on activism in more detail. Bulgaria and Slovakia feature comparatively less powerful 
presidents. However, as noted above, data on the activism of Bulgarian presidents is 
severely limited. Bulgarian presidents also  do not possess any significant powers in 
government formation, yet – given problems with the available quantitative data – one 
of the purposes of in-depth analysis is also to qualitatively assess presidential activism 
in this area. The Slovak president possesses both legislative and non-legislative powers 
and therefore has to be preferred here. Furthermore, Slovakia presents the only case in 
my sample where the mode of presidential election was changed from indirect to direct 
elections. Due to this change the analysis of presidential activism in Slovakia thus al- 
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lows for validating my hypothesis and the findings of the statistical models on the mode 
of presidential election.
56  
The Hungarian president is formally the most powerful indirectly elected president in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the competencies of the office almost match those of its 
Polish counterpart (Metcalf 2002). Thus, Hungary presents an interesting point of com-
parison in the framework of this study and its selection for in-depth study will guarantee 
variation in the role of the president within political systems.  The country with the for-
mally weakest presidency in my sample is Estonia. Similar to the Polish case, the Esto-
nian case exhibits factors that could not be adequately incorporated into the quantitative 
analysis and their effects require further qualitative investigation. As mentioned above, 
Estonian presidents can only request the judicial review of bills after a previous veto of 
the same bill has been overridden by parliament. Furthermore, Estonian presidents’ role 
in government formation is even more strongly limited than in other countries. Finally, 
both Hungary and Estonia have not experienced constitutional changes during my peri-
od of observation. The analysis of episodes from these countries will thus be able to 
give an indication of the extent to which established informal rules or constitutional 
practice influence presidential activism. The fact that important constitutional changes 
can only be observed in Poland and Slovakia presents a certain limitation of this case 
selection. Nevertheless, this is somewhat balanced by the variation in presidential pow-
ers and the differences regarding the way in which constitutional law in Estonia and 
Hungary is interpreted and enforced. While Hungary possesses one of the most power-
ful Constitutional Courts in Europe, Estonia has not established a specialised court and 
questions of constitutional law are decided by the Supreme Court (Hönnige 2011). 
   
                                                 
56 Nevertheless, the veto override threshold was simultaneously increased to an absolute majority, so that 
findings on the individual effects of both factors will remain tentative to a certain extent  
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2.5.3  Selection of episodes 
From each of the four countries selected for analysis – Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia – I will select three episodes for in-depth analysis. Once again, the rationale 
for this specific number is grounded in the desire to strike a balance between sufficient 
depth of analysis (which would suffer if too many episodes were chosen) and safeguard-
ing against giving idiosyncratic cases too much weight (which could happen if too few 
are chosen). Furthermore, as each of the selected countries has experienced at least three 
presidents so far, I will be able to choose one episode per president. While my theoreti-
cal framework follows a presidency-centred approach and assumes that there should 
only be little variation in presidential activism due to individual office holders, this still 
allows me to assess comparatively whether and to what extent presidential perceptions 
or personality can add to the understanding and explanation of presidential activism.
57 
The resulting twelve case studies of presidential activism will thus enable me to analyse 
presidential activism and its determinants in a multitude of constellations in-depth while 
maintaining a manageable number of cases. Furthermore, such a variety of cases pro-
vides a sufficiently broad basis to assess the assumptions of my theoretical framework 
and the findings of the statistical models more generally. As shown in Table 9, episodes 
vary greatly in length and sometimes only last a few months or up to four years. For the 
purpose of my study, both very short and very long episodes make it difficult to gather 
sufficient data or reach the desired depth of analysis, respectively. Therefore, I will fo-
cus my case selection on episodes that last at least eighteen months but do not exceed 
three years in length. This time period allows for gathering sufficiently specific data as 
well as maintaining a strong focus on the assessment and analysis of the working mech-
                                                 
57 As this approach only allows for limited comparison of individual presidents’ behaviour in different 
contexts, the conclusions can only be tentative. Nevertheless, as the main aim of the qualitative analysis 
here is to assess the validity of the statistical model results, proceeding in this way should still be suffi-
cient for pointing out potential problems and providing starting points for further analysis.  
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anisms behind the use of presidential vetoes. Furthermore, the predictions of the statisti-
cal model are more likely to be accurate for longer episodes than for very brief periods. 
Although necessary for the reasons outlined above, this approach introduces a certain 
selection bias – particularly regarding shorter episodes which can be assumed to differ 
more strongly from the ‘ideal length’-episodes  outlined above than longer episodes. 
This is partly controlled for by the fact that the qualitative analysis is still embedded and 
anchored in the results of the statistical analysis, and that there will still be some varia-
tion in episode length within those episodes which will eventually be selected. There-
fore, it can be reasonably expected that the exlusion of very short and very long epi-
sodes here will not greatly skew the results. Nevertheless, this limitation needs to be 
acknowledged and differences in presidential activism during shorter and longer epi-
sodes should be further explored in subsequent studies. 
In line with Lieberman’s (2005) suggestions for model-testing qualitative analysis, I 
select cases that were comparatively well-predicted by my statistical model. Neverthe-
less, in order to detect variables that might have been omitted from the model I will also 
include episodes that are over- or underpredicted by the statistical model (see Rohlfing 
2008 and discussion above). Such episodes will particularly be included if they are 
‘crucial cases’ and promise to provide unique insights that can help to validate and im-
prove the results of the statistical models, either due to a particular constellation of vari-
ables  or  their  representativeness  for  the  use  of  vetoes  under  a  particular  president. 
Lieberman (2005) explicitly allows for deliberate case selection if the researcher’s exist-
ing knowledge of cases and their respective contexts allows for it – as is the case here – 
and argues that ‘the standard benefits of SNA [Small-N analysis] are much more likely 
to apply’ under deliberate case selection (Lieberman 2005, 447). The remaining selec-
tion bias is minimised by the fact that the qualitative analysis is nested in the results of  
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the statistical analysis. The data basis for my case selection is the comparison of the ac-
tual number of vetoes per episode with the predicted number of vetoes based on the co-
efficient estimates of my negative binomial model (Chapter 2.3.1).  
 
Episode selection – Estonia 
Estonia has experienced three different presidents so far – Lennart Meri, Arnold Rüütel 
and Toomas Hendrik Ilves – and my period of observations covers several episodes for 
each presidents. All presidents have used their veto during most episodes although their 
activism appears to have decreased over time (Table 16). 
Lennart Meri. Of the three Estonian presidents, inaugural president Lennart Meri was 
the only one to serve two terms during my period of observation, whereby his first term 
was exceptionally shortened as a means to ease transition to democracy (Pettai 2001, 
126; see also Chapter 3.1.2). Meri’s presidency thus stretches over the largest number of 
episodes, yet only three episodes meet the length criterion set above. These are Meri I–
Laar I, Meri II–Siiman and Meri II–Laar II. The use of vetoes in all three episodes is 
comparatively well-predicted by the statistical model and while all of them would be 
suitable for analysis, I will select the Meri II–Laar II episode here. First, it is the longest 
of all three episodes and thus provides the most material for in-depth study. Although 
Meri II–Siiman offers a closer match of actual veto use and model predictions, the gov-
ernment was in the minority during the whole episode – an a-typical situation for Esto-
nia and thus less suitable for arriving at more general conclusions. The Meri I–Laar I 
episode would also merit attention due to the exceptionally high level of presidential 
activism, yet it is too far off from the model to be used for the validation and by captur-
ing the beginning of the first post-communist democratic presidency in Estonia – a point 
at which several constitutional regulations were not yet sufficiently defined  – might  
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similarly present an atypical case. By analysing Meri’s activism during Meri II–Laar II, 
I will still be able to draw some comparisons with the first time both actors faced each 
other in office, yet I can also offer a more nuanced picture and set Meri’s activism dur-
ing his first two years in office in perspective. Finally, Meri II–Laar II is particularly 
interesting for analysis as it covers the second half of Meri’s second term in office. Alt-
hough my model controlled for the closeness of presidential elections and a decrease in 
activism was expected, the episode is still slightly overpredicted. Furthermore, Meri is-
sued most of his vetoes in 2001 which likewise requires further explanation and testing 
whether the causal links assumed in my theoretical framework exist. 
Figure 5: Actual number of vetoes and model predictions in Estonia 
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Arnold Rüütel. Overall, the presidency of president Rüütel consists of four episodes 
of which the latter two – Rüütel–Parts and Rüütel–Ansip I – are of sufficient length for 
analysis. During both episodes, Rüütel’s own party was not only represented in parlia-
ment but also participated in the government. As Rüütel’s predecessor Meri was never 
member of a political party and his successor Ilves cut ties with his party upon inaugu-
ration this is a rare constellation for the Estonian case, yet representative of Rüütel’s 
term in office. Eventually, the Rüütel–Parts episode is a better choice for in-depth anal-
ysis for several reasons. First, it is slightly longer than Rüütel–Kallas and the predic-
tions of the statistical model match Rüütel’s actual use of vetoes very closely, whereas 
Rüütel–Ansip I is considerably underpredicted by the model. Furthermore, the episode 
covers the middle part of Rüütel’s first and only term in office. The next presidential 
elections are still sufficiently far away so that it is possible to analyse the factors shap-
ing presidential activism when the re-election motive is still in the background. 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves. My period of observation covers only three episodes out of 
president Ilves’ first term in office (he was re-elected in October 2011). The first epi-
sode thereby only covers six months and is too short to serve as the basis of an insight-
ful analysis. The second and third episode – Ilves I–Ansip II and Ilves I–Ansip III, re-
spectively – are long enough to be analysed (26 and 19 months). Both episodes are 
overpredicted by the statistical model, yet the difference between predicted and actual 
vetoes per month is still rather small in both cases. While both episodes are not perfect 
for detailed analysis given their overprediction, it seems more appropriate here to select 
the episode Ilves I–Ansip II here. It is not only a little longer than Ilves I–Ansip III but it 
also has the advantage that is a complete episode while the Ilves I–Ansip III episode has 
been artificially ‘cut off’ by my choice of a period of observation. As the regular end of 
Ilves I–Ansip III would have been the general elections in March 2011, a small expan- 
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sion of this period for analysis would theoretically have been possible. However, be-
cause Ilves did not use his veto again after December 2010, the ratio of actual and pre-
dicted vetoes would have been similar to Ilves I–Ansip II in any case. 
 
Case selection – Hungary 
Between 1990 and 2010, Hungary had four different presidents. While the presidencies 
of the first three – Árpád Göncz, Ferenc Mádl and László Sólyom – are covered in full 
and will be the included in my analysis, president P￡l Schmitt’s tenure during my period 
of observation is unfortunately too short to analyse it as part of this study. 
Árpád Göncz. The activism of Árpád Göncz is an outlier both within Hungary and in 
the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. Göncz engaged in a number of conflicts with 
parliament and government over the use of his powers in such varied issues as the use 
of the military to break up a strike and the appointment of the heads of public broadcast-
ing (O’Neill 1997), and sent a number of bills to the Constitutional Court for review. 
Nevertheless, during his ten years in office he used his veto power only twice, both 
times during the Göncz II–Horn episode. While the episode is not as overpredicted by 
the statistical model as other episodes in Hungary, it is still a clear outlier. Irrespective 
of these limitations, Göncz II–Horn is the only episode during Göncz presidency that 
allows for model-testing analysis and the assessment of factors that caused his use of 
vetoes. Fortunately, the episode covers a period of three years and thus also allows for 
identifying the factors that determined G￶ncz’ use of vetoes in this particular instance 
and those that prevented further activism on other occasions. 
Ferenc Mádl. President M￡dl’s presidency consists of only three episodes, whereby 
Mádl–Orbán I and and Mádl–Medgyessy are both longer than 18 months and thus par-
ticularly suitable for analysis. During both episodes, president Mádl used his veto sig- 
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nificantly less frequently than predicted by the statistical model. This is less surprising 
for Mádl–Orbán I as Mádl had just been elected by the government majority and the 
overprediction thus likely represents an exceptionally strong effect of the consensus be-
tween president and cabinet. Yet during Mádl–Medgyessy president and government 
were in cohabitation and the government struggled to maintain coherence, so the over-
prediction of the model with regard to M￡dl’s veto use is rather unexpected. Therefore, 
it appears more promising to select the Mádl–Medgyessy episode for analysis here. It 
not only covers a somewhat longer time period but Mádl also used his veto more fre-
quently and the episode thus allow for a better analysis of the effect of explanatory fac-
tors. Similar to the case of Árpád Göncz, the focus of the analysis will be to understand 
the specific factors that caused the vetoes and why they did not increase activism in 
general. 
László Sólyom. László Sólyom was the most active president Hungarian president to 
date and used his veto power more frequently than both of his predecessors combined. 
His presidency consists of five, relatively short episodes of which Sólyóm–Gyurcsány II 
and Sólyóm–Bajnaj are the longest (23 and 13 months, respectively). Sólyóm–Bajnaj 
would theoretically be too short according to my selection criteria. Nevertheless, as the 
episodes selected for presidents Göncz and Mádl were significantly overpredicted, the 
fact that the statistical model only predicted half the number of Sólyóm’s veto would 
justify a deviation from this criterion. Nevertheless, Bajnaj’s cabinet was a largely tech-
nical rather than political government and therefore represents an atypical case from 
which it is hard to draw inferences. Sólyóm–Gyurcsány II is the longer episode and 
more suited for analysis here. The prediction of the statistical model for this episode 
provides one of the closest matches with the actual number of vetoes in Hungary and 
thus allows for a purer model-testing approach.    
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Figure 6: Actual number of vetoes and model predictions in Hungary 
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Episode selection – Poland 
Similar to Hungary Poland has had four different presidents so far, yet as my period of 
observation only covers five months of the term of current president Bronisław Komor-
owski I will only include the first three in my analysis. 
Lech Wałęsa. All episodes during Lech Wałęsa’s presidency are relative short and 
the  two  longest  episodes  Wałęsa–Suchocka  and  Wałęsa–Pawlak  II  –  only  reach  16 
months in length. While the first episode during Wałęsa’s term, Wałęsa–Bielecki, also 
still lasted a year, it is not very well suited for analysis as the Sejm was not yet demo-
cratically elected during this time (65% of the seats were reserved for parties of the old 
regime; Ziemer and Matthes 2010, 240). Overall, the Wałęsa–Pawlak II episode pre-
sents the best basis for analysis in the framework of my study. In contrast to Wałęsa–
Suchocka, the predictions of the statistical model match the actual use of vetoes by 
Wałęsa very closely and his activism is also almost midway between his most active 
and least active episodes. Furthermore, Pawlak II was the first government to be formed 
under the so-called ‘Small Constitution’, an interim constitution that contained a num-
ber of ambiguous stipulations, so that the analysis of the Wałęsa–Pawlak II episode al-
lows for assessing whether and how this change influenced presidential activism. 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Aleksander Kwaśniewski is the only Polish president to 
date who served two terms in office, both of which are covered by my period of obser-
vation. Due to frequent cabinet changes Kwaśniewski’s presidency consists of ten dif-
ferent episodes, half of which are shorter than a year and thus provide no sufficient basis 
for  analysing  presidential  activism  in  depth  and  for  tracking  legislation  over  time. 
Therefore,  the  episodes  Kwaśniewski  I–Cimoszewicz,  Kwaśniewski  I–Buzek  I  and 
Kwaśniewski II–Belka II present the most promising episodes here. However, the gov-
ernment during Kwaśniewski II–Belka II can – similar to Sólyóm–Bajnaj in Hungary be  
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classified as a cabinet of experts rather than a political government and an analysis of 
activism would therefore not be likely to provide generalizable results. Of the remaining 
two episodes, I will select Kwaśniewski I–Buzek I for in-depth study as it promises to 
provide  more  valuable  insights  with  regard  to  potential  model  misspecification.  
Kwaśniewski and Cimoszewicz were both from the same party and president and gov-
ernment thus in unified relations. The fact that Kwaśniewski used his veto power less 
often is thus not as surprising as in the case of the first Buzek cabinet. Kwaśniewski was 
in cohabitation with the Buzek government, yet still used his power only infrequently. 
Furthermore, the first Buzek cabinet was the first government to be formed under new 
constitution of 1997 and thus provides a point of comparison for the analysis of the 
Wałęsa–Pawlak II episode selected above. 
Lech Kaczyński. The term of Lech Kaczyński consists of five episodes overall but 
only the Kaczyński–Tusk episode is sufficiently long to be analysed as part of this study 
and there is no alternative to selecting it. Fortunately, Kaczyński used almost all of the 
vetoes during his term in this episode (16 out of 17) and it belongs to one of the best 
predicted episodes in the four countries. Just as the other two episodes selected above it 
starts after parliamentary elections. While this together with the fact that all presidents 
were in office for at least two years ensures a certain degree of comparability between 
the episodes selected for Poland, a selection bias is controlled for by the fact that the 
qualitative analysis is embedded in the results of the statistical analysis and there are 
sufficient points of comparison in the other countries.    
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Figure 7: Actual number of vetoes and model predictions in Poland 
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Case selection – Slovakia 
Similarly to Estonia, Slovakia has seen three presidents since it became an independent 
state in 1993. Thereby, only the first president, Michal Kov￡č, was elected indirectly by 
parliament while his successors – Rudolf Schuster and Ivan Gašparovič – were elected 
by popular vote. Until the Czech Republic changed the mode of presidential election in 
the same way in 2013, Slovakia was the only country in Central and Eastern Europe to 
have done so. 
Michal  Kováč.  The  presidency  of  the  first  and  only  indirectly  elected  president 
Michal Kov￡č consists of only three episodes, whereby the first episode (Kováč–Mečiar 
I) and the third episode (Kováč–Mečiar II) are particularly interesting and the only epi-
sodes in which Kov￡č used his veto; the episode Kováč–Moravčik would also have too 
short to sensibly analysed. Both Kováč–Mečiar I and Kováč–Mečiar II do not fit my 
selection criteria very well as they are slightly too short and too long, respectively. 
While Kováč–Mečiar II is somewhat better predicted by the model and I have otherwise 
rather preferred longer over shorter episodes, it is in this case better to select the shorter 
and less well-predicted Kováč–Mečiar I episode. Several authors have highlighted the 
shortcomings of Slovak democracy during Kováč–Mečiar II due to the autocratic gov-
erning style of Prime Minister Vlad￭mir Mečiar (Goldmann 1999;  Henderson 2002; 
Malov￡/Ryb￡ř 2008). Kováč–Mečiar I on the other hand can still be entirely classified 
as representing the politics of an indirectly elected president under ‘normal’ democratic 
conditions. This allows not only for generalising from its findings but also for compar-
ing Kov￡č’s activism to presidential activism in Estonia and Hungary. Furthermore, as 
there is significantly more literature on the period from 1994 to 1998, the selection of 
the Kováč–Mečiar I is also more valuable in terms of the generation of new knowledge. 
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Figure 8: Actual number of vetoes and model predictions in Slovakia 
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ther shows the working of the system under ‘normal’ conditions. Finally,  Schuster–
Dzurinda II still contains 30 vetoes and thus allows for assessing which factors were 
responsible for Schuster’s exceptionally high levels of activism. 
Ivan Gašparovič. My period of observation covers five episodes of president Ivan 
Gašparovič’ term in office. Unfortunately, only two episodes – Gašparovič I–Dzurinda 
II and Gašparovič I–Fico – are of sufficient length to be analysed as part of my study. 
The episode Gašparovič I–Dzurinda II would provide an interesting case as it would 
allow for comparison between the activism of presidents Schuster and Gašparovič dur-
ing  the  tenure  of  the  same  Prime  Minister.  Nevertheless,  I  will  choose  the  episode 
Gašparovič  I–Fico  for  analysis.  As  the  episodes  selected  for  president  Kov￡č  and 
Schuster are both significantly over- or underpredicted, respectively, it is necessary to 
select an episode here for which the number of vetoes was relatively well-predicted by 
the statistical model to be able to assess whether the working mechanisms assumed by 
my theoretical framework actually exist in practice. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the first statistical, cross-country analysis of the actual 
use  of  presidential  powers  in  parliamentary  and  semi-presidential  systems  to  date. 
Based on an original data set I have tested eight hypotheses on presidential activism us-
ing  descriptive  statistics,  event  count  regression  models  and  event  history  analysis. 
Overall, the results with regard to presidential vetoes were most robust and confirmed 
the majority of my hypotheses. Most prominently, it showed that popularly elected pres-
idents use their veto power more often than their indirectly elected counterparts.
58 In 
                                                 
58 Nevertheless, it was unfortunately not possible to directly control for the veto override threshold (which 
was highly correlated with the mode of election), so that this relationship requires further investigation in 
the qualitative analysis.  
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case of presidential requests for judicial review and legislative initiatives, the results 
were not as conclusive, yet still confirmed some of my hypotheses. The fact that the 
former are only very rarely used and evidence on the latter stemmed from only four 
countries also created some difficulties in applying the statistical models. 
The subsequent qualitative analysis will focus on the use of presidential vetoes. Their 
use was not only best explained by the different models, but vetoes are also the most 
prominent and frequently used presidential power, thus representing a key aspect of 
presidential activity. As their empirical analysis also confirmed the majority of my hy-
potheses, they provide a suitable basis to engage in ‘model-testing’ analysis which will 
help to further validate the quantitative findings and explore additional or alternative 
explanations of presidential activism. For this purpose, I have chosen 12 episodes of 
president-cabinet pairings for in-depth analysis using a two-step process. First, I select-
ed four countries – Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – as representatives of most 
different political systems (two directly and two directly elected presidents; two power-
ful and two weak presidents). In the second step, three episodes per country (one per 
office-holder) were selected based on the predictions of the negative binomial model of 
presidential vetoes. Thereby, a mix of well-predicted episodes and episodes where veto 
use did not match the model predictions was chosen. While the choices of specific cases 
for analysis invariably raised some concerns over potential selection bias, the great vari-
ety of cases chosen and the nesting of their qualitative study within the results of the 
statistical analysis will help to minimize the effects of potential bias. Thus, the eventual 
selection can not only be expected to enable me to confirm the links between variables 
in the model but should also help me to identify potential additional variables and prob-
lems with the model specification.    
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3 
PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVISM IN ESTONIA AND POLAND 
 
Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe use their powers in clearly distinguishable pat-
terns. The statistical analysis has shown that presidents use their veto particularly more 
frequently when they are directly elected, are in cohabitation with the government and 
when the government’s seat share is small. Nevertheless, it still stands to reason to what 
extent these general patterns are a true representation of the actual use of presidential 
powers and its determinants in practice. The second part of this study deals exactly with 
this question. It implements the second step of the nested analysis approach (Lieberman 
2005) and is thus aimed at the generation of in-depth knowledge that allows for critical-
ly assessing and validating the results of the statistical analysis. Given that not all fac-
tors could be included in the statistical models and hypotheses with regard to presiden-
tial activism in government formation, censure, and dismissal could not be tested due 
the lack of appropriate data, this step becomes even more relevant. It allows for includ-
ing additional variables and assessing different aspects of presidential activism, thereby 
laying the foundation for drawing strong and reliable conclusions.  
In this and the following chapter I will use qualitative case studies to analyse the 
working mechanisms behind presidential activism in depth. My analysis will thereby 
build on my findings with regard to presidential vetoes which largely confirmed the ex-
pectations of my theoretical model. Hence, I will follow the logic of ‘model-testing’ 
analysis which is aimed at validating the results of the statistical model by tracing the 
assumed causal relationships between variables and demonstrating ‘that in the absence 
of a particular cause, it would have been difficult to imagine the observed outcome’  
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(Lieberman 2005, 442). Following this logic, the analysis will be structured around spe-
cific presidential vetoes which were chosen for their overall significance, both in rela-
tion to the results of my elite interviews and in comparison with similar, non-vetoed leg-
islation. Where possible examples of comparable or other bills which were not returned 
by the president will also be discussed in the analysis. While Lieberman (2005) argues 
that the model-testing qualitative analysis should be confined to those variables that 
were already included in the statistical model, I will still take Rohlfing’s (2008) sugges-
tion into account and broaden the scope of the analysis by also exploring other factors 
that could have influenced presidential activism.  
The analysis will thereby be focussed on twelve episodes of president-cabinet pair-
ings in Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia which were selected based on their con-
formity with the predictions of the statistical model and/or promise to provide valuable 
insights beyond the variables included in my theoretical framework. The variation with-
in this sample as well as its size – allowing for analysing mechanisms in depth while 
simultaneously safeguarding against spurious inferences based on idiosyncratic cases – 
will thereby enable me to draw strong conclusions. While the analysis of presidential 
veto use is confined to these episodes to achieve a sufficient depth of analysis
59, the use 
of presidential powers in government formation, censure, and dismissal is assessed on a 
country-basis. Given that not all episodes cover presidents’ use of non-legislative pow-
ers, this is necessary to achieve a sufficient number of observations and achieve reliable 
results. 
The analysis will start with a brief overview of the presidencies in the four case study 
countries – their creation, powers, and the development of political practices over time – 
to provide sufficient context for the following in-depth analysis. I will then proceed by 
                                                 
59 Nevertheless, where appropriate some comparison to preceding and subsequent episodes will be made.  
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analysing the use of presidential vetoes and presidential involvement in government 
formation,  censure  and  dismissal  in  two  ‘most  different’  country  pairs.  As  outlined 
above, this approach allows for assessing and contrasting the effects of variables under 
very different conditions. This not only allows for stronger conclusions if the same ef-
fects of independent variables are found in two very different systems but it also prom-
ises to produce results that can contribute to the critical assessment of the more general 
theoretical framework proposed in this study. Albeit valuable, insights from the compar-
ison of two similar cases within a sample that already shares a number of similarities 
might be too particular to do so. Nevertheless, the results of this tudy will still be sub-
ject to a final comparative assessment (chapter 5) which combines insights from all four 
countries, so that potential differences between more similar cases can still be highlight-
ed and discussed. 
In this chapter, I will examine presidential activism in Estonia (weak & indirectly 
elected president) and Poland (strong & directly elected president). In the following 
chapter, I then turn to presidential activism in Hungary (strong & indirectly elected 
president) and Slovakia (weak & directly elected president). As presidents in Slovakia 
have only been elected by popular vote since 1999, I will also analyse the activism of 
inaugural president Michal Kov￡č and assess whether changing the mode of election 
had an impact on presidential activism. Overall, the qualitative case studies confirm the 
working mechanisms of the variables included in the statistical models and demonstrate 
that the associations found in the statistical analysis are more than just correlation. Nev-
ertheless, the analysis also highlights some difficulties with coding and suggests a num-
ber of additional explanatory factors for presidential activism which will be discussed in 
the third part of this thesis.    
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3.1  Overview: Presidents, their powers and political developments in 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
The four case study countries have been chosen for their diversity in terms of the mode 
of presidential election and presidents’ constitutional powers. While the four countries 
faced similar obstacles in developing a political practice with regard to the presidency, 
there are also some important country-specific developments. In order to aid the under-
standing of the in-depth case studies in this and the following chapter it is necessary to 
provide some more contextual information on the political developments in each coun-
try as well as the particular stipulations guiding the use of presidential powers. For this 
purpose, this section provides an overview of the creation of the presidencies and their 
constitutional role as well as the most important political conflicts and constitutional 
changes that led up to today’s political practice. 
 
3.1.1  Creating the presidential office 
Following the fall of Communism, all four countries were faced with the challenge of 
designing a new political system. Hereby, Estonia and Slovakia adopted new constitu-
tions (Pettai 2001; Malová 2001), whereas Hungary and Poland opted for amendments 
to the communist constitutions. Poland then first passed an interim document on the re-
lationship between parliament, president and government in 1992 – the ‘Small Constitu-
tion’ – and an entirely new constitution in 1997 (Wyrzykowski 2001). Hungary on the 
other hand continued to use the heavily amended communist constitution until 2011 
(Szikinger 2001; Várnagy 2012). Except for Slovakia, where the break-up of Czecho-
slovakia required the quick adoption of a new constitution and the role of the president 
was not given much thought (Malová 2001), the creation of the presidency was a major 
point of contention and political debate in all countries.    
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The  greatest  conflict  took  place  in  Hungary  where  the  Socialist  Workers  Party 
pushed for a strong, directly elected presidency they hoped to fill by with a popular ‘re-
formed’ candidate as a means to hold on to power (Körösényi 1999, 276).
60 After the 
parties of the democratic opposition were at first divided over the issue (Dieringer 2009, 
163ff), they eventually decided to postpone presidential elections until after a new and 
democratic parliament had been elected. After their election victory the constitution was 
then amended to allow for an indirect election of the president; however, the presidents’ 
wide range of powers – a remnant of the Communists’ proposals – was not curtailed 
(Szikinger 2001, 412f; O’Neill 1997, 205f). 
In Estonia, the constitutional assembly was likewise divided over the issue of presi-
dential powers and the mode of election (Pettai 2001; Annus 2004). Most constitutional 
drafts favoured a more presidential system, but deputies eventually chose a strongly par-
liamentarian draft as the basis for a new constitution (Taagepaera 1993, 223). Neverthe-
less, the public clearly favoured a popularly elected head of state, so that the first round 
of presidential election in October 1992 was exceptionally held by popular vote. Par-
liament then elected the president from the two frontrunners (Pettai 2001, 132). 
Poland initially amended its 1952 Communist constitution and, as part of a compro-
mise reached during the roundtable talks in 1989, established an indirectly elected and 
powerful presidency with Communist leader General Jaruzelski as its first incumbent 
(Jasiewicz 1997, 131f). Popular and democratic presidential elections were only intro-
duced a year later after Lech Wałęsa, leader of the Solidarity trade union, called for Ja-
ruzelski’s removal. Prime Minister Mazowiecki  (himself a Solidarity  representative) 
believed he would rather be able to defeat Wałęsa in a popular contest and therefore 
proposed direct presidential elections. After Jaruzelski agreed to have his term in office 
                                                 
60 Interestingly, in other CEE countries the democratic opposition pressed for direct elections as their 
candidates had higher chances of winning the election (O’Neill 1997, 199).  
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shortened,  the  first  popular  presidential  elections  were  held  in  November  1990 
(Jasiewicz 1997, 132f; McMenamin 2008, 121). 
 
3.1.2  Presidential elections and term limits 
The rules for popular presidential elections in Poland and Slovakia mirror systems used 
across the world. In the first round of elections an absolute majority of votes is needed 
to win; if no candidate reaches the required majority the two frontrunners proceed into 
the second round. Whichever candidate receives the largest number of votes in the sec-
ond round is elected president. Until now, first-placed candidates in the first round usu-
ally won the second round as well; only Aleksander Kwaśniewski has been elected in 
the first round (albeit only for his second term). Presidents in both countries are elected 
for a term of five years.
61 
Table 20: Results of direct presidential elections in Poland and Slovakia, 1990-2010 
President  In office  1
st round  2
nd round 
Poland       
Lech Wałęsa  12/1900 – 12/1995  40.0%  74.3% 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski  12/1995 – 12/2000  35.1%  51.7% 
  12/2000 – 12/2005  53.9%  - 
Lech Kaczyński  12/2005 – 04/2010     33.1%
 *  54.0% 
Slovakia       
Rudolf Schuster  06/1999 – 06/2004  47.4%  57.2% 
Ivan Gašparovič  06/2004 – 06/2009     22.3% *  59.9% 
  06/2009 – present  46.7%  55.5% 
Notes:* Runner-up in first round. 
Source: Malov￡ and Učeň (2000), Učeň (2005); Malov￡ and Učeň (2010); Jasiewicz (1997); Jasiewicz 
and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2001; 2006). 
 
Stipulations on the indirect election of presidents in Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia 
(1993-1998) show greater diversity. In Estonia, an absolute two-thirds majority is need-
ed to elect a president in parliament. If after three rounds of voting no candidates re-
                                                 
61 In Poland, presidents can only serve two terms at any point (Art. 127 II Polish Constitution), whereas 
Slovak  presidents  are  only  restricted  to  two  consecutive  terms  and  could  thus  theoretically  seek  re-
election after a break (Art 103 II Slovak Constitution [2001]).  
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ceives the required number of votes, the election is transferred to an electoral college 
consisting of the 101 deputies of the Riigikogu (parliament) and representatives of mu-
nicipal councils (§79 Estonian Constitution).
62 The two candidates with the most votes 
are automatically nominated, yet the college can also nominate further candidates. An 
absolute majority of votes is needed to be elected by the college, yet should none of the 
candidates reach the  required majority, the election is transferred back to parliament 
(§§20-28 President of the Republic Election Act). As mentioned above, these rules did 
not apply to the first presidential elections in October 1992 (Pettai 2001, 132). 
In Hungary, a majority of two thirds of the members of parliament is required to 
elect a president in the first two rounds of voting. In the third and final round, a simple 
majority is sufficient (Art 29B Hungarian Constitution  [1989]). Until l999, the Slovak 
Constitution stipulated that an absolute three-fifths majority was necessary to elect the 
president. While there was no limit to the number of rounds, the necessary majority did 
also not decrease and new nominations were possible at any point (Art 101 Slovak Con-
stitution [1992]). After parliament failed to elect a successor for inaugural president 
Michal Kov￡č in 1998, the regulations were changed to allow for popular elections 
(Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 2008, 183-184). Finally, all presidents are elected for a term of five 
years
63; yet the first term of Estonia’s inaugural president Lennart Meri was exception-
ally shortened to four years to facilitate the transition into the new political system (Pet-
tai 2001, 126).
64 
   
                                                 
62 In the past, municipal councils have sent 273 (1995), 265 (2001), and 244 (2006) representatives (La-
gerspetz and Meier 2010, 84).  
63 Estonian presidents are limited to two consecutive terms (§80 Estonian Constitution),  while Hungarian 
presidents can only serve two terms at any time (Art. 29A Hungarian Constitution). 
64 The first term of parliament was likewise shortened from four to three years.  
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3.1.3  Presidential powers 
The Estonian and Slovak presidents are typically classified as comparatively ‘weak’, 
whereas the presidents of Poland and Hungary have been vested with a wider range of 
formal powers. In the following, I describe the stipulations on the use of presidents’ re-
active powers – the focus of the following in-depth analysis – in more detail. 
 
Reactive legislative powers 
Each of the four presidents has the right to return legislation to parliament; however, 
regulations on this differ from country to country. With a few exceptions, presidents can 
return any bill to parliament and they can theoretically do so for any reason. Until 1999, 
the Slovak president was also obligated to return a bill to parliament if the government 
demanded it (Art 87 IV Slovak Constitution [1992]), yet such vetoes did not constitute a 
discretionary action of the president and thus cannot be described as presidential ac-
tivsim (see also Appendix A4.3). Apart from this, the largest differences between coun-
tries are a) the available time frame, b) potential responses by the legislature, and c) the 
majority needed to override a veto. Presidents have at least two weeks to either sign or 
return a bill; except for Slovakia, this period starts after the receipt of the bill by the 
president.
65 In both Poland and Hungary, bills can be declared as ‘urgent’ by the gov-
ernment which reduces the time limit to seven (Poland) or five days (Hungary). After a 
veto, parliaments in Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia can drop the bill, attempt to over-
ride the veto or amend it and incorporate presidential suggestions for amendments. In 
Poland,  the  latter  is  not  possible.  Poland  also  deviates  with  regard  to  the  override 
threshold. While a simple or absolute majority is needed in the other countries (although 
higher override majorities are necessary if the original bill also required a higher thresh-
                                                 
65 This is relevant because in 1995-1998 the Slovak parliament repeatedly only delivered official version 
of bills to the president for signature one or two days before the deadline or failed to deliver them at all in 
a bid to hinder the president’s work.  
157 
old), a relative 3/5 majority is necessary to override a veto here (2/3 from 1989 to 
1997). After a successful override, the president is generally obliged to sign and prom-
ulgate the bill in question. An exception exists in Estonia, where the president can still 
apply for judicial review (see also next paragraph); this possibility also existed in Po-
land 1992-1997. Should parliament incorporate presidents’ suggestions into the bill, Es-
tonian and Slovak presidents can veto the bill again. In Hungary, the Constitutional 
Court decided in 2003 that the president has to sign the bill irrespective of amendments 
(Hungarian Constitutional Court 2003).  
Presidents can also request a judicial review of bills before the Constitutional Court 
(Supreme Court in Estonia). Similar to a presidential veto, presidents can only request 
judicial reviews when they are presented with a bill for signature. In the case of Estonia, 
presidents can only file review request of bills for which their initial veto has been over-
ridden by parliament. In all other countries, applying to the Constitutional Court for re-
view is not possible after a veto override (except for Poland 1992-1997). The deadline 
for filing a judicial review request is generally the same as for using a presidential veto 
(the Estonian constitution does not specify a deadline; neither did the ‘Small Constitu-
tion’ in Poland for review requests after a veto override). Courts on the other hand are 
not given a limit to reach a decision, which can take between a few days and more than 
a year. During the time of the proceedings, the bill is not in force and review requests 
can thus be an effective, yet unpredictable way for presidents to suspend the promulga-
tion of a bill. However, if the Court declares a bill constitutional, the president has to 
sign it. In Poland, the ‘Small Constitution’ allowed parliament to override rulings of the 
Constitutional Court, so that the president still had to sign a bill even if it was declared 
unconstitutional. 
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Y
e
s
,
 
o
n
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
P
M
 
(
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
 
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
r
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
M
,
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
r
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
 
y
e
s
 
y
e
s
 
n
o
 
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
t
e
 
t
o
 
i
m
p
e
a
c
h
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
f
a
i
l
e
d
 
[
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
9
]
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
 
 
f
a
i
l
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
s
i
x
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
e
)
 
 
[
1
9
9
9
-
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
]
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
 
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
d
r
a
f
t
 
l
a
w
 
t
i
e
d
 
t
o
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
n
o
t
 
p
a
s
s
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
;
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
h
a
s
 
n
o
t
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
m
a
k
e
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
f
)
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
Y
e
a
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
 
s
h
o
w
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
o
r
 
a
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
t
s
)
 
e
n
t
e
r
e
d
 
i
n
t
o
 
f
o
r
c
e
;
 
a
)
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
i
r
d
 
c
a
n
d
i
d
a
t
e
;
 
b
)
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
c
a
n
 
a
l
s
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
a
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
v
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
;
 
c
)
 
i
.
e
.
 
a
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
;
 
d
)
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
m
u
s
t
 
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
,
 
S
p
e
a
k
e
r
 
o
f
 
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
s
;
 
e
)
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
m
u
s
t
 
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
 
w
i
t
h
 
S
p
e
a
k
e
r
 
o
f
 
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
;
 
f
)
 
n
o
t
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
s
t
 
s
i
x
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
s
i
-
d
e
n
t
’
s
 
t
e
r
m
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
n
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
;
 
H
u
n
g
a
r
i
a
n
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
[
1
9
8
9
]
;
 
S
l
o
v
a
k
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
[
1
9
9
2
]
;
 
S
l
o
v
a
k
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
[
2
0
0
1
]
.
 
 
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
 
 
Y
e
s
,
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
 
b
)
 
(
o
n
l
y
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
/
r
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
M
)
 
Y
e
s
,
 
o
n
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
P
M
 
(
a
f
t
e
r
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
 
N
o
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
d
 
r
o
l
e
 
i
n
 
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
 
 
y
e
s
 
n
/
a
 
y
e
s
 
(
n
o
 
t
i
m
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
)
 
 
n
/
a
 
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
p
a
s
s
e
s
 
f
o
u
r
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
m
o
-
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
o
n
e
 
y
e
a
r
;
 
a
 
c
a
n
-
d
i
d
a
t
e
 
f
o
r
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
4
0
 
d
a
y
s
 
o
f
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
m
e
n
t
 
d
)
 
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
 
 
Y
e
s
,
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
 
(
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
h
a
s
 
t
w
o
 
a
t
t
e
m
p
t
s
)
 
a
)
 
Y
e
s
,
 
o
n
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
P
M
 
(
a
f
t
e
r
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
r
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
M
,
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
r
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
 
y
e
s
 
y
e
s
 
y
e
s
 
(
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
3
 
d
a
y
s
)
 
 
N
o
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
b
i
l
l
 
p
u
t
 
t
o
 
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
d
u
m
 
b
y
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
j
e
c
t
e
d
;
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
n
o
t
 
p
a
s
s
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
o
f
 
b
u
d
g
-
e
t
a
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
O
n
 
r
e
q
u
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
 
C
a
b
i
n
e
t
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
C
a
b
i
n
e
t
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
s
 
C
a
b
i
n
e
t
 
D
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
 
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
e
s
 
c
a
b
i
n
e
t
 
C
e
n
s
u
r
e
 
 
O
n
 
r
e
q
u
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
 
O
n
 
r
e
q
u
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
c
)
 
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
o
b
l
i
g
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
p
l
y
 
D
i
s
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
m
u
s
t
 
d
i
s
s
o
l
v
e
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
c
a
n
 
d
i
s
s
o
l
v
e
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
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T
a
b
l
e
 
2
4
:
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
’
 
n
o
n
-
l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
p
o
w
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
P
o
l
a
n
d
 
N
e
w
 
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
1
0
/
1
9
9
7
 
–
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
 
Y
e
s
,
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
 
(
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
h
a
s
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
t
t
e
m
p
t
)
 
a
)
 
b
)
 
O
n
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
P
M
 
(
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
 
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
r
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
M
,
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
r
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
 
y
e
s
 
y
e
s
 
y
e
s
 
(
n
o
 
t
i
m
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
 
S
e
j
m
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
e
l
e
c
t
 
a
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
p
r
o
-
p
o
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
j
m
 
f
a
i
l
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
l
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
’
s
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
c
a
n
d
i
d
a
t
e
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
a
 
c
a
n
d
i
d
a
t
e
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
j
m
 
n
/
a
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
Y
e
a
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
 
s
h
o
w
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
o
r
 
a
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
t
s
)
 
e
n
t
e
r
e
d
 
i
n
t
o
 
f
o
r
c
e
;
 
 
a
)
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
 
c
a
n
d
i
d
a
t
e
;
 
b
)
 
p
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
c
a
n
 
a
l
s
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
a
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
v
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
;
 
c
)
 
i
.
e
.
 
a
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
;
 
d
)
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
-
m
i
s
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
j
m
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
,
 
o
r
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
j
m
’
s
 
o
w
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
;
 
e
)
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
p
e
a
k
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
e
j
m
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
:
 
P
o
l
i
s
h
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
[
1
9
8
9
]
;
 
P
o
l
i
s
h
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
[
1
9
9
2
]
;
 
P
o
l
i
s
h
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
[
1
9
9
7
]
.
 
‘
S
m
a
l
l
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
’
 
1
2
/
1
9
9
2
 
–
 
1
0
/
1
9
9
7
 
 
Y
e
s
,
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
 
(
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
h
a
s
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
t
t
e
m
p
t
)
 
a
)
 
O
n
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
P
M
 
(
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
t
u
r
e
)
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
n
e
e
d
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
e
d
 
o
n
 
c
a
n
d
i
d
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
a
f
f
a
i
r
s
,
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
d
e
-
f
e
n
c
e
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
i
o
r
 
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
r
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
M
,
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
r
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
 
y
e
s
 
y
e
s
 
y
e
s
 
(
n
o
 
t
i
m
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
)
 
 
y
e
s
 
B
u
d
g
e
t
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
p
a
s
s
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
;
 
n
o
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
l
o
s
e
s
 
s
i
m
p
l
e
 
v
o
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
-
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
s
t
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
1
9
5
2
,
 
a
m
e
n
d
e
d
 
1
9
8
9
)
 
1
2
/
1
9
8
9
 
–
 
1
2
/
1
9
9
2
 
 
N
o
,
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
o
n
l
y
 
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
w
h
o
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
n
 
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
-
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
j
m
 
N
o
,
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
j
m
 
 
N
o
,
 
t
h
e
 
S
e
j
m
 
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
o
n
 
i
t
s
 
o
w
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
a
 
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
m
e
 
m
i
n
s
t
e
r
 
 
n
/
a
 
d
)
 
n
/
a
 
d
)
 
n
/
a
 
d
)
 
 
n
/
a
 
N
o
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
;
 
n
o
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
i
s
 
p
a
s
s
e
d
;
 
S
e
j
m
 
h
i
n
d
e
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
s
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Non-legislative powers 
Presidents in all countries generally have the first choice in putting forward a candidate 
for Prime Minister, whereby no explicit criteria for selection are specified in the consti-
tutions. Nevertheless, as candidates in all countries need to pass a vote of confidence, 
presidents need to nominate a candidate that is supported by a majority of deputies. Ex-
cept for Slovakia, the Prime Minister and other government members are only appoint-
ed and sworn in after a successful vote of confidence. While the Slovak exception of 
swearing in the government before the vote of confidence has not created any contro-
versies so far, the fact that Czech president Miloš Zeman used a similar stipulation to 
appoint a government against the will of a parliamentary majority in 2013 (BBC 2013) 
shows the potential for conflict. Furthermore, in all countries cabinet ministers are ap-
pointed by the president on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Under the Polish 
‘Small Constitution’ (1992-1997) the president needed to be consulted on candidates for 
the so-called ‘force ministries’, i.e. foreign affairs, interior and administration, and de-
fence. As the constitution did not specify the process of consultation, this has meant that 
presidents appointed candidates of their own choosing or governments have anticipated 
potential objections in their proposals (see also Chapter 3.3.4). Presidents can only dis-
miss the government after a vote of no-confidence, the resignation of the Prime Minis-
ter, or after parliamentary elections. Between 1989 and 1992 the Polish president could 
submit a motion for the government’s dismissal to the Sejm, yet otherwise all presidents 
have (had) no discretion in initiating a dismissal of the cabinet. 
In all countries the censure of individual cabinet members takes place on request of 
the Prime Minister. In Estonia and Poland (since 1992) parliament can also pass indi-
vidual motions of no-confidence which require the president to dismiss the minister in 
question. Although the constitutional rules are very clear, presidents have often refused  
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to comply with Prime Ministers’ requests.
66 While the controversy in Estonia was exac-
erbated by the fact that organic law stipulates presidential action within three days (BNS 
1994a), in Slovakia the Constitutional Court ruled that the president is not obligated to 
acquiesce to the Prime Minister’s request (Orosz and Šimunčov￡ 1998, 101). The disso-
lution of parliament is the non-legislative power in which presidents generally have the 
largest discretion (except for Polish presidents since 1997). However, presidents can 
only exercise such discretion in specific scenarios, e.g. if no government is formed after 
elections or if the passage of the budget is significantly delayed. 
 
3.1.4  Conflict, consolidation and constitutional changes 
The above discussion has already highlighted a number of important conflicts with re-
gard to the role of the president. Nevertheless, to place the following in-depth analysis 
into a broader and less technical context, it is also necessary to outline general political 
developments with regard to presidential activism in the case study countries. For the 
sake of brevity, the overview has to remain rather general and will therefore concentrate 
on events of particular importance to the role of the president and to the episodes of 
president-cabinet pairings selected for in-depth analysis. The overview is complemented 
by detailed tables of episodes and the use of presidential powers in all four countries 
(Appendix A4). 
In all four countries, clashes between presidents and governments characterised the 
first years after the fall of communism. In Hungary, president Árpád Göncz and the 
government of Jószef Antall clashed on a variety of issues ranging from the role of the 
president as Commander-in-chief and in representing the country abroad to his right to 
refuse high-level appointments (K￶r￶s￩nyi 1999, 281, O’Neill 1997, 211f). These con-
                                                 
66 See also sections on presidents’ activism in government formation, censure and dismissal in the follow-
ing case studies.  
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flicts were mostly triggered by the ambiguity in the design of the presidency; yet, the 
Constitutional Court soon curtailed the presidency’s powers considerably. Its rulings 
made clear that the president was not part of the executive and could not refuse ap-
pointments for political reasons or exercise actual power over the military (Szikinger 
2001, 419f; Körösényi et al. 2010, 365). They also stressed the parliamentary character 
of the political system and closed ‘semi-presidential loopholes’ so effectively that am-
biguity (and thus future conflicts) were mostly avoided (Köker and Engst 2012). The 
conflict  between  president  and  government  decreased  considerably  even  before  the 
1994  elections  brought  G￶ncz’  former  party,  the  SZDSZ,  into  power.  Furthermore, 
when attempts were made to draft a new constitution during the second term of parlia-
ment (1994-1998), the constitutional commission suggested limiting presidential powers 
further (Körösényi 1999, 279). Discussion about the role of the presidency then largely 
subsided – also due to the fact that Göncz and his successor Ferenc Mádl later largely 
refrained from using their powers very often. Although Mádl did veto important gov-
ernment projects and had the Constitutional Court confirm the importance of his veto 
power, he mainly left policy-making to government and parliament (Körösényi et al. 
2009, 111). After the election of Lászlo Sólyom in 2005, discussions about the presi-
dency and its powers resurfaced. Sólyom (a non-partisan and former chairman of the 
Constitutional Court) was elected with the votes of the opposition and therefore re-
mained in cohabitation with the government throughout his term. He also practiced a 
very literal interpretation of the constitution and disregarded established political prac-
tice, e.g. he refused to coordinate appointments for high political posts with the parlia-
mentary majority (Körösényi et al. 2009, 112).  
Similar to G￶ncz in Hungary, Estonia’s first president Lennart Meri also served two 
terms. Although Meri’s election had been supported by most leading parties (including  
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the Pro Patria Union [IL] of Prime Minister Mart Laar), he soon clashed with govern-
ment and parliament. Most initial conflicts concerned the role of the president and were 
thus somewhat similar to the struggles of his Hungarian counterpart. For instance, Meri 
repeatedly vetoed the Law on the Office of the President (Tavits 2008, 63f) and blind-
sided the government by his uncoordinated foreign policy decisions (Pettai 2001, 131). 
After Meri’s first term, he was not re-nominated by the IL, yet eventually became the 
government candidate (EECR 1996a). Meri’s activism decreased after his re-election, a 
trend that continued under his successor Arnold Rüütel. Nevertheless, his use of vetoes 
along party lines – Rüütel was member of the ‘People’s Party’ which was part of the 
government for about two thirds of his term – was not popular with parties and the pub-
lic alike. Estonia’s third president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, used his powers only sparing-
ly and his vetoes were always based on constitutional objections. Ilves did not engage in 
larger  conflicts  with  parliament  and  government  and  even  initiated  a  constitutional 
change that abolished the president’s position as Supreme Commander of the armed 
forces (ERR 2011) – a position which other presidents (including Göncz in Hungary but 
also Wałęsa in Poland) had been very keen to keep. 
In Poland the first direct election of the president in 1990 created an imbalance of 
power. The Sejm had still been elected under semi-democratic rules
67 and Wałęsa could 
claim higher legitimacy in comparison to parliament and government during the first 
year in office (Jasiewicz 1997, 136f). In 1992 the ‘Small Constitution’ came into force, 
an interim constitution that only regulated the basic relations between president, gov-
ernment and parliament. It extended presidential powers and codified political practices 
– such as the president’s involvement in government formation – that had developed 
through Wałęsa’s initial legitimacy advantage (van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 1999, 
                                                 
67 65% of seats had been reserved for the Communists (Ziemer and Matthes 2010, 240).  
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177;  Wyrzykowski  2001,  443ff).  The  strong  constitutional  position  and  the  heavily 
fragmented parliament allowed Wałęsa to dominate the political agenda. He was only 
challenged  on  his  behaviour  after  the  1993  parliamentary  elections  when  the  post-
communist SLD came to power. Contrary to other countries in this period, neither gov-
ernment  nor parliament  called on the  Constitutional Court to  clarify the president’s 
competencies. 
Wałęsa’s successor Aleksander Kwaśniewski (SLD) was overall less confrontational 
and maintained good contacts with the government even during cohabitation. However, 
as the SLD commanded at least a third of seats in the Sejm throughout his presidency, 
he was still able to exert considerable influence. A new constitution was adopted in 
1997 that limited the powers of the president in government formation and the legisla-
tive process (van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 1999, 188f). Most of the stipulations had 
been written as an antithesis to Wałęsa’s conduct in office and Kwaśniewski had presid-
ed over the constitutional commission before his election, so it was not surprising that 
conflict around the presidential office was rarer while he was in office (McMenamin 
2008, 128). His successor Lech Kaczyński kept close ties with the ‘Law and Justice’ 
party (PiS) led by his twin brother Jarosław Kaczyński and used its deputies to increase 
his leverage over the government after Jarosław became leader of the opposition. Ka-
czyński’s presidency was characterised by frequent clashes with Prime Minister Tusk 
and for the first time since 1989, the government asked the Constitutional Court to clari-
fy the president’s competencies. In 2008 Tusk and Kaczyński quarrelled over the presi-
dent’s  right  to  attend  and  participate  in  EU  summits  (Jasiewicz  and  Jasiewicz-
Betkewicz 2009, 1075f). While the Court ruled that the president was allowed to attend 
the meetings, it also declared that that the competency for formulating foreign policy lay  
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with the cabinet and that the president had to represent its position (Polish Constitution-
al Tribunal 2009). 
In the Slovak Constitution, the role of the president was only vaguely defined and al-
ready shortly after the election of Michal Kov￡č as president, these ambiguities trig-
gered the first conflicts between Kov￡č and Prime Minister Mečiar. In contrast to Esto-
nia, Poland and Hungary, the conflict was driven by the Prime Minister and his gov-
ernment. As Kov￡č openly opposed Mečiar’s autocratic governing style and attempts to 
embezzle public funds, the governing coalition started to obstruct the president’s fulfil-
ment of his duties, e.g. by reducing the budget of the presidential office to a bare mini-
mum (Haughton 2005, 88). In 1995, the government parties even tried to recall the pres-
ident but failed to reach the quorum of 3/5 of deputies (Kipke 2010, 322).
68 After the 
end of Kov￡č’s term, parliament failed to elect a successor on several occasions as nei-
ther government nor opposition commanded the required 3/5 majority and both sides 
were unable to agree on a compromise candidate (Horváth 2005, 4-5). To guarantee the 
functioning of the state until a new president was elected all parties agreed to amend the 
constitution and transfer some presidential powers to the speaker of parliament (Malová 
and Učeň 1999, 504).
69 A solution to the crisis in the form of popular presidential elec-
tions was only found when the opposition parties came to power in 1998 (Kipke 2010, 
321; Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 2008, 184). 
The governmental candidate, Rudolf Schuster, then also won the first popular presi-
dential election but renounced his party membership before inauguration. Subsequently, 
conflict between president and government was driven by the president. For instance, 
                                                 
68 Attacks against the president even continued on a personal level. While not entirely proven until today, 
the Meciar government has been seen as responsible for arranging Kov￡č’s son to be beaten up, drugged, 
and kidnapped to Austria in 1995 (Haughton 2005, 86-87). 
69 The constitution stipulated that the Prime Minister would be acting as head of state but forbade him to 
exercise a number of powers, i.e. promulgating laws, appointing the Prime Minister and other members of 
government. It were these powers that were transferred to the speaker.  
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Schuster supported several plans of the opposition (Tavits 2008, 126) and used his veto 
power with unprecedented frequency. He also called for an extension of his powers yet 
these suggestions went unheard, and government and parliament marginalised the presi-
dent by blocking most of his projects and initiatives (Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 2008, 196). 
Schuster’s successor, Ivan Gašparovič, largely followed the same pattern, although over 
time he forged closer ties with the SMER (‘Direction’) Party and decreased his use of 
vetoes during their tenure. Like Schuster, Gašparovič called for more powers for the 
presidency (Mesežnikov 2007, 34; 2009, 35). Gašparovič was re-elected in 2009, yet 
except for refusing to appoint a new general prosecutor elected by parliament using a 
constitutional loophole (Vilikovská 2011) he has not had a great influence on the devel-
opment of the role of the Slovak presidency. 
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Presidential activism in Estonia and Poland 
Estonia and Poland comprise the first ‘most different pair’ in the context of which I will 
analyse the use of presidential vetoes and presidents’ involvement in government for-
mation, censure and dismissal in depth. As outlined above, the activism of Estonian 
presidents has significantly decreased since the mid-1990s while Polish presidents have 
continually used their powers at a comparatively higher level since the first democratic 
presidential elections were held in 1990. The analysis shows that the mode of presiden-
tial election is one of the key factors in explaining this difference. Polish presidents act-
ed as agents of their electorate and used their veto power to defend their voters’ interests 
independently from government and parliament. The indirect election of presidents in 
Estonia on the other hand made presidents dependent on parliament so that office hold-
ers eventually only used their powers to improve legislation, rather than for political 
reasons. It is not only this contrast that corroborates the findings of my statistical analy-
sis, but there are also very similar findings from both countries that confirm the assump-
tions of my theoretical framework. For instance, presidents in both countries exploited 
decreasing government majorities and used their veto more frequently when the ideo-
logical distance from the government was greater. The findings also call the reliability 
of the effective number of parties as an indicator of parliamentary weakness into ques-
tion. In Estonia, parties were able to coordinate veto overrides irrespective of the frag-
mentation of parliament, and the Polish case showed that low rather than high fragmen-
tation can increase presidents’ chances of successful vetoes. In both countries high over-
ride thresholds affected presidents’ propensity to veto, yet their effect also interacted in 
varying degrees with other variables. Finally, presidents in both countries vetoed more 
frequently when there were divisions within or between government parties – a factor 
that was not included in my statistical models and merits further consideration.     
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3.2  Presidential activism in Estonia 
The Estonian president is the ‘weakest’ in comparison with presidents in the countries 
selected for in-depth analysis. Both the indirect elections and the limited powers stood 
in contrast to the majority of proposals in the constitutional assembly and public opinion 
(Taagepera 1993, 211; Pettai 2001, 132), yet this institutional set-up had the single larg-
est effect on presidential activism over time. Elections by parliament led to lower levels 
of activism and presidents generally issued vetoes in order to improve rather than to 
block policies. Overall, this corroborates the assumptions of my theoretical framework, 
as do findings that a higher seat share of the government and harmonious relations be-
tween president and government lead to lower levels of presidential activism. Yet, the 
in-depth study of presidential activism in Estonia also yields several unexpected results. 
For instance, the analysis shows that parliamentary fragmentation did not play a role for 
presidential activism and does not always provide an adequate measure of parliament’s 
weakness. Furthermore, presidents also vetoed legislation when their own party partici-
pated in the government in order to increase its leverage vis-à-vis its coalition partners. 
 
3.2.1  Meri II – Laar II: The president exploits intra-governmental divisions 
Table 25: Summary of key information – Meri II-Laar II (03/1999-09/2001) 
Episode start:  03/1999  Episode end:  09/2001 
President:  Lennart Meri (non-partisan)  Prime Minister:  Mart Laar (IL) 
In office since:  10/1992 (re-elected 10/1995)  In office since:  03/1999 
Government composition:  IL, RE, MD 
Government seat share:  51% (episode start), 52% (episode end) 
Effective No of parties:  6.64 (episode start), 7.01 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  6 vetoes / 0.19 per month 
Model prediction:  7.14 vetoes / 0.23 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Well predicted; largely representative of Meri’s 2
nd term in office. 
 
The conflict between Lennart Meri and Mart Laar had characterised politics during the 
first years of Estonian independence. During his first term in office, Meri had frequently  
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returned bills to parliament (24 vetoes in four years or 3.9% of legislation) and weighed 
in on several political debates, especially issues concerning the Russian minority in the 
country and the new institutional arrangements (Tavits 2008, 62-64). Despite having 
been nominated by the IL, Meri did not affiliate himself with any party and his relation-
ship with Laar’s first government can be described as cohabitational.
70 After Laar re-
turned to power, they faced each other once again, and while Prime Minister Laar was 
now clearly the dominant political actor this did not mean that Meri remained inactive.  
In the general elections of March 1999 the Centre Party (KE) won the largest number 
of seats, yet as its leader Edgar Savisaar was unable to find suitable coalition partners, 
the runner-up IL led by Mart Laar formed a coalition with the Reform Party (RE) and 
the Moderates (MD). Other than its predecessor, the government held a majority in the 
Riigikogu and would have been able to promptly implement its planed reforms of cor-
porate taxation, state administration, and the extension of welfare (Pettai 2002, 947; La-
gerspetz and Maier 2010, 93). However, this was partly prevented by continuing con-
flicts among coalition partners and particularly the Reform Party’s reluctance to support 
administrative and welfare reform. The reasons for this were conflicts with IL-affiliated 
mayors in Tallinn where the three parties cooperated in the City council (Lagerspetz and 
Maier 2010, 92; Pettai 2002, 948).
71 Furthermore, parties were unable to settle on a joint 
candidate for the 2001 presidential elections. 
The selected time period covers Meri’s last two and a half years in office. Although 
some personal animosities between Meri and Laar from the first years of Meri’s very 
active presidency remained, relations between president and government can overall be 
described as neutral. The predictions of the statistical model match the actual number of 
vetoes relatively well and as in other episodes during Meri’s tenure, the government 
                                                 
70 The IL even refused to nominate him for re-election after the end of his first term (Tavits 2008, 62). 
71 As several MPs were also members of the city council it was easy for conflicts to spill over to the n a-
tional level (Pettai 2002, 949f).  
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consists of more than two parties and only holds a slim majority in parliament. While it 
is thus overall representative of Meri’s presidency and provides an excellent basis for 
model-testing analysis, one also needs to take into account that it is one of his least ac-
tive episodes. During Meri’s second term, his activism overall decreased although he 
still remained comparatively active (16 vetoes in five years or 1.9 per cent of all legisla-
tion) and the success rate of his vetoes increased. Nevertheless, the overall legislative 
output  of  parliament  remained  the  same  compared  to  the  previous  legislative  term. 
When facing Laar for a second time, Meri used his veto six times. Above all, the main 
reasons for vetoing were thereby not disagreements over content, but rather formal/legal 
considerations and – as the comparison with similar, non-vetoed legislation shows – the 
intermittent fragile government majority. At the same time, Meri’s general support for 
the government’s reform agenda prevented a higher number of vetoes. 
Table 26: Vetoes by president Lennart Meri during Laar II 
Name of vetoed bill  Date passed 
(majority)  Date of veto  Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1)  Bar Association Act  21/02/2001 
(43/77)  14/03/2001  Override 
(21/03/2001; 42/71) 
2)  Bankruptcy Act  01/06/2000 
(48/48)  08/06/2000  Override/Re-passage 
(14/06/2000; 70/71) 
       
Total: 6 vetoes / 1.4 % of all legislation passed     
Notes: Table only lists vetoes mentioned in analysis. 
 
Veto of the Bar Association Act 
For present purposes, Meri’s veto of the Bar Association Act is probably best-suited to 
illustrate the influence of different factors on the president’s decision. Passed in Febru-
ary 2001, the Act regulated the activities of the Bar Association and foreign lawyers in 
Estonia. The Reform Party had voiced some concerns in the drafting process of the bill, 
namely that it would potentially not guarantee the availability of legal aid for every-
body. Nevertheless, the bill was eventually passed with the votes of the coalition parties 
without any defections. President Meri subsequently vetoed the act, officially objecting  
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to the fact that it did not sufficiently regulate access to legal aid for the poor (Tavits 
2008, 63) and argued that this was in conflict with the country’s constitution. Opinions 
about the constitutional infringement of the bill differed, but the assertion of unconstitu-
tionality by the president must generally be treated with caution in the Estonian context. 
As Estonian presidents can only refer bills to the Supreme Court for judicial review af-
ter parliament has overridden their veto, Estonian politicians and experts generally agree 
that the president can only veto a bill if it is unconstitutional.
72 Thus, since the late 
1990s presidents have generally attempted to justify their objections on constitutional 
grounds. 
When the bill was debated in parliament again, the constitutional committee rejected 
Meri’s  concerns;  however,  opposition  parties  supported  the  idea  of  amending  the 
bill/further debate. Apart from concerns about the act’s constitutionality, the opposi-
tion’s support of his veto as well as the concerns voiced by deputies of the Reform Party 
(holding one third of the coalition’s seats) appear to have been part of Meri’s calcula-
tions when vetoing the bill. The government relied on a slim majority and Meri there-
fore only required a handful of defections for his veto to be successful. The veto had 
also raised public awareness of the issue so that Meri had public opinion on his side.
73 
Nevertheless, parliament overrode the veto; yet after RE representatives speculated that 
the president might after all turn to the Supreme Court (Tomsalu 2001) the government 
promised to regulate the access to legal aid in another bill, the Legal Service Act (BNS 
2001; Tavits 2008, 63). 
The statistical model would explain the veto through the slim parliamentary majority 
and parliamentary fragmentation. However, public opinion and the divisions between 
coalition parties also played an important role in Meri’s decision to veto. The use of 
                                                 
72 This was also corroborated by my interviews. 
73 In an interview after parliament’s override of the bill, the Chancellor of Justice declared that 70% of 
those who had petitioned his office during the last year had done so asking for legal aid (Tomsalu 2001).  
173 
public interest/support as a power resource was also a strategy that Meri used in his first 
term when he vetoed several pieces of legislation on the rights of the Russian minority. 
Lacking parliamentary support, he was still able to build up pressure on government and 
parliament by involving the public and international actors such as the CSCE (van der 
Stoel 1993). 
In contrast to the veto discussed above, Meri did not veto other government bills that 
had a social policy component and had an even higher public profile. This is mainly be-
cause the coalition parties – despite internal disagreements – were still able to pass them 
with more comfortable majorities and the support of opposition parties. For instance, 
the ‘Unemployment and Social Protection Act’ which foresaw an extension of allow-
ances for jobseekers, was not vetoed by Meri. The plans were less extensive than origi-
nally proposed and several regulations hinged on an improving economic situation (Rii-
gikogu Stenographic Record 14/06/2000; BNS 2000a). Thus, the bill would have been a 
suitable target for presidential activism. Nevertheless, all parties supported the bill and 
it was passed unanimously (Riigikogu Voting Record 14/06/2000) rendering both a veto 
override and later change – as in the case of the Bar Association Act – unlikely.
74 
 
Vetoes of the Bankruptcy Act and other bills 
Meri’s remaining vetoes do not entirely conform to the expectations of my theoretical 
framework, insofar as they were not so much motivated by policy differences between 
president and government or parliament but rather by procedural considerations. For 
instance, in his veto of the Bankruptcy Act in June 2000 Meri did not object to content 
of the bill, but merely called attention to the fact that it had only been passed with a 
relative, not an absolute majority as required by the constitution (Meri 2000). Thus, the 
                                                 
74 A similar situation emerged with regard to the reform of the hospital service which – albeit controver-
sial  (BNS  2000b)  –  was  passed  with  an  80%  majority  in  parliament  (Riigikogu  Voting  Record 
09/05/2001).  
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reason for Meri’s veto was simply to allow parliament to rectify this procedural error 
which it did by overriding the veto with the correct majority. Formal-legal considera-
tions were also preponderant in Meri’s remaining four vetoes, yet other factors included 
in my statistical models equally played a role. In all cases Meri justified his vetoes with 
the fact that the bills were internally inconsistent and contained obvious constitutional 
infringements. At the same time, these vetoes occurred towards the end of Meri’s term 
in office when tensions between the Reform Party and its coalition partners weakened 
the government and its coherence in parliament. Thus, the coalition parties made no at-
tempts to override the bills and only returned to them after the election of Meri’s suc-
cessor, Arnold Rüütel. After the internal cohesion of the Laar government in its early 
days appears to have prevented Meri from interfering in the legislative process (his first 
veto was only used more than a year after the government’s inauguration), the narrow 
majority in combination with increasing internal conflicts resulted in an increased use 
(and success) of vetoes. 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that during this episode Meri’s vetoes did 
not concern bills which were at the core of the government’s legislative agenda. This 
could be interpreted as an effect of the neutral president-government relations. Further-
more, an increasing share of legislation (and governmental reform plans) was aimed at 
preparing Estonia’s accession to NATO and the EU which Meri wholeheartedly sup-
ported. Thereby, the government now incorporated advice from international organisa-
tions into their bill proposals and Meri, who had demanded this on previous occasions 
(e.g. in the case of the language law; van der Stoel 1993; BNS 2000c), now had no rea-
son to intervene.    
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Lennart Meri – From activist president to passive guardian of the constitution 
The main reasons for Meri’s use of vetoes during the analysed episode were the short-
comings of the bills passed by parliament as well as the increasing weakness of the gov-
ernment. The latter was not only caused by the slim majority but also by divisions be-
tween coalition parties. Nevertheless, parties were still able to pass their major bills with 
comparatively  large  majorities  and  the  support  of  (most)  opposition  parties,  so  that 
Meri’s vetoes rather concerned bills of lesser importance. He also objected to bills due 
to their form rather than their content. The latter could potentially also be interpreted as 
an effect of his generally neutral relationship with the government. Last, an increasing 
number of bills was meant to prepare Estonia for NATO and EU accession. As the 
country was one of the ‘frontrunners’ in accession talks at the time (Grabbe 2003), Meri 
did not want to jepoardise its position or counteract his own foreign policy efforts of the 
last years by interfering. 
In the context of the remainder of Meri’s presidency, the episode also highlights oth-
er factors that influenced his activism over time. During his first term, parliament was 
far more fragmented and polarised which facilitated and appears to have increased his 
veto use. Furthermore, as interviews with two of his former staff members highlighted, 
Meri saw himself as having been popularly legitimised by his semi-popular election. As 
constitutional practice was only slowly established, he also pushed for more powers 
(which explains his consecutive vetoes of the Working Act of the President; Tavits 
2008, 63f). This motive became less important over time after the most fundamental 
issues regarding the relations between state institutions had been resolved and parlia-
ment and government agreed to withstand presidential interference. Finally, during his 
first term Meri’s staff had been mostly been young and politically less experienced than 
him so that he lacked informal connections to other institutions. For his second term in  
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office, advisors were largely recruited from government ministries which gave the pres-
ident a better insight into the workings of government and facilitated the tactical (and 
sparser) use of vetoes. 
 
3.2.2  Rüütel – Parts: Activism to defend the presidential party’s interests 
Table 27: Summary of key information – Rüütel-Parts (04/2003-04/2005) 
Episode start:  04/2003  Episode end:  04/2005 
President:  Arnold Rüütel (RL)  Prime Minister:  Juhan Parts (RP) 
In office since:  10/2001  In office since:  04/2003 
Government composition:  RP, RE, RL 
Government seat share:  58% (episode start), 59% (episode end) 
Effective No of parties:  5.9 (episode start), 7.2 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  3 vetoes / 0.13 per month 
Model prediction:  3.22 vetoes / 0.13 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Very well predicted; representative of Rüütel’s term in office 
 
Arnold Rüütel’s election had come as a surprise to many and so did his vocal support 
for Estonia’s EU membership by which he distanced himself from his former party al-
lies (Huang 2002). Yet when his own party joined the Parts government, it became clear 
that his independence was far from established and that he was more than willing to be-
come a vicarious agent in the hands of his party. 
In the 2003 elections, the Centre Party had once again won the most votes yet tallied 
with the newly formed ‘Res Publica’ (RP) in the number of seats. RP then formed a 
coalition with the Reform Party and Rüütel’s People’s Union (RL) under RP leader Ju-
han Parts (Pettai 2004). In contrast to Meri, Rüütel had a strong partisan affiliation as he 
had stood at the helm of the RL until his election.
75 Thereby, Rüütel had a partisan rep-
resentation in parliament throughout his presidency and the RL was part of the cabinet 
for nearly two-thirds of his tenure. His relationship with the Parts government was 
                                                 
75 Nevertheless, he was not considered to be a very influential figure in the party. My respondents in Es-
tonia almost unequivocally described him as ‘party chairman but not party leader’.  
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overall neutral to unified. Although the governing coalition held almost 60% of the par-
liamentary  seats,  it  was  continuously  weakened  by  internal  conflicts  over  reforms, 
changes in key ministries due to scandals
76 and the inability of Prime Minister Parts to 
act as an arbiter between parties (Pettai 2004; 2005; Lagerspetz and Maier 201 0, 92). 
Already in November 2003  – only seven months after the government’s investiture – 
the RL threatened to leave the government to force its coalition partners to postpone tax 
cuts proposed by the RP (Pettai 2004, 996). This also significantly delayed the passage 
of a number of bills which were stipulated in the coalition treaty and were predicated on 
a different budgetary situation. On the other hand, tensions between RP and the RE in-
creased after RE leader Andrus Ansip joined the government as minister of economy. 
Following Parts’ resignation, Ansip formed a new government with the Centre Party 
(KE) and the RL (Pettai 2005, 1005). 
Table 28: Vetoes by president Arnold Rüütel during Parts I 
Name of vetoed bill  Date passed 
(majority)  Date of veto  Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1)  Amendments  to  the  European  Parlia-
ment Election Act 
11/02/2004 
(61/90)  03/03/2004  Override 
(09/03/2004; 61/95) 
2)  Act  to  Amend  the  Dwelling  Act  and 
§12 of  the Republic of Estonia Prin-
ciples of Ownership Reform Act 
15/06/2004 
(50/87)  30/06/2004  Override 
(20/07/2004; 47/83) 
3)  Government  and  Associated  Acts 
Amendment Act 
25/02/2004 
(52/83)  11/03/2004  Override 
(24/03/2004; 53/85) 
       
Total: 3 vetoes / 0.9 % of all legislation passed     
 
The predictions of the statistical model for Rüütel’s veto activity during the Parts 
government match the actual use of veto very closely and it is one of the best predicted 
episodes in all four countries. The constellation of other factors – unified president-
government relations, majority government, and at least a small support base in parlia-
ment – is also representative of Rüütel’s presidency as a whole. Thus, the analysis will 
allow for validating the results of the statistical model and for assessing whether the 
                                                 
76 The heads of the ministries of defence, economy, finance, agriculture and foreign affairs were all re-
placed during the Parts government.  
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close match of prediction and actual activism can in fact be attributed to the influence of 
the variables in the model or other factors. 
When Rüütel was elected it was expected that he would overall be less active than 
his predecessor (Huang 2002; Tavits 2008, 65) which is certainly true for his veto activ-
ity (during his term Rüütel vetoed 12 bills, i.e. 1.9 per cent of legislation). Nevertheless, 
my interviews showed that he frequently attempted to influence policy informally (see 
below), although he did not resort to actual threats. Rüütel also maintained closer con-
tacts with the government (even when the RL was not a coalition partner) and used his 
regular meetings with the Prime Minister to discuss policy issues. In the episode at 
hand, Rüütel used his veto three times and thus returned the same percentage of legisla-
tion to parliament as the in the previous episode during which he was still in cohabita-
tion with the government. Questions of constitutionality only played a role for one veto; 
in the remaining two cases the vetoes represent Rüütel’s attempts to defend his own par-
ty’s interests. While this challenges the assumption that presidents’ policy preferences 
are already being implemented when their party is part of the government, it.confirms 
the expectations that presidents will veto to block policy that conflicts with their own 
views. Furthermore, it provides a tentative explanation for the similarly high level of 
activism in this episode compared to the preceding one. 
 
Veto of the European Parliament Election Act 
In February 2004 parliament passed amendments to the law on elections to the Europe-
an Parliament. Amongst others, the bill stipulated the use of open electoral lists for the 
upcoming EP elections.
77 Rüütel’s RL strongly opposed this option and preferred closed 
lists as they feared other parties would nominate well-known candidates or celebrities to 
                                                 
77 This was similar to the system used for the elections of the Riigikogu.  
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attract votes which would then refrain from taking up their seats and let others go to 
Strasbourg (Riigikogu Stenographic Record 11/02/2004). However, as the bill had not 
been initiated by the government but by the Pro Patria (IL) faction, the RL had little in-
fluence over the drafting process of the bill. The RE opposed the reform for the same 
reason, so that the RP eventually passed the bill against the will of its coalition partners 
using the votes of the opposition. 
After the bill’s passage, the RL leadership started to apply pressure on the president 
both  publicly  and  informally  to  return  the  bill  back  to  parliament  (Toomla  2004; 
Mattson  2004;  Tavits  2008).
78 Rüütel eventually bowed to  his  party’s demands and 
based the justification for his veto on the RL’s arguments. There was little possibility 
for avoiding an override (even when taking into account that an absolute majority was 
needed) but it is possible that the RL and Rüütel speculated that the Centre Party would 
eventually vote with them to block the override (Sildam and Mattson 2004). Neverthe-
less, after the president’s veto attracted many negative comments, the Centre Party did 
not change its position and supported the override. As Rüütel’s veto did not have any 
constitutional basis
79, a subsequent request for judicial review was out of the question 
and he had to sign the bill. While Rüütel tried to distance himself officially  from the 
RL, the process of this veto shows that his ties were still strong and rather than being 
able to use the RL’s participation in the government to his advantage, the RL used the 
president to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its coalition partners. This provides a new 
perspective on president-government relations and presidential activism. My theoretical 
framework assumed that presidents will refrain from vetoing legislation when their par-
ty participates in the government. However, the above example shows that presidents 
                                                 
78 This has also been corroborated by my interviews with respondents from parliament/government. 
79 In fact, the justification of his veto only mentioned the constitution in a footnote hinting at § 107 as the 
legal basis for the veto. The body consisted of on ly five sentences in which the Rüütel argued that open 
lists would not ‘give voters the confidence’ that the candidate they had voted for would enter parliament 
(Rüütel 2004a).  
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might be equally inclined to veto during unified relations if it promises to increase their 
party’s bargaining weight within the coalition. It needs to be seen in the analysis of the 
remaining episodes to what extent this mechanism can be found in other cases, although 
it calls for a reassessment of the respective theoretical assumptions in any case. 
The amendments to the ‘Riigikogu Election Act’ passed in September 2004 present a 
counterexample to the veto described above. In particular, it highlights the importance 
of the majority situation in parliament for presidential activism. The bill was initiated by 
the government so that the RL had the opportunity to exert greater influence over the 
drafting process and subsequent discussions. Several of the party’s suggestions (BNS 
2004) were still not incorporated into the final version and the party leadership could 
have asked president Rüütel to intervene on their behalf once again. Nevertheless, this 
time the opposition parties unanimously supported the bill and chances for stopping it 
by the ways of a veto were minimal. Eventually, the People’s Union even voted in fa-
vour of the bill (Riigikogu Voting Record 22/09/2004) and Rüütel did not become ac-
tive. 
 
Veto of the Law on Ownership 
A similar pattern can be observed for Rüütel veto of the Law on Ownership, although 
here the president was at least partially able to draw on legal arguments. The bill was 
passed in June 2004 and changed rent-related regulations for tenants of properties which 
– after having been seized by the Communist state – had now been returned to their 
rightful owners. The RL opposed the bill from early on even though it had been initiated 
by the government. In particular, the party objected to the abolition of a rent-ceiling and 
feared that poorer tenants would be evicted if the new owners decided to raise the rent 
(Riigikogu Stenographic Record 09/06/2004). Subsequently, the RL voted against the  
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bill in the third reading and it only passed with support from the IL and an independent 
MP (Riigikogu Voting Record 15/06/2004). When Rüütel returned the bill to parlia-
ment, he once again incorporated arguments made by the RL and claimed that the quick 
entering into force of the bill violated the constitutional principle of legal certainty. Fur-
thermore, he argued that the social security system would not be able to cope with the 
potential demand for state-funded housing that might arise as a consequence of the bill 
(Rüütel 2004c). As the government  was  divided over the issue, Rüütel (or the RL) 
might well have expected that parliament would not pass the bill again without delaying 
its entry into force. Nevertheless, the constitutional commission rejected the president’s 
objections  and  the  bill  was  passed  again  unamended  (Riigikogu  Voting  Record 
20/07/2004). Rüütel then asked the Supreme Court to declare the bill unconstitutional, 
yet failed to substantiate the comparatively short justification of his veto. In line with 
the opinions from the Ministry of Justice and the Chancellor of Justice the Court de-
clared the bill constitutional in December 2004 and ordered its entry into force ten days 
after its publication in the State Gazette (Estonian Supreme Court 2004). As the presi-
dent’s main objective was to postpone the implementation of the bill, the decision of the 
Supreme Court must not be seen as a disappointment for Rüütel. The application to the 
Supreme Court delayed the implementation of the bill and furthermore directed atten-
tion towards an issue relevant to the RL. This corroborates my assumptions that presi-
dents will also veto under conditions that are unfavourable to seeing their veto sustained 
as long as it raises awareness of their policy position. It also demonstrates that the ‘suc-
cessful’ use of vetoes cannot always easily be established as presidential motivations for 
activism might be very bill-specific. 
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Arnold Rüütel – The president as the long arm of the party 
Despite  the  close  match  of  the  model  prediction  and  the  actual  number  of  vetoes, 
Rüütel’s veto activity cannot sufficiently be explained by the variables included in my 
statistical models. Rüütel vetoed to satisfy the interests of his own party and to defend 
them  against  the  larger  coalition  partners  which  was  unforeseen  by  my  theoretical 
framework. However, it might provide an additional explanation as to why the relation-
ship between veto use and president-government relations is non-linear. A potential ad-
ditional variable for inclusion in the statistical models might be a dummy indicating that 
the president’s party is the junior coalition partner, but this might lead to similar coding 
problems as with the current measure of intra-executive relations in determining the ac-
tual affiliation of the president with one particular party. Irrespective of these potential 
problems, the analysis has shown that for Rüütel (as well as for Meri during the episode 
analysed above) divisions between government parties provided an incentive to become 
active as vetoes were more likely to be sustained. 
At the same time, the analysis highlights the role played by communication between 
coalition parties and between president and government in how presidents deal with 
bills in general. My interviews showed that Rüütel regularly met with with Prime Min-
ister Kallas and cabinet ministers from all coalition parties to discuss legislation current-
ly debated in parliament. During these meetings, Rüütel or his staff would suggest new 
bills  or  amendments  to  existing  legislation  (although  usually  unsuccessfully).  Even 
though my interviews also revealed that cabinet ministers dreaded the meetings initiated 
by the president, these meetings still appear to have served as an ‘outlet’ for presidential 
activism. They provided a semi-formal environment to discuss legislation and forum for  
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Rüütel to voice his concerns without resorting to using his powers.
80 Rüütel was report-
edly already satisfied when  his suggestions were acknowledged by representatives of 
the government. Irrespective of whether his suggestions were incorporated, he felt that 
he had fulfilled his role as check-and-balance which reduced the overall number of ve-
toes. The latter is exemplified by the fact that both vetoes described above as well as the 
subsequent veto of the Government Amendment Act occurred during a period in which 
‘normal’ communication between president and government was suspended.
81 Accord-
ing to two of my respondents, regular meetings between president and Prime Minister 
had been discontinued by the end of 2003. Prime Minister Parts had made it clear that 
he would not take (further) policy suggestions from the president and questio ned the 
purpose of their regular meetings that only started again in March 2005, shortly before 
the end of Parts’ premiership. It appears therefore that despite his partisan partiality, 
president Rüütel might still have played a role as informal arbiter in conflicts between 
the RL and the other coalition partners. This role was particularly salient when the RL 
felt that their preferences were not taken into account. On the other hand, closer com-
muniation between coalition partners – e.g. in the case of the Riigikogu Election Act – 
prevented the emergence of divides and Rüütel was not required to step in. 
Last, the analysis of Rüütel’s activism also sheds light on the symbolic value of ve-
toes and that the reason for vetoing does not have to be a complete prevention of a bill’s 
coming into force. However, these reasons appear to be bill-specific. The data basis is 
too thin to derive wider conclusions here, yet the relationship between specific charac-
                                                 
80 It should be noted that his suggestions never amounted to veto threats but could rather be described as 
determined but with little actual expectation that they would be taken into account. 
81 Based on the evidence gathered in my interviews, it appears likely that the veto of the ‘Government and 
Associated Acts Amendment Act’ – which was motivated by reasons of internal inconsistency and legal 
technicalities (Rüütel 2004b) – could have even been avoided had the line of communication between 
president and Prime Minister not been cut.  
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teristics individual bills and presidential vetoes could still be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
 
3.2.3  Ilves I – Ansip II: Limited activism due to limited legitimacy 
Table 29: Summary of key information – Ilves I-Ansip II (03/2007-05/2009) 
Episode start:  03/2007  Episode end:  05/2009 
President:  Toomas Hendrik Ilves 
(non-partisan, formerly SD) 
Prime Minister:  Andrus Ansip (RE) 
In office since:  10/2006  In office since:  04/2005, 
re-elected 03/2007 
Government composition:  RE, IRL, SD 
Government seat share:  59% (episode start), 59% (episode end) 
Effective No of parties:  7.42 (episode start), 7.79 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  2 vetoes / 0.09 per month 
Model prediction:  3.37 vetoes / 0.13 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Outlier/overpredicted (as all episodes during Ilves’ presidency) 
 
Ilves candidacy for president was supported by both his own Social Democrats (SD) as 
well as the Reform Party (RE) (Pettai 2007, 944). When Prime Minister and RE leader 
Andrus Ansip was confirmed in office and formed a coalition with the SD and IRL after 
the 2007 elections, Ilves naturally continued to be largely inactive.
82 Yet Ilves’ patterns 
of activism differ from his predecessors and marked a shift towards a more passive role 
for the president. 
In Prime Minister Ansip’s second cabinet, the collaboration between the government 
parties was mostly characterised by the SD’s struggle to reach compromises on social 
policy with the two centre-right parties. The eventual exclusion of the SD from the coa-
lition followed a battle over unemployment benefits. The RE proposed to cut benefits, 
whereas the SD opposed cuts and forced consultations with trade unions and employer 
associations. When it became clear that benefits had to be cut in any case due to budget-
                                                 
82 Nevertheless, he had left the SD upon his election and did not maintain particularly close contact.  
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ary restrictions, the SD and its call for higher taxes stood in clear opposition to the other 
parties. Prime Minister Ansip eventually decided to remove the SD from the coalition 
and to continue as a minority government (Pettai 2010, 958). Contrary to the pattern 
observed with regard to Rüütel and the RL, Ilves neither sided with his former party nor 
did he actively interfere.
83 In fact, he remained largely supportive of the government’s 
plans throughout the episode. 
Table 30: Vetoes by president Toomas Hendrik Ilves during Ansip II 
Name of vetoed bill  Date passed 
(majority)  Date of veto  Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1)  Temporary  Procedure  for  Remunera-
tion of Members of the Riigikogu Act 
19/11/2008 
(53/54)  24/11/2008  Override
a) 
(02/12/2008; 88/59) 
2)  Gender Equality Act, Equal Treatment 
Act, Republic of Estonia Employment 
Contracts Act, Local Government Or-
ganisation Act and Local Government 
Council Act Amendment Act 
19/02/2009 
(58/85)  03/03/2009  Amendments accepted 
(24/09/2009; 68/69) 
       
Total: 2 vetoes / 0.1% of all legislation passed     
Notes: a) The bill was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
 
Ilves was clearly Estonia’s least active president, yet he also did not experience a pe-
riod of cohabitation during his first term in office. Two out of his seven vetoes fall in 
the selected episode and while this matches the predictions of my statistical model most 
closely, it is still less than expected. Furthermore, the episode at hand is the least active 
period during Ilves’ first term in office. Part of this might be connected to the fact that 
parliament’s legislative output was lower during the selected episode. While this was 
included in the statistical models, the recurrent conflicts between coalition parties meant 
that more controversial bills with a higher public profile were postponed. Parties then 
concentrated on passing bills which had their full support, maximising the likelihood of 
veto overrides. The following analysis focusses on identifying additional factors ex-
                                                 
83 This was confirmed by both expert and political respondents. The only open (yet less significant) con-
flict between president and government arose in 2007/2008 when Ilves’ nominee for the office of Chan-
cellor of Justice was not elected for a second term. His second candidate was however accepted without 
difficulty (Pettai 2009, 953f).  
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plaining why Ilves refrained from further activism. It is shown that the most important 
factors for Ilves’ restraint were thereby not the large government majority (although it 
did play a role) and the presence of his former party in the government. Rather, the indi-
rect election of the president contributed to him playing a largely apolitical role so that 
he refrained from using his veto for political reasons. 
 
Veto of MPs salaries 
In November 2008, the Riigikogu passed two bills that tied the calculation of salaries 
for public servants and members of parliament to the average wage and temporarily 
prevented planned increases. Thereby, the bill regulating deputies’ salaries created a 
greater discussion and controversy and was eventually vetoed by president Ilves. The 
bill capped salaries at the 2007-level until parliamentary elections in March 2010 – a 
gesture by which parties (together with reducing and/or capping the salaries of other 
high-ranking  officials)  hoped  to  please  the  electorate  in  times  of  economic  crisis.
84 
However, §75 of Estonian constitution stipulates that any amendments to deputies’ sala-
ries can only come into force in the next legislative term and require an absolute majori-
ty according to §107. The issue of constitutionality had been raised in discussions of the 
draftand the presidents’ office had signalled to the coalition parties that the president 
would return the bill on these grounds. The bill was eventually passed by a 53:1 margin 
and Reform Party deputies abstaining (Riigikogu Voting Record 19/11/2008). There-
fore, when Ilves issued the veto, an override seemed only slightly more likely than 
amendments to the bill. Eventually, the Act was passed without amendments by a clear-
er 58:1 margin; nevertheless, deputies of Prime Minister Ansip’s Reform Party still ab-
stained from voting (Riigikogu Voting Record 02/12/2008). Subsequently, Ilves applied 
                                                 
84 This is not only the shared perception of several of my unaffected respondents but was also admitted by 
some of those more directly involved.  
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to the Supreme Court for judicial review. The Court agreed with his argumentation that 
the bill violated the Estonian constitution and rejected the position of the government 
and the Chancellor of Justice (Estonian Supreme Court 2008). 
Overall, the veto and its justification show that Ilves had no interest in blocking the 
bill for political reasons. Nevertheless, as his concerns were not shared by the Chancel-
lor of Justice and the government he might not have decided to veto the bill had the 
constellation of other factors not been so beneficial. The divisions between the RE and 
its coalition partners as well as the exceptionally required absolute majority increased 
his chances of forcing amendments to the bill. Furthermore, by vetoing Ilves opposed 
his own (former) party which is evidence of a continued distancing from the SD and 
growing closeness to the RE – a pattern corroborated by my interviews. The veto also 
highlights the difficulties of incorporating veto override thresholds into statistical mod-
els – apart from the strong correlation between higher thresholds and popular presiden-
tial elections they can still vary from bill to bill. 
President Ilves did not veto the second bill on the salaries of public officials. This 
highlights the importance of the division within the government – in combination with 
the exceptionally high override threshold – for the veto described above. The second bill 
regulated the salaries of judges, ombudsmen, members of the government and the presi-
dent, and was not subject to the increased override threshold. While Ilves criticised that 
the measure was only temporary and reduced the salary of some officials (e.g. the Gen-
der Equality and Equal Treatment Commissioner), whereas merely freezing the salary 
of others he did not have any legal objections. Furthermore, in contrast to the bill on 
MPs’ salaries, it was supported by all parties and passed without a dissentient vote (Rii-
gikogu Voting Record 19/11/2008). Ilves later stressed that parliament was within its 
right to set the salaries in this way and that he would therefore sign the bill (Estonian  
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Presidential Office 2008). Nevertheless, it cannot be entirely exluded that not vetoing 
the bill was a strategic move. By refraining from returning the second bill to parliament 
and accepting a reduction of his own salary, he had let parties have at least part of their 
political gesture, thereby sweetening his veto with their political success. 
 
Veto of the Gender Equality Act 
Ilves’ second veto during the episode shows again that rather than returning bills due to 
their content, he used his veto to ensure their constitutionality in every possible way. In 
March 2009, he returned the Gender Equality Act to parliament because of errors in its 
drafting process. Similar to the law on public officials’ salaries, he stressed that parlia-
ment could regulate the matter as they wished (implying that he would not interfere 
even if he disagreed with the content).
85 However, he objected to the fact that an addi-
tion about local elections had been made to the draft shortly before its second reading 
and the opposition thus had no chance to submit fu rther amendments or counter -
proposals.
86 As the additions had nothing to do with the original draft, Ilves asserted 
that it had in fact become a new draft that needed to go through all three readings, not 
only the second and the third (Estonian Presidential Office 2009). Parties agreed not to 
override the veto and passed a new version of the law six months later. This pattern was 
also followed in vetoes after the Social Democrats had been excluded from the coalition 
– in each case Ilves’ vetoes were accepted by parliament and his suggestions were in-
corporated. Hereby, a significant factor also seems to be Ilves’ growing closeness with 
the RE already mentioned above which – apart from the low level of presidential activ-
                                                 
85 In discussions with parliament, the head of his legal department furthermore declared that the president 
would also refrain from providing any instructions on how the law should be changed or re-adopted in 
order not to overstep his prerogatives. 
86 This had also been criticised by the Centre Party (Riigikogu Stenographic Record 17/02/2009).  
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ism – was the main reason given by my interviewees for the good relations between 
president and government. 
In addition to these factors, it appears that the strong position of the Chancellor of 
Justice as a further check-and-balance on government and parliament may have pre-
vented further vetoes. In December 2008 parliament passed amendments to the Local 
Government Election Act relating to the Tallinn City Council. The changes were moti-
vated by the fact that current legislation did not provide for sufficiently proportional 
representation and thus tentatively violated the constitution. Therefore, the amendments 
stipulated changes to both the size of the city council and to the seat allocation formula. 
However, similar to the Gender Equality Act, the bill’s passage had been very quick
87. 
Thus, concerns of the KE whose deputies pointed out that the amendments did not actu-
ally increase proportionality had not been adequately incorporated. The bill was eventu-
ally passed against the votes of the KE and some deputies already anticipated that Ilves 
would veto the bill for the reason mentioned above. Nevertheless, the Chancellor of Jus-
tice publicly criticised the bill almost immediately after its passage and prompted pa r-
liament to pass a new version (BNS 2008), thus giving Ilves no possibility to become 
active. 
  
Toomas Hendrik Ilves – The presidency as a passive-corrective 
The low level of activism under president Ilves can only partly be explained by factors 
relating to the political environment – unified intra-executive relations and a large gov-
ernment seat share – and additional factors such as provisions for special override ma-
jorities and the unique institution of the Chancellor of Justice. The most important ex-
planatory factor – both for the low level of activism and the emphasis on legal techni-
                                                 
87 The bill had passed through all three readings in less than two weeks.  
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calities over political objections – appears to lie in the mode of election of the president. 
Ilves clearly and repeatedly stressed his support for a political set-up in which parlia-
ment  and  other  institutions  (such  as  the  Chancellor  of  Justice  or  other  ombuds-
men/institutional watchdogs) rather than the president provided checks-and-balances on 
the government. This can be seen as the main reason for the low number of vetoes, even 
when taking into account the lack of cohabitation during his presidency and his growing 
closenss to the RE. Furthermore, in contrast to Rüütel Ilves did not try to use his infor-
mal contacts with members of parliament and government to influence the content of 
legislation, but he was rather concerned with its form.
88 
Ilves’ idea of a more representative presidency is best exemplified by a constitutional 
amendment proposed early in his first term which can said to have set the ‘tone’ for his 
whole presidency. In May 2007, Ilves proposed to parliament to strip the president of 
his right to nominate the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. After president 
Meri had still successfully contested changes to the president’s position as Supreme 
Commander and thus ultimate superordinate to the Commander-in-Chief
89, Ilves pro-
posed that, instead of the president, the Defense Minister should nominate the Co m-
mander-in-Chief. He also proposed to eliminate all references to the Commander -in-
Chief from the constitution. He justified his proposal by arguing that the government 
and not the president was subject to parliamentary control. Therefore, the Commander 
of the Defence Forces had to be nominated by the government and its selection regulat-
ed by ordinary law (Ilves 2007; ERR 2011). The fact that Ilves pursued a decrease in 
presidential power early in his term and that his proposal had been prepared in extensive 
                                                 
88 A respondent noted that if Ilves’ advisors took part in consultations about new legislation, their sole 
focus lay on the legal-technical aspect. 
89 In 1994, Meri first vetoed the National Defense Act which allowed the government to use armed forces 
during peacetime in case of states of emergencies. After his veto was overridden  he asked the Supreme 
Court to declare it unconstitutional. Instead of voiding the bill as a whole, the court simply excluded the 
contested passage (Elling 2001, 53).  
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meetings with all parties and the national defence committee show his commitment to a 
less powerful role of the president. 
 
3.2.4  The activism of Estonian presidents in government formation, censure  
and dismissal 
The Estonian constitution grants the president some discretion in the process of gov-
ernment formation (yet not in its dismissal or censure) but the powers are very limited. 
§89 of the Constitution stipulates without further specification of any criteria that the 
president nominates a candidate for Prime Minister who then has to be approved by the 
Riigikogu before formally forming a government. In case a proposed candidate is turned 
down – which has never happened – the president is allowed to present a further candi-
date before the legislature can present a candidate of its own. There is no constructive 
vote of confidence so that the president also has to designate a new candidate for Prime 
Minister if the Riigikogu passes a motion of no-confidence. In practice, the president’s 
influence on the choice of Prime Minister has been very limited. It is in the logic of a 
parliamentary system that the president must nominate a candidate who is able to form a 
government supported by a parliamentary majority (at least at its vote of investiture). 
Interestingly, for four out of the twelve cabinets formed between 1992 and 2010 Es-
tonian presidents did not nominate the leader of the party that had received the most 
votes as Prime Minister (and twice the largest party was not even included in the gov-
ernment). Nevertheless, this has not been the result of presidents’ attempts to influence 
government formation but rather the effect of political practicalities. In all cases the 
nominees were the only candidates able to form a coalition and were only nominated by 
the president after they had already formed a tentative coalition. Also, it was always the 
Centre Party (KE) that did not provide the Prime Minister or was not included in the  
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government at all. In 1999 when the KE won 28% of seats (compared to 18% by the 
runner-up IL led by the eventual Prime Minister Laar), the party still protested against 
the president’s decision not to nominate its party leader. However, after meetings with 
all parties it was clear to president Meri that the Centre Party would find no coalition 
partners and therefore nominated Mart Laar as Prime Minister (BNS 1999). In 2003, 
president Rüütel offered KE leader Edgar Savisaar to nominate him as Prime Minister 
as he had received more votes (the difference was so minimal that it did not result in 
more seats), yet Savisaar declined (BNS 2003) and blamed other parties for their un-
willingness to form a coalition with him (Pettai 2004, 996). The only instance which 
could be remotely interpreted as active presidential involvement in the choice of Prime 
Minister or coalition partners occurred in 2010. After it had been revealed that Centre 
Party leader Savisaar had asked a Russian investor for a campaign donation for his par-
ty, Ilves declared that he would block the party’s entry into government even if it re-
ceived enough votes (Ummelas 2010). 
Table 31: Provision of the Prime Minister and 
government participation of the largest party in Estonia 
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PM leader of 
largest party  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  no  no  no*  yes  yes  yes 
Largest party 
in coalition  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  no  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: * In 2003  the Centre Party received more votes than Res Publica, yet the difference was so small 
(0.8 per cent) that both parties were subsequently allocated 28 seats in the Riigikogu (Pettai 2004). 
Source: Lagerspetz and Maier 2010; Sikk 2014; Website of the Riigikogu at http://www.riigikogu.ee. 
 
With regard to the appointment and dismissal of ministers the Estonian constitution 
leaves little discretion to the president as §§ 89 and 90 stipulate that the president ap-
points and dismisses members of the government on recommendation of the Prime Min- 
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ister. As organic law furthermore regulates that the presidents makes changes within 
three days of receiving the Prime Minister’s request, the president has hardly any room 
for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, during a cabinet reshuffle in January 1994 president Meri 
refused to accept two of the four ministerial changes proposed by Prime Minister Laar 
(Raun 2001, 27).
90 Meri argued that given the good state of the economy and public fi-
nances a change in the respective ministries would not be necessary and that the r e-
placement of ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence during the proceedings of  the 
13
th NATO summit in Brussels (10-11 January 1994) would be unwise (BNS 1994b). 
However,  after  increasing  pressure  from  parliament  and  Prime  Minister  Laar,  Meri 
eventually accepted the new nominations a few days later (EECR 1994a; Annus 2004). 
Since then, Estonian presidents have always fulfilled demands for censure by the Prime 
Minister, although it has been argued that the president might be able to refuse a nomi-
nation if a candidate is too inexperienced (Annus 2004). 
This inactivity of Estonian presidents in government formation can largely be ex-
plained by the constitutional stipulations and regulations in organic law that unambigu-
ously limit the president’s discretion. Furthermore, the political realities and partisan 
majorities that the presidents confronted further limited their room for manoeuvre. Pres-
ident Meri’s singular attempt to block a cabinet reshuffle should in this context not be 
seen as an attempt to overstep his constitutional authority, but as one to extend it with 
the approval of other parties. Only shortly before the incident Meri had refused to ap-
point several new judges without a legal basis but also without causing any controversy 
(Annus and Tavits 2004, 714; Tavits 2008, 61).
91 Thus, after he had accepted several 
                                                 
90 He accepted the changes of the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence but objected to the dismissal 
of the ministers of Economy and Finance. 
91 The Act on the Office of the President that specified potential reasons for refusal – albeit vaguely – was 
only passed in 2001 (Tavits 2008, 61).  
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changes to the cabinet composition before, he could now expect that his actions were at 
least partly justified by an evolving constitutional practice. 
 
3.2.5  Estonia – Indirect elections and the diminishing role of the presidency 
Explaining the activism of Estonian presidents is not straightforward. On the one hand, 
some factors relating to the political environment, such the size of the government’s 
seat share and the relations between president and government, had the effects assumed 
by my theoretical framework (with the exception of Rüütel’s vetoes to defend his par-
ty’s interests). The relevance and effects of these factors were also confirmed when ve-
toes were contrasted with other, non-vetoed legislation. As expected, Meri was less ac-
tive in his second term in office, presidents also did not use their vetoes directly after a 
new government was installed and vetoed more frequently closer to parliamentary elec-
tions. However, although comparatively high throughout, parliamentary fragmentation 
did not weaken parliament and increase presidential activism. Governments still easily 
found allies when special override majorities were needed or one of the coalition part-
ners voted against a particular bill. Likely for the same reason, the minority govern-
ments of Tiit Vähi (11/1996-1997) and Andrus Ansip (06/2009-03/2011) were not sub-
ject to a higher increase in presidential activism.
92 In the Estonian case, a measure of the 
ideological polarisation of the assembly might therefore be a better operationalisation of 
parliamentary weakness and the legislature’s ability to agree on a veto override. 
The indirect election of the president appears to have had the strongest influence on 
presidential activism, although its effect was delayed by Meri’s semi-popular election in 
1992 and the fact that the law on presidential elections was only passed shortly before 
his  re-election.  The  dependence  of  the  president  on  parliament  became  more  pro-
                                                 
92 Nevertheless, the number of vetoes in both cases was still higher than when they still held a majority.  
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nounced with Meri’s re-election as parties made it clear that they would only vote for 
him if he decreased his activism.
93 Since then presidential activism has constantly d e-
creased and presidents’ have – similar to parliament and government – seen their legit-
imacy and authority as limited.
94 The fact that Rüütel catered so strongly to his party’s 
interest can also be understood as an acknowledgement of his dependence on parlia-
ment. Under Ilves even the role of check-and-balance on the government was largely 
left to be fulfilled by the Chancellor of Justice. The prominent position of the latter in 
general and the fact that the Chancellor’s responsibilities were increased since 2007 in 
particular (Chancellor of Justice Act 2013) may have had an additional effect. 
 
3.3  Presidential activism in Poland 
Polish presidents, particularly former Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa, and their activism 
have been subject to many studies (e.g. Simpson 1996; Jasiewicz 1997; Zubek 1997; 
Millard 2000; van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 1999; McMenamin 2008; Tavits 2008; 
Leszczyńska 2011; 2012). Nevertheless, through its mixed-methods approach and reli-
ance on original interview data the analysis still produces new insights into presidential 
activism in Poland. The findings of my statistical model and reasoning of my theoretical 
framework are corroborated as the effects of the president-government relationship, the 
parliamentary seat shares (or lack thereof) of presidential and governmental parties, and 
popular  elections  on  presidential  activism  can  be  demonstrated.  Polish  presidents 
stressed that their responsibility was towards their voters rather than other institutions 
which was also a key motivation for their activism. They acted independently from par-
liament and government and other political actors tolerated their activism precisely be-
                                                 
93 A fact acknowledged by both my expert and political respondents. 
94 From the early nineties, representatives of parliament and government often cited the example of Ge r-
man president Richard von Weizsäcker as the ideal (i.e. inactive and uncontroversial) role model  of the 
president (BNS 1994a).  
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cause of presidents’ direct legitimation through popular elections Furthermore, similar 
to the Estonian case the analysis suggests two additional predictors of presidential activ-
ism, i.e. divisions over policy within government coalitions and the president’s links 
with the junior coalition partner. In addition, the case study provides further insights 
into the effects of the override threshold on presidential activism and its interaction with 
other variables. Last, the analysis of presidential involvement in government formation, 
censure and dismissal is equally insightful and challenges prevalent assumptions. For 
instance it is shown that presidential involvement is more likely under unified relations 
and is not necessarily reflected in the number of non-partisan ministers. 
 
3.3.1  Wałęsa – Pawlak II: Presidency-centred factors trump personality 
Table 32: Summary of key information – Wałęsa-Pawlak II (19/1993-03/1995) 
Episode start:  10/1993  Episode end:  03/1995 
President:  Lech Wałęsa (non-partisan)  Prime Minister:  Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) 
In office since:  12/1990  In office since:  03/1995 
Government composition:  PSL, SLD 
Government seat share:  66% (episode start), 65% (episode end) 
Effective No of parties:  3.88 (episode start), 4.03 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  9 vetoes / 0.56 per month 
Model prediction:  8.60 vetoes / 0.54 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Very well predicted and overall representative of Wałęsa’s activism 
 
When Waldemar Pawlak was nominated as Prime Minister by Wałęsa for the first time, 
he still had to bow to the president’s wishes like all his predecessors. Yet this time, with 
the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and an impressive parliamentary majority on his 
side, Pawlak’s government was the first cabinet able to challenge Wałęsa on his previ-
ously unchecked activism. The coalition of SLD and PSL (Polish Peasant Party) almost 
held a constitutional majority (Jasiewicz 1994, 406-407) and with the number of par-
liamentary parties heavily reduced, Wałęsa was no longer able to take advantage of a  
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fragmented Sejm and unstable governments (Jasiewicz 1997, 136-141; van der Meer 
Krok-Paszkowska 1999, 179-182). In addition, the Non-Partisan Block for the Support 
of Reforms (BBWR) – to which Wałęsa had initially lent his support in the electoral 
campaign but later retracted it – won only 5.4% of the vote and failed to play a signifi-
cant political role (Jasiewicz 1997, 149).
95 The relationship between the coalition part-
ners was characterised by mutual mistrust and a number of conflicts over ministerial 
nominations. At the same time the parties were at least initially united in defending their 
policies against interference of th e increasingly unpopular president (Jasiewicz 1996, 
438; van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 1999, 182-185).
96 Nevertheless, as parties repre-
sented very different electorates they  were at variance on a number of key issues and 
genuine reforms were postponed (Jasiewicz 1994; 1995). 
 
Table 33: Vetoes by president Lech Wałęsa during Pawlak II 
Vetoes discussed  Date passed 
(majority)  Date of veto  Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1)  Law amending the Penal Code  11/06/1994 
(241/350)  4/07/1994  Override failed 
 (02/09/1994; 232/411) 
2)  Law amending the electoral ordination 
of municipal councils 
10/03/1994 
(267/298)  20/04/1994  Override failed 
 (21/04/1994; 166/303) 
3)  Law amending the Law on combatants 
and  person  who  were  victims  of  re-
pression during and after the war  
01/12/1994 
(197/322)   25/01/1995  Override failed 
 (16/02/1995; 185/385) 
4)  Law amending certain laws regulating 
the principles of taxation and certain 
other laws 
16/11/1994 
(332/357)  25/11/1994  Override 
(02/12/1994; 327/422) 
5)  Law on the configuration of funds for 
salaries  in  the  public  sector  and 
amendments to certain other laws 
14/12/1994 
(238/374)  21/12/1994  Override 
(23/12/1994; 301/425) 
6)  Law amending the law on the duties 
and rights of deputies and senators 
22/04/1994 
(358/363)  09/09/1994  Override 
(07/07/1994; 356/382) 
       
     Total: 10 vetoes / 8.1 % of all bills passed     
Notes: Table only lists details for vetoes discussed in analysis. 
   
                                                 
95 Andrzej Olechowski, who on Wałęsa’s suggestion became foreign minister had run as the BBWR’s 
candidate for Prime Minister and even drafted the movement’s programme, yet he had never been an offi-
cial member. 
96Given the ambiguities of the ‘Small Constitution’, they still had to accept Wałęsa’s nominees for the 
ministries of foreign affairs, defence, and interior.  
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The  episode  is  overall  very  well  predicted  by  the  statistical  model.  Despite  the 
strengthened parliament and government compared to the first three years of Wałęsa’s 
term in office, the episode is still typical of Wałęsa’s presidency insofar as president and 
government are in cohabitation but the Prime Minister still cooperates with the presi-
dent to strengthen his party’s position. Wałęsa’s veto use is also midway between his 
most active and least active episodes so that it should theoretically show representative-
ly which factors influenced presidential activism. Furthermore, the level of parliament’s 
legislative output remained very stable throughout the episode so that this factor can be 
exluded as a reason for vetoes. The main explanation for Wałęsa’s vetoes during the 
episode appears to be the cohabitation with the government. Divisions between and 
within the government parties also prove to be an important explanatory factor. While 
many respondents mentioned Wałęsa’s personality as an abstract explanation for his 
activism, it is difficult to fully disentangle a potential influence of president-centred fac-
tors from the effects of popular elections and cohabitation. 
 
Veto of the Penal Code 
In 1990 and 1993, the governments of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Hanna Suchocka had 
passed several measures that severely constrained possibilities to obtain an abortion 
(Simpson 1996, 330-332). The amendments to the penal code in 1994 were aimed at 
reversing part of this reform by once again allowing abortions for ‘social’ reasons (ra-
ther than only when the mother’s life was threatened) and allowing private doctors to 
perform the procedure. The SLD was the driving force behind the liberalisation but the 
amendments were opposed by a majority of PSL deputies (only one quarter voted in 
favour of the bill). Thanks to almost unanimous support from the Labour Union (UP) 
and half of the Freedom Union (UW) deputies, the bill still passed with a clear majority  
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(Sejm Voting Record 11/06/1994).
97 Wałęsa had supported a tightening of the regula-
tions on two previous occasions, so that his position on the issue was known.
98 When he 
returned the bill, Wałęsa did not mention any substantive reasons. However, he made 
clear that he would not sign the bill even if it was re-adopted, whereby the only way that 
parliament could have responded to such a ‘pocket veto’ would have been impeachment 
(Jasiewicz 1997, 151). The Sejm failed to override the veto – SLD, UP, and half of the 
UW continued to support the bill but 90% of PSL deputies voted against it (Sejm Vot-
ing Record 02/09/1994). 
The main reason for the veto appears to have been Wałęsa’s personal opposition 
against the bill; the division between the coalition parties and the high profile of the bill 
provide a further explanation, yet it can be safely assumed that he would have vetoed 
the bill regardless. Nevertheless, the high override threshold (2/3 relative majority) at 
the time strengthened Wałęsa’s position considerably – had the threshold been lower, 
parliament would have been able to override the veto. Even though my statistical mod-
els include the size of the government seat share, in this case it fails to take into account 
the difference between Poland and the other countries.
99 In addition, the veto highlights 
a pattern of cooperation between Pawlak and Wałęsa. Pawlak was indebted to Wałęsa 
for becoming Prime Minister even though the PSL was only the junior coalition partner. 
The PSL also relied on the president as a partner to stand up against the SLD. Similar 
voting patterns of the PSL can also be observed for Wałęsa’s vetoes of the communal 
                                                 
97 However, both parties demanded a more wide-reaching reform and debate on the issue (Sejm Steno-
graphic Record 28/05/1994). 
98 Wałęsa neither publicly threatened with a veto, nor did he mention a potential veto to cabinet members. 
As relevant respondents also told me, they still expected a veto due to Wałęsa’s almost parochial piety 
(illustrated amongst others by the fact that his personal chaplain was present at many important political 
meetings). 
99 Nevertheless, as mentioned in the previous chapter the way to control for it in the statistical analysis 
would have equated to a dummy variable for Poland and would not have been adequate or very inform a-
tive.  
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election law and the law on combatants and war victims which both failed to be over-
ridden. 
The particular importance of cohabitation, inter-governmental divisions and the high 
public profile of bills can be demonstrated by looking at other legislation passed at the 
time. For instance, in May 1994 parliament passed changes to the law on criminal pro-
cedures. These amendments were meant to bring regulations on complaints in line with 
European standards and had not been subject to conflict within the coalition. Thus, they 
were eventually passed with the votes of the government parties. Despite a sizeable 
number of abstentions from the opposition and the BBWR in particular (Sejm Voting 
Record 13/05/1994)
100, Wałęsa did not veto the bill. Overall, the amendments had a 
very  low  public  profile  and  were  not  at  the  core  of  the  coalition’s  legislative  pro-
gramme. Moreover, as government parties were united on the issue, a veto override 
would have been extremely likely. The 1995 census bill on the other hand shows that 
the mere potential of seeing a veto sustained is not always enough to trigger a presiden-
tial veto. Rather, it (only) becomes important when the president also objects to the con-
tent of legislation. The census bill was fiercely opposed by the liberal UW (Sejm Voting 
Record 14/12/1994) which would have been able to block a veto override together with 
the votes of the BBWR (which would have likely acquiesced with a potential request by 
the president to vote against the bill). Nevertheless, unlike the UW Wałęsa had no ob-
jections to the content of the bill and therefore did not use his veto. 
 
Vetoes of tax laws 
In November 1994, parliament passed a bill which stipulated amendments to a number 
of  laws  and  amongst  others  raised  the  income  tax.  As  the  government  feared  that 
                                                 
100 Wałęsa only very rarely made use of public or informal veto threats and the opposition of the BBWR 
usually proved to be a good predictor of presidential objections to bills for government parties.  
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Wałęsa would veto it, parties took several measures to prevent a veto (although accord-
ing to my interviews there were no direct negotiations).
101 The bill passed with a clear 
majority and after Wałęsa vetoed the bill on the basis that it violated the constitutional 
principle of the uniformity and consistency of the legal system, it was quickly overrid-
den. Seeing that his veto did not delay the bill enough to also delay the passage of the 
budget, Wałęsa sent the bill to the Constitutional Tribunal (Jasiewicz 1997, 153). The 
Court scheduled a hearing for late December.
102 However, Wałęsa’s representative de-
liberately failed to appear in court, causing a further delay of the process. Eventually, 
the  Tribunal  ruled  against  the  president  (Polish  Constitutional  Tribunal  1995a)  and 
Wałęsa had to sign the bill; he then immediately resubmitted it to the Court with a 
broader question (Jasiewicz 1997, 153). The decision – now in his favour – was an-
nounced in March (Polish Constitutional Tribunal 1995b). However, in early February 
Wałęsa also refused to sign the budget as it relied on the income tax increase and sent it 
to the Constitutional Tribunal for review, too. 
The reason for these delaying tactics was not an actual constitutional objection to the 
tax bill or the budget but rather Wałęsa’s wish to dissolve parliament. A delay of more 
than three months in passing the budget since the presentation of its first draft would 
have given him the opportunity to do so.
103 The fact that Wałęsa withdrew his objec-
tions once parties agreed to acquiesce and remove Pawlak from premiership (Jasiewicz 
1997, 153) supports this explanation. This highlights once again that presidential vetoes 
can also be successful if they simply delay the implementation of a law (rather than 
block it completely). The vetoes also demonstrate some strategic considerations of the 
                                                 
101 The government declared the bill as ‘urgent’ so that Wałęsa had only seven days (rather than thirty) to 
sign it. This way a potential veto could have been overridden before the new year and the projected in-
come could still be included into the 1995 budget. The accumulation of amendments to several laws into 
one bill had been an additional strategy to prevent a veto (Gazeta Wyborcza 1994). 
102 In the meantime, parliament had also passed another budget-related bill on wages in the public sector 
(also declared as ‘urgent’) which Wałęsa vetoed but parliament passed again only two days later. 
103 Nevertheless, as Wałęsa himself had caused the delay such a move was constitutionally questionable.  
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president which were not discussed or included in my theoretical framework. While I 
mentioned that it might be possible that presidents veto (or threaten to do so) in order 
press concessions from the government, the combination of several powers to block a 
bill was not foreseen and merits further investigation – particularly because Wałęsa used 
similar tactics on other bills as well.
104 
 
Lech Wałęsa – A president trying to adjust his hat 
‘To attempt to propose today what the office of the president is to be in the future is like 
choosing a hat and adjusting the head to fit that.’ (Lech Wałęsa)
105 
 
The analysis of this episode has shown that while Wałęsa’s activism corroborates the 
model results there are some additional factors that need to be considered. Overall, co-
habitation as well as divisions within the government (a factor also found in Estonia) 
played a significant role in his use of vetoes. The hyper-fragmentation of the Sejm 
1991-1993 and unstable governments also appear to explain his previous activism. Nev-
ertheless, the veto of the income tax bill and its aftermath highlight that his main moti-
vation  was  to  (re)gain  control  over  the  government.  This  motivation  can  partly  ex-
plained by his popular mandate, which up until the 1991 Sejm elections had given him a 
‘legitimacy advantage’ over government and Sejm (Jasiewicz 1997, 136f). Furthermore, 
Wałęsa was able to use the exceptionally high override threshold in combination with 
intra-governmental divisions to his advantage. Nevertheless, the comparison with non-
vetoed legislation demonstrated that the mere potential to see a veto sustained was not 
enough to trigger activism but that the bill’s content also needed to differ from the pres-
ident’s policy preferences. 
                                                 
104 See for instance Wałęsa’s veto of amendments to the status of deputies and senators. Once his veto 
was overridden, he immediately requested a judicial review for the bill. Even though government and 
parliament generally knew when to expect a veto, they could never foresee the lengths to which Wałęsa 
would go to block or delay the bill. 
105 Quoted in Kolankiewicz (1993, 99).  
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More often and more strongly that in relation to any other president in the four coun-
tries studied, my respondents advanced on their own accord idiosyncrasy and personali-
ty as explanations for Wałęsa’s activism. From interviews with political and expert re-
spondents alike it appears that Wałęsa perceived that he was entitled to ‘more power’. 
He  derived  this  entitlement  not  only  from  his  popular  mandate  but  also  from  his 
achievements as leader of Solidarity and his limited grasp of constitutional principles 
and questionable interpretation of his prerogatives.
106 This perception might have been 
furthered by the unclear regulations of the Small Constitution.  Wałęsa’s idiosyncrasy 
and individual perceptions cannot be discounted as an explanatory factor. Nevertheless, 
Wałęsa’s presidency also demonstrates the difficulties of disentangling the effect of 
presidency- and president-centred factors. On the one hand it can be argued that presi-
dent-centred factors – at least in this episode – were largely absorbed by variables relat-
ing to the institutional setting (popular election and presidential powers). On the other 
hand, effects might have coincided. Furthermore, the finding that a favourable parlia-
mentary arithmetic only triggered activism in combination with objections to the con-
tent of a bill raises the question to what extent policy preferences should be seen as re-
lating to the political environment or the to individual characteristics of office-holders. 
   
                                                 
106 The latter is exemplified for his repeated and clearly unconstitutional threats to dissolve parliament 
(Millard 2000, 47, 51) as well as the threat of a pocket veto of the penal code. Wałęsa also suggested the 
introduction of a presidential system (Leszczńska 2011, 56).  
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3.3.2  Kwaśniewski I – Buzek I: The government submits to presidential leverage 
Table 34: Summary of key information – Kwaśniewski I-Buzek I (10/1997-06/2000) 
Episode start:  10/1997  Episode end:  06/2000 
President:  Aleksander Kwaśniewski (SLD)  Prime Minister:  Jerzy Buzek (AWS) 
In office since:  12/1995  In office since:  10/1997 
Government composition:  AWS, UW 
Government seat share:  57% (episode start), 53% (episode end) 
Effective number of parties:  2.95 (episode start), 3.26 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  8 vetoes / 0.26 per month 
Model prediction:  12.41 vetoes / 0.40 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Outlier/overpredicted episode  
 
In a combined effort the parties that emerged from the Solidarity movement had formed 
an electoral alliance (AWS) and won the election against the SLD in 1997. Despite their 
election victory, Prime Minister Buzek’s coalition could offer only little resistance to 
the popular president. Kwaśniewski’s SLD held 35% of seats so that the government 
was almost always unable to reach the 3/5-majority necessary for overriding his vetoes. 
While the coalition was relatively united during its first year, greater conflicts began to 
appear  in  1999  as  parties  clashed  over  the  health  care  and  social  security  reforms 
(Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2000, 494f). AWS deputies also repeatedly voted 
against government policies (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2000, 496; 2001, 387) 
and  left  the  alliance’s  party  group  to  set  up  their  own  factions.  At  the  same  time, 
Kwaśniewski challenged the government on questions of how to deal with the com-
munist legacy, administrative reform and social/education policies. These plans – often 
described under the umbrella of ‘de-communisation’ policies – were at the core of the 
centre-right government’s legislative agenda and electoral manifesto. Although the pres-
ident had a diametrically opposed view on these issues, parties initially pursued their 
policies regardless in order to fulfil the promises they had made to their electorate.  
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The episode is overpredicted by my model, meaning that Kwaśniewski vetoed less 
than expected. The analysis is thus aimed at identifying factors explaining why he did 
not veto more frequently and whether the variables included in the models worked dif-
ferently than expected. A number of bills introduced from 1999 onwards concerned the 
implementation of the acquis communautaire. As Kwaśniewski was an avid supporter 
of Poland’s EU accession, it was clear that he would not veto these bills (whose content 
was largely prescribed by EU regulations in any case). Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
Rüütel-Parts  episode  in  Estonia,  these  bills  were  introduced  in  addition  to  the  pre-
existing parliamentary workload so that the total number of ‘domestic’ bills remained 
similar to the previous legislature. Therefore, EU-related legislation can be exluded as 
the reason for a lower number of vetoes. 
Overall, Kwaśniewski issued eight vetoes during this episode (all but one of which 
were sustained), mostly on issues of interest for his or the party’s electorate. Thereby, 
the strongest explanatory factors are the cohabitation with the government and the fact 
that he benefitted from the strong SLD presence in the Sejm which made veto overrides 
less likely. The latter eventually increased his leverage over the cabinet to the degree 
that the government anticipate presidential vetoes and made sure to get the president’s 
approval before bills were even introduced in parliament. This influence of the presi-
dential seat share appears to have been the main cause of the low number of vetoes. As 
this effect was unforeseen by my theoretical framework it will need to be discussed in 
greater detail when the findings of quantitative and qualitative analysis as subjected to a 
final comparative assemessment in chapter 5. 
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Table 35: Vetoes by president Aleksander Kwaśniewski during Buzek I 
Vetoes discussed  Date passed 
(majority)  Date of veto  Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1) Law amending the law on family plan-
ning,  protection  of  the  human  fetus 
and conditions of permissible abortion 
11/12/1997 
(235/404)  26/12/1997  Override failed 
 (30/12/1997; 260/444) 
2)  Law on the introduction of a primary 
three-level  territorial  division  of  the 
state 
05/06/1998 
(246/451)
 1)  02/07/1998  Override failed 
 (03/07/1998; 247/437) 
3)  Law on the indexation of some pen-
sions and in 1998 some pensions and 
retirement  benefits  and  the  amend-
ment of certain laws 
11/12/1997 
(235/397)  23/12/1997  Override failed 
(30/12/1997; 258/444) 
4)  Law on the Institute of National Re-
membrance 
22/09/1998 
(237/404)  04/12/1998  Override 
(18/12/1998; 282/446) 
       
     Total: 8 vetoes / 2.6 % of all bills passed     
Notes: Table only lists details for vetoes discussed in analysis. 1) Date and majority for third reading in 
Sejm. Senate proposal to expand the number of voivodeships to 15 accepted by 195/400 deputies (195 
abstentions) on 25/06/1998. 
 
Veto of amendments to sex education 
Sex education in schools had been a major issue for the right-wing parties (and the 
Catholic Church) since 1993/4 (Millard 1997, 93-94) and the AWS now tried to prevent 
it from becoming an individual school subject (Korbonski 2000, 126). Although the 
ideological background for the amendments was clear, the official justification for the 
bill were yearly savings of 51 million PLN.
107 To bypass further discussion the amend-
ment was presented as part of other budgetary measures using the ‘urgency’ procedure. 
In contrast to its coalition partner, the UW was strongly divided over the issue and 
about half of its deputies joined the SLD in voting against the bill or abstained in the 
third reading (Sejm Voting Record 11/12/1997). Kwaśniewski had neither used his veto 
power under Buzek so far, nor had he substantively interfered in government formation. 
Government representatives therefore did not expect the president to use his veto.
108  
The main reason for Kwaśniewski’s veto can be seen in the cohabitation between 
president and government. The bill went against the declared positions of the SLD and 
                                                 
107 Ca. 14 million U.S.D at the time; less than 0.0004% of the overall budget (Sejm 1998). 
108 Nevertheless, the ‘urgency’ procedure was a potential safe-guard against Wałęsa-like delaying tactics.  
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Kwaśniewski, but the issue also had a strong symbolic value for the AWS and its sup-
porters. Nevertheless, in his official justification Kwaśniewski objected to the lack of 
any calculations proving the savings in expenditure (Kwaśniewski 1997) and highlight-
ed the loss of international aid for Poland in case the bill was passed again (Korbonski 
2000, 126). Either way, public opinion was clearly in favour of the Kwaśniewski’s posi-
tion (CBOS 1998). Additional explanatory factors can be found in the SLD’s large seat 
share in the Sejm and the high threshold required to override the veto. This, together 
with  the  divisions  within  the  government  and  the  UW
109  –  22  UW  deputies  voted 
against the override or abstained (Sejm Voting Record 30/12/1997) – secured the suc-
cess of the veto. Furthermore, Kwaśniewski might have calculated that a (successful) 
veto early on in the government’s term would increase his bargaining weight in future 
conflicts over policy.
110 Overall, the working mechanisms of several variables from my 
statistical model are thereby confirmed. Nevertheless, these do not yet explain why their 
favourable constellation did not increase the use of vetoes.  This only becomes clear 
when analysing the later veto of the regional government reform  and taking the results 
of my elite interviews into account. 
 
Veto of the regional government reform 
The veto of the regional government reform has been described as ‘nothing but a politi-
cal tug of war’ (Jasiewicz 1999, 492) and ‘relatively insignificant’ (Tavits 2008, 103).
111 
However, my interviews and  additional research show that Kwaśniewski’s motivation 
behind the veto was to secure future votes for the SLD and for himself. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
109 The UW had also decided not to impose party discipline on its MPs (Sejm Stenographic Record 
11/12/1997). 
110 This would corroborate the assumption that presidents will attempt ‘to build a more extreme reputation 
and thereby extract concessions in subsequent, related legislation’ (Cameron 2009, 376). Although the 
results of interviews from Kwaśniewski’s aides showed that this was not the main reason for the veto, 
some nonetheless acknowledged that this was a beneficial side-effect. 
111 Tavits (2008) also incorrectly describes this as a case of a veto threat (Tavits 2008, 103).  
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veto corroborates the assumptions of my theoretical framework and provides an expla-
nation for the episode’s overprediction which also has potential conseuences for the as-
sumptions of the theoretical framework. 
The introduction of a new administrative structure was one of the most important re-
forms of the AWS-UW coalition (Millard 2000, 56). Their original plans reduced the 
number of voivodeships (provinces) from 49 to 12, whereas the SLD proposed 17 in-
stead  (Jasiewicz  1999,  491).
112  Kwaśniewski  initially  agreed  with  the  government 
which according to my interviews had been in negotiations with the president to secure 
the reform’s passage from early 1998 onwards. Nevertheless, he eventually supported 
the SLD’s plans (Millard 2000, 56; Paradowska 2005b, 14f). To prevent a veto override, 
the  coalition  parties  changed  the  bill  to  create  15  voivodeships  as  a  compromise 
(Jasiewicz 1999, 492). However, Kwaśniewski immediately vetoed it and argued that 
17  voivodeships  were  necessary  to  accommodate  different  socio-cultural  identities 
(Kwaśniewski 1998). The Sejm failed to override the veto so that AWS, UW and SLD 
agreed on 16 voivodeships in the end (Jasiewicz 1999, 426). 
Kwaśniewski’s veto can again largely be explained by his cohabitation with the gov-
ernment. The reform presented a further step towards the country’s ‘de-communisation’ 
(Yoder 2003, 272; Brusis 2013, 413), an issue that also provoked two other presidential 
vetoes.
113 Furthermore, the veto was an opportunity for gerrymandering to the SLD’s 
and Kwaśniewski’s advantage. Before the final passage, Kwaśniewski had himself trav-
elled to several regions in Western Poland promising more than 15 voivodeships (Stein-
hagen 2008). A member of Kwaśniewski’s office was furthermore tasked with conduct-
                                                 
112 After the presentation of the exact territorial divisions evoked protests from citizens and local politi-
cians (Yoder 2003, 272), the SLD’s suggestion led to a steep increase of its approval ratings (Paradowska 
2005b, 15). 
113 The establishment of the Institute of National Remembrance handling Communist -era secret service 
files and changes to the pensions of previous members of military  and police were also   vetoed by 
Kwaśniewski during the episode (Millard 2000, 56; Jasiewicz and Gebethner 1998, 503).  
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ing their own consultations with regional representatives (who backed the SLD’s plan 
of 17 voivodeships), which also stresses the president’s motivation to act independently 
from other institutions and in the interest of his own electorate. The main conflicts over 
territorial divisions appeared in the urbanised west, the electoral strongholds of the SLD 
at the time (Brusis 2013, 414f).
114 In the local elections of October 1998, the SLD sub-
sequently won most of their support in the ‘added’ voivodeships (Millard 2000, 56; 
Szczerbiak 1999, 89). Kwaśniewski, too, received most votes in these areas when re-
elected two years later (Szczerbiak 2001). 
 As  mentioned  above,  my  interviews  showed  that  the  government  was  aware  of 
Kwaśniewski’s ability to easily block its policies and was therefore actively negotiation 
with the president. The president’s powerful position meant that bills were sometimes 
changed in anticipatory obedience before the president could suggest any changes or 
that the government majority incorporated more of the SLD’s suggestions made in par-
liament. While the results of my interviews with political and expert respondents clearly 
support the existence of this general mechanism, it was more difficult to obtain more 
specific examples.
115 Nevertheless, based on the analysis of other government reform 
legislation at the time, the amendments to corporate tax rates in late 1999 appear to pro-
vide a case of Kwaśniewski’s ‘pre-emptive’ influence. As the changes included the abo-
lition of various tax credits that had previously been introduced by the SLD (e.g. for 
those employing disabled people), a veto seemed very likely. Throughout the drafting 
stages, the government therefore kept close informal contacts with the presidential of-
fice and Prime Minister Buzek met with Kwaśniewski several times to discuss the issue 
(Baczyński 1999). Furthermore, several of the SLD’s suggestions were incorporated so 
                                                 
114 The fact that cities would gain power through becoming voivodeship capitals also explains why the 
SLD generally supported the reform (Brusis 2013, 415). 
115 Given the large time span that has elapsed since these events, this should not be interpreted as a limita-
tion on the general findings.  
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that even though its deputies eventually voted against the bill (Sejm Voting Record 
18/11/1999), the content was largely in line with Kwaśniewski’s less radical prefer-
ences. 
 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski – The president as pivot of the policy process 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s veto use in this episode demonstrates the working mecha-
nism of several factors included in my models, yet it also shows some unexpected ef-
fects of variables which can in turn explain the low levels of activism. In all his vetoes 
the cohabitation with the centre-right government played a major role (although the 
simultaneous strengthening of the SLD’s position was certainly an additional factor). 
His activism was further increased by the narrow government majority and by divisions 
between the coalition parties – a factor not included in my statistical models yet also 
found in other episodes. The fact that Kwaśniewski did not veto more often despite this 
favourable constellation of factors lies in the large seat share of the SLD, which in com-
bination with the higher override threshold exerted a much stronger effect than expected 
and was therefore not accurately captured by the statistical models. Not only could he 
be sure that his vetoes would be sustained, but due to the 3/5 majority necessary to over-
ride his vetoes, he also gained considerable leverage in negotiations with the govern-
ment. As shown in the case of the corporate tax law, he could influence policy without 
needing to resort to using his formal powers. According my interviews, Kwaśniewski 
oftentimes did not even need to exert any influence as the government had already an-
ticipated his likely objections to legislation. This presents a highly interesting finding as 
this  effect  presents  an  extreme  situation  that  was  not  considered  in  my  theoretical 
framework. Finally, my respondents also frequently mentioned Kwaśniewski’s popular-
ity with the electorate as a means by which he could increase his leverage over the gov- 
211 
ernment. As this cannot be validated on the basis of one episode, I will return to the po-
tential of public approval as an explanatory variable in chapter 5.3 (‘Additional explana-
tions’). 
 
3.3.3  Kaczyński – Tusk: Electoral promises as the reason for activism 
Table 36: Summary of key information – Kaczyński-Tusk (11/2007-04/2010) 
Episode start:  11/2007  Episode end:  04/2010 
President:  Lech Kaczyński (PiS)  Prime Minister:  Donald Tusk (PO) 
In office since:  12/2005  In office since:  11/2007 
Government composition:  PO, PSL 
Government seat share:  52% (episode start), 51% (episode end) 
Effective number of parties:  2.82 (episode start), 3.00 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  16 vetoes / 0.57 per month 
Model prediction:  15.13 vetoes / 0.54 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Very well predicted; episode covers most of Kaczyński’s presidency 
 
Lech Kaczyński had won the presidential elections against Donald Tusk almost two 
years ago. After the fall of the government of his identical twin brother Jarosław Ka-
czyński, Tusk’s Civic Platform (PO) clearly won the 2007 snap elections and set course 
to revert the changes that the twins had introduced. President and government thus en-
tered a phase of cohabitation. Despite being rocked by a number of scandals (e.g. the 
‘gambling affair’; Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2010, 1127), the coalition stood 
united  and  experienced  little  internal  disagreements.  Kaczyński  and  the  government 
clashed most prominently on the attendance of European Council meetings and the Lis-
bon  treaty  (which  Kaczyński  initially  refused  to  sign;  Jasiewicz  and  Jasiewicz-
Betkiewicz 2009, 1076); disagreements also concerned the coalition’s plans to privatise 
health care and to reform the judiciary. 
The episode is one of the best predicted episodes for Poland and even though other 
episodes under Kaczyński were significantly shorter (ranging between one and twelve  
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months), it is representative of Kaczyński’s activism as its patterns of activism were 
largely consistent over time. Furthermore, the episode shows a number of parallels to 
the Kwaśniewski I–Buzek I episode analysed above. It starts after the president had been 
in office for two years at the beginning of episode, the president’s party was ousted 
from government but still with significant seat share (Law and Justice [PiS] even slight-
ly increased its seat share in the 2007 elections), president and government are in cohab-
itation, and presidential elections are approaching. Furthermore, the government was 
attempting to implement a relatively comprehensive reform agenda that stood in clear 
contrast to the president’s declared policy position. The analysis should theoretically not 
only corroborate the results of my statistical models but also show some similarities to 
the findings above. 
Overall, Kaczyński’s vetoes were mostly determined by his opposition to the gov-
ernment’s policies which were in many cases diametrically opposed to the policy posi-
tions of his party.
116 His vetoes also aimed to protect his party’s influence in various 
state institutions. Kaczyński’s popular mandate played a role insofar as he declared to 
be the president  of a particular political  programme and was  fulfilling his  electoral 
promises through activism. Overall, Kaczyński used his veto 16 times (7 vetoes were 
overridden) or on 2.8% of all bills, respectively, which is only slightly more than Ale-
ksander  Kwaśniewski  during  the  first  Buzek  government.  PiS  did  not  command  as 
many seats as the SLD under Buzek, yet was still the second largest party in parliament. 
While this increased Kaczyński’s leverage over the government parliamentary majority, 
it did not have the same effect on presidential activism as it had during the Kwaśniewski 
I–Buzek I episode. 
   
                                                 
116 For this reason president Kaczyński had threatened to veto all bills of a government led by Donald 
Tusk already in late 2006 (PAP 2006).  
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Table 37: Vetoes by president Lech Kaczyński during Tusk I 
Vetoes discussed  Date passed 
(majority)  Date of veto  Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority)* 
1)  Law  amending  the  law  on  radio  and 
television and other laws 
18/03/2008 
(231/437)  16/05/2008  Override failed 
(25/07/2008; 245/447) 
2)  Law on health care facilities  21/10/2008 
(231/423)  27/11/2008  Override failed 
(19/12/2008; 243/449) 
3)  Law on the particular authorisations of 
employees in health care facilities 
21/10/2008 
(234/426)  27/11/2008  Override failed 
(19/12/2008; 242/449) 
4) Law on the regulations implementing 
laws in the area of health care 
21/10/2008 
(235/418)  27/11/2008  Override failed 
(19/12/2008; 242/449) 
5) Law amending the law on the public 
prosecution 
16/07/2009 
(279/439)  18/09/2009  Override 
(09/10/2009; 264/420) 
       
     Total: 16 vetoes / 2.8 % of all bills passed     
Notes: Table only lists details for vetoes discussed in analysis. *Date and majority for third reading in 
Sejm; vote and discussion of Senate amendments on 25/04/2008 (media law), 06/11/2008 (health care 
reform) and 28/08/2009 (law on public prosecution). 
 
Veto of media law 
Kaczyński’s first veto during the selected episode concerned amendments to the media 
law and the National Radio and Television Council (KRRiT) which is in charge of allo-
cating broadcasting licenses. Since its establishment in 1992 the KRRiT and its compo-
sition (members are appointed by president, Sejm and Senate) had been subject to polit-
ical conflict between president, parliament, and government.
117 In the latest changes in 
December 2005, PiS, Self-Defence (SO) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) d e-
creased the number of council members from  nine to five and widened the council’s 
powers with regard to licensing and the control of journalists’ adherence to a controver-
sial ethics code (Interia.pl 2005). Apart from updates to the law with regard to digital 
media, the changes introduced by the Tusk government were aimed at shortening the 
terms and eventual replacement of members appointed by PiS, SO, and LPR. The bill 
was passed with votes of the coalition, whereas PiS voted against it and the ‘Left and 
Democrats’ (LiD – electoral alliance headed by the SLD) collectively abstained (Sejm 
                                                 
117 In 1994, Lech Wałęsa fired the council’s chairman in a constitutionally questionable move and ex-
changed the majority of his nominees (Jasiewicz 1995, 453f). In 2003, Aleksander Kwaśniewski publicly 
called for the resignation of all members of the council in the wake of the Rywin affair (RMF24 2003) 
although only the council’s secretary – one of Kwaśniewski’s nominees – was accused (Jasiewicz and 
Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2004, 1113).  
214 
Voting Record 18/03/2008). Kaczyński’s chances of seeing his veto sustained were thus 
equal to those of the government’s success.
118 Before parliament reconsidered the bill, 
both PO leadership and Kaczyński actively sought to convince SLD chairman Napieral-
ski to vote in their favour
119, yet SLD deputies eventually abstained and the override 
failed. 
Similar to Kwaśniewski, Lech Kaczyński was thus able to use his party’s large seat 
share (158 of 460 seats/34%) in combination with the high override threshold to block a 
veto override which created an opportunity for him to become active. Nevertheless, due 
to the great importance of the bill for his party and its allies it can be reasonably as-
sumed that he would have vetoed it regardless. This assumption is also supported by the 
fact that in the press conference after vetoing the bill Kaczyński explained his veto and 
general opposition to the bill by declaring that he had been elected president to represent 
a specific political programme (Polish Presidential Office 2008b). Furthermore, it high-
lights not only the principal-agent relationship between voters and the (directly elected) 
president but also the need for activism resulting from a popular mandate. Last, the ne-
gotiations preceding the failed override attempt also show how low rather than high par-
liamentary fragmentation can sometimes weaken the government and facilitate the bar-
gaining process for the president. 
Early on during Tusk’s term in November 2007, president Kaczyński already faced a 
similarly favourable situation to veto, yet eventually refrained from using his powers. 
When the government proposed to keep funds for the rehabilitation and integration of 
                                                 
118 The latter is highlighted by the fact that LiD was far less disciplined when the Sejm voted on correc-
tions proposed by the Senate (Sejm Voting Record 25/04/2008). 
119 While the negotiations with Kaczyński became widely publicised, according to my interview with 
Gregorz Napieralski the president initially wanted to keep it secret but bowed to Napieralski’s condition 
of publicity. Another respondent affiliated with the SLD confirmed that similar negotiations had taken 
place with Napieralski’s predecessor. In talks on the day of the override attempt, the PO offered to make 
further amendments to the bill once the veto was overridden, yet this was eventually rejected by the SLD 
leadership.  
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the disabled in the workforce at the same level, this move was not only opposed by Ka-
czyński’s PiS but also by LiD. While parties objected to different aspects of the legisla-
tion, they both criticised that it was not clear how and to what extent any proposed 
measures could be financed (Sejm Stenographic Record 06/12/2007). The government 
would have been unable to override a veto given that PiS and LiD cohesively voted 
against the bill (Sejm Voting Record 06/12/2007). Furthermore, social issues were at 
the heart of Kaczyński’s policy programme, so that a veto could have been expected. It 
also would have helped to raise his party’s profile early on during Tusk’s premiership. 
Nevertheless, the government eventually promised to incorporate the higher expenditure 
mandated by the bill into the 2008 budget and Kaczyński signed the bill. 
  
Veto of health care reforms 
Kaczyński not only used his veto to block the reversal of policies implement by his twin 
brother’s governments but also specifically targeted parts of the coalition’s reform of 
the welfare system (Vetter 2010, 4). In November and December 2008 he vetoed three 
out of the six bills relating to the government’s health care reform. At the time of the 
bills’ introduction in the Sejm, Kaczyński used his right to call a meeting of the Cabinet 
Council (‘Rada Gabinetowa’) – a meeting of the cabinet under the president’s chair-
manship  on  topics  of  particular  importance  (included  in  the  1997  constitution  as  a 
weakened version president’s right to call and chair regular cabinet meetings under the 
Small Constitution) – that was specifically dedicated to the healthcare reform (Polish 
Presidential Office 2008a).
120 PiS – which also chaired the parliamentary committee on 
health policy – was furthermore particularly active in suggesting amendments to the bill 
                                                 
120 This is remarkable in so far as there had only been ten meetings since 1997 and previous meetings had 
only been called to discuss larger reform agendas, particularly those needed for EU and NATO accession, 
and  thus  concerned  topics  within  the  presidency’s  constitutionally  defined  remit  of  influence 
(Leszczyńska 2007, 421).  
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and initiated a (unsuccessful) no-confidence motion against health minister Ewa Kopacz 
in July 2008 (Czerwiński 2008) while the president reiterated his threats to veto the 
whole healthcare reform package (PAP 2008a). After all six bills passed Kaczyński ve-
toed three of them, namely those relating to hospital staff and the transformation of hos-
pitals into commercial entities. In particular, he criticised that there were no safeguards 
if privatised hospitals failed to guarantee the sufficient provision of healthcare. As the 
regulations in all bills were interdependent, the vetoes also prevented the other bills 
from coming into force (PAP 2008b) and when override attempts for all bills failed, the 
reform was abruptly brought to a halt. 
While Kaczyński’s opposition to changes in the media law was largely motivated by 
party patronage, his refusal to sign the health care reform bill was rooted in his party’s 
general hostility towards the privatisation of state services.
121 At the same time, K a-
czyński also vetoed five other government bills – based on my interviews it appears 
likely that this was in order to press concession from the government. Nevertheless, the 
government neither negotiated on these with the president and his brother Jarosław Ka-
czyński as PiS party leader, nor were there negotiations with the SLD (whose opposi-
tion to the health care reform had also been part of the negotiations between Kaczyński 
and Napieralski mentioned above). 
In contrast to these bills, the president did not use his veto on any bill related to the 
government’s tax reforms. This is particularly noteworthy as Kaczyński had repeatedly 
declared that he would veto any tax reform bills from a potential PO-led government 
(Paradowska 2005a; PAP 2006). Given that tax-related bills duringthis episode mostly 
proposed a lowering of taxes or exempting specific payments from income tax, neither 
the president nor PiS – which voted with the government parties on these bills – openly 
                                                 
121 Another example of such a policy-based veto was his refusal to sign the law on the general prosecu-
tor’s office. The law established a break-up of the personal union of the office of the general prosecutor 
and the minister of justice which PiS opposed on principle (Polish Press Agency 2009; Vetter 2010, 5).  
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opposed this legislation. At first glance this suggests an indirect influence over legisla-
tion similar to Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s increased leverage over the Buzek govern-
ment. However, as the government otherwise refused to negotiate with the president and 
my respondents gave no indication of consultations in this specific case, such a scenario 
seems less likely. Rather, it appears that the coalition parties strategically decoupled the 
proposed tax cuts from the cuts in state expenditure that would be needed to balance 
them. 
 
Lech Kaczyński – President of all his voters 
The described vetoes once again show the importance of cohabitation as a factor in ex-
plaining presidential veto use. Similar to Kwaśniewski, Kaczyński used his veto both to 
prevent policy change as well as to exercise patronage for fellow party members. Ka-
czyński’s insistence on representing and implementing a (personal) political programme 
furthermore demonstrated the effect of his popular mandate on his use of vetoes. Never-
theless, in the peculiar case of the Kaczyński twins claiming the positions of both presi-
dent and leader of the opposition, it is often difficult to pinpoint where the actual deci-
sions to veto originated. My expert respondents as well as analysts (e.g. Ziemer and 
Matthes 2010; Vetter 2010) have consistently described Jarosław Kaczyński as being 
the driving force behind the political plans of the duo (particularly in domestic politics), 
while president Lech took care of implementing them. Despite its uniqueness, the case 
highlights that the degree of closeness and strength of ties of presidents with their (for-
mer) party plays a key role explaining their activism. The large seat share of PiS in 
combination with the 3/5 override threshold made it difficult for the government to pass 
bills again after they had been vetoed. In contrast to Kwaśniewski, Kaczyński formed an  
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alliance with the other opposition parties rather than government dissenters to block ve-
to overrides. 
The parliamentary arithmetic at the time also demonstrates that low parliamentary 
fragmentation can weaken parliament’s ability to withstand presidential activism. Alt-
hough in this particular case, the effect of the high override threshold cannot be dis-
counted, this finding is contrary to the assumptions of my models which stated that 
higher fragmentation weakens parliament as it increases bargaining costs and makes 
building alliances more difficult. Due to the strong programmatic divisions between 
government and opposition, low fragmentation only decreased bargaining costs for the 
president but not for the governing coalition. Last, public opinion might be a factor that 
can explain why the government did not make any concessions to the president. Ka-
czyński’s approval ratings were lower than those of the government and almost always 
decreased with every veto. The president could not increase his leverage by claiming to 
have more supporters behind him than the government and the coalition benefitted from 
ignoring the president’s suggestions – even if it meant that they could not implement its 
policy programme. 
 
3.3.4  The activism of Polish presidents in government formation, censure and  
dismissal 
Formally, Polish presidents have not had significantly more powers in the area of gov-
ernment formation, censure and dismissal than their Estonian, Hungarian and Slovak 
counterparts. However, in practice their actual influence has often exceeded the letter of 
the law. The main reasons for presidential activism in this area can be seen in the timing 
of the first democratic presidential elections, the ambiguous stipulations of the Small 
Constitution and their legacy, and the highly fragmented party system. In contrast to  
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previous assumptions (Neto and Strøm 2006; Tavits 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 
2009b), presidents interfered most often when their own party was represented in the 
government, not during cohabitation. 
The heavily amended Communist Constitution placed formal authority over govern-
ment formation, dismissal, and censure in the hands of the Sejm, although the president 
could nominate candidates for Prime Minister (Leszczyńska 2011, 44). Yet, when Lech 
Wałęsa was inaugurated in December 1990 he enjoyed a ‘legitimacy advantage’ over 
the Sejm (Jasiewicz 1997, 137) which had still been elected under semi-competitive 
rules (Ziemer and Matthes 2010, 240). This situation placed more power in the hands of 
the  president  who  largely  controlled  the  formation  of  the  Bielecki  government 
(Jasiewicz 1992; Leszczyńska 2011, 51). After the first free elections in October 1991, 
Wałęsa continued to play a key role and benefitted from the Sejm’s high fragmentation. 
Although he was now unable to influence the exact portfolio allocation, Wałęsa was 
still crucial in shaping the coalition’s party composition (Leszczyńska 2011, 52f). Fol-
lowing the fall of the Olszewski government, he then not only nominated Waldemar 
Pawlak of his own accord but also had his choices for ministers of foreign affairs, de-
fence, and interior nominated.
122 From the Suchocka government onwards (particularly 
under Pawlak’s second premiership) Wałęsa also repeatedly refused to comply with the 
requests of parties or the Prime Minister to replace cabinet members. The main reason 
for Wałęsa’s activism seems to be that given the fragmented Sejm parties were unable 
to confront the president or assemble an alternative coalition. Furthermore, a respondent 
                                                 
122 The ‘Small Constitution’ and its stipulation that the president needed to be ‘consulted’ on the candi-
dates for these ministries would only come into force seven months later (what this consultation entailed 
was not further specified). However, Pawlak – as well as the parties making up the Suchocka cabinet one 
month later – already then accepted the president’s control over these offices. 
According to several respondents from the government side, this even went so far that Wałęsa was able to 
push through his choice of deputy ministers (MPs with rank of undersecretary of state) in the ‘force min-
istries’. Later confronted with a stronger parliament, he required parties to submit three candidates from 
which he then chose candidates for these ministries.  
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from the presidential administration pointed out that because Wałęsa had won the presi-
dential elections with almost three-quarters of the vote parties considered his legitimacy 
to be higher than theirs. 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski was overall slightly less actively involved in the formation 
of governments. He largely refrained from any interference in the formation and censure 
of the Buzek governments, yet was always strongly involved in the formation of the 
SLD-led  governments  of  Cimoszewicz,  Miller  and  Belka.  It  was  Kwaśniewski  who 
chose Cimoszewicz as Oleksy’s successor (Leszczyńska 2012, 405f) and installed one 
of his former aides as the minister of interior. In the formation of the first Miller gov-
ernment Kwaśniewski was less influential. Other than in 1996, when Kwaśniewski had 
only just resigned as party leader and could therefore rather freely appoint Cimoszewicz 
as Prime Minister, the appointment of SLD leader Miller was now dictated by the elec-
toral result. Nevertheless, he still saw his candidates for ministers of finance, foreign 
affairs and interior appointed. He also tried to suggest a candidate for the ministry of 
justice and attempted to block Leszek Miller’s choice for the treasury (Leszczyńska 
2012, 412-418). After Miller’s resignation, Kwaśniewski pushed for the appointment of 
Marek Belka (who on his wish had previously been minister of finance). Belka failed to 
win the confidence of the Sejm, yet Kwaśniewski threatened with early elections so that 
the Sejm eventually accepted him as Prime Minister. As a matter of course, Belka ap-
pointed the president’s candidates for the force ministries and the ministry of agriculture 
(Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2005; Leszczyńska 2012, 418-423). 
Kwaśniewski’s activism (and success) can be explained by his strong authority with-
in the SLD (amplified by his general popularity). Two of my respondents close to the 
president estimated that there were about 60-80 SLD deputies at any time who were 
loyal the president rather than party leadership which increased Kwaśniewski’s leverage  
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in negotiations.
123 In his second term Kwaśniewski was furthermore not dependent on 
the SLD’s support for re-election and could choose a riskier strategy with Miller and 
Belka. One can only speculate about the reasons for his his non-interference in the 
Buzek governments. Nevertheless, due the large seat share of the SLD in combiantion 
with the high override threshold Kwaśniewski had in any case a a large potential for in-
fluence over policy and did likely not need to interfere to reach the desired outcome. 
Lech Kaczyński appears to have been least active with regards to government for-
mation and censure, yet here the very close ties with his brother’s party may understate 
his influence on government composition. Furthermore, rather than pushing through 
several cabinet members at once (as Kwaśniewski did at the formation of the Miller and 
Belka cabinets) Lech Kaczyński incrementally increased the number of ‘his’ candidates 
in the government. Shortly after his election as president (yet before his inauguration) 
Kaczyński’s campaign manager Zbigniew Ziobro was made minister of justice in the 
first Marcinkiewicz government. At the formation of the second Marcinkiewicz cabinet 
his  long-time  advisor  then  became  foreign  minister  after  her  predecessor  resigned 
(Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2007, 1068f). The first government led by Ka-
czyński’s twin brother Jarosław brought no changes in government personnel, yet fol-
lowing the ejection of SO and LPR from the coalition in summer 2007 two of the presi-
dent’s former aides took over the remaining two ‘force ministries’ defence, and interior 
and administration, while his former chief of cabinet became minister of sport and tour-
ism (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2008, 1101f). Similarly to Kwaśniewski dur-
ing the Buzek governments, Kaczyński remained largely inactive during the formation 
of the PO-PSL coalition under Donald Tusk’s leadership. Nevertheless, he unsuccess-
fully attempted to prevent the appointment of Tusk’s candidate for the Foreign Ministry 
                                                 
123 Due to his influence on the government composition of Miller I, Kwašniewski was frequently called 
‘the third coalition member’ (Leszczyńska 2012, 417).  
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(Vetter 2010, 5). Despite the increasing level of conflict between Kaczyński and Tusk 
the president always acquiesced to the Prime Minister wishes when it came to censure. 
All presidents, even after the introduction of the new constitution in 1997, have at-
tempted to and succeeded in installing their candidates in the ‘force ministries’ (foreign 
affairs, defence, interior and administration). While popular legitimacy only played a 
role for Wałęsa and Kwaśniewski, partisan ties were crucial for the success of all presi-
dents. Kwaśniewski and Kaczyński were more successful in influencing portfolio allo-
cation as their party membership allowed them to influence intra-party negotiations. 
Wałęsa did not maintain a party affiliation and could therefore only choose from the 
candidates that parties presented to him. Finally, the highest level of activism was dis-
played not during cohabitation but when president and Prime Minister came from the 
same party or, in the case of Wałęsa, when the Prime Minister had been picked by him. 
 
3.3.5  Summary: Poland – New insights from a well-studied case 
A number of valuable conclusions can be drawn from the in-depth analysis of presiden-
tial activism in Poland. First, even though unlike Slovakia Poland has not had an indi-
rectly elected president
124 as a point of comparison, the effect of popular presidential 
elections becomes evident. Presidents acted independently of parliament and gover n-
ment and used their powers specifically  and explicitly to benefit their own electorate. 
Furthermore, the higher legitimacy of the president vis-à-vis other institutions allowed 
not only Wałęsa but also his successors to increase their leverage over parliament. As 
the vast majority of my respondents pointed out, the presidents’ popular legitimacy was 
also one of the key factors of why governments often acquiesced to presidential de-
mands.  
                                                 
124 At least not a one elected under fully democratic conditions – General Wojciech Jaruzelski was still 
elected by a National Assembly which largely consisted of deputies whose election had been guaranteed 
by the compromise reached at the roundtable talks.  
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Policy differences between president and government also played an important role 
in determining presidential activism as veto use increased during cohabitation and de-
creased when president-government relations were neutral or unified. As Kwaśniewski 
and Kaczyński were party members, they also often used their veto to defend their own 
party’s position. The size of presidents’ parliamentary support base, however, only be-
came genuinely relevant in the context of the high veto override majority. It increased 
the president’s and the presidential party’s leverage in negotiations with the government 
(particularly under Kwaśniewski) during phases of cohabitation. Yet, it is not clear to 
what extent a larger seat share would have contributed to less objectionable legislation 
for the president without the increased threat potential. Nevertheless, in most cases ve-
toes concerned bills of high symbolic importance for presidents’ voters. Given the re-
sponsiveness of incumbents to these concerns due to their popular mandate, there is at 
least some evidence suggesting that they would have used their veto only slightly less 
often had the override threshold been lower. 
The analysis furthermore showed that divisions between government parties provide 
an additional opportunity for presidents to become active – a factor that was not includ-
ed in my theoretical framework and statistical models. It also demonstrated that the ef-
fect  of  parliamentary  fragmentation  on  presidential  activism  is  not  uniform.  Under 
Wałęsa and Kwaśniewski, higher or increasing fragmentation appears to have led to 
more presidential activism, whereas for Kaczyński low fragmentation provided more 
opportunities to become active. Finally, the results of the examination of Polish presi-
dents’ role in government formation, censure and dismissal challenges previous scholar-
ship on the matter. Presidents were more active when their own party was part of the 
government or when their relation with the Prime Minister was neutral to positive rather 
than under cohabitation. Presidents also attempted to install partisan rather than non- 
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partisan ministers and tended to become more active when fewer parties were in the 
government. 
 
3.4  Presidential activism in Estonia and Poland compared 
The in-depth analysis of presidential activism in Estonia and Slovakia has overall cor-
roborated the findings of my statistical analysis and shown that the considerations of my 
theoretical framework appear to mirror the majority of actual causal mechanisms of 
presidential activism. The findings also point to similar weaknesses of the approach and 
suggest analogous additional explanatory factors. First and foremost, the comparison of 
presidential activism in both countries demonstrates the expected contrast with regard to 
the mode of election. The activism of Polish presidents was driven by their desire to 
serve their voters’ interests and their independence from other institutions. Estonian 
presidents on the other hand acknowledged their dependence on parliament (although 
the effect was somewhat delayed due to Meri’s semi-popular election for the first term) 
and rather focussed on improving policy than blocking it. Even Rüütel’s use of vetoes 
along party lines could be interpreted as expressing his dependence on his party and par-
liament as his principals. 
The contrast in the powers of the presidency and the mode of election also helps to 
draw strong conclusions for the effect of other factors. Despite differences in the set-up 
of the Estonian and Polish political systems, they had a very similar influence on presi-
dential activism. For instance, the size of the government majority was an important de-
terminant of presidential activism in both  countries and presidents deliberately used 
higher override majorities (although these are only a permanent feature in Poland) to  
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their advantage.
125 Presidents also vetoed more often when they were in cohabitation 
with the government or when their own policy position did not match governments’ 
plans. Hereby, the division between and within coalition parties emerged as an addi-
tional explanatory factor in both countries; the relationship between the president and 
the junior coalition partner (Rüütel and the RL; Wałęsa and the PSL) also occasionally 
appears to play a role. Results with regard to parliamentary fragmentation were more 
diverse but showed in each case that the effective number of parties does not always 
correctly represent parliaments’ ability to organise a veto override. Last, my interviews 
suggested that presidential personality might have played a role for the activism of Lech 
Wałęsa. Nevertheless, disentangling the potential effects of president-centred from pres-
idency-centred factors proved difficult (particularly with regard to presidential percep-
tions vs. the mode of election and presidential powers). 
   
                                                 
125 These findings appear to suggest that both popular elections and override thresholds exude independ-
ent effects, although a residual uncertainty remains until this can be tested quantitatively on a different 
sample.  
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4 
PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVISM IN HUNGARY AND 
SLOVAKIA 
 
Hungary and Slovakia present the second ‘most different pair’ as part of which I will 
assess the results of my statistical analysis. While a number of authors have noted that 
popularly elected presidents typically possess more powers than their indirectly elected 
counterparts and vice versa (e.g. Metcalf 2002; Tavits 2008; Strohmeier 2010), the two 
countries present very unlikely cases in this regard. The indirectly elected Hungarian 
president is formally one of the most powerful presidents, whereas the Slovak counter-
part is weaker than most other directly elected presidents. This pairing of cases promis-
es valuable insights not only because they are unlikely representatives of presidents in 
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems but also because Slovakia is the only coun-
try in my sample that changed the mode of presidential election from indirect to direct 
and is thus on its own an important case for analysis in this study. 
Contrasting the findings from these two different countries demonstrates once again 
the importance of the mode of election, yet also highlights some more details of its 
mechanism of effect. In Hungary, presidents acknowledged their dependence on parlia-
ment and refrained from using their veto for political reasons. Rather, they sought to 
address shortcomings in legislation (a motive also found in the analysis of Slovakia’s 
only indirectly elected president Michal Kováč as well as in Estonia). Nevertheless, the 
effect of the indirect elections was partly amplified by the rulings of the Constitutional 
Court which further defined the role of the president within the polity. While democrat-
ic shortcomings in Slovakia during 1994-1998 make the within-case comparison more  
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difficult, it can still be shown that presidential activism markedly increased after the in-
troduction of popular elections. Presidents sought to act independently of parliament 
and government and justified their actions with their popular mandate. The analysis of 
presidential activism in both countries also highlights the importance of several other 
variables included in the statistical model, yet thereby also suggests slightly different 
mechanisms of effect. For instance, while presidents were more active during cohabita-
tion, its substantial effect differed depending on the mode of election. Directly elected 
presidents vetoed for political reasons and tried to block government policy, whereas for 
indirectly  elected  presidents  cohabitation  rather  raised  awareness  of  legal-technical 
problems of legislation which they sought to address in their vetoes. Similar to the anal-
ysis of Poland and Estonia, the findings also suggest intra-governmental divisions and 
exceptionally high override majorities (in interaction with presidential and governmen-
tal seat shares) as additional explanations for presidential activism.  
 
4.1  Presidential activism in Hungary 
The Hungarian president belongs to the most powerful indirectly elected presidents, not 
only in Central  and Eastern Europe but  also in comparison  with Western European 
counterparts. Similar to the presidency of his Polish counterpart, Lech Wałęsa, the first 
term of Hungary’s inaugural president Árpád Göncz and his clashes with the govern-
ment have been well-documented in the literature (O’Neill 1993; 1997; Dieringer 2005; 
Kim 2013) and drawn on to question the effect of indirect elections on presidential ac-
tivism (Tavits 2008). However, G￶ncz’ second term in office as well as his successors, 
Ferenc Mádl and Lászlo Sólyom, have received significantly less attention. By carefully 
analysing selected episodes from each presidency in depth and using new data and in-
sights from qualitative interviews it becomes clear that indirect elections in fact played a  
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role in decreasing presidential activism over time. Nevertheless, the effect is not as 
straightforward as theorised and was amplified by rulings of the Constitutional Court. 
The analysis also highlights how the indirect election of the president affects the way in 
which other factors, particularly the relationship between president and government, 
influence presidential activism in legislation. The almost complete inactivity of Hungar-
ian presidents in government formation, censure and dismissal despite superficially fa-
vourable conditions  furthermore  calls  the reliability of  frequently used  indicators of 
presidential activism into question.  
 
4.1.1 Göncz II – Horn: Activism to help the government 
Table 38: Summary of key information – Göncz II-Horn (06/1995-07/1998) 
Episode start:  06/1995  Episode end:  07/1998 
President:  Árpád Göncz (SZDSZ)  Prime Minister:  Gyula Horn (MSZP) 
In office since:  08/1990 (re-elected 06/1995)  In office since:  07/1994 
Government composition:  MSZP, SZDSZ 
Government seat share:  72% (episode start), 70% (episode end) 
Effective No of parties:  2.89 (episode start), 3.02 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  2 vetoes / 0.06 per month 
Model prediction:  3.14 vetoes / 0.09 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Only episode in which Göncz used his veto power 
 
Árpád Göncz had been elected president in 1990 because it was expected that he would 
not interfere in the politics of the government (Dieringer 2005, 282), yet his first term in 
office was characterised by frequent clashes between the president and government and 
parliament (Schiemann 2004, 134-135; Kim 2003, 108). Nevertheless, after the rulings 
of the Constitutional Court had significantly curtailed the powers of the president as a 
consequence (Köker and Engst 2012), Göncz largely refrained from using any of his 
powers. 
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In May 1994 the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) won the second democratic par-
liamentary election and – despite their absolute majority (54.1% of seats) – formed a 
coalition government with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) (Körösényi et al. 
2010, 372, 384). While the SZDSZ was divided over G￶ncz’ nomination for a second 
term, the MSZP unanimously backed his re-election in 1995.
126 Therefore and due to 
the fact that Göncz  remained a member of the SZDSZ throughout his presidency, the 
relationship between him and the government can generally be described as unified. 
G￶ncz’ re-election came shortly after the presentation of the so-called ‘Bokros Pack-
age’, a controversial set of economic and social policies presented by MSZP-minister 
Lajos Bokros, which not only evoked criticism from social partners and the public (Kim 
2013,  164)  but  also  from  different  factions  within  the  MSZP  (Ilonszki  and  Kurtán 
1996). These and similar conflicts (e.g. about privatisation) as well as  a number of 
scandals (Ilonszki and Kurtán 1998) initially hindered collaboration between coalition 
parties failed to impact the overall stability of the government. 
The selected episode is the second longest during G￶ncz’ presidency and starts with 
his re-election for a second term in office. Göncz only used his veto twice during this 
episode but not any other power. This is generally in line with his decreasing activism 
over time that characterised his presidency and his second term in office in particular. 
However, it is also the first and only time that he used his veto power so that it should 
be considered an outlier. The analysis must therefore be focussed on identifying factors 
or constellations thereof that explain why Göncz used his veto only then and not at any 
other point. It is shown that G￶ncz’ closeness to the government parties played an im-
portant role for his activism. However, the latter had a different effect than expected. 
                                                 
126 One respondent each from my government/MP and expert categories suggested the alternative view 
that despite the SZDSZ’ internal discussions, G￶ncz’ re-election might also be seen as a sign that the ac-
tual power of the SZDSZ within the coalition was greater than their vote share and status in this surplus 
coalition would suggest.  
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Göncz used his veto instead of judicial review requests, allowing them to amend the 
bills more easily. Intra-party divisions also contributed to Göncz’ decision to veto but 
only mattered because a special majority was needed to override one of his vetoes. Last, 
it appears that G￶ncz’ general inactivity and decreasing activism over time during his 
second term can at least in part be attributed to his indirect election. 
Table 39: Vetoes by president Árpád Göncz during Horn I 
Name of vetoed bill  Date passed 
(majority)  Date of veto  Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1)  Members of Parliament Amendment   
     Act  17/12/1996  03/01/1997  Override*
 
(25/02/1997; 195/278) 
2)  Sale of State Property Amendment Act  19/12/1996  04/01/1997  Amendments accepted 
(25/02/1997; 195/291) 
       
Total: 2 vetoes / 0.5% of all legislation passed     
Notes: * The Constitutional Court later declared the bill unconstitutional after an application of several 
opposition deputies (Ilonszki and Kurtán 1998, 420; Hungarian Constitutional Court 1997). 
 
Members of Parliament Amendment Act 
The ‘Members of Parliament Amendment Act’ was passed in December 1996 and spec-
ified several incompatibilities of the office of MP and other anti-corruption measures. 
Most importantly, it stipulated that MPs would not be able to serve as managers or on 
the board of state-owned firms (Kim 2013, 169; EECR 1997, 14f). The bill had been 
proposed by the MSZP and was almost unanimously supported by the coalition depu-
ties. In the final vote, most opposition deputies (except for Fidesz) abstained from the 
final vote rather than voting against the bill (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 17/12/1996). 
In his veto, Göncz particularly highlighted problems with the application of the regu-
lations which depended on whether deputies had already been in such a position at the 
time of their election (in which case a continuation was permissible).
127 He also criti-
cised that it did not apply to private business activities and raised concerns over the con-
stitutionality of the disclosure of assets (Kim 2013, 170f; EECR 1997, 15). As he kept 
                                                 
127 MSZP and SZDSZ deputies disproportionately benefitted from this regulation (Ilonszki and Kurtán 
1997).  
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close contacts with the coalition parties at the time (Kim 2013, 158)
128, he must have 
been aware that the government was unlikely to simply accept his objections. On the 
other hand, he could have asked the Constitutional Court to review the bill. Kim (2013) 
argues that the veto could have been motivated by the president’s wish to publicly dis-
tance himself from the government (Kim 2013, 172), while G￶ncz’ spokesperson ex-
plained at the time that deputies should decide on their own affairs, i.e. without the in-
volvement of a third actor (Kim 2013, 171). Ultimately, it appears that Göncz opted for 
a veto to serve not one, but several purposes. First, irrespective of the veto’s success he 
was able to distance himself from the government. Second, a veto presented a faster 
procedure to amend the bill and implement the incompatibility measures – which Göncz 
supported in principle – than a judicial review procedure. Last and most importantly, the 
chances for success of a veto were higher than ever during his presidency because the 
bill required a two-thirds majority to be overridden.
129 The coalition parties commanded 
the necessary majority at the time; however, had Göncz been able to persuade only 8 
more coalition deputies to vote against the bill’s re-passage or abstain the veto would 
have been sustained.
130 While the number of abstentions in the MSZP doubled to 20 the 
veto was overridden nonetheless.
131 
Göncz thus took both the seat share of the government and the division of parliament 
over the issue into account which generally corroborates my statistical models. Never-
theless, these factors only became salient because the constitution stipulated an override 
majority for the bill that was higher than usual. This is one of the explanations why 
Göncz did not use his veto more frequently overall. Furthermore, the voting behaviour 
                                                 
128 This was also corroborated by my interviews. 
129 The constitution does not generally specify an override majority for presidential vetoes yet it is implic-
it that a repeated passage of a bill is only possible if it obtains the majority of votes needed in the first 
instance. According to Art. 20.6  Hungarian Constitution [1989], the ‘Members of Parliament Act’ and 
any amendments of it require a majority of two thirds of all MPs to pass. 
130 Previously, 10 MSZP deputies had abstained and five had voted against the bill. 
131 As in the third reading of the bill, the SZDSZ deputies supported the bill unanimously.   
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of the coalition parties corroborates statements by several of my respondents that by 
G￶ncz’ second term his relationship with the MSZP was better than with his own party. 
The latter also highlights problems with coding the presidential seat share correctly. 
As mentioned above, Göncz’ general support for the incompatability measures was 
one of the reasons he chose a veto over a request for judicial review which – as evi-
denced by the Constitutional Court’s ruling triggered by an application of the opposition 
– would have had harsher consequences. Another reason for Göncz’ lack of further ve-
toes might therefore lie in the fact that he accepted the necessity of the government’s 
reforms – even if he did not agree with them personally – and preferred the quick im-
plementation of imperfect legislation over protracted negotiations with government par-
ties. An example of this is the law on the abovementioned ‘Bokros Package’ in June 
1995.
132 Although he had criticised the way in which the package had been introduced 
as well as the extent of the cuts and was petitioned by a number of groups to veto it, he 
nevertheless signed it into law. Göncz stressed at the time that any kind of interference 
would  have been beyond the scope of his competences and  Kim (2013, 164-168) 
demonstrates on the basis of his interviews that this specific decision was largely due to 
Göncz’ awareness of the package’s necessity. This notion is also supported by the re-
sults of my own interviews. 
 
Veto of the Sale of State Property Act 
The bill on the sale of state property was passed at the same time as the other vetoed bill 
and had also been proposed by the MSZP. The main point of contention in the parlia-
mentary debate was a clause that had been introduced on the initiative of the MSZP. It 
foresaw that state property could be transferred to local governments and cooperatives 
                                                 
132 Note that this was still 6 days before the start of the episode analysed here.   
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for free (RFE/RL 1997). The opposition saw this as a way of pork-barrelling before the 
upcoming parliamentary elections and feared that it would facilitate corruption (EECR 
1997, 15). While not voiced openly in the parliamentary debate, my interviews with ex-
perts suggest that the opposition and part of the SZDSZ (almost a third abstained in the 
final vote of the bill; Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 19/12/1996) saw this as a covert fa-
vouritism of the former nomenclatura. As furthermore the parliamentary Constitutional 
Commission had recommended deleting the clause in question (RFE/RL 1997), it was 
clear that Göncz would take action. 
Similar to the case of the first veto, the most likely option appeared to be a request 
for judicial review. Yet, Göncz again returned the bill to parliament instead and incor-
porated the criticism from opposition parties and SZDSZ in his  justification. It was 
speculated that Göncz wanted to give the government the opportunity to bring the bill in 
line  with  the  constitution  (Tavits  2008,  76)  and  acted  on  wishes  of  the  SZDSZ 
(Szomszéd 2005, 139).
133 Once again, a veto was also a faster option than a judicial re-
view procedure – a motive that Kim (2013, 176-177) corroborates based on communi-
cation with G￶ncz’ spokesperson. Nevertheless, in the justification of his veto G￶ncz 
also expressed his believe that a cross-partisan consensus was needed for the bill (Or-
sz￡ggyűl￩s Stenographic Record, 25/02/1997; Kim 2013, 178). Attributing the veto to 
G￶ncz’ closeness to the government alone thus falls short of explaining it in its entirety. 
Rather, Göncz exercised this veto to both address actual shortcomings of the bill
134 and 
to mediate a conflict within the coalition. The latter stands in contrast to the assum p-
tions of my theoretical framework, but bears resemblance to the use of vetoes by Est o-
nian president Arnold Rüütel discussed in the previous chapter. 
   
                                                 
133 The latter would also coincide with the aforementioned voting behaviour of the SZDSZ deputies. 
134 Interestingly, the opposition supported the president’s objections but still voted against the passage of 
the amended bill (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record, 25/02/1997).  
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The lustration law 
G￶ncz’ second veto again appears to be a rather atypical example of presidential activ-
ism given that there were a number of bills where a veto could have been more readily 
expected. One example of this is the lustration law in 1996. Although the law had al-
ready been passed during the previous legislature in 1994, it had been declared void by 
the Constitutional Court due to several inconsistencies (Hungarian Constitutional Court 
1994; EECR 1996b). When it appeared again on the legislative agenda, MSZP and 
SZDSZ differed greatly on the issue. The MSZP wanted to restrict the number of people 
who would have to face lustration, whereas the SZDSZ advocated a more extensive ap-
proach  (EECR  1996b).  Göncz  had  himself  been  a  victim  of  the  repressions  of  the 
Communist regime and was strongly concerned with issues of transitional justice (Kim 
2013, 118-130), so that he supported the SZDSZ’ position here. 
The eventual draft foresaw the vetting of only 600 people which stood in stark con-
trast to the 4-5,000 initially proposed by the SZDSZ.
135 Although it was the SZDSZ 
which finally conceded to the MSZP’s position (EECR 1996b), it could still have been 
expected that Göncz would veto the bill because of its importance to him personally and 
to increase his party’s leverage. Nevertheless, despite concerns of the SZDSZ and a 
sizeable number of dissenters in the MSZP, a majority of deputies supported the bill 
(Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 03/07/1996), so that an override would not have been 
very likely. In addition to a veto’s small chances of success, it appears that Göncz re-
frained from becoming active because he generally supported the bill, accepted that an 
extension  was  not  possible,  and  that  he  would  have  overstepped  the  constitutional 
boundaries of his office by interfering. 
   
                                                 
135 The original law even proposed the vetting of ca. 10-12,000 people (EECR 1994b).  
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Árpád Göncz – From activist president to grandfather of the nation 
Göncz’ vetoes in this episodes can be explained by his desire to shorten (and thus facili-
tate) the procedure to amend the bill before its implementation. Thereby his closeness to 
the government certainly played a role for the ‘Sale of State Property Act’ and G￶ncz’ 
general support for incompatibility and anti-corruption measures for the veto of the oth-
er bill. While the latter corroborates my assumption that presidents’ policy preferences 
are being implemented when their own party is in office, it is contrary to the assumption 
that this will lead to less presidential activism. Yet, the next parliamentary elections 
were only 18 months away and the inopportune outcome of a judicial review procedure 
might have negatively affected the coalition’s electoral campaign so that G￶ncz chose 
the less damaging option. 
The fact that Göncz only used his veto twice can be attributed to two factors. First, 
the chances of success had never been higher than under the particular constellation of 
factors at the time. Second, his indirect election also played a very important role, alt-
hough its effect did not unfold through the stronger dependence on parliament and low-
er legitimacy alone. Rather, the rulings of the Constitutional Court ensured that Göncz 
became  less  active.  Relevant  political  and  expert  respondents  agreed  that  after  the 
landmark rulings of the Court elites – including the president – simply considered it to 
be out of line with the role of the president to become directly involved in everyday pol-
itics.
136 As one of my expert respondents remarked, G￶ncz was actually not ‘more’ ac-
tive in the beginning than later – his activism rather remained constant in relation to his 
(clarified) constitutional powers. Göncz’ justification for not vetoing the ‘Bokros Pack-
age’ and his failure to veto the lustration law supports this conclusion. An additional 
factor in preventing further activism might have been G￶ncz’ frequent meetings and 
                                                 
136 This is corroborated by the eventually unsuccessful drafts of a new constitution which included a stip-
ulation that clearly defined the government alone as constituting the executive (Dieringer 2005, 286).  
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good contacts with government politicians. After communication with the Antall and 
Boross cabinets had been very formal (often by letter), Göncz could now – similar to 
Rüütel in Estonia – voice his concerns informally. 
While Göncz’ activism thus overall confirms the assumptions of my theoretical mod-
el, the analysis has shown that the direction of effect of different factors can be different 
based on their specific constellation. Furthermore, depending on the stipulations on how 
parliament can respond to presidential vetoes (i.e. incorporate amendments or not) pres-
idents will use different powers to block bills. Last, the role of the Constitutional Court 
highlights that the effect of the mode of presidential election might not be as straight-
forward as assumed, particularly if a president is as popular as Göncz. Nevertheless, it 
was still the indirect election that effected G￶ncz’ transformation from activist president 
to a passive ‘grandfather of the nation’ (Dieringer 2009, 175) and – in accordance with 
Elster’s (1997) argument about agent selection – he was initially chosen because it was 
expected that he would hardly be active at all. 
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4.1.2  Mádl – Medgyessy: President resists party pressure 
Table 40: Summary of key information – Mádl-Medgyessy (05/2002-09/2004) 
Episode start:  05/2002  Episode end:  09/2004 
President:  Ferenc Mádl (non-partisan)  Prime Minister:  Péter Medgyessy  
(non-partisan; nominated 
by MSZP) 
In office since:  08/2000  In office since:  05/2002 
Government composition:  MSZP, SZDSZ 
Government seat share:  51% (episode start), 51% (episode end) 
Effective No of parties:  2.49 (episode start), 2.53 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  3 vetoes / 0.11 per month 
Model prediction:  9.35 vetoes / 0.33 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Outlier/overpredicted 
 
After Ferenc Mádl was elected president in August 2000, he was generally seen as the 
president of Fidesz (Schiemann 2004, 138) which nominated him again and convinced 
its coalition partner to vote for him (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2001, 325). Despite the fact 
that Mádl was not officially affiliated with any party, Fidesz politicians also regarded 
him as ‘their’ president
137 and were surprised when he refused to bow to party pressure 
after Fidesz lost the 2002 parliamentary elections and MSZP and SZDSZ formed a new 
government under Péter Medgyessy. 
M￡dl’s relationship with the Fidesz-FKgP-MDF government of Viktor Orbán had 
been very harmonious but the formation of another MSZP-SZDSZ coalition heralded a 
new period of cohabitation (Körösényi et al. 2009, 116).
138 Regular meetings between 
president, Prime Minister, and the speaker of parliament as well as the departmental 
                                                 
137 This impression was corroborated by the fact that Mádl refrained from intervening in everyday politi-
cal decision-making similar to Göncz (Dieringer 2009, 176). His only veto during the Fidesz government 
had been requested by the speaker of parliament to rectify procedural errors (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Stenographic 
Record 26/06/2001) and the judicial review requests concerned only very technical questions (Bitskey 
and Sonnevend 2005). 
138 On the one hand this was due to different ideological orientations. Mádl was a well -known conserva-
tive and had been member of the centre-right Antall government in 1993-1994 (Pradetto and Weckmüller 
2004, 267), so that he naturally opposed both the post -communist MSZP and the liberal SZDSZ. On the 
other hand, the government perceived Mádl as a partisan ally of the opposition (particularly Fidesz) lead-
ing to mutual hostility.  
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heads from the presidential and government administration became rare and were even-
tually discontinued. The government was united in preparing Hungary for its forthcom-
ing EU accession and related legislation dominated the agenda during the first months 
of the episode. Parties furthermore began to revert some of the policies introduced under 
Prime Minister Victor Orbán during the last legislative term. However, at the same time 
the government faced several problems and at times struggled to maintain coherence. 
After the coalition parties had initially retained the spending levels of the previous gov-
ernment, they now had to introduce a number of painful and hugely unpopular budget 
cuts (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2004). Furthermore, as the SZDSZ was not a surplus coalition 
partner anymore, the balance of power within the coalition had shifted compared to its 
last edition, yet the MSZP was unwilling to make concessions (Ilonszki and Kurtán 
2003). Not being an official party member, Prime Minister Medgyessyi furthermore 
struggled to control the MSZP (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2005, 1033) and revelations about 
his work for Communist intelligence provoked parts of the SZDSZ to call for his resig-
nation (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2003, 972f). Eventually, Medgyessyi handed in his resigna-
tion after MSZP minister Ferenc Gyurcsány had already garnered sufficient support for 
a new government (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2005, 1034). 
The predictions of the statistical model exceed the actual number of presidential ve-
toes for all three episodes during M￡dl’s presidency. This raises the question of why 
Mádl did not use his power more often. The selected episode is not only the longest dur-
ing M￡dl’s presidency and thus provides the most ample base for analysis, it is also 
characterised by a constellation of factors assumed to increase activism. The govern-
ment majority was not only very slim (only 5 seats) but also unstable and president and 
government were in cohabitation. Furthermore, parliament even slightly increased its 
legislative output compared to previous years, giving Mádl more opportunities to veto.    
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 Thus, the aim of the analysis is to understand to what extent factors still worked as 
expected and if not why. Mádl used his veto three times during the episode. Except for 
the veto of the Law on European Parliament Elections
139, the vetoes appear to show that 
Mádl vetoed due to pressure from Fidesz. Yet, the opposition of Fidesz towards the r e-
spective bills was not a particularly salient factor. Similar to Göncz, the indirect pres i-
dential election appears to be able to explain the low level of activism and the analysis 
demonstrates that Mádl was reluctant to use his powers for political purposes because of 
his lower legitimacy.  Evidence from my interviews furthermore suggests that Mádl 
chose to request judicial review for bills rather than returning them to parliament.  
Table 41: Vetoes by president Ferenc Mádl during Medgyessy I 
Name of vetoed bill 
Date passed 
(majority) 
Date of veto 
Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1)  Law  amending  certain  social  regula-
tions 
17/12/2002 
(189/194) 
23/12/2002 
Override 
(04/02/2003; 195/319) 
2)  Law on healthcare providers and on the 
organisation of public health services 
16/06/2003 
(194/194) 
20/06/2003 
Override 
(23/06/2003; 192/194) 
3)  Law on the election and status of 
 members of the European Parliament 
03/11/2003 
(193/366) 
12/11/2003 
Bill withdrawn 
(17/11/2003; 312/313) 
       
Total: 3 vetoes / 1.1% of all legislation passed     
 
Veto of the social services bill 
President M￡dl’s first veto during the Medgyessyi government concerned amendments 
to the provision of social services. The bill was controversial in so far as it changed the 
role churches played in providing social services and their cooperation with municipali-
ties (mostly with regard to financing said activities). The churches as well as Fidsez and 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) objected to the bill (Bitskey and Sonnevend 
2005,  453f;  Szomszéd  2005,  140f;  Tavits  2008,  76f)  claiming  that  it  violated  the 
churches’ constitutional rights and – with respect to the Roman Catholic Church – the 
                                                 
139 Mádl returned the bill on the grounds that other than in the original proposal, the bill did not properly 
regulate the election of the Hungarian members of the European parliament (Mádl 2003). The veto was 
accepted by the government without further discussion and the bill withdrawn.  
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Hungarian concordat with the Vatican (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Stenographic Record 04/02/2003). 
The original bill was passed with almost unanimous support of the government parties 
(only one MSZP deputy voted against it) while the opposition refrained from voting in 
an attempt to sabotage the necessary quorum of 50 per cent of members (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s 
Voting Record 17/12/2002). An override of the veto thus seemed very likely and after 
Mádl vetoed the bill it was passed again without amendments (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting 
Record 02/04/2003). 
Given these unfavourable preconditions, the question is why Mádl vetoed the bill 
nonetheless. Fidesz opposed the bill and according to my expert respondents it is likely 
that the party tried to influence Mádl in his decision. Yet two other factors also need to 
be considered. First, the churches were still important political actors at the time as their 
membership reached almost three quarters of the population (Hungarian Statistical Of-
fice 2001).
140 As Mádl was a devout catholic himself, his own closeness to the church 
and concerns about the impact of the bill on a major part of the population might have 
played an equally large role for the veto as his contacts to Fidesz and the MDF in the 
opposition. Thus, the president’s opposition could also have been expected had intra-
executive relations been unified. Second, the bill had been declared as ‘urgent’ by the 
government when it was introduced. Mádl thus only had five instead of fifteen days to 
either promulgate or return the bill to parliament, and less time to ascertain the likeli-
hood that the governmental majority would succumb to public pressure and follow his 
suggestions in amending it. 
At the same time, parliament passed a government-initiated bill with the votes of the 
coalition parties which introduced amendments to regulations on the criminal prosecu-
tion of drug users. The bill foresaw the reversion of the ‘no tolerance’ policy that had 
                                                 
140 According to the 2001 census 73.5 per cent of the Hungarian population belonged to a Christian 
church (a further 1 per cent to other religions) and 51.9 per cent were Roman Catholics (Hungarian Statis-
tical Office 2001).  
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been introduced under Victor Orbán in 1999. Fidesz naturally opposed the changes and 
called on the president to veto the bill and a group of Christian intellectuals collected 
over 100,000 signatures under a petition requiring the same (Szakacs 2002). Given this 
context, it appears that the bill would have made an equally likely target for presidential 
activism. Nevertheless, Mádl decided against using his veto in this case. He was certain-
ly critical of the changes in the law, yet in contrast to the law on social services the 
changes did infringe on any constitutional rights and the public cared only very little 
about the issue (Szakacs 2002). As can also be seen in the case of M￡dl’s veto of the 
health care act (see below), he was generally reluctant to veto bills because of objec-
tions to their content. Last, the bill was not declared as ‘urgent’ so that M￡dl had more 
time to review it and assess the chances that his veto would be successful (and be it only 
in raising awareness of his own policy preferences). 
 
Veto of the Health Care Act 
M￡dl’s most prominent veto during the episode at hand concerned the so-called hospital 
bill which allowed for the privatisation of the provision of hospital beds and other ser-
vices (Szomszéd 2005, 140; Tavits 2008, 79). The opposition parties Fidesz and MDF 
had voted against the bill, whereas the government parties had unanimously supported it 
(Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 16/06/2003). Given these results of the final vote, a veto 
was unlikely to be successful and related considerations were in fact not the reason for 
its eventual use. According to my interviews, the presidential office invited the respon-
sible secretary of state before and after the passage of the bill. He was asked to explain 
the motives behind the bill due to the great importance of the changes to the provision 
of health care that it foresaw. While Mádl personally opposed the idea behind the bill, 
he was reluctant to veto it for political reasons. As several of my respondents explained,  
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the eventual reason for M￡dl’s decision to veto was the fact that the government had 
apparently informally signalled to the president that it would amend the bill in accord-
ance with the president’s wishes if he returned it to parliament. As the bill had also been 
declared ‘urgent’, there was no time for more informal negotiations on the matter and 
Mádl reluctantly returned the bill to parliament.
141 However, the government did not 
keep its promise to amend the bill and passed the bill again withou t plenary debate or 
discussions in the respective parliamentary committees (O rsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 
23/06/2003; Schiemann 2004, 138).
142 As a further affront to the president, the speaker 
of parliament did not formally invite Mádl to the parliamentary session at which the ve-
to was discussed. 
The results of my interviews highlight that the government had had no intention to 
amend the bill and provoked a veto to implement the bill without delay. The Hungarian 
constitution gives the president no choice but to sign a bill into law once a veto has been 
overridden by parliament (irrespective of whether it has been amended or not). Mádl 
hence signed the bill yet also petitioned the Constitutional Court to give an interpret a-
tion of the president’s rights in the veto process. The Court generally strengthened the 
president’s position by ruling that parliament needs to seriously reconsider a returned 
bill and debate the president’s objections. Furthermore, the president must be invited 
and given the opportunity to speak at parliamentary sessions – in particular when a ve-
toed bill is debated. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court also upheld the interpretation 
                                                 
141The minister of health even arranged a formal, i.e. publicly announced, meeting with the president 
(most likely to confirm the government’s promises), yet this meeting only took place after the bill had 
already been vetoed. 
142 Fidesz and MDF deputies still unsuccessfully attempted to stop the override by not voting on the re -
passage of the bill so that there would be no quorum (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 23/06/2003).  
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that the president has to sign any bill that has been re-passed after a veto, irrespective of 
the changes that have been made (Hungarian Constitutional Court 2003).
143  
 
Ferenc Mádl – President above parties 
Compared to the previous government under Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán Mádl vetoed 
more often, but cohabitation was not the most decisive factor for presidential activism 
in this episode. Deception on part of the government, pressure from outside actors as 
well as the fact that bills were declared urgent (without actual necessity) influenced the 
president’s decision to veto most prominently. Even though the government majority 
was slim, the low fragmentation of parliament and the opposition of two party blocks 
disciplined deputies and thus worked for the coalition’s advantage. This means that the 
lower seat share did not lead to a weakening of the government as expected by my mod-
el. Apart from this, the fact that M￡dl’s level of activism remained much lower overall 
than expected can be attributed to two interconnected factors – his indirect election and 
the use of judicial review requests. Respondents from all groups reported that there had 
been many instances in which Mádl had refused to be more politically active. During 
the selected episode he repeatedly rejected requests from government members to make 
a statement on an issue of public interest. He also scorned demands from the opposition 
to return a particular bill to parliament or send it to the Constitutional Court even if he 
personally objected to the bills (see e.g. the law on the criminal prosecution of drug us-
ers mentioned above). Each time Mádl justified his refusal to veto bills by stating that 
the president should be apolitical. Respondents did not explicitly mention the indirect 
election of the president but explained that the established elite consensus was that the 
president should remain inactive. Also, while M￡dl’s use of vetoes remained low, he 
                                                 
143 This stands in contrast to other Central and East European countries that allow for vetoed bills to be 
amended within the veto process (i.e. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia). In 
these countries, the amended piece of legislation can be vetoed again by the president.   
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requested judicial review for seven bills during the same period of time.
144 This was a 
significant increase in comparison to his first two years in office  under the Fidesz-led 
government of Viktor Orbán during which he only submitted one review request. From 
this it appears that vetoes cannot only be an al ternative to requests for judicial review 
requests as seen with  Árpád Göncz, but judicial review request can also be a way of 
presidential activism that is usually expressed through vetoes. Last, based on the vetoes 
of the bills on social services and  on members of the European parliament (together 
with his refusal to veto the  drug user prosecution law) as well as my interviews, it ap-
pears that Mádl only used his veto to address grave inconsistencies of bills which would 
not necessarily have been unconstitutional. These findings stand  in contrast to the ex-
pectations of my theoretical framework, yet it remains to be seen in the analysis of the 
other episodes whether this is more than just a singular occurrence and would eventual-
ly need to be addressed in terms of different operationalisation and model specification. 
   
                                                 
144 All bills (or parts of them) were declared unconstitutional and subsequently either amended or with-
drawn by parliament.  
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4.1.3  Sólyom – Gyurcsány II: Mutual isolation of president and government  
Table 42: Summary of key information – Sólyom-Gyurcsány II (06/2006-04/2008) 
Episode start:  06/2006  Episode end:  04/2008 
President:  Lászlo Sólyom (non-partisan)  Prime Minister:  Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP) 
In office since:  08/2005  In office since:  09/2004, 
re-elected 06/2006 
Government composition:  MSZP, SZDSZ 
Government seat share:  54% (episode start), 54% (episode end) 
Effective No of parties:  2.61 (episode start), 2.63 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  5 vetoes / 0.22 per month 
Model prediction:  6.12 vetoes / 0.27 per month 
Reasons for selection:  Well predicted and representative of Sólyom’s presidency 
 
Lászlo Sólyom owed his election as president to disagreements within the government 
coalition. Despite being the candidate of the opposition
145, he narrowly won the third 
round of voting in parliament (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2006, 1125 -1126). Fidesz hoped to 
have an ally in  Sólyom against the MSZP-SZDSZ government, yet Sólyom was far 
from letting himself be co-opted by any party and isolated himself to the degree of b e-
ing in cohabitation with everybody else. 
The coalition of MSZP and SZDSZ had been confirmed in office in the 2006 parlia-
mentary elections and even increased its seat share. Despite their promises to the contra-
ry during the electoral campaign, parties announced an austerity programme almost 
immediately after their victory. Consequently, the implementation of  tax increases and 
other measures to balance the budget as well as to improve the country’s economic situ-
ation  took  over the legislative agenda  and increased the public’s awareness  of bills 
(Ilonszki and Kurtán 2007, 967). Parties disagreed strongly on the implementation of 
health and education reforms which also were fiercely opposed by the opposition. The 
public resistance against austerity and the publication of Gyurcs￡ny’s ‘speech of lies’ – 
                                                 
145  Sólyom  had  initially  not  been  nominated  by  a  political  party  but  the  environmentalist  group 
‘Vedegylet’ and a group of more than a hundred intellectuals. Fidesz then declared their support for 
Sólyom and proposed his name to parliament (Szakacs 2005).  
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in which he acknowledged that the government had deceived the electorate – in Sep-
tember  2006  only  increased  tensions  between  the  coalition  partners.
146  In late 2006 
Fidesz won the local elections which put further pressure on the government (Ilonszki 
and Kurtán 2007, 972) and in March 2008 the opposition initiated a ref erendum on the 
planned introduction of fees for higher education and medical services (Ilonszki and 
Kurtán 2009, 973-4). After a majority voted against all proposed changes, Gyurcsány 
dismissed the minister of health  – a position under the control of the SZDSZ – which 
was followed by the withdrawal of the SZDSZ from the coalition (Ilonszki and Kurtán 
2009, 976).
147 
The relationship between president Sólyom and the Gyurcsány governments can be 
described as cohabitational from the beginning, yet it became incre asingly hostile over 
time. This was not only due to different political orientations  – like his predecessor, 
Sólyom was politically conservative – but also because of the personal antipathy be-
tween president and Prime Minister. Furthermore, Sólyom, a former president of the 
Constitutional Court, practised a very literal interpretation of the constitution concern-
ing the separation of powers; there were no regular contacts between president and gov-
ernment, not even on an informal level. While Sólyom occasionally made formal re-
quests for more information about the government’s bill projects and their impact, an-
swers were only rarely and even then only insufficiently provided by the government. 
Sólyom has been Hungary’s most active president and used his veto four times more 
often than both of his predecessors combined. The selected time period is the longest 
single episode during Sólyom’s presidency. Overall, the time period can be seen as rep-
resentative of his presidency and therefore lends itself to examining whether the factors 
                                                 
146 In September 2006 a recording of speech by Prime Minister Gyurcsányi to MSZP politicians was 
leaked in which he declared that the government had lied constantly to win the election. The publication 
of the speech also sparked large-scale public protests (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2007, 971f) 
147 Gyurcsányi subsequently formed a minority government which still relied on votes from the SZDSZ 
and several deputies of the MDF.  
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included in the statistical models worked as expected. The analysis of Sólyom’s vetoes 
does not entirely corroborate the findings of the statistical models. While cohabitation 
was one of the main factors, it did not lead to more vetoes because of disagreements 
over policy but rather raised Sólyom’s awareness of legal-technical insufficiencies of 
legislation. Furthermore, divisions between coalition partners as well as the unpopulari-
ty of the government played a large role and the slim governmental majority appears to 
have had only a subordinate effect. 
Table 43: Vetoes by president Lászlo Sólyom during Gyurcsány II 
Name of vetoed bill 
Date passed 
(majority) 
Date of veto 
Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1) Law on health insurance funds and on 
the order of the use of care services pro-
vided by the compulsory health insurance 
17/12/2007 
(204/361) 
27/12/2007 
Amendments accepted 
(11/02/2008; 203/376) 
2) Law amending the law No 150 from the 
year 2003 on the agreement of cooperation 
with EU member states in criminal matters 
and other related laws  
10/11/2008 
(376/376) 
27/11/2008 
Amendments accepted 
(01/12/2009; 372/373) 
3)  Law  on  the  ratification  of  the  agree-
ment between the United States of Ameri-
ca and the European Union on the use and 
transfer of passenger name records to the 
United  States  Department  of  Homeland 
Security 
20/11/2006 
(342/351) 
29/11/2006 
Amendments accepted 
(18/12/2006; 361/362) 
       
Total: 5 vetoes / 1.8% of all legislation passed     
Notes: Table only lists vetoes mentioned in analysis. 
 
Veto of the Health Insurance Bill 
The coalition parties passed a bill on health insurance contributions on 17 December 
2007; the bill was declared ‘urgent’ as most stipulations were planned to enter into force 
by 1 January 2008 (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s 2007). The bill mainly foresaw the opening of the 
health care sector to private competitors and steps towards further privatisation to make 
the system more cost-effective. The liberal SZDSZ (which occupied the ministry of 
health which initiated the bill) had pressed for even stronger privatisation measures but 
these were mitigated by the MSZP which – similarly to Prime Minister Gyurcsány –  
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only half-heartedly supported the bill (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2008, 1001). Thus, the fact 
that the bill was passed with no defections (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 17/12/2007) 
does not entirely reflect the coalition’s division over the issue. The bill was unanimous-
ly opposed by all opposition parties which called on Sólyom to send it to the Constitu-
tional Court. They were supported by several intellectuals and groups of health care pro-
fessionals who likewise demanded that the president should take action (HVG 2007). 
While the opposition objected to the privatisation of the health care sector in principle, 
professional groups complained that no public consultation had taken place. 
According to my interviews it was soon clear to Sólyom and his staff that there were 
no constitutional problems with the bill, although many changes to the draft had only 
been introduced at a point that had not allowed the opposition to comment on them. 
Similar to other cases, there had been no negotiations between president and govern-
ment, yet this time the secretary of state from the ministry of health was invited to the 
presidential office to answer questions after the bill’s passage. The main concern from 
the president’s perspective was that no studies on the impact of the bill had been con-
ducted. Respondents explained that Sólyom had to order studies from external experts 
which were subsequently  discussed in  his  advisory  council.
148  In contrast, president 
Mádl in his aforementioned veto of the hospital bill had been able to rely on such stu d-
ies and arguments from the parliamentary debate. Two months after Sólyom vetoed the 
bill it was amended in accordance with the Sólyom’s suggestions and passed with the 
votes of the governmental majority (the opposition parties still voted against it). During 
the final debate deputies of SZDSZ and MSZP even praised the constructiveness of the 
president’s objections (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Stenographic Record 11/02/2008). 
                                                 
148 Not all vetoes were discussed in this round which shows the importance attributed to the bill by both 
the president and other actors.  
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The debates within the presidential office over a possible request for constitutional 
review of the bill showed that the president was concerned about the success of his use 
of powers. Sólyom later stated that the president should only send a bill to the Constitu-
tional Court if s/he is certain that it will be ruled unconstitutional (Sólyom 2009, 86).
149 
While the government’s majority alone (210/386 seats) would have been sufficient to 
override the veto, the weakness of the coalition lay in factors not captured by my theo-
retical framework and statistical models. The president used the divisions within the 
MSZP and the government’s general unpopularity which was furthered by the public 
protests. The question of whether the ideological opposition to the government was a 
decisive factor cannot be answered conclusively. Sólyom stressed that the constitution 
allowed for several ways to organise the health care sector and – according to my inter-
views – generally sympathised with the SZDSZ who had initiated the bill. On the other 
hand, Sólyom had made his negative attitude towards the government known on several 
occasions. Furthermore, the bill was central to Gyurcs￡ny’s reform programme so that 
even delaying its implementation considerably affected the government’s agenda. 
In this case it is difficult to find an appropriate case for comparison as Sólyom vetoed 
the majority of the government’s important legislative projects. Nevertheless, he re-
frained from vetoing the first steps of the health care reform in late 2006. In a number of 
bills, the government regulated professional associations for health care workers, creat-
ed a supervisory authority for health insurance providers, and amended the law on com-
pulsory health insurance. In each case, Fidesz and KDNP opposed the changes, yet there 
were no deep intra-governmental divisions yet. Thus, the coalition passed the bills with 
a comfortable majority (Orsz￡ggyűl￩s Voting Record 20/11/2006; 11/12/2006). While 
Sólyom likely took this into account, the reasons for refraining from using his veto here 
                                                 
149 Nevertheless, this makes his refusal to enter into informal negotiations with parties despite these con-
cerns even more puzzling.  
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appear to lie elsewhere. First, a number of the changes were necessary to bring Hungary 
in line with emerging European standards and could thus draw on experiences in other 
countries. Therefore, a major factor for his veto of the 2008 health insurance bill as well 
as other vetoes was now missing. Second, the laws were all prepared by the SZDSZ-led 
ministry of health. My interviews suggested that Sólyom had considerably better rela-
tions with the SZDSZ and was generally supportive of their policies. Last, the bills were 
generally less important and did not have a high public profile. 
 
Lászlo Sólyom – Sticking to the letter of the law 
The level of presidential activism under Lászlo Sólyom was higher than under both of 
his predecessors. He was also more successful as all but four of his 32 vetoes led to 
amendments to the bills in question or their withdrawal. Thereby, all of his vetoes fol-
lowed a largely similar pattern and their use was determined by the same factors. The 
cohabitation  between  president  and  Prime  Minister  was  one  of  the  main  drivers  of 
Sólyom’s activism. However, an analysis of the justifications for his vetoes in conjunc-
tion with my interviews showed that Sólyom did not necessarily object to the proposed 
policies. Rather, the president objected to the low quality of bills, meaning that were 
inconsistencies or that the range/effect of application was unclear. Bills were often hast-
ily drafted and in several cases not prepared by ministries but by groups of individual 
deputies.
150 The decrease in the quality of bills was however not matched by an increase 
in the overall amount of legislation as I argued when introducing the number of bills as 
a control variable into my statistical models. Therefore, it can be argued that the cohabi-
tation with the government made Sólyom more attentive to its failures and that he v e-
toed more for that reas on. This interpretation would also be compatible with the a s-
                                                 
150 Complaints about the quality of legislation even increased under the Bajnaj government (04/2009-
05/2010) and there, too, can explain the increase in vetoes together with the minority status of the gov-
ernment.  
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sumptions of my theoretical framework. Furthermore, the fact that the majority of his 
vetoes was accepted (bills withdrawn or amended according to his suggestions) might 
have  been  another  factor  for  the  increasing  activism  throughout  the  episode  and 
Sólyom’s presidency in general. 
Sólyom himself was significantly less popular that his predecessors (HVG 2012), yet 
the fact that the approval ratings of the government were even lower gave him a com-
parative advantage and might explain why he also vetoed bills that were supported by a 
large majority of deputies. Here it also becomes clear that while eventually being mod-
erately accurate, the predictions of the statistical model rely on assumptions that do not 
always match reality. The model would explain the high number of vetoes with the nar-
row governmental majority, yet as seen in the case of the health care bill party discipline 
was very high (despite disagreements between coalition partners) and overrides very 
likely. Based on the above analysis and the results of my interviews, one can conclude 
that the greatest influence on Sólyom’s veto use was the mutual isolation of president, 
government and parliament. Following his own Constitutional Court rulings that the 
president is separate from both government and parliament, Sólyom was unwilling to 
negotiate informally with the government or individual parties and insisted on using his 
powers independently. This is best exemplified by his refusal to coordinate appoint-
ments for ombudsmen and judges with parliament or government even though his first 
choice-candidates were regularly rejected (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2008, 1004; Körösényi 
et al. 2009, 112; Várnagy 2010, 1007). Government and parliament followed suit and 
for instance regularly denied the president complete answers to his requests for more 
information on their policies.    
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4.1.4  The activism of Hungarian presidents in government formation, censure 
and dismissal 
The Hungarian constitution formally gives the president a certain discretion in govern-
ment formation after elections, yet in reality the possibilities of the office to influence 
the composition of the government are limited.
151 According to Art. 33 III of the consti-
tution, the president recommends a candidate for Prime Minister to parliament, yet – as 
in several other political systems – it is not specified on what criteria presidents have to 
base their decision (Körösényi et al. 2010, 364). The president can also only nominate a 
Prime Minister after elections or when the Prime Minister resigns. Otherwise, parlia-
ment  can  independently  change  the  Prime  Minister  via  a  constructive  vote  of  no-
confidence. In practice, presidents have always appointed the candidate of the party that 
won the most votes in the parliamentary election (Körösényi et al. 2009, 50); however, 
these parties have so far also always been able to form a majority government. Until 
now there have only been two minority governments in Hungary – Gyurcsány III and 
Bajnai I. The president could not play a role in the appointment of either. In the first 
case, the SZDSZ left the coalition but Gyurcsány simply remained in his post (Várnágy 
2010, 1003) and in the second case, Gordon Bajnaj was elected by the ways of a con-
structive vote of no-confidence (Körösényi et al. 2009, 282). 
Neither the academic literature nor my interviews have shown any evidence that 
presidents attempted to influence the choice or dismissal of a particular Prime Minister 
formally or informally. The only instance of possible interference on the dismissal of 
the  Prime  Minister  occurred  after  the  publication  of  Prime  Minister  Gyurcs￡ny’s 
‘speech of lies’ in the aftermath of the 2006 parliamentary elections. In a controversial 
speech, Sólyom declared that it was in the hands of parliament to resolve the matter 
                                                 
151 Due to the time period chosen for this thesis, all following mentions of the constitution refer to the 
version in place before March 2011.  
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(Ilonszki and Kurt￡n 2007, 972). The president’s opponents used this statement to argue 
that the president was acting as an extension of Fidesz and the opposition (who were 
naturally also calling for the government’s resignation), yet my interviews showed that 
Sólyom’s attitude towards Gyurcs￡ny was already well-known to elites and most of the 
public. While still being the first time that a Hungarian president publicly hinted at the 
government’s resignation, the importance of this incident in practical terms was rela-
tively low. As Gyurcsány only resigned more than two and a half years later in March 
2009, no direct effect can be attributed to his speech.  
Table 44: The share of non-partisan ministers in Hungarian cabinets, 1990-2010 
 
 
A
n
t
a
l
l
 
 
B
o
r
o
s
s
 
 
H
o
r
n
 
 
O
r
b
á
n
 
I
 
 
M
e
d
g
y
e
s
s
y
 
*
*
 
 
G
y
u
r
c
s
á
n
y
 
I
 
 
G
y
u
r
c
s
á
n
y
 
I
I
 
 
G
y
u
r
c
s
á
n
y
 
I
I
I
 
 
B
a
j
n
a
j
 
*
*
 
 
O
r
b
á
n
 
I
I
 
Cabinet size*  18  18  14  17  16  18  13  16  16  10 
Non-partisan 
ministers n (%) 
4 
(22.2) 
3 
(16.7) 
2 
(14.3) 
8 
(47.1) 
6 
(37.5) 
5 
(27.8) 
6 
(46.2) 
6 
(37.5) 
8 
(50.0) 
3 
(30.0) 
Notes: * Total number of cabinet members at the time of formation, i.e. the Prime Minister, the ministers 
(including the minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s office), and ministers without portfolio; ** Non-
partisan Prime Minister. 
Source: Körösényi et al. (2009); Ilonszki and Kurtán (2007; 2008; 2009); Várnagy (2010; 2011); Website 
of the Hungarian parliament at http://www.mkogy.hu; Website of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office 
at http://www.kormany.hu. 
 
According to Art 33 IV of the Hungarian Constitution, the president appoints and 
dismisses cabinet ministers on recommendation of the Prime Minister. A similar clause 
caused conflict between president and Prime Minister in Slovakia (see Chapter 4.2.4), 
yet in Hungary this has not been the cause of any disagreements. At least since the rul-
ing of the Constitutional Court that the president could not refuse to appoint or dismiss 
heads of government agencies for political reasons (Brunner/Sólyom 1995, 210) it was 
implicit that the president would also not be able to do so with regard to members of 
government. Again, neither the academic literature nor my interviews have shown evi- 
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dence that presidents interfered in the appointment or censure of cabinet ministers. In-
terestingly, this result stands in contrast to the share of non-partisan ministers used by 
several authors as an indicator of presidential activism (Neto and Strøm 2006; Tavits 
2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b). In Hungary, said share amounts to 32.7% of 
all  ministers  in  governments  formed  between  1990  and  2010.
152  The three highest 
shares of non-partisan ministers in political cabinets can be found in Orbán I and 
Gyurcsány II and in both cases the lack of presidential activism can be easily demo n-
strated (Bajnai I can be classified as an expert/caretaker cabinet for which a higher 
number of non-partisan is expected by the teams of authors mentioned). In case of 
Orbán I, all non-partisan ministers still held very close ties to Fidesz – the largest party 
in the coalition. Three of these ‘non-partisan’ ministers were even re-appointed in 2010 
(two of them had joined Fidesz by then) and a further one joined Orbán as an advisor 
and was soon appointed as judge to the Constitutional Court.
153 This suggests that the 
non-partisan ministers were far from being compromise candidates. In the case of 
Gyurcsány II, formed after the elections of 2006, my interviews showed that president 
Sólyom did not even meet with party leaders until after they had agreed on a new  gov-
ernment – including the allocation of portfolios – and his only task was to formally ap-
point a candidate for Prime Minister. Given that Sólyom had been president of the Con-
stitutional Court when the ruling on the appointment of high government officials was 
passed, any such interference would also have been against his understanding of the 
constitution. The fact that he refused to consult with parties over appointments such as 
the ombudsman (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2008, 1004) further corroborates the claim that 
                                                 
152 Note that this differs from the 10% given by Neto and Strøm (2006), Tavits (2008) and Schleiter and 
Morgan-Jones (2009b). While they exclude ministers without portfolio, this does not account for the dif-
ference between the given numbers and highlights problems with determining ministers’ party affiliation. 
153 Sándor Pinter (Minister of the Interior 1998-2002, 2010-present); Györgyi Matolcsi (Minister of the 
Economy 1999-2002 [predecessor also non-partisan] and 2010-2013); János Martonyi (Foreign Minister 
1998-2002 and 2010-present); Istv￡n Stumpf (Minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s office 1998-
2002; advisor to the PM 05-07/2010; judge at the Constitutional Court 07/2010-present).  
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involvement by Sólyom was not responsible for the higher share of non-partisan minis-
ters in any of the governments formed during his presidency. 
 
4.1.5  Hungary – Confirmatory and contradictory evidence 
The analysis of presidential activism in Hungary has produced evidence that partly chal-
lenges the assumptions of my theoretical framework as well as the interpretation of the 
statistical models. Assumptions were confirmed in so far as the variables used also con-
stituted the most important influences on presidential activism. However, the mecha-
nisms by which they impacted activism and/or their direction of effect were oftentimes 
slightly different than theorised. 
The election by parliament has made Hungarian presidents more supra-partisan and 
especially Mádl and Sólyom shared the conviction that they should not interfere in day-
to-day decision-making for ‘political’ reasons. The isolation of the presidency pursued 
by Sólyom can also be seen as an effect of the indirect election, as well as of the 1991 
ruling of the Constitutional Court that placed the president outside the executive (which 
Sólyom himself accounted for as the Court’s chairman; Hungarian Constitutional Court 
1991). Nevertheless, the dependence of the president on the legislature that my theoreti-
cal framework posits is to a considerable extent linked to the president’s desire for re-
election. There was a significant decrease in G￶ncz’ activism after the 1994 parliamen-
tary elections, likely to secure his re-election in 1995. Mádl however needed to be per-
suaded to run at all in 2000 and it was clear from early on in his term that he would not 
seek re-election. Sólyom, too, soon realised that his chances of re-election were slim 
and did not publicly declare interest in standing again. The lack of a re-election motive 
might thus explain the slightly higher levels of activism under Mádl and Sólyom com-
pared to G￶ncz’ second term.  
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The relationship between president and government, too, was a very important ele-
ment of presidential activism but worked differently than expected. Under all presi-
dents, cohabitation led to clashes with the government and for Mádl and Sólyom to 
more vetoes. However, Göncz vetoed not only during but exactly because of harmoni-
ous president-government relations. His activism thus resembles the use of vetoes by 
Arnold Rüütel in Estonia. Sólyom on the other hand did not veto to block policy despite 
being in cohabitation with the government. Rather, cohabitation increased his awareness 
of the technical-legal shortcomings of the bill and he used his veto to address them.
154 
While this mechanism of effect does not match my initial assumptions, it is perfectly 
compatible with my theoretical framework and worth incorporating. 
 
4.2  Presidential activism in Slovakia 
Slovakia presents a unique and crucial case within the remit of this study as it is the on-
ly country in my sample (and one of the few countries worldwide) that moved from in-
direct to popular presidential elections outside the context of political transition.
155 The 
in-depth analysis of three president-cabinet episodes confirms the findings of the quanti-
tative analysis on the effects of several explanatory factors. In particular, Slovak presi-
dents vetoed more frequently when their policy orientation diverged from that of the 
government and when the government held no majority in parliament. Although parlia-
mentary fragmentation proved non-significant in the statistical models, the qualitative 
analysis suggests that higher fragmentation led to more presidential activism  – at least 
in the short term, i.e. immediately after increases in the effective number of parties. The 
most uniform influence on presidential activism appears to have been the mode of pres-
                                                 
154 M￡dl’s preference for judicial review requests over vetoes can also be interpreted as a consequence of 
this mechanism. 
155 Unfortunately, the veto override threshold was simultaneously changed to an absolute majority so that 
it remains difficult to fully differentiate between the effects of both variables.  
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idential elections. The analysis shows that the introduction of popular elections led to an 
increase in presidential activism as presidents thereby enjoyed not only greater legiti-
macy, but also became active to respond to the wishes of their voters independently 
from parliament and government. 
 
4.2.1 Kováč – Mečiar I: Few vetoes despite cohabitation 
Table 45: Summary of key information – Kováč-Mečiar I (03/1993-04/1994) 
Episode start:  03/1993  Episode end:  04/1994 
President:  Michal Kov￡č 
(non-partisan, formerly HZDS) 
Prime Minister:  Vladim￭r Mečiar 
(HZDS) 
In office since:  03/1993  In office since:  06/1992 
Government composition:  HZDS, SNS (no official representation in cabinet 03-11/1993) 
Government seat share:  59% (episode start), 42% (episode end) 
Effective number of parties:  3.19 (episode start), 4.58 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  2 vetoes / 0.14 per month 
Model prediction:  4.77 vetoes / 0.34 per month 
Reasons for selection:  The only episode under fully democratic conditions containing use 
of presidential powers; outlier/overpredicted 
 
Vladim￭r Mečiar had been one of Slovakia’s leading politicians since the Velvet revolu-
tion, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Prime Minister 
since June 1992, and even served as acting president during the first months of Slovak 
independence. The election of Michal Kov￡č, a former minister of finance and speaker 
of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (as well as HZDS deputy chairman), introduced 
a check-and-balance on Mečiar’s power. This proved to be a recipe for conflict over 
policy and the role of the president. The relationship between president and Prime Min-
ister was tense from the beginning and grew more conflict-laden over time as Kov￡č 
was quick to distance himself from his old party (Haughton 2003, 273) and criticised 
Mečiar over his autocratic style of governing. In particular, Kov￡č opposed and refused 
to rubberstamp the government’s controversial privatisation plans. The government on  
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the other hand refused any kind of cooperation with the president
156 and began to delib-
erately obstruct his work, eventually even using unconstitutional means when the con-
flict reached its peak in 1994-1998 (Tavits 2008, 124; Haughton 2005, 86-87). In a very 
critical state of the nation address in 1994, Kov￡č accused Mečiar of autocratic tenden-
cies (Malová 1995, 468; Haugthon 2003, 274) and indirectly called for his resigna-
tion.
157 Kov￡č had no power to unilaterally dismiss the Prime Minister but his speech 
triggered a fierce debate in parliament. At its end an opposition deputy proposed a vote 
of no-confidence in the government and as both government parties did not participate 
in the vote, Mečiar lost and Kov￡č subsequently dismissed the government (Malov￡ 
1995, 468; Henderson 2002, 43).  
Kov￡č’s activism only reached its peak between 1996 and 1997, yet the selected epi-
sode is the only period during his term that is unproblematic to be used as part of this 
study.  ‘[D]uring  1994-1998  Slovakia’s  political  regime  had  essential  shortcomings’ 
(Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 2008, 180) with regards to democracy, yet my theoretical frame-
work seeks to explain presidential activism under conditions where democracy is ‘the 
only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, 15). That would also apply to the govern-
ment of Jozef Moravščik (04/1994-11/1994), yet the episode is very short and Kov￡č 
refrained from using any of his powers.
158 Being overpredicted by my statistical model, 
the episode provides an opportunity to discover factors that inhibit presidential activism 
                                                 
156 Two of my respondents from Kov￡č’s office mentioned that Mečiar refused to meet the president over 
several months. The government also refused to answer Kov￡č’s requests for information (which eventu-
ally led to proceedings before the Constitutional Court; Orosz and Simunčov￡ 1998, 131-132). 
157 Kov￡č concluded his speech saying that he did not call for the Mečiar’s resignation yet his words were 
soon interpreted as such (Kov￡č 2012, 187). Even with the results of my interviews it is unclear what Ko-
v￡č’s actual intentions were as he had prepared the concluding part of his speech without consulting with 
his staff. 
158 This was probably due to the fact that Kov￡č himself was in close contact and unified relations with 
the government. As the government was short of a majority in parliament, he could effect policy change 
without using his powers. Last, due to his very public conflict with Mečiar he also did not need to use his 
veto to show his policy position in the forefront of the 1994 parliamentary elections.  
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and to find out whether the overprediction is caused by misspecification of the statistical 
model or by the fact that some explanatory factors did not work as expected. 
Table 46: Vetoes by president Michal Kov￡č during Mečiar I 
Name of vetoed bill 
Date passed 
(majority) 
Date of veto 
Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1)  Law the on salaries of certain constitu-
tional state officials  
25/03/1993 
(90/108) 
06/04/1993 
 
Override 
(21/04/1993; n/a*) 
2)  Law on the mitigation of property in-
justices  done  to  churches  and  religious 
communities 
29/09/1993 
(76/96) 
14/10/1993 
Amendments accepted 
(27/10/1993; 92/121) 
       
    Total: 2 vetoes / 1.7 % of all legislation passed     
Notes: * Varying majorities as all 21 suggestions for amendments rejected individually. 
 
During the episode parliament mainly passed bills on privatisation, the return of pri-
vate property, and further measures dealing with the heritage of the Communist state. 
This  also  included several  law amendments  that  had become necessary as  a conse-
quence of Slovak independence.
159 Thereby, Kov￡č used his veto power twice, mainly 
making use of the unstable and decreasing government majority.
160 In March 1993, the 
only cabinet member of the Slovak National Party (SNS) resigned (Malová 1994, 417), 
yet its deputies continued to support the government (NRSR Voting Records 1993). A 
month later several HZDS deputies left the party to form their own faction (Petranská 
Rolková 2011) and it took HZDS and SNS until November 1993 to reach a new coal i-
tion agreement (Malová 1994, 417). However, shortly afterwards  the SNS split and  a 
group of deputies left the coalition so that the government could only pass the budget 
with the help of two opposition deputies (Kipke 2010, 326f). These intra -governmental 
problems provided an excellent basis for presidential activism and Kov￡č’s vetoes in 
1993 thus corroborates assumptions about the mechanisms of effect of the variables in-
                                                 
159 For instance the removal of references to Czechoslovakia and the creation of own institutions after the 
fulfilment of several state functions had previously been concentrated on the Czech part of Czechoslo-
vakia. 
160 In a further four cases the government used its power to order the president to return a bill to parli a-
ment (Art 87 IV Slovak Constitution [1992]). As Kov￡č was constitutionally obligated to do so, this did 
not constitute a discretionary action of the president and must not be seen as presidential activism.  
260 
cluded in my model. The fact that the episode is nonetheless overpredicted can mainly 
be attributed to two factors. First, despite a decrease in its formal seat share, the gov-
ernment still functioned as a majority government for most of the time as it relied on 
strong informal agreements with other parties to pass its policies. This also explains 
why parliament’s level of legislative output remained relatively stable throughout the 
episode. Second, the government was proactive in correcting problems with its legisla-
tion by using its power to request a return of a bill before Kov￡č had a chance to veto it. 
 
Veto of salary increases for state officials 
Kov￡č issued his first veto already a month after his inauguration. While the bill in 
question had been passed with a clear majority and the support from all parties, some 
prominent politicians (including some representatives of the coalition) voted against the 
bill or abstained.
161 The president’s main objection to the changes was that he believed 
the current economic situation would not allow for the proposed salary increases and 
suggested alternative thresholds (his suggestions would also have decreased his own 
salary). Furthermore, he criticised that the speaker of parliament received significantly 
less than the Prime Minister as it did not reflect their constitutional rank and proposed 
several measures relating to deputies’ parliamentary expenses (Kov￡č 1993a). Three 
weeks later and without a major plenary debate all parliamentary committees involved 
rejected Kov￡č’s suggestions and parliament followed their recommendations in over-
riding the veto. 
As the bill was passed with overwhelming support from all parties, Kov￡č’s decision 
to veto the bill appears to be counterintuitive at first sight. However, the veto can to a 
large extent still be explained by the unstable majority situation of the government. Ko-
                                                 
161 Among them were NRSR speaker Ivan Gašparovič (HZDS) and SDĽ chairman Peter Weiss (voted 
against) and MKDH chairman Béla Bugar (abstained; NRSR Voting Record 25/03/1993).  
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v￡č vetoed the bill just after defections and intra-coalition conflict had reduced the gov-
ernment’s seat share from 59% to 44%.
162 The government was still able to override the 
veto; however, the voting records show that when Kov￡č’s 21 suggestions for amend-
ments were voted on individually the majority of amendments was only one or two 
votes short of being accepted and that there were many abstentions (usually outnumber-
ing the votes against).
163 Thus, Kov￡č’s veto was well-calculated and can be explained 
by the government’s seat share and a sudden increase in parliamentary fragmentation. A 
further factor was that the bill had important opponents with the HZDS (such as speaker 
Ivan Gašparovič). This corroborates the importance of the governmental seat share and 
parliamentary as predictors of presidential activism but also poses the question why this 
did not lead to more vetoes as predicted by the statistical model. The reason here lies in 
the fact that HZDS and SNS re-established their cooperation shortly afterwards (albeit 
without a new coalition treaty) and were still informally supported by a number of op-
position deputies. The government was thus functionally a majority government and its 
strength was not affected by increased parliamentary fragmentation. Furthermore, the 
HZDS party leadership was united with regards to almost all other bills so that Kov￡č 
could not use intra-party conflicts to his advantage. 
My interviews suggest another reason why Kov￡č used his veto only infrequently 
and refrained from making suggestions to the content of bills which were not motivated 
by concerns of constitutionality. Shortly after the overridden veto described above, Ko-
v￡č also tried to advise cabinet members on solving the country’s payment insolvencies 
(albeit informally). This initiative was not only blocked by the government but also 
fuelled the growing tensions with Prime Minister Mečiar. In order to let the relationship 
                                                 
162 On 6 April 1993, the day of the veto, eight deputies left the HZDS to form their own faction. Only two 
weeks before, the SNS’ only cabinet member had resigned so that the official governmental seat share 
was reduced to 66 seats (44%) (Petranská Rolková 2011). 
163 The bill was eventually passed again because deputies who had previously abstained preferred the e x-
isting bill to having no bill at all – after all, it raised deputies’ salaries and parliamentary expenses.  
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with the government not deteriorate any further and endanger his position
164, Kov￡č 
henceforth refrained from similar activism 
 
Veto of the church property restitution bill 
Kov￡č’s only other veto during this episode concerned a bill regulating the restitution of 
property that had been seized by the communist state to the church and other religious 
organisations – a common subject of policy debates in the region (see e.g. Kozminski 
1997; Blacksell and Born 2002). The HZDS-led government still had no official majori-
ty in the assembly and governed with continued support by the SNS. The passage of the 
original bill had been relatively uncontroversial (except for some reservations from the 
post-communist left) and supported by a large majority. Yet, Kov￡č objected to the bill 
because some groups who had previously been allocated or bought former church prop-
erty would not be compensated when they returned it now. This resulted from a formu-
lation that had been introduced during the later stages of the drafting process and was 
not part of the initial governmental draft of the bill. Other than providing comprehen-
sive amendatory observations, Kov￡č only asked parliament to correct one sub-clause 
(Kov￡č  1993c).  Very  importantly,  Kov￡č  presented  parliament  with  two  alternative 
ways to do so. As the Slovak parliament can only reject or accept the president’s obser-
vation but not introduce any other amendments as part of the veto process, Kov￡č there-
by minimised the chances that his veto would be overridden. The government and most 
opposition parties accepted Kov￡č’s criticism and passed the amended bills with a large 
majority (NRSR Stenographic Record 27/10/1993). 
The statistical  model would explain this  veto  through the low  governmental  seat 
share, increased parliamentary fragmentation and the cohabitation between president 
                                                 
164 Already at that point Kov￡č faced difficulties in fulfilling his duties due to the government’s hostile 
attitude and his therefore insufficiently equipped office.  
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and Prime Minister. However, as mentioned above the government still relied on a rela-
tively stable majority and policy differences did not play a role in the veto at hand. Ko-
v￡č’s motivation was to improve the legislation which was also in the government’s in-
terest and secured the veto’s success. While the aftermath of the veto on state officials’ 
salaries could explain why Kov￡č did not use more vetoes based on objections to bill 
content, it still stands to reason why he did not issue more ‘technical’ vetoes. The ex-
planation here appears to be the government’s proactivity in correcting problems similar 
to the ones described above by pre-emptively requesting Kov￡č to return bills. 
 
Government-mandated veto of the law on names and surnames 
During the episode at hand, the government used its constitutional right to request the 
return of a bill by the president four times. Thereby, they could quickly rectify incon-
sistencies or react to criticism before the president even had time to review the bill and 
veto it himself. An illustrative example in this context is the law on names and sur-
names passed in July 1993. After it emerged that current regulations for the use of non-
Slovak names in official documents were in conflict with international law as well as 
with the new constitution, the bill introduced entirely new rules and was passed without 
major opposition (NRSR Voting Record 07/07/1993). Nevertheless, it contained several 
inconsistencies and  garnered criticism from national  minority  representatives.  Given 
these problems and the fact that a number of presidents in CEE tended to be vocal sup-
porters of minority rights during the transition (see e.g. Meri’s support for ethnic Rus-
sians in Estonia) one could have expected Kov￡č to veto the bill. Nevertheless, the cabi-
net decided to demand the bill’s return at its next meeting only a few days after the 
bill’s passage (Vláda SR 1993). The comments that the president attached to the bill  
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when returning it (Kov￡č 1993b) strongly suggest that he would have in fact vetoed the 
bill on his own, had not the government pre-emptively demanded its return. 
 
Michal Kováč – Strategic activism limited by dependence on parliament 
The analysis of Kov￡č’s vetoes produces two main findings. First, the government’s 
seat share and the fragmentation of parliament are important predictors of presidential 
activism.  Second  and  more  importantly,  both  variables  are  not  always  accurate 
measures  of  the  government’s  majority/minority  status  and  parliamentary  weakness. 
The  latter  at  least  partly  corroborates  the  results  of  my  statistical  model  (non-
significance of parliamentary fragmentation), whereas the former can explain part of the 
overprediction for this episode. The government functioned as a majority government 
for most of the episode which is why Kov￡č did not use his veto more often. Further-
more, the internal division within the HZDS which Kov￡č tried to exploit in his first 
veto  was  a  singular  occurrence.  The  government  parties  were  otherwise  very  disci-
plined, leaving Kov￡č less opportunities for activism. Intra-party divisions are a factor 
that also emerged from other case studies and was not included in my statistical model. 
However, it would be difficult to devise an indicator of issue-specific divisions unless 
bill-specific and roll-call data are used to predict the likelihood that a particular bill is 
vetoed. In addition, the fact that Kov￡č issued his first veto within a month of his inau-
guration lends some support to the assumptions that president may veto early on in their 
term to build a reputation and potentially extract policy concessions later on. 
Despite a period of  cohabitation Kov￡č only vetoed two bills  (1.7% of all bills) 
which can be seen as an indication of restraint on his part due to his dependence on par-
liament for re-election. Kov￡č himself acknowledged the dependence of an indirectly  
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elected president on the nominating party and parliament
165 as well as the fact that he 
refrained from using his powers in cases where his objections had no constitutional b a-
sis (Slovak Spectator 1999).  This effect of indirect elections was likely reinforced by 
Kov￡č’s experiences in issuing his first veto and attempting to advise the government 
on other economic issues. On the other hand, the reason for why he did not veto more 
bills  on legal/technical  grounds  appears to  lie in  the government’s requests to  have 
problematic bills returned to parliament before Kov￡č could veto them. As shown in the 
case of the law on names and surnames, Kov￡č would very likely have vetoed the bill 
due to its various inconsistencies had the government not pre-emptively requested the 
bill’s return to parliament. Interestingly, if the four government-mandated vetoes are 
taken into account, the number of issued vetoes is much closer to model prediction. 
Finally, two respondents suggested that Kov￡č’s professional background can ex-
plain why he vetoed the two bills in particular. As he had worked for the Czechoslovak 
National Bank, was Czechoslovak minister of finance (12/1989-05/1991) and had been 
responsible for economic policy during his time as HZDS deputy chairman (Pradetto 
and Weckmüller 2004, 136, 141) Kov￡č reportedly saw himself as an expert on finance 
and public economy. Both vetoed bills had large financial implications and he wanted to 
put his experience to use – the same applies to his attempts to advise the government on 
payment  insolvencies. Presidents’ personal  background might  potentially  provide  an 
explanation for why presidents veto specific bills, yet with regard to this episode the 
evidence is unfortunately inconclusive. As parliament passed many more bills related to 
public finance and privatisation over the course of the episode, one would have ex-
pected more presidential vetoes and not less. Nonetheless, I will return to this question 
in the final comparative assessment of findings in chapter 5.   
                                                 
165 Variations of this principal-agent approach were also mentioned by two of my political respondents 
and one expert.  
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4.2.2  Schuster – Dzurinda II: Activism boosted by popular elections 
Table 47: Summary of key information – Schuster-Dzurinda II (10/2002-06/2004) 
Episode start:  10/2002  Episode end:  06/2004 
President:  Rudolf Schuster 
(non-partisan, formerly SOP) 
Prime Minister:  Mikulaš Dzurinda 
(SDKÚ) 
In office since:  06/1999  In office since:  11/1998, 
re-elected 10/2002 
Government composition:  SDKÚ, SMK, KDH, ÁNO 
Government seat share:  52% (episode start), 45% (episode end) 
Effective number of parties:  6.52 (episode start), 8.79 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  30 vetoes / 1.43  per month 
Model prediction:  13.81 vetoes / 0.69  per month 
Reasons for selection:  Outlier/underpredicted,  constellation  of  independent  variables  repre-
sentative for time period 
 
Rudolf Schuster and Mikulaš Dzurinda had started off as allies in a coalition formed 
after the 1998 elections but turned into rivals when Schuster became president. Yet after 
Dzurinda’s mandate was renewed, relations between president and Prime Minister be-
came even worse than they had been before. During Dzurinda’s first term, Schuster had 
already visibly distanced himself from his own party (Party of Civic Understanding – 
SOP) and the government as a whole.
166 Now, he specifically targeted bills at the core 
of the government’s legislative agenda which included a number of further privatisaton 
measures and reforms of the welfare state, although with little success. After the first 
Dzurinda government had often struggled to reach compromises and was weakened by 
unstable political parties (Učeň 2001; 2002), the coalition now showed a higher degree 
of cohesion. Nevertheless, in the first months of this episode the smaller parties still 
tried to block initiates from the SDKÚ and delayed the passage of several bills (Učeň 
2003; 2004). The coalition became more effective after losing its majority status in late 
                                                 
166 After his election Schuster resigned as SOP party chairman and suspended his party membership 
(Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř  2008, 196). He also announced a referendum initiated by the opposition which called 
for a shortening of the legislative term (L￡štic 2011, 80-84) and accused Dzurinda and speaker Migaš of 
trying to use his life-threatening illness in June and July 2000 to their advantage (Mesežnikov 2000, 34-
35; Nicholson 2000).  
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2003/early 2004 due to numerous defections. Thanks to deals with defectors from the 
HZDS, the government in practice remained a majority coalition (Učeň 2005, 1175) and 
managed to implement its reforms in the area of taxes, pensions and social security 
(Učeň 2004, 1128). This increase in parliament’s legislative output was however only 
partly matched by an increase in vetoes, meaning that other factors were responsible for 
Schuster’s activism. 
Schuster’s term in office only consists of two episodes, yet the second episode pro-
vides a better basis for arriving at generalizable conclusions. The first years of Schus-
ter’s presidency were still characterised by the constitutional amendments of 1999-2000 
which not only introduced popular elections but also changed presidential powers, e.g. 
the president’s right to chair cabinet meetings and attend sessions of parliament without 
invitation was abolished (Malov￡ and Učeň 2000, 515) and the threshold for a veto 
override raised from relative to absolute
167 (Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 2008, 184; Učeň 2002, 
1078). The selected episode thus shows the workings of the system under ‘normal’ con-
ditions after actors grew accustomed to the new institutional arrangements. The aim of 
the following analysis is thus to see to what extent the variation of explanatory factors 
can explain activism over the course of the episode or in particular instances, and identi-
fy reasons for the significant underprediction of the episode. 
From October 2002 until the end of his term in June 2004, Schuster vetoed 30 bills 
(ca 12% of all legislation). While this was a decrease compared to before (70 veto-
es/14% of bills during Dzurinda I), vetoes were now motivated by objections to the con-
tent rather than the form of legislation. In particular, Schuster tried to block bills on two 
of the most important reform projects of the government – social policy and market 
liberalisation (Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 2008, 196). Hereby, the most important variables in 
                                                 
167 President Schuster even suggested that it should be raised to a 3/5 majority (Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř  2008, 
196).  
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explaining Schuster’s activism are the cohabitation with the government whose privati-
sation and liberalisation programme were in conflict with his own political convictions. 
Furthermore, Schuster tried to make use of the increasing fragmentation of parliament 
and the decreasing seat share of the governing coalition. Last, Schuster vetoed a signifi-
cantly higher percentage of legislation than his predecessor Michal Kov￡č while cohab-
iting with Mečiar between 1993 and 1998 (6.4%). Together with the justifications for 
his vetoes, this suggests an independent effect of direct presidential elections. 
Table 48: Vetoes by president Rudolf Schuster during Dzurinda II 
Vetoes discussed 
Date passed 
(majority) 
Date of veto 
Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1) Amendments Act to the law social as-
sistance  and  the  law  on  the  subsistence 
minimum  and  the  determination  of  the 
amounts  for  the  purposes  of  state  social 
benefits 
15/11/2002 
(78/129) 
28/11/2002 
 
Override 
(09/12/2002; 76/125) 
2) Amendments Act to the law on social 
assistance 
05/12/2003 
(73/114) 
19/12/2003 
Override 
(20/01/2004; 79/148) 
3)  Income tax Amendment Act 
28/10/2003 
(85/138) 
24/11/2003 
Override 
(04/12/2003; 78/136) 
4)  Amendment Act to the Law on tax and 
real estate transfer and the law on experts 
and surveyors 
06/11/2003 
(87/126) 
28/11/2003 
Override 
(04/12/2003; 78/122) 
       
     Total: 30 vetoes / 12% of all bills passed     
Notes: Table only lists details for vetoes discussed in analysis. 
 
Vetoes of amendments to the social assistance act 
Schuster vetoed amendments to the Social Assistance Act twice, albeit unsuccessfully. 
The first veto particularly highlights the importance of intra-executive relations for ex-
plaining presidential activism, whereas the second veto showcases the effect of the gov-
ernment’s seat share. In the first case, the bill was part of the government’s attempts to 
achieve budgetary savings for 2003 by cutting down on social services. While Schuster 
did not directly criticise the amendments, he still suggested increases to hand-outs for 
subsistence and following prolonged illnesses as well as the abolition of some maxi-
mum amounts for social benefits (Schuster 2002). As the bill was part of the govern- 
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ment’s reform programme, it was unlikely that any of Schuster’s comments would be 
incorporated and the veto was overridden. Nevertheless, the aim of the bill was clearly 
contrary to Schuster’s declared policy objectives, so that cohabitation appears to have 
been the main driver of this veto. Furthermore, all opposition parties voted in favour of 
Schuster’s proposals so that the veto was likely a signal to both voters and party leaders. 
Schuster’s second veto was more clearly based on the weakness of the government 
which held exactly 50% of seats at the time. This time the bill actually increased some 
social benefits and regulated financial help for carers of ill family members. However, 
Schuster still objected to several stipulations on the classification of disabilities and def-
initions about who could become a carer (Schuster 2003). Once again, the opposition 
parties supported Schuster’s suggestions and while the veto was overridden, most of his 
13 individual suggestions only fell short of being accepted by a handful of votes be-
cause independent deputies alternatively voted with the larger opposition parties and the 
government.  
Schuster’s failure to veto the subsequent amendments to the law on social insurance 
in early 2004 underlines the importance of the two factors discussed above. The bill 
foresaw that the state would cover pension and disability insurance contributions for 
young people in full-time secondary and tertiary education to avoid putting them at a 
disadvantage later. The bill only passed with a slim majority and a great number of ab-
stentions, so that based on patterns found in other vetoes by Schuster a presidential veto 
would have been likely at first glance. Yet, there are several reasons why Schuster re-
frained from sending the bill back to parliament. First, although it related to social poli-
cy, one of the main areas of government reform plans, the bill was proposed by SMER 
party leader Robert Fico and a fellow party deputy. A veto would thus not have stopped 
any of the government’s reforms. Contrary to the previous vetoes of the social assis- 
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tance act amendments, cohabitation therefore played no role. Second, the passage of the 
bill was only possible due to the fact that a great number government deputies either 
abstained or did not show up (likely so that they would not to be portrayed as having 
blocked the generally popular reform; NRSR Voting Record 27/05/2004). The result of 
the vote therefore did not matter in the same way as for other vetoes. 
 
Vetoes of the flat tax and other budgetary legislation 
The slim majority of the government as well as Schuster ideological opposition to the 
government can also explain a number of vetoes in November and December 2003. 
Schuster vetoed not only the introduction of a flat income tax – the heart piece of the 
government’s agenda – but also an increase in real estate tax. In both cases, Schuster 
opposed the regulations in its entirety so that parliament could only override the veto or 
not have the bill come into force. Since the 2000 constitutional amendments an absolute 
majority  was  needed  to  repass  any  bills  vetoed  by  the  president  so  that  Schuster’s 
chances to see them sustained were relatively good. Both vetoes were eventually only 
overridden because three independent deputies voted with the government. Even though 
a number of HZDS deputies had initially supported both bills, the opposition eventually 
unanimously voted against the override. Vetoes of legislation towards the end of the 
calendar year (7 of Schusters 22 vetoes in 2003 were issued in November and Decem-
ber) also had another benefit for Schuster which might present an additional explanatory 
factor. As many bills were set to enter into force on 1 January and contained stipulations 
that could not be implemented at another date (because they contained changes to taxes 
or payments made by the state), a successful veto would have derailed the financial 
planning of the government and obstructed coalition’s policies on a large scale.   
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Interestingly, the government only rarely engaged in negotiations with the president 
– even on important legislative items. On the one hand, this might have been due to the 
fact that the government generally tried to margninalise the  president.  On the other 
hand, my respondents told me that Schuster rarely gave an indication of which bills he 
objected to. As evidenced by Schuster’s signature under amendments to the penal code 
in May 2003, this lack of coordination might have contributed to the high count of ve-
toes. After the bill’s passage, Schuster had publicly announced that he and his advisors 
were unsure about whether the law allowed for retroactive (and thus unconstitutional) 
application of some stipulations (Mesežnikov 2004, 32). Due to the government’s inter-
nal quarrels at the time, a re-passage of the bill was not as secure at it would have ap-
peared from the results of the final vote. Therefore, the justice minister actively lobbied 
the president not to veto the bill (Slovak Presidential Office 2003) and Schuster signed 
it soon afterwards. Similar to president Sólyom’s situation in Hungary, the mutual isola-
tion of president and government might thus have increased Schuster’s activism. While 
Schuster could certainly derive some utility from the publicised meeting, the case might 
also corroborate findings from the analyses of Arnold Rüütel’s and Árp￡d G￶ncz’ activ-
ism in so far as meetings and coordination with government members can serve as ‘out-
lets’ of presidential activism. 
 
Rudolf Schuster – The extreme effects of popular legitimacy 
Schuster’s vetoes appear to corroborate several hypotheses of my theoretical framework 
but also hint at potential additional variables. First, in comparison to the presidency of 
his indirectly elected predecessor Kov￡č, there was a considerable increase in veto ac-
tivity under Schuster, thus tentatively corroborating the assumption that direct presiden-
tial elections increase activism. The effect of direct elections also becomes clear when  
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taking  into  account  that  Schuster  mostly  vetoed  high-profile  bills  with  central  im-
portance to the government’s reform agenda. By attempting to block bills that decreased 
social services or raised taxes for those on a low income for political reasons, Schuster’s 
aim was to send clear messages to voters for the 2004 presidential contest. He also tried 
to exploit the coalition’s decreasing seat share and increasing parliamentary fragmenta-
tion which made it more difficult for the government to organise veto overrides. On the 
other hand, the informal agreements between the government and independent deputies 
highlight that seat shares and the effective number of parties cannot always adequately 
represent the strength of political institutions.  
The small decrease in veto activity from the first Dzurinda government despite a con-
tinuously narrow majority (or minority status) reflects the somewhat stronger cohesion 
of government parties – a factor not included in my theoretical framework. Schuster ve-
toed comparatively frequently despite a rather low success rate (25 out of 30 vetoes 
were overridden) which demonstrates that the actual prevention of government policy 
was not always a key motivation for presidential activism – even an overridden veto can 
sufficiently serve the purpose of highlighting the president’s policy position and satisfy 
the president’s goals. The latter is also supported by the results of my interviews. As 
mentioned above, political and expert respondents said that Schuster did not pursue ac-
tive negotiations with individual (independent) deputies to prevent overrides. Rather, he 
attempted to forge ties with SMER in hope of gaining their support in the 2004 presi-
dential elections.    
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4.2.3 Gašparovič – Fico: Re-election as the reason for (less) activism 
Table 49: Summary of key information – Gašparovič-Fico (07/2006-06/2009) 
Episode start:  07/2006  Episode end:  06/2009 
President:  Ivan Gašparovič (HZD)  Prime Minister:  Robert Fico 
(SMER-SD) 
In office since:  06/2004  In office since:  07/2006 
Government composition:  SMER-SD, ĽS-HZDS, SNS 
Government seat share:  57% (episode start), 56% (episode end) 
Effective number of parties:  4.81 (episode start), 5.33 (episode end) 
Number of vetoes:  18 vetoes / 0.51 per month 
Model prediction:  23.90 vetoes / 0.68  per month 
Reasons for selection:  Overpredicted; the longest episode under Gašparovič and rare peri-
od of government with clear  majority in parliament 
 
Robert Fico’s victory in the early elections of 2006 brought a novelty to Slovak politics 
– the government had a clear majority (Malov￡ and Učeň 2007, 1100) and relations be-
tween president and Prime Minister were characterised by mutual respect and coopera-
tion. Gašparovič had already started to forge ties with Fico during the last Dzurinda 
government (Mesežnikov 2007, 29; 2008, 29) and with his HZD
168 neither represented 
in government nor parliament, he sought new allies in his bid for re-election. Over the 
course of the episode, Gašparovič showed increasingly overt support for the policies of 
SMER-SD (Direction – Social Democracy) and SNS which in turn supported his re-
election campaign in 2009 (Mesežnikov 2009b, 98-103). A minor cause of friction with 
the government was the inclusion of Gašparovič’s former party, the ĽS-HZDS, in the 
coalition. Yet internally, the government remained free of major conflicts and was suc-
cessful in achieving its two main goals of joining the Schengen Area in 2007 as well as 
the Eurozone in 2009 – despite the fact that the latter required the passage of many un-
popular bills which reduced government spending in the areas of health, education, and 
social affairs (Malov￡ and Učeň 2008).  
                                                 
168 A splinter party of the HZDS (later renamed to ĽS-HZDS) formed after a fall-out with Mečiar; Gašpa-
rovič remained its honorary chairman.   
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While being comparatively well-predicted for Gašparovič’s term in office, the epi-
sode is also untypical with regard to the constellation of variables in the political envi-
ronment.  The  stable  governmental  majority,  low  parliamentary  fragmentation,  and 
largely neutral to cooperative relations between president and government are overall 
unconducive to presidential activism which is reflected in the significant decrease of 
Gašparovič’s veto activity compared to the Dzurinda government (10% of bills vetoed 
during Dzurinda II compared to 4.1% under Fico). Nevertheless, the model still predict-
ed a higher number of vetoes than Gašparovič actually used. The specific aim of the 
analysis is thus not only to validate the findings of the statistical model but also to find 
out why Gašparovič did not use his veto more frequently. The legislative output of par-
liament remained relatively stable throughout and did not show any decrease in compar-
ison to the preceding episode so that there must have been other factors responsible for 
Gašparovič’s low number vetoes. 
Table 50: Vetoes by president Ivan Gašparovič during Fico I 
Vetoes discussed 
Date passed 
(majority) 
Date of veto 
Parliamentary reaction 
(date; majority) 
1) Act amending the Law on the protec-
tion of species of wild fauna and flora by 
regulating their trade 
26/06/2007 
(75/124) 
17/07/2007 
 
Override 
(11/09/2007; 79/136) 
2) Amendments to the Law on nature and 
landscape protection 
26/06/2007 
(76/124) 
18/07/2007 
Override 
(11/09/2007; 79/135) 
3)  Amendments  to  the  Law  on  Spatial 
Planning and Construction (Building Act) 
22/05/2008 
(68/111) 
11/06/2008 
Override failed 
 (17/06/2008; 18/138) 
4)  Amendments to the Law on education 
and training (Education Law) and related 
laws 
03/12/2008 
(107/124) 
17/12/2008 
Amendments accepted 
(03/02/2009; 106/138) 
5) Law amending the Law on Road Traf-
fic 
09/02/2007 
(67/124) 
07/03/2007 
Override failed 
(20/03/2007; 72/144) 
       
     Total: 18 vetoes / 4.1% of all bills passed     
Notes: Table only lists details for vetoes discussed in analysis. 
 
It appears that Gašparovič’s generally low level of activism can mainly be attributed 
to two factors. First, although approaching presidential elections were included in the 
model and assumed to decrease presidential activism their effect was so strong that it  
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trumped other incentives to become active. Second, although the president-government 
relationship in this episode was coded as neutral due to some policy differences between 
Gašparovič and the coalition parties, in political practice it appeared to be unified. The 
latter is exemplified by the fact that Gašparovič hardly targeted legislation that was part 
of the government’s reform programme. He also failed to veto bills which experts had 
previously declared to be unconstitutional (Mesežnikov 2008, 33) or those that evoked 
protest among smaller pressure groups (Mesežnikov 2007, 33f). These examples of non-
vetoed legislation will be discussed and contrasted with vetoed bills in more detail be-
low. 
 
Vetoes to of environmental legislation & building act 
In 2007, Gašparovič vetoed amendments to environmental legislation even though both 
bills had been passed with a clear majority and were unanimously supported by the coa-
lition parties. However, environmentalist organisations had voiced concern in both cas-
es (Mesežnikov 2008, 32). The amendments to the law on trade in wild flora and fauna 
stipulated the abolition of animal registration numbers which was criticised as facilitat-
ing illegal trade, whereas the act amending the nature protection law was criticised for 
precluding environmental NGOs from appealing against decisions by authorities (SME 
2007). Gašparovič did not adopt these arguments but argued that the new trade regula-
tions violated EU law and suggested to not pass the bill again. With regard to the law on 
nature and landscape protection, he maintained that it contradicted the Vienna Conven-
tion  on  Wetlands  and  suggested  14  amendments  (Gašparovič  2007b,  2007c;  SME 
2007). Both vetoes were overridden with the votes of the coalition parties without any 
of the observations being incorporated.  
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The vetoes cannot be attributed to a weak government or parliament but can only be 
explained by Gašparovič’s wish for remaining in office and thus the mode of presiden-
tial elections. By vetoing the bills, Gašparovič demonstrated that he was still independ-
ent from SMER-SD and the government, and attempted to broaden his potential elec-
torate. Most of Gašparovič’s arguments were shared by the opposition parties, particu-
larly the party of the Hungarian minority (SMK-MPK). Given the participation of the 
far-right Slovak National Party (SNS) in the government with which Gašparovič coop-
erated, the veto provided a good opportunity to showcase his independence and curry 
favour with the SMK-MPK and its voters. Furthermore, as the environmental movement 
in Slovakia had been the basis for the ‘Public Against Violence’ (the Slovak counterpart 
of the Czech ‘Civic Forum’) in the 1980s (Podoba 1998) its members were largely po-
litically conservative and thus less likely to vote for him in the next elections. Here, too, 
the veto could also showcase his independence from the government and potentially 
attract undecided voters. Last, as the bill was not part of the government’s legislative 
agenda and was introduced by an individual SMER-SD deputy, Gašparovič did not run 
the risk of significantly worsening his relationship with the coalition parties either. 
Gašparovič’s veto of the Building Act was also motivated by his wish for re-election. 
The amendments – once again presented by individual SMER-SD deputies, not the gov-
ernment – stipulated that developers would be able to decide whether they wanted to use 
the public land-use plans in force at the time of the planning application or those in 
force when the building permission was issued (NRSR 2008).
169 The bill passed with 
the votes of the coalition government
170, but was met with criticism from the Associ a-
tion of Towns and Villages  of Slovakia (ZMOS) and the Union of Towns of Slovakia 
(UMS) (Mesežnikov 2009a, 38; SME 2008a). ĽS-HZDS and the SNS leadership now 
                                                 
169 The official justification was that the amendment would improvement developers’ planning reliability. 
170 The majority of ĽS-HZDS deputies present abstained or voted against the bill (NRSR Voting Record 
22/05/2008).  
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also voiced their concerns more openly (SME 2008b) and Gašparovič returned the bill 
without suggestions for amendments, pointing out several contradictions and declaring 
that it violated the EU Charter on Local Self-Government (Gašparovič 2008b). 
This time, Gašparovič’s veto increased the leverage of ĽS-HZDS and SNS in the 
government. Particularly the support of the former in the upcoming presidential elec-
tions was crucial as Gašparovič’s biggest opponent in 2004 had been ĽS-HZDS party 
leader Vladim￭r Mečiar. Furthermore, Gašparovič as well as SMER-SD had received 
most of their electoral support in the countryside (Krivý 2005; 2007) which was particu-
larly affected by the law. Although it does not explain why SMER-SD initially support-
ed the law
171, it can account for Gašparovič’s veto and the fact that SMER-SD deputies 
later abstained together with the majority of coalition deputies, thus preventing a veto 
override. 
Gašparovič’s refusal to veto the law on the financing of schools and school facilities 
in December 2006 corroborates the above findings. The law placed the funding of non-
state art schools into the hands of local authorities which was strongly opposed by the 
ZMOS. After the bill’s passage the ZMOS called on the president to veto the bill and 
claimed  that  it  infringed  upon  local  authorities’  constitutional  rights  (SME  2006; 
Mesežnikov 2007, 33f). In contrast to the vetoed legislation above, the potential to ap-
peal to new voters was relatively low and Gašparovič was still in the process of building 
a strong working relationship with the government. A veto of the bill would have had a 
significant impact on the drafts of the 2007 budget; as could be seen in the case of Ru-
dolf Schuster (but also with regard to Lech Wałęsa in Poland), presidents in cohabita-
tion tended to veto exactly for this reason. However, Gašparovič found himself in the 
opposite position and therefore signed the bill into law regardless of any criticism.   
                                                 
171 An attempt to cater to business interests while miscalculating of public resistance at the same time 
would seem likely.  
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Vetoes of amendments to Traffic Act and School Law 
In his vetoes of the Traffic Act and the School Law, Gašparovič responded to pressure 
from coalition parties. The Traffic Act amendment had been initiated by an opposition 
deputy and was only passed with support from a number of ĽS-HZDS and SNS depu-
ties. As most SMER-SD deputies voted against the draft or abstained, it is likely that it 
was pressure from the party that led Gašparovič to veto it. He mainly criticised that the 
new stipulations would enter into force on different dates and made some suggestions 
for changes (Gašparovič 2007a), which were later accepted across party lines. Neverthe-
less, in the final vote on the amended law SMER-SD, SNS and half of the ĽS-HZDS 
voted  against  its  passage  so  that  it  failed  to  reach  the  necessary  absolute  majority 
(NRSR Voting Record  20/03/2007;  Mesežnikov 2008, 32). The coalition’s tactic to 
support Gašparovič’s amendatory observations despite voting against the bill in the final 
vote can hereby be interpreted as an indirect sign of support for the president and an in-
dication that the veto was motivated by partisan pressure. 
The veto of the School Law shows the influence from a coalition party even clearer. 
The amendments foresaw that geographical names in school books would not only be 
presented in Slovak but also in minority languages. This was strongly opposed by the 
SNS whose deputies unanimously voted against the bill. In the justification for his veto 
Gašparovič also highlighted the status of Slovak as the constitutionally defined state 
language (Gašparovič 2008a) but generally adopted the argumentation of the SNS (and 
parts of the ĽS-HZDS) as his own (Mesežnikov 2009a, 38). Nevertheless, despite the 
resistance of SNS and the bill was passed again with votes from SMER-SD and the op-
position parties (NRSR Voting Record, 03/12/2008). 
In contrast to the two vetoes above, the law on extraordinary measures to prepare the 
building of motorways in December 2007 shows how Gašparovič did not veto a bill due  
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to pressure from the government. The law foresaw some measures to facilitate the quick 
building of motorways to the eastern part of the country – a promise that Prime Minister 
Fico had even included in his inaugural speech – and was supported by all government 
parties. The bill was strongly criticised by the opposition and legal experts as it allowed 
the government to build on private property before the process of expropriation and 
compensation had been completed (Týždeň 2007). Nevertheless, it appears that parties 
had  lobbied  the  president  beforehand  as  Gašparovič  shrugged  off  the  criticism  and 
adopted the government’s line of argumentat, i.e. that the public interest trumped indi-
vidual rights in this case (Mesežnikov 2008, 33). Although the bill would have been an 
opportunity for Gašparovič to become active, he signed the bill due to his closeness to 
the government parties and knowledge that they would in turn support his re-election 
campaign. 
 
Ivan Gašparovič – All for re-election 
The overarching explanatory factor for Gašparovič’s activism – specific instances as 
well as the overall level – appears to have been his quest for re-election. My respond-
ents  and  commentators  alike  (e.g.  Mesežnikov  2010,  29)  stressed  that  Gašparovič 
avoided doing anything that would have endangered his chances of remaining in office. 
Thereby, his activism mostly corroborates the assumptions of my theoretical framework 
and the results of my models. Gašparovič’s activism decreased considerably due to the 
higher and more stable government majority, and not the least due to his ideological 
closeness to Prime Minister Fico and SMER-SD as well as the SNS. Although the epi-
sode was coded as neutral with regard to president-government relations, it resembled 
unified relations in practice. This was also evidenced by Gašparovič’s readiness to sign 
bills  which  were  likely  unconstitutional.  Together  with  Gašparovič  desire  to  be  re- 
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elected this finding can explain the overprediction of the episode by the statistical mod-
el. Gašparovič remained moderately active throughout the episode but mostly used his 
veto as a signal to selected groups that would be able to help him in his re-election, ra-
ther than to block policy. The latter once again highlights the need for directly elected 
presidents as agents of the public to be active in order to fulfil the expectations of vot-
ers. In contrast to Schuster, Gašparovič refrained from vetoing bills that were part of the 
coalition’s reform programme. The majority of my respondents attributed this to Gašpa-
rovič’s growing closeness with SMER-SD and the fact that he lacked an own political 
programme. Nevertheless, this could also be an indication of the fact that presidents will 
rather  veto  bills  that  are  less  significant  to  the  government  when  the  president-
government relations are better. This way, presidents can still send a signal to their elec-
torate but do not risk losing the support of the government parties. The fact that presi-
dents in other episodes tended to focus their activism on legislation of particular im-
portance for the government when they were in cohabitation supports this finding. 
 
4.2.4  The activism of Slovak presidents in government formation, censure and  
dismissal 
Slovak presidents have played a largely passive role in government formation, censure 
and dismissal. There are only few instances in which presidents become active. There-
by, their activism can largely be explained by the party constellations in parliament at 
the time and the relations between president and government. 
  
Government formation 
Theoretically, the president has free choice in appointing a Prime Minister and it is 
her/his sole right to do so (Art 110 I). Nevertheless, not more than 30 days after the ap- 
281 
pointment the government has to present its programme to the National Council and 
pass a vote of confidence, so that the president’s choices are limited by parliamentary 
arithmetic. Except for two occasions, presidents have always appointed the leader of the 
largest party in parliament as Prime Minister and in both cases this was the outcome of 
party negotiations or electoral results rather than particular activism. 
In March 1994 Kov￡č appointed Jozef Moravč￭k as Prime Minister after the resigna-
tion of the Mečiar government. Moravč￭k belonged to the ‘Alternative for Political Re-
alism’ (APR, later merged with others to form the DÚ) which only consisted of less 
than a dozen deputies at the time and was only the third largest party in the new five-
party coalition (Malov￡ 1995, 466). Nevertheless, the choice of Moravč￭k had been the 
outcome of negotiations among the coalition parties and Kov￡č claimed that he ‘was not 
at all involved’ in the government’s formation (Kov￡č 2012, 191; translation by the au-
thor).  My  interviews  with  political  respondents  and  experts  support  this  version  of 
events, yet it should be highlighted that Kov￡č had maintained close contacts with the 
opposition before and most likely played a significant role in uniting the opposition par-
ties against Mečiar. 
Following the 2002 parliamentary elections, Schuster appointed Dzurinda for another 
term as Prime Minister. While the HZDS had won more seats (36 seats versus 28 won 
by the SDKÚ), none of its previous allies had entered parliament. As the HZDS thus 
had no chance of forming a majority coalition with other parties, Schuster had no choice 
but to appoint Dzurinda who was supported by a coalition of four parties.
172 
   
                                                 
172 A third instance would be the appointment of Mikul￡š Dzurinda after the 1998 parliamentary elections 
(the HZDS won one more seat that Dzurinda’s SDK). However, the future coalition parties elected SDĽ-
chairman Jozef Migaš as NRSR speaker who then served as acting president. Therefore, the appointment 
of Dzurinda (whose SKD was in a coalition with the SDĽ) cannot be classified as activism; it was the 
only politically viable option.  
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Censure 
Slovak presidents have been somewhat more active with regard to censure whereby 
their actions can largely be explained by cohabitation between president and govern-
ment. Slovak presidents have some more discretion in the appointment and dismissal of 
cabinet ministers than their counterparts in the region. While the constitutional stipula-
tions are still rather vague, the Slovak Constitutional Court ruled in 1993 that presidents 
are not always required to acquiesce with the Prime Minister’s requests to appoint and 
recall cabinet ministers. Nevertheless, it failed to formulate the conditions under which 
the president can refuse (Slovak Constitutional Court 1993; Orosz and Šimunčov￡ 1998, 
101).
173  
In March 1993, Kov￡č refused to recall foreign minister Milan Kňažko (HZDS) and 
replace him with Jozef Prokeš (SNS), both of whom were Deputy Prime Ministers at the 
time.
174 As Kov￡č preferred to keep Kňažko in the government as a balance to Mečiar, 
he petitioned the Constitutional Court leading to the abovementioned ruling. Yet even 
before the Court announced its decision Kov￡č accepted Kňažko’s dismissal, although 
only after Mečiar had first threatened to resign (EECR 1993, 12) and then proposed 
Jozef  Moravč￭k  (HZDS;  a  less  outspoken  critic  of  Mečiar)  as  Kňažko’s  successor 
(Malová 1994, 465). When the SNS officially re-joined the government in November 
1993, Mečiar asked Kov￡č to appoint seven new cabinet members en bloc. Out of these, 
Kov￡č refused to appoint the candidate for the Ministry of Privatisation as his father 
managed the largest privatisation fund (Fischer 1996, 45; Zifcak 1995, 62). Due to this 
conflict of interest, it is debatable whether Kov￡č’s refusal qualifies as presidential ac-
                                                 
173 Interestingly, parties did not change these regulations as part of the 1999-2001 constitutional amend-
ments (Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř  2008, 188). 
174 As Kňažko had openly quarrelled with Mečiar over his authoritarian leadership style since autumn 
1992 (EECR 1993, 12), the reason behind Mečiar’s request was to rid himself of an intra-party rival.  
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tivism or if he simply fulfilled his duty as a president to ‘uphold and defend the Consti-
tution and other laws’ (Art 104 I).
175 
President Schuster only once refused to follow the Prime Minister’s request for ap-
pointing a temporary head for the Ministry of the Interior. After the resignation of the 
minister of the interior in May 2001, Schuster temporarily appointed the minister of jus-
tice instead of Prime Minister Dzurinda to oversee the ministry (Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 
2008, 195), the conflict was soon resolved with the appointment of a new minister. The 
reason for the Schuster’s interference seems to have been his sympathy with a group 
within the governing Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) to which he hoped to give an 
advantage in the negotiations about the replacement (Mesežnikov 2002, 32).
176 
 
Government dismissal 
As most other presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Slovak presidents have no 
power to dismiss the government unilaterally. They can only do so after parliamentary 
elections or a vote of no-confidence in the government. Between 1993 and 2010 the on-
ly successful no-confidence motion led to Vladim￭r Mečiar’s dismissal in March 1994 
(see also section 4.2.1 in this chapter). While Kov￡č had no discretion in dismissing the 
government, it can be argued that he was still responsible for the dismissal. In his con-
troversial state of the nation address he indirectly called for the Mečiar’s resignation 
which triggered a lengthy parliamentary debate and the vote of no-confidence (Malová 
1995, 468; Henderson 2002, 43). While Kov￡č’s speech definitely played a considera-
                                                 
175 In November 1994, Kov￡č once again refused to dismiss cabinet ministers yet this time the situation 
was different. After the parliamentary elections the Moravč￭k government had tendered its collective res-
ignation to the president but the HZDS-led majority passed motions of non-confidence against two of the 
ministers and demanded that Kov￡č dismissed them. Kov￡č refused on the grounds that ministers who 
had already resigned could not be subject of a no-confidence motion. The Constitutional Court followed 
the Kov￡č’s argumentation and declared that there was no constitutional basis for dismissal (Orosz and 
Simunčov￡ 1999, 102). 
176 Schuster later claimed to have consulted his decision with the leaders of the coalition parties b ut those 
involved denied that it had been properly discussed (Mesežnikov 2002, 32).  
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ble role, other circumstances also need to be taken into account. In February 1994, a fur-
ther eight deputies had left the HZDS (Petranská Rolková 2011) so that the governmen-
tal seat share dropped from 54% to 42% and a continuation of the government would 
have been difficult in any case. As all parties later unanimously agreed to hold early 
elections (Malová 1995, 468) it appears that Kov￡č’s speech only accelerated the gov-
ernment’s deterioration. Last, given that the speech was motivated by Mečiar’s autocrat-
ic style of governing it is doubtful in how far one can derive generalisations from the 
incident. 
 
4.2.5  Slovakia – A crucial case for analysis 
The above analysis has shown the salience of a number of explanatory factors from my 
theoretical model and corroborated the assumed mechanisms of effect. Nevertheless, in 
each case the analysis also revealed the limitations of their operationalisation. The size 
of the government’s seat share was a catalyst for presidential activism. The low and 
waning seat share of Mečiar’s and Dzurinda’s cabinets increased the chances for Kov￡č 
and Schuster to see their vetoes sustained or to have their suggestions taken into ac-
count.  Under  Gašparovič,  governments  could  rely  on  continuously  stable  majorities 
which  decreased  presidential  activism.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  both  Mečiar  and 
Dzurinda forged informal deals with defectors or with another party which secured the 
passage of their bills illustrates that this variable does not always capture a govern-
ment’s actual seat share in the assembly. For the same reason, the fragmentation of par-
liament did not have a unidirectional effect. The increase in parliamentary parties made 
gathering an override majority more difficult for the government. Yet at the same time, 
presidents too struggled to form alliances with parties. Their situation was aggravated 
by the fact that they either broke ties with their old party (Kov￡č, Schuster) or their par- 
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ty was not represented in parliament (Gašparovič). Therefore, they did not have a par-
liamentary party or group of deputies on which they could rely when trying to push 
through their interests. 
The relationship between president and government proved equally important in the 
analysis which supports the assumptions of my theoretical framework. The degree to 
which presidents and governments differed on policy undoubtedly co-determined the 
level of presidential activism (which was illustrated by the comparison of vetoes with 
non-vetoed legislation). However, the Slovak case also shows the difficulties in coding 
these relations and provides an illustrative explanation of why their effect did not appear 
to be unidirectional in the empirical analysis. For instance, Rudolf Schuster had been 
chairman of the SOP and his candidacy had been part of the coalition treaty. As his 
(former) party was part of the government, the first episode would have to be coded as 
‘unified’ or at least ‘neutral’. Nevertheless, once in office he suddenly opposed almost 
all of the government’s reforms making it the most active episode recorded in my data 
set. The example of Ivan Gašparovič on the other hand shows that presidents will still 
veto moderately frequently during neutral (or unified) relations to either improve their 
own re-election prospects directly or indirectly by supporting the views of smaller coali-
tion partners. 
As Tavits (2008, 119) points out, Slovakia ‘provides a “natural experiment”’ with 
regard to the effect of popular presidential elections. In her analysis of presidential ac-
tivism in Slovakia, Tavits (2008) argues that ‘the mode of election did not seem to in-
fluence the level of Slovakian presidents’ activism and ‘did not bring any qualitative 
increase in presidential involvement’ (Tavits 2008, 128). However, my analysis comes 
to a different conclusion – rather than showcasing the insignificance of the mode of 
election for presidential activism, the Slovak case actually lends support to the argu- 
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ment. Nevertheless, I agree with Tavits (2008, 129) that an analysis of Slovakia alone 
cannot provide a sufficient test. There are several reasons why Tavits (2008) reaches a 
different  conclusion. First,  she relies  on  incomplete (and partially incorrect) data to 
draw her conclusions. Tavits (2008) includes no data on presidential vetoes under presi-
dent Kov￡č and does not address the issue of government-mandated vetoes. Further-
more, she claims that Kov￡č referred 22 bills to the Constitutional Court (2008, 121), 
although there were only seven such requests (Orosz and Šimunčova 1998); her over-
view table also excludes data on review requests by presidents Schuster and Gašparovič. 
Tavits (2008) furthermore understates the undemocratic policies of the Mečiar govern-
ment  which  were  certainly  more  than  a  ‘personal  antagonism’  (Tavits  2008,  128). 
Therefore, she draws conclusions about the activism of indirectly elected presidents 
based on Kov￡č’s activism in 1994-1998. Yet Kov￡č was subject to outright unconstitu-
tional and personal attacks during this time; attempts to obstruct Kov￡č’s work as presi-
dent ranged from (unsuccessful) impeachment votes (Goldmann 1999, 72) and the re-
duction of his budget to the point that only three staff were left (Haughton 2005, 124; of 
initially up to a hundred), to the abduction of Kov￡č’s son by the Slovak secret service 
(Henderson 2002, 45-46). Therefore, this time period does not allow for making gener-
alisations about presidential activism in parliamentary democracies. 
Table 51: The use of legislative powers by Slovak presidents, 1993-2010 
President 
Michal Kov￡č 
(1993-1998) 
Rudolf Schuster 
(1999-2004) 
Ivan Gašparovič 
(2004-2010) 
Vetoes / % of bills  25 / 5.6%  100 / 13.1%  68 / 6.9% 
Judicial review / % of bills  7 / 1.6%  1 / 0.1%  2 / 0.2% 
 
The indirectly elected Michal Kov￡č used his veto power less often than his popular-
ly elected successors. Over the course of his term, Kov￡č vetoed 5.6% of all legislation 
passed, whereas Rudolf Schuster vetoed more than twice as much with 13.1%. Ivan 
Gašparovič still vetoed 6.4% of all bills during his terms. The absolute difference be- 
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tween Kov￡č and Gašparovič is not as considerable, yet Kov￡č spent 88% of his term in 
cohabitation whereas Gašparovič’s relations with the government were cohabitational 
only 60% of the time. The difference between the activism of Kov￡č and his predeces-
sor  becomes  even  clearer  when  taking  into  account  the  undemocratic  game  of  the 
Mečiar government. During 1995-1998 parliament repeatedly only delivered bills to the 
president for signature one or two days before the deadline or failed to deliver them at 
all.
177 Tavits (2008) argues that Kov￡č vetoed these bills ‘despite parliament’s efforts to 
obstruct his ability’ to veto them (Tavits 2008, 124). However, as the late delivery of 
bills meant that Kov￡č did not know the exact content of the bills, he was forced to use 
his veto ‘blindly’ to fulfil his constitutional role as check-and-balance. If one excludes 
these bills, Kov￡č’s veto activity only concerned 4.5% of all legislation. Kov￡č was also 
most active during Meciar II (12/1994-10/1998) and 15 vetoes were issued in 1996 and 
1997.  These  are  the  only  years  since  Slovak  independence  during  which  Freedom 
House ranked the country as only partly free (Freedom House 2014) and Kov￡č used his 
vetoes in an attempt to block a further deterioration of the state of democracy in the 
country. While Kov￡č used his right to request judicial review 7 times and thus more 
frequently than his successors combined, all but one request were successful.
178 This 
shows that the use of review requests was not necessarily politically motivated but r a-
ther due to the unconstitutionality of legislation. 
The change to popular presidential elections also changed the way in whi ch presi-
dents saw their legitimacy and responsibility towards their principals which ultimately 
fuelled presidential activism. Almost all of my respondents expressed the opinion that 
Schuster and Gašparovič enjoyed not only more legitimacy but also that this furthered 
                                                 
177 Three privatisation-related bills in July 1995 were not delivered at all and vetoed ‘pre-emptively’, in 
two further cases (11/1996 & 6/1997) bills were only delivered one or two days before deadline 
178 It was only unsuccessful because judges  were evenly divided on the issue (Orosz and  Šimunčová 
1998, 130-133).  
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their ambitions and – in consequence – their activism. Kov￡č stressed in an interview 
that given his dependence on parliament he often decided not to become active (Slovak 
Spectator  1999)  which  corroborates  the  assumptions  of  my  theoretical  framework. 
Schuster on the other hand often stressed the fact  that he was  ‘elected by citizens’ 
(Mesežnikov 2004, 31) and called for an increase in his powers (Malov￡ and Ryb￡ř 
2008, 195f). Gašparovič equally called for more presidential powers and an extension of 
the  presidential  term  to  seven  years  specifically  because  he  was  popularly  elected 
(Mesežnikov 2007, 34; 2009, 35). While it was not possible to fully disentangle the ef-
fects of popular elections and the simulatenously increased override threshold, these 
findings strongly suggest an independent effect of the mode of presidential election on 
activism. 
 
4.3  Presidential activism in Hungary and Slovakia compared 
The analysis of presidential activism in Hungary and Slovakia and the comparison of 
findings generally confirmed the results of the statistical analysis, yet not always as 
clearly  as  in  Estonia  and  Poland.  The  case  studies  also  suggested  slightly  different 
mechanisms of effect. Nevertheless, the effects of the mode of presidential election, the 
size of the governmental seat share and the relationship between president and govern-
ment once again emerged as the most important determinants of presidential activism. 
In Hungary, the indirect election of the president did not directly lead to a lower level of 
presidential activism, yet reduced it after rulings of the Constitutional Court which drew 
among others on the mode of election to define the president’s constitutional role. Sub-
sequently, presidents rarely used their powers for political reasons or to block policies 
but rather issued vetoes to highlight the low quality of bills and press for improvements. 
Michal Kováč, the only indirectly elected Slovak president, also used his veto to suggest  
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improvements of legislation and later refrained from using it except when there was a 
constitutional justification. Kováč’s directly elected successors on the other hand were 
significantly more active and used their powers in (what they perceived as) the interests 
of their voters. Presidents in both countries usually took the size of the government’s 
seat  share  into  account  when  deciding  about  a  veto;  nevertheless,  the  analysis  also 
pointed  out  two  potential  problems  with  this  indicator  of  governmental  weak-
ness/strength. In Hungary, even governments with very slim majorities were able to 
override vetoes  because the opposition of two partisan blocks led to  a significantly 
higher voting discipline of deputies. In Slovakia on the other hand, governments that 
were officially in a minority often functioned as majority government because of infor-
mal agreements with party groups or individual deputies. In both cases, the seat share 
did thus not reflect the actual strength of the government and potentially led to misspre-
dictions by the statistical model. Thus, it could be argued that it did not always matter 
whether the override threshold was relative or absolute (although the exceptional high 
majority had an effect in the case of Árpád Göncz). Neverthless, a qualitative analysis 
can only give tentative evidence in this regard. Cohabitation increased presidential ac-
tivism in both Hungary and Slovakia, but the analysis also highlighted some problems 
with coding the president-government relationship when presidents develop closer ties 
with government parties throughout their term. Interestingly, intra-governmental divi-
sions emerged once again as an additional explanatory factor although these were often 
very bill-specific. Finally, the complete lack of activism by Hungarian presidents with 
regard to government formation and censure despite a continuously high level of non-
partisan ministers casts doubt on the reliability of this indicator for measuring presiden-
tial involvement in these processes. 
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5 
PATTERNS  AND  SPECIFICS:  INTEGRATING  QUANTITATIVE 
AND QUALITATIVE FINDINGS ON PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVISM 
 
Comparing the findings of quantitative and qualitative analysis is the most crucial step 
of the nested analysis approach (Lieberman 2005). Rather than merely concluding with 
separate results produced by each method, the findings are considered together and sub-
ject to a final comparative assessment. The integration of results is key to determining 
whether causes and effects can be plausibly linked (Lieberman 2005, 448) but also nec-
essary to arrive at more valid, reliable and comprehensive conclusions. Do the inde-
pendent variables work in the way assumed by the theoretical framework? To what ex-
tent do patterns found in the statistical analysis of presidential activism correspond to 
political practice? Are there additional explanations for presidential activism or how 
could the model be improved? These are the key questions this chapter seeks to answer. 
Unfortunately, Lieberman (2005) does not provide much guidance on this last step of 
the analysis. In my assessment, I will focus on crucial and challenging cases. Crucial 
cases are episodes of president-cabinet pairings which strongly confirm the effect of a 
given variable and allow for studying and illustrating its mechanism in detail. Challeng-
ing cases on the other hand are episodes which appear to contradict theoretical assump-
tions or are inconsistent with correlations found in the statistical analysis. These cases 
present the best basis for discovering problems with theoretical assumptions, variable 
coding and operationalisation as well as for discussing potential solutions. 
The synthesis of results produces five main findings. First and foremost, popular 
presidential elections appear to increase presidential activism irrespective of any other  
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factors; the results of the in-depth analysis show that political practice is very well cap-
tured by the theoretical framework and statistical models. While some limitations with 
regard to the override threshold remain, there is strong evidence that popular elections 
had the theorised independent effect. Second, the relationship between president and 
government and the governments’ seat share are the best predictors for presidential ac-
tivism with regard to the political environment. Parliamentary fragmentation and the 
presidents’ seat share on the other hand only have an effect in interaction with the gov-
ernments’ seat share and exceptionally high veto override majorities. Fourth, divisions 
within and between coalition parties present the most promising additional factor found 
in the qualitative analysis and should be included in future studies. Last, no clear pat-
terns emerge with regard to the effect of presidential popularity and president-centred 
factors on activism. While there is some evidence that they have the potential to con-
tribute to the understanding of presidential activism, more research based on strong the-
ory needs to be conducted before they can be included in a more general explanation.  
Two other variables – the number of laws passed by parliament and presidents’ sec-
ond term – exhibited the expected effect in the statistical models as well as in the in-
depth analysis. Presidents vetoed more frequently when parliaments’ legislative output 
increased as this also increased the probability that presidents found bills objectionable. 
A second term in office led to fewer vetoes as presidents no longer needed to highlight 
their policy positions to their respective electorates. This corroborates findings from 
previous studies (e.g. Lee 1975; Shields and Huang 1995, 1997); therefore I will not 
discuss these factors in detail. The effects of approaching parliamentary and presidential 
elections will also not be discussed in further detail. With one exception (see section 
5.1) the in-depth analysis and my fieldwork provided little evidence of the electoral cy- 
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cle being a conscious part of presidents’ considerations – despite statistically significant 
correlations found in the statistical models.  
 
5.1  The mode of presidential elections: Direct elections matter 
The statistical analysis and the in-depth case studies demonstrated that the mode of elec-
tion was one of the main determinants of presidential activism – directly elected presi-
dents were significantly more active than their indirectly elected counterparts. Popular 
elections provided presidents with a mandate independent from government and parlia-
ment and they used their powers more frequently in order to please their voters and 
block policy change.
179 Conversely, indirectly elected presidents acknowledged their 
lower legitimacy and dependence on parliament and on the (super-) majority that elect-
ed them. Because of this dependence, they restrained their activism and refrained from 
interfering in the legislative process. Likewise, indirectly elected presidents were largely 
inactive in government formation, censure and dismissal. 
The episodes of Mádl-Medgyessy as well as Schuster-Dzurinda I
180 are crucial cases 
in studying the influence of the mode of election on presidential activism. In both cases, 
the indirect or direct election of the president  appears to have been the most important 
factor in determining their activism. Although being clea r outliers in terms of model 
predictions (see also Table 52)
181, the episodes represent extremes of the expected effect 
and thus confirm rather than challenge the overall findings. Ferenc Mádl issued only 
three vetoes during Medgyessy’s premiership even though the constellation of factors 
should have led to more presidential activism. M￡dl clearly opposed the government’s 
                                                 
179 My interviews also demonstrated that political elites perceive the legitimacy of directly elected presi-
dents to be higher and therefore tolerated presidential activism rather more than elites in systems with 
indirectly elected presidents. 
180 Schuster-Dzurinda I was not directly included in the in -depth analysis, yet discussed in conjunction 
with the case study of Schuster-Dzurinda II.  
181 Mádl-Medgyessy is overpredicted (vetoes: 3, predicted: 9.35; ratio 0.32);  Schuster-Dzurinda I is un-
derpredicted (vetoes: 70, prediction: 30.57; ratio 2.39).   
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policies and the coalition was struggling with intra- and inter-party conflicts. Further-
more, the government relied only on a slim majority of 51%. Yet as my interviews 
showed, Mádl adhered to an established elite consensus (which among others was mani-
festated in rulings of the Constitutional Court) that presidents should not involve them-
selves in the policy process because they derived their legitimacy from election in par-
liament. As demonstrated by M￡dl’s veto of the health care reform, the reluctance to 
interfere in political decisions played a major role in discussions about presidential ve-
toes and made other factors almost irrelevant. 
Table 52: The effect of the mode of election on presidential activism – summary of results 
Hypothesis:  Directly elected presidents are more active than their indirectly elected counterparts 
Results of NB:  Hypothesis confirmed; popular elections significantly increase vetoes per month 
Results of EHA:  Hypothesis confirmed; popular elections significantly decrease time between vetoes 
Episode 
a) 
Mode of 
election 
Results of in-depth analysis 
Schuster – Dzurinda II 
12.0%  (2.10)  Direct  Popular  elections  likely  most  important  for  activism;  higher 
legitimacy amplified effect of other factors 
Wałęsa – Pawlak II 
8.1%  (1.05)  Direct  Popular mandate the main driver of activism; analysis highlights 
president acting independently from parliament and government 
Gašparovič I – Fico I 
4.1%  (0.75)  Direct  Popular mandate important, overprediction as president tried to 
secure re-election and decreased activism to please parties 
Kaczyński  – Tusk 
2.8%  (1.06)  Direct  Exemplary case of popular elections leading to more activism as 
president wants to fulfil electoral promises & secure re-election 
Kwaśniewski I – Buzek I 
2.6%  (0.65)  Direct  Popular  elections  together  with  other  factors  increased  presi-
dent’s authority so much that he could veto policy informally 
Sólyom – Gyurcsány II 
1.8%  (0.77)  Indirect  Comparatively accurate prediction, yet president’s dependence 
on parliament weakened by lack of chances for re-election 
Kov￡č  – Mečiar II 
1.7%  (0.42) 
b) 
Indirect  President dependent on parliament; overprediction through gov-
ernment’s proactivity in requesting return of bills before veto  
Meri II – Laar II 
1.4%  (0.82)  Indirect  President less active than during first term due to re-election 
deal with parties and thus greater dependence on parliament 
Mádl – Medgyessy 
1.1%  (0.32)  Indirect  Effect  of  indirect  election  eclipses  the  otherwise  favourable 
conditions for activism leading to overprediction 
Rüütel – Parts 
0.9%  (0.93)  Indirect  Effect  unclear  despite  accurate  prediction;  president  strongly 
dependent on own party/party group rather than on parliament 
Göncz II – Horn 
0.5%  (0.64) 
c) 
Indirect  Indirect election responsible for fewer vetoes, yet only in con-
junction with Constitutional Court rulings 
Ilves – Ansip II 
0.1%  (0.59)  Indirect  President’s understanding of his role as apolitical due to indirect 
election amplifies effect of factors unfavourable to activism 
Notes: NB: Negative Binomial regression model; EHA: Event History Analysis; a) Data under episode 
names relates to % of bills vetoed during episode and ratio [vetoes/predicted number of vetoes; >1 = 
overprediction; <1 underprediction]; episodes ordered by % bills vetoed; b) the only episode under fully 
democratic conditions containing use of presidential powers; c) The only episode with veto use by presi-
dent Göncz. 
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During his term in office, Rudolf Schuster used his veto very frequently despite con-
ditions being overall unfavourable to presidential activism, particularly during the first 
Dzurinda cabinet (06/1999-10/2002). Schuster had been the candidate of the govern-
ment (in which his former party participated) and the coalition held a clear majority of 
61% in parliament. This should have reduced presidential activism, yet already during 
the first 18 months of his term Schuster vetoed 19 bills (9.6% of all bills; 1.8 times more 
vetoes  than  predicted  by  the  model).  He  repeatedly  stressed  that  he  was  ‘a  supra-
partisan president, elected by the citizens, [and] therefore supports decisions that are 
good for them [yet] not those that are bad’ (Mesežnikov 2003, 31; translation by the au-
thor). This suggests very strongly that his popular mandate was the main driver of his 
activism.
182 The fact that he attached a much higher importance to direct electoral legit-
imation than to other factors can also partly explain why the statistical model  – which 
gives equal weight to all factors – predicted a lower number of vetoes. This finding also 
highlights the advantages of mixed-methods approaches for the validation and correct 
interpretation of statistical models. 
The Kaczyński-Tusk episode offers a more representative example of the working 
mechanisms behind the effect of popular elections on presidential activism; the mode of 
election played a less dominant role and the predictions of the statistical model closely 
match Kaczyński’s actual veto use (see Table 52). In his dealings with the government 
and his public appearances Kaczyński also made clear that he was elected as the presi-
dent of a particular political programme (Polish Presidential Office 2008b). As he there-
fore only had to answer to his voters for his actions, he acted independently from gov-
ernment and parliament to fulfil his voters’ expectations (which meant amongst others 
blocking the government’s attempts to privatise state services). Nevertheless, Kaczyński 
                                                 
182 It also highlights that the mode of election had an effect that was independent of the higher veto over-
ride threshold requirement which Slovakia introduced at the same time as the popular elections.  
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also took other factors into account, such as the size of the seat shares of the govern-
ment and of his own party to make sure his vetoes were successful. Yet even if vetoes 
were overridden, they still served as important signals to his electorate, highlighting his 
own policy position and his efforts to act as the agent of his electorate. 
The above examples have shown how the in-depth case studies corroborated the re-
sults of the statistical analysis. The episodes of Gašparovič I-Fico and Kwaśniewski I-
Buzek I analysed above appear to defy these conclusions at first glance. Despite their 
popular election, presidents used considerably less vetoes than the statistical model pre-
dicted. In the case of Gašparovič I-Fico this can be explained by difficulties in coding 
the president-government relationship and the exceptional strength of another effect of 
the mode of election – a decrease in presidential activism to secure re-election. For 
Kwaśniewski I-Buzek I the discrepancy probably stems from intra-governmental divi-
sions and the higher veto override threshold, both of which cannot easily be included in 
the statistical model. 
The constellation of independent variables during Gašparovič I-Fico would already 
predict a low number of vetoes. The government held a stable majority of 56% and par-
liamentary fragmentation was comparative low which made veto overrides very likely. 
The next parliamentary elections – which would have motivated Gašparovič to veto 
more frequently to highlight policy differences between parties – were still more than a 
year away and presidential elections were approaching so that it can be assumed that he 
reduced his use of vetoes to appear less controversial. Yet as these factors were all in-
cluded in the model, they cannot be the cause of overprediction. The actual reason ap-
pears to lie in the nature of the president-government relationship and its coding. Gašpa-
rovič was chairman of the HZD
183 and had no official affiliation with any of the coal i-
                                                 
183 The HZD was however never represented in parliament.  
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tion parties. Nevertheless, he shared some policy positions with the government so that 
the relationship was coded as neutral.
184 In practice, however, the relationship  resem-
bled unified relations. Furthermore, the episode shows the extreme effects of Gašparov-
ič’s quest for re-election. He attempted to stay as uncontroversial as possible as not to 
endanger his re-election (Mesežnikov 2010, 29) as well as to win the support of the 
government parties for his re-election campaign, and therefore reduced his veto use 
even further than predicted by the model.  
When Aleksander Kwaśniewski faced the first Buzek cabinet, the constellation of in-
dependent variables was only moderately more favourable for activism. Nevertheless, 
the specific combination of factors actually increased Kwaśniewski’s leverage of the 
government so much that he did not even need to use his veto to influence policy. The 
government held a clear majority of 57% and would thus have been able to override 
presidential vetoes despite the high threshold (3/5) with the help of just a dozen opposi-
tion deputies. Nevertheless, there were often great differences in the positions of AWS 
and UW and both suffered from low discipline. As Kwaśniewski’s SLD held 35% of 
seats in parliament, it was almost singlehandedly able to prevent a veto override and 
Kwaśniewski could thus influence legislation without even needing to threaten a veto 
(see section 5.2 – ‘Presidential seat share’ for a more detailed discussion).
185 
The in-depth case studies also produced two further valuable insights. First, while di-
rectly elected presidents returned legislation to parliament because of their opposition to 
its content, indirectly elected presidents mostly vetoed due to technical-legal shortcom-
ings of bills. This finding can easily be incorporated in the theoretical  framework as it 
further  specifies  incumbents’  responsiveness  to  different  electorates.  For  indirectly 
                                                 
184 Prime Minister Fico’s SMER-SD had supported Gašparovič’s candidacy, but Gašparovič had defeated 
the candidate of the HZDS (SMER’s coalition partner and Gašparovič’s former party) in the second round 
of the 2004 presidential elections (Ryb￡ř 2005). 
185 The results of interviews showed that after Kwaśniewski’s first successful vetoes, the government be-
gan to coordinate each larger reform project with the president before it was introduced in parliament.  
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elected presidents, technical vetoes present an opportunity to be active without interfer-
ing too strongly in the work of the assembly. This way they acknowledge their lower 
legitimacy  and do not  decrease their  chances  for re-election.
186 Conversely, directly 
elected presidents should attempt to appeal to their voters based on policy and therefore 
rather veto bills due to their content. This is a finding that  might not have necessarily 
been produced by a most-similar systems design, as it only emerged from contrasting a 
variety of different cases. 
The second additional insight is that the lack of a re -election motive can both i n-
crease and decrease activism. These distinct effects became most evident in the study of 
Lászlo Sólyom and Ferenc Mádl in Hungary as neither intended or had the chance to 
run for re-election. My respondents highlighted that Mádl made it clear from the begin-
ning that he would only serve one term.
187 As a consequence, Mádl was in effect the 
functional equivalent to a president in the second term  – he could enjoy the spoils of 
office but had no motivation to appeal to a wider base of voters to ensure his re-election 
and thus only became active when he felt very strongly compelled to do so (or was 
tricked by the government). Sólyom had not decided about the possibility of re-election 
at the beginning of his term. Nevertheless, he must have realised that his chances for re-
election were very small as he grew more and more isolated from government and par-
liament. In contrast to Mádl, the lack of re-election prospects appears to have rather in-
creased Sólyom’s activism and he exploited the fact that he could not be ‘punished’ by 
deputies.
188 However interesting it would be to control for the lack of a re-election mo-
tive in the statistical analysis, given the limited evidence and limited possibilities for 
                                                 
186 As mentioned in the analysis, president M￡dl’s apparent preference for using judicial review requests 
over vetoes can also be interpreted as a result of this mechanism. 
187 After his unsuccessful candidacy in 1995 he had even at first declined to run again at all. 
188 Nevertheless, due to the constellation of factors towards the end of Sólyom’s term this cannot be estab-
lished with certainty.  
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operationalisation
189, it is not clear whether the inclusion of such a variable would i m-
prove the models. 
 
5.2  The president and other institutions 
Apart from the mode of election, the relationship between president and government 
and the parliamentary strength of the government emerged as the most important expla-
nations for presidential activism and confirmed initial assumptions. The size of the pres-
ident’s support base in parliament and parliamentary fragmentation were overall less 
important and only partly corroborated in the case studies. The parliamentary strength 
of the president’s party only played a role when president and government were not in 
cohabitation or when extraordinarily high veto override thresholds were required. High 
parliamentary fragmentation only increased presidential activism when it was caused by 
defections from government parties and thus decreased the governmental majority. 
 
President-government relations 
Policy is an important part of presidents’ motivation to run for office as well as for their 
activism once they are elected. Therefore, my theoretical framework posited that presi-
dents should veto more frequently when they are in ideological opposition to the gov-
ernment and less frequently when the policy position of the government approximates 
their own views. This relationship was confirmed not only in the statistical models but 
also by the qualitative analysis.  
A crucial case in this regard is the brief interlude of unified relations between Slovak 
president Michal Kováč and the cabinet of Jozef Moravčik from March to December in 
                                                 
189 Presidents do not generally disclose their ambitions as not to become a ‘lame duck’ in office. Yet post-
factum measures, e.g. whether an incumbents runs again or not, are also not reliable indicators. Further-
more, as indirectly elected presidents need the support of parties, they might not run at all if the constella-
tion of partisan forces in parliament is such that they will definitely fail to be re-elected or they might 
simply not be nominated again.  
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1994. Here, the positive relations between president and government had greater rele-
vance than any other factor. Following Kováč’s controversial state of the nation address 
Prime Minister Mečiar had lost a vote of confidence and Jozef Moravčik formed a new 
government of former opposition parties. The coalition parties were extremely diverse 
ideologically (stretching from a splinter of the far-right Slovak National Party to the 
post-communist Party of the Democratic Left) and only held 43% of seats. The relations 
between government parties and between the government and its support parties were 
consequently characterised by frequent conflicts (EECR 1994c). Furthermore, parlia-
mentary elections were approaching and the coalition passed the second stage of vouch-
er privatisation which – based Kováč’s previous activism with regard to bills of high 
impact on public finances – should have increased the likelihood of a veto. However, 
Kov￡č’s support for the government made these factors less relevant. Before the for-
mation of the Moravčik government, he had met regularly with parties and was likely 
pivotal in bringing the coalition together. As parliament had unanimously decided to 
hold early elections, Kov￡č also had an interest not to use his powers until then so that 
the government appeared more successful. Due to the unified president-government re-
lations, Kováč did not  use his veto once despite favourable conditions  – the model 
would have predicted at least 2.9 vetoes during this episode. 
The cohabitation between Kaczyński and the Tusk government once again provides a 
representative example that illustrates the working mechanisms of the effect of presi-
dent-government relations. Kaczyński repeatedly highlighted that his main motivation 
for activism was policy and therefore blocked any attempts to alter the status quo that 
the governments of his own party had previously established. As the coalition under 
Tusk began reverting some of the policies and passed reforms to which Kaczyński had 
previously  declared  his  opposition  (e.g.  the  privatisation  of  hospitals),  the  president  
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used his veto to block these initiatives. While he justified most vetoes by referring to 
legal problems, the actual reasons were political (as also evidenced by the results of my 
interviews) and he often described the government’s bills as ‘ill-conceived’. 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s level of activism during the first Buzek cabinet was low-
er than predicted by the quantitative models which – given the cohabitation between 
president and government at the time – runs counter to the overall findings. As ex-
plained above, the likely causes for this are the divisions within the government in com-
bination with the high override majority and Kwaśniewski’s large support base in par-
liament.
190 Nevertheless, there seems to be another explanation for the overprediction 
related to president-government relations. Interviews with my political respondents 
suggested  that  the  actual  effect  of  president -government  relations  is  at  times  co -
determined by the personal relationship between the president and the Prime Minister or 
coalition party leaders. Better personal relations between key actors improve coordin a-
tion and allow for  reducing  activism.
191  As I  highlighted  in the analysis of Arnold 
Rüütel’s activism during the government of Juhan Parts, Rüütel vetoed only during a 
period in which informal communication between president and government was sus-
pended. This shows that coordination and closer contacts can significantly reduce (if not 
prevent) activism. Kwaśniewski and Buzek generally had a positive and cooperative 
working relationship characterised by frequent personal meetings. That the level of ac-
tivism was lower than expected activism during Kwaśniewski I-Buzek I can thus also be 
explained by the generally positive relationship between president and Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, in  Hungary  respondents  highlighted that president  Sólyom’s dislike of 
                                                 
190 See also subsection ‘Presidential seat share’ in this chapter. 
191 It appears that formal means of coordination  – such as the ‘Rada Gabinetowa’ in Poland or the pres-
ence of presidential representatives at cabinet meetings and membership in governmental committees – 
had less practical relevance in reducing presidential activism. One of my respondents from the Polish 
presidential administration explained that at times no representative of the president attended cabinet 
meetings ‘because they had better things to do’.  
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Prime Minister Gyurcsány was partly mitigated by his good relationship with the leader 
of his coalition partner’s party group (SZDSZ), János Kóka (although here it is more 
difficult to differentiate between personality- and policy-based antipathy). 
 
Governmental seat share 
The size of the government’s seat share in parliament is the key determinant of whether 
a veto can be overridden and an important part of presidents’ calculations before the use 
of this power. Its influence on presidential activism was confirmed by my statistical 
models and the in-depth analysis; presidents vetoed less often if the government held a 
large  majority  in  the  assembly  and  vice  versa.  Nevertheless,  the  case  studies  also 
showed that this effect can be mitigated by high override majorities and by divisions 
within or between coalition parties. 
The majority of respondents from presidential administrations confirmed that the size 
of the governmental seat share was the key factor in assessing the chances of success of 
a potential veto. This strongly corroborates the assumptions about presidential pre-veto 
considerations made in my theoretical framework and the results of the statistical mod-
els. The effect is more difficult to illustrate on the basis of a crucial case study than for 
other factors. Changes in the seat share – be it within or between episodes – almost only 
appeared in the form of decreases (see Table 53) which often coincided with approach-
ing parliamentary elections. Yet the problem of distinguishing between the effects of 
both variables does not call the results of the statistical models into question. It rather 
highlights the strengths of a mixed methods approach in combining the advantages of 
quantitative and qualitative methods to arrive at meaningful conclusions. The interviews 
confirmed the relevance of the government’s seat share and coefficients for both the 
seat share and approaching elections variables were significant in the regression models.    
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Thus, even without a crucial case the combination of methods produces strong results 
that allow for attributing an independent effect to the government’s seat share.
192 
The effect of the governmental seat share becomes more apparent when analysing 
the reasons why presidents vetoed despite large government majorities. The case studies 
showed that these tended to be singular incidents where the government’s majority was 
temporarily weakened. Their analysis thus highlights both the effect of a large govern-
mental seat share as well as additional explanatory factors for presidential activism. In 
the in-depth case studies, Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Árpád Göncz both vetoed legisla-
tion even though the government held 59% or even 70% of seats. In both cases the rea-
sons  were intra-governmental  divisions and  extraordinary  override majorities.  When 
Ilves’ vetoed the bill on MPs’ salaries the coalition parties were divided over the bill 
and all deputies of its largest party abstained in the final vote. Despite a formally large 
governmental seat share, the bill was thus initially passed only with a slim majority. 
Furthermore, §107 of the Constitution required an absolute majority for the passage of 
the bill which decreased the chance of a veto override. Therefore, the president might 
not have vetoed the bill if not for this particular constellation of factors. Árpád Göncz 
also used his veto on a bill that required a higher than usual majority to be overridden. 
Any changes to law on the status of MPs needed to be passed by a 2/3-majority and a 
veto override would also have to meet this requirement. Although the government held 
70% of seats, the MSZP of Prime Minister Horn was divided over the bill and it was not 
clear whether the coalition would be able to pass it again with the required majority. 
                                                 
192 Even the phenomenon of ‘functional’ majority governments in Slovakia does not call this effect into 
question. Governments that lost their parliamentary majority due to defections sometimes continued to 
function as majority governments thanks to informal agreements with other party groups and individual 
opposition deputies. Nevertheless, these agreements were informal  and therefore considerably weaker 
than coalition agreements. Informal agreements did not create considerably more stable governments, but 
the ability of ‘functional’ majority governments to override presidential vetoes was slightly higher than 
those of minority governments relying on alternating majorities. Thus, the government’s strength can still 
be reliably measured by the size of its ‘official’ seat share and the finding does not call the reliability and 
validity of the variable into question.  
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This increased G￶ncz’ chances of success and the high override threshold is probably 
one of the most important factors in explaining the veto. Intra-governmental divisions 
were a common occurrence in the analysed episodes and will therefore be discussed 
separately in section 5.3 of this chapter. The issue of higher majorities for specific laws 
only appeared in the cases mentioned above (although most constitutions specify such 
exceptions); Poland is the only case where an exceptionally high majority was required 
for veto overrides at all times. Unfortunately, the case studies could only provide lim-
ited evidence on whether the difference between relative or absolute override majorities 
– which was almost perfectly correlated with the mode of election – had an independent 
effect on presidential activism.
193 Therefore, further statistical tests on a more varied 
sample are necessary to derive at a definite conclusion. 
Polish presidents often vetoed even though governments held large majorities. The 
high override thresholds (1989-1997: 2/3; 1997-present: 3/5) practically reduced gov-
ernments’ seat shares so that presidential vetoes had a higher chance of success. This 
mechanism of effect became clearest during Kaczyński’s cohabitation with the Tusk 
government when the government was often unable to override the president’s vetoes. 
Nevertheless, during Kwaśniewski I-Buzek I, the higher override threshold (together 
with Kwaśniewski’ large parliamentary support base – see next section) increased the 
president’s bargaining weight so much that it actually lowered the number of presiden-
tial vetoes. A similar pattern can be observed for Lech Wałęsa’s activism during the Su-
chocka government (07/1992-10/1993). The government was in a minority from the 
start which significantly increased Wałęsa’s leverage over the coalition. Therefore, he 
only had to use his veto on four occasions which is three times less than the model pre-
dicted. From the Polish case and the examples of Ilves and Göncz above it appears that 
                                                 
193 For instance, the fact that even minority government often functioned as majority governments due to 
deals with other parties or individual deputies might suggest this difference was potentially less relevant.  
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the effect of override thresholds is not uniform. High override majorities that only apply 
to certain laws present exceptional opportunities for presidents to become active and 
appear to increase veto use. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to control for these bills 
in a statistical model unless they concern the likelihood that a specific bill is vetoed. 
The high override threshold in Poland that applies to all laws on the other hand appears 
to decrease the use of vetoes, but for both Kwaśniewski and Kaczyński its effect also 
interacted with the size of the presidential support base in parliament. 
 
Presidential seat share  
My theoretical framework assumed that not only a larger governmental seat share would 
be associated with fewer vetoes but also a larger seat share of the president’s party. A 
larger parliamentary support base should increase the extent to which legislation passed 
by parliament conforms to the president’s policy preferences and enables her/him to in-
directly make suggestions to bills before they are even passed. It should also increase 
presidents’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the parliamentary majority as a large representa-
tion makes it easier to prevent a veto override. However, only the results of the negative 
binomial regression corroborated the hypothesis and the case studies showed that the 
mechanism of effect is decidedly different from the assumptions of the theoretical mod-
el. The in-depth analysis suggested that an increasing seat share will not increase presi-
dents’ influence over legislation unless the president’s party is an important coalition 
party or it is the largest opposition party and can – thanks to a high override majority – 
almost singlehandedly prevent a veto override. 
In my case study countries, only presidents Göncz, Rüütel, Kwaśniewski and Ka-
czyński were members of parties that also held seats in parliament. While Ivan Gašpa-
rovič  was  honorary  chairman  of  the  HZD,  the  party  was  not  represented  in  parlia- 
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ment.
194 An effect of the president’s seat share became most apparent in the analyses of 
Kwaśniewski’s  and  Kaczyński’s  activism.  However,  in  both  analysed  episodes 
Kwaśniewski’s SLD and Kaczyński’s PiS held 35% of seats in the Sejm, i.e. only 5% 
less than necessary to block a veto override. Furthermore, the larger seat share only de-
creased Kwaśniewski’s activism and rather increased Kaczyński’s (nevertheless, Ka-
czyński-Tusk is still very well predicted by the model). Árp￡d G￶ncz’ SZDSZ also held 
a considerable number of seats (25%) during the 1990-1994 term of the Hungarian par-
liament, but could only significantly influence legislation when super-majorities were 
needed to pass bills, e.g. in the case of the media law in 1992 (Ilonszki and Kurtán 
1993). A lower number of presidential vetoes can also not be attributed to the presence 
of Arnold Rüütel’s People’s Union (RL) in parliament. From Rüütel’s election in Octo-
ber 2001 until joining the Parts government after the parliamentary elections in March 
2003, it only held 7% of seats and my interviews did not suggest a significant influence. 
However, when SZDSZ and RL were in government, they were able to influence legis-
lation, and Göncz and Rüütel only vetoed on the comparatively rare occasions that their 
party’s position (and thus their own) was not reflected in the respective governments’ 
policies. Presidents without parliamentary representation on the other hand had hardly 
any possibility to influence legislation during its drafting stages. While lawmakers usu-
ally knew presidents’ views on certain bills through informal contacts, presidents could 
not formally propose any amendments. 
These findings – in connection with the more detailed discussions of the interactions 
between various factors and override thresholds above – call for the rethinking of the 
effect of the presidential seat share on presidential activism. It appears that the effect 
alternates between two extremes and is thereby dependent on the relation of the presi-
                                                 
194 Ilves and Schuster on the other hand were previously party chairmen but cut their ties with their parties 
upon inauguration. Ilves and Gašparovič established very close links to other parties over time, yet Schus-
ter failed to do so.  
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dent’s party to the government majority and the veto override threshold. When the pres-
ident’s party participates in the government, its influence over legislation and thus the 
ideological overlap of bills with the president’s policy preferences will increase in ac-
cordance with its seat share.
195 Yet when the president’s party is in the opposition the 
size of its seat share does not have the same near-linear effect. It only appears to matter 
if the veto override threshold is exceptionally high and the president’s party commands 
(almost) enough votes to block override attempts or if supermajorities are needed to 
pass specific laws. This also means that some of the potential problems discussed in 
connection with the limitations of my theoretical framework exist and that the current 
theoretical framework partially underestimates presidential activism – albeit only under 
the specific (and within the remit of my sample unique) circumstances outlined above. 
 
Fragmentation of parliament 
Parliamentary fragmentation did not have a significant effect on presidential activism in 
my statistical models. The results of the in-depth analysis, too, showed little support for 
an independent and unidirectional effect. Contrary to the assumptions of my theoretical 
model, a high level of fragmentation did not always decrease the ability of party groups 
to coordinate a veto override. Overall, parliamentary fragmentation only seems to affect 
presidential activism if it also affects the governmental seat share. 
My theoretical framework assumed that high fragmentation would increase coordina-
tion costs between parties. Higher coordination costs would decrease the likelihood of 
veto overrides and therefore increase presidential activism. There are several episodes 
which appear to be crucial cases at first sight because low or high levels of fragmenta-
tion are superficially associated with different levels of activism. Yet it can be demon-
                                                 
195 As the case of the Parts government under Arnold Rüütel shows, if the president’s party participates in 
the government as a junior coalition partner it is still possible that its policy position is not reflected in all 
legislation.  
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strated in all cases that the decisive factor was the size of the government’s seat share 
(see also Table 54). For instance, Michal Kováč issued his very first veto shortly after 
eight deputies of the governing HZDS left the party and formed their own party group 
in parliament creating a spike in parliamentary fragmentation. During the second Buzek 
cabinet (06/2000-10/2001) Aleksander Kwaśniewski also often used vetoes following 
recent increases in parliamentary fragmentation. In both cases presidents became active 
because of the decreased governmental seat share caused by defections of deputies who 
set up their own party groups. The greater parliamentary fragmentation does thus not 
explain the vetoes. Conversely, the low fragmentation during Göncz II-Horn was not 
the real reason behind the small number of vetoes during the episode. The large and sta-
ble  government  majority  as  well  as  the  unified  president-government  relations  and 
G￶ncz’ indirect election likely eclipsed any effect the low fragmentation might have 
had. Last, Lech Kaczyński was able to secure the success of his vetoes during the Tusk 
government due to low rather than high parliamentary fragmentation. As Kaczyński’s 
PiS and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) were the only opposition parties at the 
time, it was much easier for the president to block veto overrides (although only in cer-
tain policy areas) than if the opposition had been fragmented. 
The case studies therefore highlighted that parliamentary fragmentation fails to ex-
plain presidents’ vetoes because it does not reflect parties’ varying ability to override 
them. The general potential for overrides can also not be operationalised by using the 
polarisation of parliament as an alternative variable. While increased polarisation could 
be assumed to decrease the general willingness of parties to collaborate on a veto over-
ride, the analysis of Kaczyński-Tusk has shown that cooperation is very issue-specific. 
The national-conservative PiS and the centre-left SLD agreed on blocking privatisation 
bills, but did not cooperate with regard to the reform of the general prosecutor’s office  
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(where the SLD voted with the government) and other presidential vetoes. Even if over-
all polarisation is very high, a large governmental seat share would still outweigh its 
effect and allow the government to override a veto. This conclusion is also supported by 
the fact that the case studies pointed towards divisions between or within government 
parties rather than overall parliamentary fragmentation as an important determinant of 
presidential vetoes.  
 
5.3  Additional explanations 
Divisions within and between government parties and presidential popularity are two 
additional explanatory factors suggested by the in-depth analysis and above discussion. 
Furthermore, this study has so far relied on presidency-centred factors (i.e. the constitu-
tional factors and the political environment) to explain presidential activism. Neverthe-
less, it is also necessary to give at least a tentative evaluation of the extent to and way in 
which president-centred factors (i.e. those related to the president as an individual) can 
still add to the understanding of presidential activism. Upon closer investigation, only 
intra-governmental divisions promise to meaningfully complement the existing frame-
work at this point. Yet as divisions only influence presidential activism when the gov-
ernment government’s seat share is small or high override majorities are required, its 
inclusion into the framework comes at the cost of slightly reduced parsimony. The two 
remaining factors also show some potential. However, their patterns of effect are still 
unclear and further, theory-driven research is needed before they can be effectively in-
cluded in systematic explanations of presidential activism. 
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Intra-governmental divisions 
The case studies suggested divisions within the government as an important reason for 
presidential vetoes even if the conditions for presidential activism were otherwise unfa-
vourable. Sometimes only one of the government parties was divided over a policy is-
sue, but divisions usually appeared between coalition parties. Typically, disagreements 
between coalition partners decreased voting discipline of parties and furthered defec-
tions. This significantly altered the chances of success for presidential vetoes in a way 
that is difficult to capture by quantitative indicators. 
The case study analysis showed two ways in which intra-governmental divides in-
creased presidential activism. Most commonly, presidents vetoed more frequently be-
cause the coalition was not able to override the vetoes, yet when their own party was 
part of the government they vetoed to defend their party’s interests. When Kwaśniewski 
vetoed amendments to the law on family planning, he made use of the fact that the bill 
was only supported by the conservative AWS while the junior coalition partner, the cen-
tre-liberal UW, largely opposed it. Although the government held 57% of seats and 
would have been able to count on the support of several opposition deputies to cross the 
3/5 override threshold, it was unable to override the veto without the votes of most UW 
deputies. Gašparovič likewise used divisions between coalition partners when he vetoed 
environmental legislation that was supported by the largest coalition party SMER-SD, 
but opposed by the junior coalition partners (ĽS-HZDS and SNS). Rüütel’s veto of the 
European Parliament Election Act illustrates another way in which divisions can lead to 
activism under unlikely circumstances. As Rüütel’s own ‘People’s Union’ participated 
in the government, he found himself in unified relations with the Parts government, yet 
his party opposed the bill and applied pressure on the president to veto it. Similarly to  
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the Polish and Slovak examples, the veto was caused by inter-party divisions, but was 
motivated by Rüütel’s desire to defend his party’s interests. 
Divisions  between parties  increased the use of presidential  vetoes irrespective of 
presidents’ relations with the government. Neto and Strøm (2006) and Tavits (2008) use 
the number of parties in government to control for divisions, yet my in-depth analysis 
demonstrated that divides between coalition partners were almost as likely to appear if 
only two parties were in government (e.g. between SLD and PSL in Poland or MSZP 
and SZDSZ in Hungary) than when there were three or more. The ideological range of 
the government or its polarisation might provide better measures of the likelihood of 
policy disagreements that weaken a government. Nevertheless, the extent to which divi-
sions increase presidential activism is still partly dependent on the size of the govern-
mental seat share. Governments with a large majority can tolerate disagreements and 
internal divisions more easily as their ability to pass bills and override vetoes is usually 
not threatened even if several of its deputies fail to vote with the majority.
196 However, 
the slimmer the parliamentary majority the more vulnerable a government becomes to 
dissenters.  
In summary, divisions between government parties are an important additional factor 
to explain presidential activism and way to measure governmental strength. Therefore, 
they should be incorporated into the existing theoretical framework in future studies. 
The effect of divisions is dependent on the governmental majority (as well as veto over-
ride thresholds) and would thus reduce the framework’s parsimony. Given that the coef-
ficient estimate for the government’s seat share was statistically significant in all mod-
els, including a measure for intra-governmental divisions in a model might also not nec-
essarily increase model fit or improve its predictive power. However, the additional var-
                                                 
196 The government then either still has a majority or it is easier to find a handful of supporters from to 
opposition.  
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iable significantly improves the theoretical framework and increases its explanatory ca-
pacity which should take precedence over difficulties in operationalisation and meas-
urement. 
 
Presidential popularity 
Presidential  popularity  is  an  established  explanatory  factor  in  American  presidential 
studies where it is typically argued that increasing popularity decreases activism. Higher 
public approval ratings increase presidents’ leverage in negotiations with the legislature 
and thus their ability to shape policy in accordance with their preferences. Conversely, 
presidents should veto more if they are unpopular (Rhode and Simon 1985; Shields and 
Huang 1995; 1997). The Polish case studies suggested that presidential popularity could 
be an additional factor in explaining presidential activism. However, it is difficult to de-
termine whether decreasing popularity was the cause of more vetoes and other factors – 
such as a small governmental seat share – appear to have eclipsed the effect of high 
public approval. Until there is more research on the effects of public approval within 
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems and their interaction with other variables, it 
remains problematic to formulate more general hypotheses and use presidential popular-
ity as an additional explanatory variable. 
The case studies demonstrated that both Wałęsa and Kaczyński vetoed more fre-
quently when their popularity was declining, but in both cases it is not possible to refute 
the alternative hypothesis that presidents do not veto because of low approval ratings 
but that more activism causes unpopularity (see Groseclose and McCarty 2001). At first 
glance, Kwaśniewski’s comparatively low number of vetoes during the first Buzek cab-
inet appears to confirm the hypothesis that high approval ratings lead to fewer vetoes. 
Kwaśniewski’s popularity increased his leverage over the government and his position  
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was taken into account when new bills were drafted so that he did not need to become 
active. However, Kwaśniewski’s high approval ratings (averaging 68% throughout his 
term) did not always reduce his activism and he issued most vetoes at the peak of his 
popularity. Particularly his exceptionally high level of activity during the second Buzek 
cabinet (06/2000-10/2001)
197 suggests that the effect of popularity might  at times be 
eclipsed by other factors. Buzek II was a minority cabinet consisting only of the AWS 
which lost more and more deputies as the 2001 elections approached. As predicted b y 
my  theoretical  framework  and  in  line  with  the  results  of  the  statistical  models, 
Kwaśniewski therefore vetoed more frequently. It therefore appears that his popularity 
did not play a role. 
These qualitative insights are naturally limited in their ability to provide the basis for 
rejecting popularity as an additional explanatory variable. In any case, a potential effect 
on  presidential  activism  would  seem  to  be  less  straightforward  than  in  the  U.S.-
American presidential system. The popularity of the government as the second (and typ-
ically dominant) executive actor need would need to be taken into account as well as 
factors with a potential influence on presidential popularity (e.g. scandals or previous 
use of vetoes and other powers). Until further research into these matters allows for 
formulating  hypotheses  that  credibly  present  the  seemingly  more  complex links  be-
tween presidents’ popularity and their activism, it would be unwise to include the for-
mer as an additional explanatory variable.
198 
   
                                                 
197 Kwaśniewski vetoed 20 bills in 17 months (5.8% of legislation), whereby 16 vetoes were issued dur-
ing the last four months of the government’s term. 
198 As the availability of comparable data with regard to CEE is very limited, it would also be necessary to 
test such hypotheses on a different sample.  
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Presidential personality and perceptions 
This thesis has overall focussed on testing and validating hypotheses on the effect of 
president-centred factors (i.e. constitutional factors and the political environment) on 
presidential activism. Their explanatory power has been confirmed by both statistical 
models and case studies. Yet, given that many authors also use presidents’ perceptions 
and personalities as explanations (e.g. Baylis 1996; Gallagher 1999; Kristinsson 1999; 
Frison-Roche 2007; McMenamin 2008), it is still necessary to assess to what extent 
they can add to the understanding of presidential activism. Due to the focus of this 
study, the discussion below can naturally only provide a tentative evaluation. Overall, 
the results with regard to president-centred factors are mixed. While associated varia-
bles could at times provide additional or alternative explanations of presidential behav-
iour, either no clear patterns emerged or it was not possible to fully differentiate be-
tween the effects of constitutional arrangements and presidential perceptions. 
Lech Wałęsa’s idiosyncratic behaviour has  been mentioned in  the literature (Ko-
lankiewicz 1993; Simpson 1996; Zubek 1997; Millard 2000) and was used by my (polit-
ical) respondents more often than for any other president to explain his behaviour. Yet, 
the analysis of Wałęsa’s cohabitation with the second Pawlak cabinet also allowed for a 
different conclusion in this regard. It seemed that seemingly idiosyncratic behaviour 
could  be  explained  by  the  effects  of  his  popular  mandate,  cohabitation  and  intra-
governmental divisions in combination with a high veto override threshold. On the other 
hand, president-centred factors might have played a role but their effect coincided or 
interacted with those of presidency-centred variables (and potentially reinforced them), 
particularly the effect of popular elections. 
The case studies showed that perceptions of the presidency by individual office hold-
ers (the most frequently invoked president-centred factor in the European context) as  
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well as those of political elites in general were to a certain extent dependent on the 
mode of election (and occasionally presidential powers). It could be argued that presi-
dents’ perceptions of their office were therefore largely based on constitutional stipula-
tions of which the mode of election was the most striking. Popularly elected presidents 
shared the perception that their independent political mandate established them as actors 
on equal footing with parliament and government. Conversely, indirectly elected presi-
dents derive their legitimacy from parliament from which they inferred that they should 
play a less prominent role in comparison with other institutions. In Hungary, this was 
furthermore  reinforced  by  the  decisions  of  the  Constitutional  Court  which  used  the 
mode of presidential election to curtail presidential competencies. My interviews also 
demonstrated that political elites considered the legitimacy of directly elected presidents 
to be higher and therefore tolerated presidential activism rather more than elites in sys-
tems with indirectly elected presidents. 
The qualitative analysis also produced mixed results with regard to the explanatory 
power of president-centred factors for specific instances of presidential activism. There 
is some evidence that presidents’ personal backgrounds can contribute to explaining 
specific activity. For instance, it is likely that Michal Kováč chose to veto bills concern-
ing  public  finances  due  to  his  background  as  a  political  economist  and  that  Lech 
Wałęsa’s piety was partly responsible for his veto of the liberalisation of abortion. The 
same applies to the frequent use of judicial review requests by Ferenc Mádl and Lászlo 
Sólyom in Hungary who were both legal experts before becoming presidents. Neverthe-
less, at least within the remit of this study it was not possible to see how these individu-
al explanations could be extrapolated to more general explanations of presidential activ- 
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ism.
199 President-centred variables might thus have the potential to contribute to the un-
derstanding of presidential activism. However, the theoretical foundations still remain 
underdeveloped and the lack of a systematic approach currently hinders research in this 
area.
200 Therefore, it is unfortunately not possible to include president -centred factors 
into the explanatory framework of this thesis at the moment.  
 
5.4  Vetoes as an indicator of presidential activism 
This study has preponderantly relied on vetoes to test hypotheses on presidential activ-
ism. Overall, the statistical analysis in combination with the qualitative case studies has 
shown that presidential vetoes provide a valid and reliable indicator of presidential ac-
tivism. Although some limitations exist, they still present one of the most effective ways 
to operationalise and analyse presidential activism and are in some regards superior less 
direct measures of presidential activity. 
Vetoes are a direct measure of presidential activity and it can be established without 
doubt when they were used. While presidents also sometimes threaten to use their veto 
without  following  through,  the  results  of  the  qualitative  analysis  suggest  that  these 
threats were significantly less frequent than actual veto use. Furthermore, although I 
found that a large presidential seat share can make governments more responsive to 
threats, the circumstances for this appear to be relatively specific and thus do not neces-
sarily challenge overall findings. Moreover, there is only little evidence that presidents 
did not veto due to informal deals with other actors or strategic considerations – a con-
cern raised in the discussion of my theoretical framework. An underestimation of activ-
ism by using vetoes as the dependent variable in this regard thus seems – at least with 
                                                 
199 For instance, Slovak president Ivan Gašparovič also had a strong legal background, yet only requested 
judicial review twice in ten years and signed bills which were evidently unconstitutional.  
200 Work that focuses on specific character traits of politicians (e.g. De Landtsheer and De Sutter 2011) as 
suggested by Tavits (2008, 135) appears to be the most promising avenue here.  
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reference to CEE – unlikely. Respondents in all countries stressed that despite extensive 
consultations with political and legal advisors, vetoes were eventually always presi-
dents’ personal decisions. This distinguishes them from the share of non-partisan minis-
ters which can only measure the extent to which assumed presidential involvement in 
government was successful. Regulations about the use of presidential vetoes are also 
more uniform than those governing presidential involvement in government formation 
which facilitates cross-country comparisons.  My case studies  furthermore confirmed 
that policy is one of the main motivations for presidential activism. Presidents’ every-
day activities and decision-making is therefore dominated by interactions with govern-
ment  and  parliament  and  presidents’  attempts  to  influence  legislation.  On  the  other 
hand, the composition of a new government is largely dictated by parliamentary arith-
metic and government formation is a comparatively rare opportunity for activism. The 
latter also applies to possibilities for the use of other, less common presidential powers 
(announcing referenda, nominating candidates for judges and ombudsmen etc.) or the 
refusal to perform certain duties. By using vetoes as the dependent variable, presidential 
activism  can  also  be  studied  under  a  much  greater  variety  of  circumstances  which 
strengthens the credibility of conclusions. As shown by the event history analysis, even 
the effect of variation in the constellation of independent variables before the use of a 
veto can be studied effectively. 
There are still some limitations on using presidential vetoes as a measure of presiden-
tial activism which need to be considered. First, the analysis has shown that vetoes can 
serve a number of different purposes; they can at time also be used in combination or 
instead of other powers (e.g. judicial review reqests) and vice versa which makes their  
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analysis slightly less straightforward.
201 In some political systems, other political actors 
might also fulfil a similar function to the president with regard to legislation (e.g. the 
Chancellor of Justice in Estonia) or the government may request the president to return 
a bill (Slovakia 1993-1998). This means that the use of vetoes must always be analysed 
within the context of the respective political system and potentially other powers.  
Vetoes and the other ‘basic’ powers identified in this thesis are not the only powers 
at presidents’ disposal. Particularly the activism of inaugural office holders in Estonia, 
Hungary and Poland was at least partly characterised by the refusal of appointmens. 
These instances were – except for Hungary where the respective constitutional stipula-
tions were the most unclear and inconsistent – overall less frequent than presidential 
veto use and followed the same patterns as veto use. Nonetheless, other powers must 
not be discounted when analysing presidential activism as they still have – depending 
on the institutional and political context – the potential to be an important part of presi-
dential activity. In conclusion, this means that there are some natural limitations to the 
use of vetoes as a dependent variable in studies of presidential activism and they should 
not necessarily be relied upon as its sole indicator. Overall, however, vetoes still present 
one of the most effective ways to operationalise and analyse presidential activism. They 
are a key power of the majority of presidents and must not be ignored. Analyses like the 
one performed in this study can provide both the framework and benchmark for the 
study of other presidential powers and presidential activities beyond constitutional pow-
ers. 
   
                                                 
201 Nevertheless, they are still considerably easier to analyse than other presidential powers whose use (be 
it actual or in form of a threat) cannot be as easily established.  
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5.5  Summary 
The synthesis of quantitative and qualitative results confirms the overall importance and 
explanatory power of the variables included in the statistical models. Particularly the 
effects of the mode of election, the relationship between president and government and 
the size of the government’s seat share have been shown to be consistent and important 
predictors of presidential activism. The mode of elections is central to explaining presi-
dential activism. Both quantitative and qualitative in-depth analysis demonstrated an 
increased activism of directly elected presidents and the insights from the latter strongly 
suggested that elections have an independent effect. The same applies to the relationship 
between president and government and the government’s seat share. While the qualita-
tive analysis showed that intra-governmental divisions and high override thresholds can 
weaken their effect, this did not challenge the overall findings. As expected, presidents 
vetoed more frequently when they fundamentally disagreed with the government’s poli-
cies as well as when the governmental seat share decreased, thus increasing the chances 
of seeing their veto sustained. The discussion has also shown that other factors did not 
entirely conform to the assumptions of the theoretical framework. A larger presidential 
seat share in parliament did decrease presidential vetoes, but not in proportion to its 
size. The effect only appeared when the president’s party participated in the government 
or when the seat share was large enough to block a veto override thanks to a high 
threshold. On the other hand, the effect of parliamentary fragmentation was very much 
dependent on the extent to which it affected the government’s majority.   
Three  further  factors  –  intra-governmental  divisions,  presidential  popularity  and 
presidential personality – were also discussed. The first promises to provide the most 
significant improvement to the existing theoretical framework and should be included in 
future studies. No clear patterns emerged with regard to the remaining two and more  
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research based on strong theory needs to be conducted to further examine their effect. In 
the case studies divisions between government parties were the most common addition-
al factor explaining vetoes under otherwise unfavourable conditions. Although its effect 
depends on the size of the government’s seat share and thus reduces the parsimony of 
the existing model to a certain extent, it considerably enhances the explanatory power of 
the  theoretical  framework.  Presidential  popularity  and  president-centred  factors  also 
showed some potential for explaining presidential activism. Unfortunately, it was not 
always possible to detect wider patterns of their influence within this study. Particularly 
with regard to president-centred factors, it was difficult to determine whether their ef-
fect coincided with or was trumped by factors relating to the political environment and 
constitutional stipulations.
 Nevertheless, due to the fact that the assessment of these fac-
tors was not the main focus of this study, this finding must not be seen as a negation of 
their (potential) explanatory capacity. 
Finally, the analysis demonstrated that presidential vetoes provide a valid and relia-
ble indicator of presidential activism. They provide a direct measure of presidential ac-
tivity as the results of the qualitative analysis demonstrated that vetoes were always 
presidents’ personal decisions and dealing with legislation is one of presidents’ main 
activities. Some limitations on the use of vetoes as a dependent variable exist and they 
should not necessarily be relied upon as its sole indicator. Nevertheless, vetoes currently 
present one of the best ways to operationalise and analyse presidential activism. When 
the respective institutional context is taken into account, analyses of veto use can pro-
vide highly insightful results and an efficient way to test hypotheses on presidential ac-
tivism. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study has examined when and why presidents choose to become active and use 
their formal powers. In doing so it has developed a new theoretical framework on presi-
dential activism and used nested analysis, a sophisticated mixed-methods approach, to 
test hypotheses using comprehensive and original quantitative and qualitative data from 
nine Central and East European democracies. These countries present an ideal basis for 
analysis as there is great variation on all variables of interest, yet at the same time a 
number of factors can be held constant due to countries’ similar history, culture and tra-
jectories in political and economic development. This chapter summarises the findings 
and discusses some of their implications. An agenda for future research building on the 
results of this study is presented in the final section. 
 
Summary of results 
In this thesis I argued that presidential activism – defined as the discretionary use of 
formal presidential powers by the president – can be explained by a combination of 
constitutional  stipulations  and  the  political  environment.  This,  so-called  presidency-
centred, explanation of activism is predominant in the literature. However, only few co-
herent approaches exist and particularly in the European context a number of assump-
tions could not be satisfactorily tested due to the lack of appropriate data. Therefore, the 
first step of my analysis developed a new and coherent theoretical framework. To test 
my hypotheses I then used an original data set on the actual use of presidents’ legisla- 
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tive powers in nine Central and East European democracies. The results were strongest 
and most convincing with regard to vetoes – the most frequently used presidential pow-
er. Using negative binomial regression models and event history analysis I demonstrat-
ed that popular presidential elections, a small governmental seat share and a weak con-
sensus between president and government over policy were all significantly and posi-
tively associated with a higher number of vetoes per month and a shortening of the time 
period between vetoes. Results on the use of other powers were less striking, partly be-
cause they were only rarely used and not all presidents were vested with them. Never-
theless, it was shown that directly elected presidents initiated more bills and the use of 
judicial review requests increased during cohabitation. Based on the predictions of the 
statistical models, I selected 12 episodes – short periods of specific president-cabinet 
pairings – from four carefully chosen countries (Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
vakia) for further qualitative analysis. Thereby, I opted for a most-different systems de-
sign as it promised to produce the best results within the framework of this study. 
The second step of my mixed-methods approach comprised the qualitative analysis 
of presidential activism, in particular the use of presidential vetoes and presidential in-
volvement  in  government  formation,  censure  and  dismissal.  Using  the  selected  epi-
sodes, the aim of the analysis was to trace the assumed links between variables in order 
to validate the findings of the statistical analysis and to critically assess the assumptions 
of the theoretical framework. Furthermore, alternative explanations of presidential ac-
tivism and indications of potential misspecification of the quantitative models were ex-
plored. By contrasting the activism of presidential activism in two most different coun-
try pairs – Estonia/Poland and Hungary/Slovakia – and by relying on evidence from 65 
semi-structured interviews with political elites and ample source material, I was able to 
corroborate my statistical findings and demonstrate that there is strong evidence that  
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most of the hypothesised mechanisms actually exist. Furthermore, the analysis suggest-
ed additional factors – intra-governmental divisions, presidential popularity and office-
holders’ personality – to explain presidential activism. Finally, the analysis of presiden-
tial involvement in government formation, censure and dismissal called for a rethinking 
of the share of non-partisan ministers as an indicator for presidential activism as the re-
sults challenged its validity. 
The third and final part of this thesis synthesized the quantitative and qualitative 
findings by subjecting them to a comparative assessment. Overall, five main findings 
emerged. Most prominently, it appears that the mode of presidential elections is the 
most important determinant of presidential activism. Popular elections equip presidents 
with an independent electoral mandate that allows them to act independently from par-
liament and government, whereas indirectly elected presidents are agents of parliament 
and (despite fixed terms) enjoy considerably less independence. Directly elected presi-
dents do not only have more opportunities for activism, but because they rely on public 
support for re-election they are also required to use their powers more often to fulfil 
their  electoral  promises.  Their  indirectly  elected  counterparts  on  the  other  hand 
acknowledge their dependence on the legislature and therefore use their powers less fre-
quently as not to interfere in the work of their principals. Second, the relationship be-
tween presidents  and  government  and the  parliamentary strength  of the government 
were not only highly correlated with changing levels of presidential activism but the 
qualitative analysis also showed that these factors are key determinants of presidents’ 
decisions to use their powers. Presidents used their powers more often during cohabita-
tion than when president-government relations were unified; they also exploited gov-
ernmental weaknesses caused by a small or decreasing seat share. This increased their 
chances of successfully blocking policies as their vetoes were less likely to be overrid- 
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den. Third, although the statistical analysis appeared to confirm the hypothesis that an 
increase in presidential support in parliament would decrease presidential activism, the 
qualitative analysis suggested that it only becomes relevant in conjunction with high 
veto override requirements or when the president’s party participates in the government. 
On the other hand, parliamentary fragmentation did not exhibit a unidirectional effect in 
either quantitative or qualitative analysis. Fourth, divisions within and between gov-
ernment parties often weakened the government more substantially than a small seat 
share; presidents used this, often temporary or policy-specific weakness to veto bills. As 
this finding did not contradict any of my central assumptions about presidential activ-
ism, I concluded that it should be integrated into the existing theoretical framework for 
future studies. Unfortunately, no clear patterns emerged regarding the effect of presi-
dential popularity and factors related to individual office-holders. From the – admittedly 
limited – evidence produced by this study it appears that these variables have the poten-
tial to contribute to the understanding and explanation of presidential activism, yet more 
research based on strong theory needs to be conducted to further examine their effect. 
 
Contributions and implications of this study 
This study and its findings contribute to existing work on presidents on a theoretical, 
empirical and methodological level and have several implications for future research.  
This study has presented a new theoretical framework for explaining presidential ac-
tivism in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Previous studies have not clearly 
defined the term ‘presidential activism’, so that this study provided for the first time a 
clear,  non-normative  definition  of  the  term  which  also  facilitates  operationalisation. 
While this definition also imposed some limitations, these could largely be countered 
through my mixed-methods approach. Furthermore, in contrast to Tavits’ (2008) politi- 
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cal opportunity framework – the only general explanatory approach of presidential ac-
tivism (i.e. not specific to one power) – the new framework incorporates constitutional 
variables in addition to factors related to the political environment (which this study has 
shown to be particularly important). The approach presented in this thesis also unites 
insights from the study of European and U.S.-American presidents which – despite their 
overall similarity – have not yet been used to inform each other. The integration of these 
two  streams  of  literature  not  only  enhances  the  theoretical  foundations  of  the  new 
framework but also lays the basis for the study of presidential activism and other presi-
dential behaviour across regime types. Irrespective of their varying powers and duties, 
presidents share a set of specific characteristics that allow for studying them compara-
tively. The presidency is the only democratic, single-member executive institution on 
the national level, presidents are always the head of state and they always have some 
discretionary power beyond ceremonial duties. 
A further contribution of this thesis is a new data set on the actual use of presidents’ 
legislative powers in nine Central and East European democracies between 1990 and 
2010 – one of the first comprehensive cross-country data sets of its kind. Based on this 
data, a number of hypotheses could be adequately tested for the first time. The analysis 
corroborated the traditional assumption that popularly elected presidents are more active 
than their indirectly elected counterparts. Even though some uncertainty with regards to 
the effect of the override threshold remains, this overall finding as well as the evidence 
from the analysis of presidential activism in Slovakia challenge Tavits’ (2008) claim 
that the mode of election is irrelevant for the use of presidential powers. Due to the un-
precedented detail regarding the composition of parliament, legislative output and other 
variables related to the political environment, the data set can also be used for other 
studies – not only on presidential activism.    
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The findings based on the new data set are even more valuable given that they are 
complemented by original insights gained in 65 semi-structured elite interviews from 
four countries. Rather than relying on the same secondary source material as other re-
searchers, the qualitative section of this study could thereby not only validate the results 
of the preceding statistical analysis but also critically assess the findings of previous 
studies. The latter became particularly apparent in the Polish case where new insights on 
presidential activism could be gained that challenged previous interpretations.
202 The 
qualitative analysis also  explained why some independent variables did not exhibit a 
statistically significant effect on presidential activism  – in the case of parliamentary 
fragmentation this concerned not only the results of my analysis but also those of Neto 
and Strøm (2006) and Tavits (2008). While the potential weaknesses of the share of 
non-partisan ministers as an indicator of presidential activism were already pointed out 
in the literature review, the qualitative analysis demonstrated that the suggested mecha-
nisms of effect might only apply very rarely. 
On the other hand, the qualitative analysis could establish the use of presidential ve-
toes as a more direct, valid and reliable measure of presidential activism. While the also 
analysis flagged up some problems in using them as a dependent variable, these could 
largely be countered by the mixed-methods design of this study and insights will help to 
control for such problems in future studies. Dealing with legislation is one of the main 
everyday activities of presidents irrespective of their mode of election. Even in political 
systems where the president is the dominant executive actor it is still the president’s 
task to review – however superficially – each bill passed by parliament and sign it into 
law. Veto power is granted to most of the presidents in these systems. Although legisla-
tive activity by parliament is a prerequisite for using this power, there are hardly any 
                                                 
202 For instance, Kwaśniewski’s veto of the administrative reform was shown to be key to understanding 
his use of vetoes more generally.  
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further constraints on how, when and why presidents can exercise it (the same also ap-
plies to a number of other, less prominent presidential powers not considered in this 
study). Compared to the passage of legislation, governments are formed only very rare-
ly and election results can leave presidents with little to no discretion over the appoint-
ment of a particular party coalition and its ministers. Furthermore, co-determining the 
cabinet composition does not give presidents direct influence over policy. Presidential 
vetoes are used much more frequently and given that they are always exercised at the 
presidents’ personal discretion they present a direct expression of the presidents’ policy 
preferences. Their use (and even threatsto use them) can be studied under a greater vari-
ety of variable constellations and therefore promises to provide stronger conclusions. 
The methodological framework implemented in this study has also shown how polit-
ical science research can generally benefit from mixed-methods approaches and how 
they  can  be  used  to  their  maximum  potential.  Explicit  application  of  Lieberman’s 
(2005) nested analysis approach in political science  is still rare and the majority of 
mixed-methods  studies  do  not  link  findings  reached  using  different  methodologies 
clearly.
203 Furthermore, results are  often reported separately in the conclusion, rather 
than integrating them first in a comparative assessment ( admittedly, Lieberman 2005 
only gives very limited guidance on that final step). In this respect, this study and par-
ticularly the synthesis of results provided in Chapter 5 can serve as a template for future 
applications of the approach.  
 
 
   
                                                 
203 A notable exception is Bäck and Dumont’s (2007) analysis of coalition formation in Western Europe-
an democracies.  
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An agenda for future research on presidential activism 
The findings of this thesis provide a number of starting points for future research on 
presidential activism and suggest several questions to be investigated. There are a num-
ber of important ways in which research should be continued and for which the quanti-
tative and qualitative data gathered for the study at hand present an ideal foundation. 
The results of this study suggested that opportunities for presidential veto use often 
resulted from exceptional override majorities or policy-specific splits within or between 
coalition parties. These and other factors related to individual bills (e.g. whether a bill 
was declared ‘urgent’) could not be adequately addressed in the statistical models. To 
analyse the influence of such bill-specific factors, data on individual bills is needed. A 
similar analysis has already successfully been conducted by Gilmour (2002) for vetoes 
by U.S.-American presidents. Given that this study has highlighted that vetoes by the 
American and Central East European presidents can be explained by largely similar fac-
tors, such an analysis would not only provide further insights into presidential activism 
in semi-presidential and parliamentary systems but also provide a further point of com-
parison in the study of presidential activism across regions and regime types. 
Except for the Czech Republic and Poland, parliaments in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope have several possibilities to respond to presidential vetoes. They are not merely 
faced with a choice between overriding a veto (or attempting to do so) and withdrawing 
the bill in question, but they can also decide to incorporate the presidents’ suggestions 
and pass an amended version of the original bill. To arrive at an even more comprehen-
sive explanation of presidential veto use, one could assess the determinants of parlia-
mentary response and, in effect, the different types of the ‘success’ of presidential ve-
toes. While some theoretical work on the different regulations exists (Tsebelis and Ri-
zova 2007), their influence on how presidents use their veto power has not yet been  
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studied. Again, more data on individual bills and presidential justifications for vetoes 
would be needed to perform such an analysis.
204 Nevertheless, the results would help to 
gauge the extent to which presidents are able to affect substantive policy change 
through vetoes and would thus also have wider implications for the understanding of the 
policy process and the functioning of different regime types.  
The rare use of judicial review requests by presidents made a quantitative assessment 
rather difficult. Nevertheless, the findings from the in-depth analysis have provided new 
insights that allow for assessing their use in a different way. Lech Wałęsa used his pow-
er to request judicial review not only as a means to ensure the constitutionality of legis-
lation but also to delay the implementation of unfavourable bills. Presidents in Hungary 
on the other hand were very careful to only use this power once they were absolutely 
sure of a bill’s unconstitutionality. Before one can explain the overall number review 
requests, one first needs to investigate the different motivations and then analyse the 
‘political’ and ‘constitutional’ use of this power separately.
205 
Finally, further research should be undertaken on the involvement of presidents in 
government formation, censure and dismissal. As mentioned above, the share of non -
partisan ministers did not always prove to be a valid and reliable measure of presidential 
activism. It also failed to capture the   actual party  or presidential  loyalty of cabinet 
members as non-partisan were  either re-appointed under different presidents  or soon 
joined one of the government parties. The analyses provided in this thesis pro vide an 
ideal starting point for a case study -based nested analysis (Lieberman 2005; Rohlfing 
2008) of presidential activism in this area . By the ways of inductive reasoning  such a 
                                                 
204 Havlík, Hrubes and Pecina (2014) present the only systematic analysis of justifications for presidential 
vetoes in the European context using the example of Czech president Václav Havel. However, they do not 
link the patterns of argumentation found to the eventual parliamentary response. 
205 A first, albeit crude step could be to differentiate between successful and unsuccessful requests for 
judicial review (out of the 133 requests recorded in my data, only 52 were successful to the extent that the 
bill or parts thereof were declared unconstitutional).  
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study could help to develop a better indicator than the share of non-partisan ministers as 
well as new hypotheses which then can be tested on other cases. 
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List of interviews 
See Appendix A3 for a detailed description of sampling, interview length and location. 
Respondents in Estonia 
Respondent name  Respondent background 
Kaidi Aher  Advisor to the President on Internal Communication Affairs (2011-present) 
Head of the PR Department of the President’s Office (2006-2011) 
Member of the Public Relations Department of the President’s Office 
(2001-2006) 
Argo Ideon  Senior Editor at Postimees (2001-present) 
Urmas Klaas  Member of Parliament (Reform Party, 2004-present) 
Aaro Mõttus  Deputy Head of the Chancellery of Parliament (2009-present) 
Legal Advisor to the President (2003-2009) 
Toomas Mattson  Senior Editor at Postimees (1994-2001) 
Spokesperson for the National Audit Office (2001-present) 
Eiki Nestor  Minister for Social Affairs (1999-2002) 
Minister of Regional Affairs (1994-1995) 
Member of Parliament (Moderates/Social Democrats; 1992-1994, 1995-
1999, 2002-present) 
Deputy chairman of the Social Democrats 
Prof Vello Pettai  Professor of Political Science at University of Tartu 
Advisor to the President and Presidential Representative to the President’s 
Roundtable on National Minorities (1997-1999) 
Jaanus Pikani  Head of the President’s Office (1995-1998) 
Secretary of State, Ministry of Social Affairs (1994-1995) 
Marko Pomerants  Minister of the Interior (2009-2011) 
Minister for Social Affairs (2003-2005) 
Member of Parliament (Pro Patria & Res Publica Union, 2005-2009, 2011-
present) 
Eero Raun  Public Relations Advisor to the President (2003-2006) 
Rain Rosimannus  Member of Parliament (Reform Party, 2003-2011) 
Head of the Prime Minister’s Office (2002-2003) 
Advisor to the Minister of Finance (1999-2001) 
Domestic Policy Advisor to the President (1994-1997) 
Tõnis Saarts  Lecturer in Baltic Politics at University of Tallinn 
Kaja Tael  Undersecretary (Vice-chancellor) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006-
2012) 
Foreign Affairs Advisor to the President (1995-1998) 
Director the Estonian Institute (1991-1995) 
Ivar Tallo  Foreign Policy Advisor to the President (1993-1994) 
Member of Parliament (Moderates; 1999-2002) 
Prof Mihkel Veiderma  Head of the President’s Office (1992-1994)  
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Respondents in Hungary* 
Respondent name  Respondent background 
Pál Becker  Head of the Presidents’ Office (2000-2005) 
Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Finance (1993-1994) 
Member of Parliament (Hungarian Democratic Forum, 1990-1994) 
Prof Jürgen Dieringer  Professor of Political Science at Andrassyi University Budapest 
Prof Zsolt Enyedi  Professor of Political Science at Central European University 
Prof Sándor Gallai  Head of the Public Policy Research Institute, Ministry of the Interior 
Professor or Political Science at Corvinius University 
András Gyulás  Head of the Secretariat of President Árpád Göncz (2010-present) 
Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidents’ Office (2007-
2010) 
Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the President (1996-2005) 
Dae Soon Kim  Lecturer at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea 
Biographer of President Árpád Göncz 
János Kóka  Minister of Economy and Transport (2004-2007) 
Chairman of the SZDSZ parliamentary party (2007-2010) 
Member of Parliament (SZDSZ, 2006-2010) 
Lászlo Kovács  Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998-1998; 2002-2004) 
Member of Parliament (Hungarian Socialist Party, 1990-2004; 2010-
present) 
Prof András Körösenyi  Professor of Political Science, Head of the Political Science Division of the 
Hungarian Academy of Science 
Advisor to the President (2005-2010) 
Monika Lamperth  Minister for Social Affairs and Labour (2006-2008) 
Minister of the Interior (2002-2006) 
Member of Parliament (Hungarian Socialist Party, 1990-present) 
Prof András Lanczi  President of the think tank ‘Szaszadveg’ (2010-present) 
Professor of Political Science at Corvinus University Budapest 
Advisor to the President (2005-2010) 
András Bíró Nagy  Founder and Director of Policy Solutions 
Lecturer at Corvinus University and Eötvös Loránd University Budapest 
Pál Sonnevend  Head of the Legal Department of the President’ Office (2006-2010) 
Member of the Legal Department of the President’ Office (2000-2006) 
Katalin Szili  Speaker of Parliament (2002-2009) 
MSZP presidential candidate (2005) 
Secretary of State, Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water (1994-
1998) 
Member of Parliament (Hungarian Socialist Party, 1994-2010; independent 
2010-present) 
Notes: * One respondent each from the presidential administration and from the government/MP category 
was interviewed twice.    
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Respondents in Poland 
Respondent name  Respondent background 
Jerzy Borowczak  Director of the ‘Solidarity Centre’-Foundation 
Member of Parliament (PO, 2010-present) 
Co-founder of the BBWR 
Long-time companion and confidant of Lech Wałęsa 
Marek Borowski  Member of the Senate (independent, 2011-present) 
Chairman of the SdPL (2004-2008) 
Speaker of Parliament (2001-2004) 
Deputy Speaker of Parliament (1996-2001) 
Head of the Government’s Office (1995-1996) 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (1993-1994) 
Member of Parliament (SdRP, 1993-1999; SLD, 1999-2004; SDPL 2004-
2005, 2007-2011) 
Andrzej Dorsz  Head of the Legal Department of the President’s Office (1995-2005; 2010-
present) 
Head of the Archive of the President’s Office (2005-2010) 
Member of the Legal Department of the President’s Office (1986-1995) 
Andrzej Drzycimski  Spokesperson of the President (1990-1994) 
Confidant and co-author of biography of Lech Wałęsa 
Marek Dukaczewski  Deputy secretary of State for Defence, President’s Office (1997-2001) 
Elżbieta Jakubiak  Member of Parliament (PiS, 2007-2011) 
Minister of Sport and Tourism (2007) 
Head of the President’s Personal Cabinet (2005-2007) 
Ryszard Kalisz  Minister of the Interior (2004-2005) 
Acting Head of the President’s Office (1998-2000) 
Deputy Secretary of State, President’s Office (1997-1998) 
Member of Parliament (SLD, 2001-2013; independent, 2013-present) 
Michał Karnowski  Journalist (Newsweek Polska, Dziennik, Polska The Times) and publicist 
Editor/co-author of several books on the Kaczyński twins 
Zbigniew Krzyżanowski  Correspondent at the President’s Office, Polish Press Agency (1991-2007) 
Barbara Labuda  Secretary of State for Women & Equality, President’s Office (1995-2005) 
Member of Parliament (UD, 1989-1994; UW 1994-1995; independent 
1995-1997) 
Krystyna Leszczyńska  Lecturer in Political Science at Marie Curie-Skłodowska University Lublin 
Andrzej Majkowski  Chairman of A. Kwaśniewski’s ‘Amicus Europae’ Foundation (2005-
present) 
Deputy secretary of State for international affairs, President’s Office 
(1996-2005) 
Grzegorz Napieralski  Chairman of the SLD (2008-2011) 
Chairman of the SLD parliamentary party (2009-2011) 
Member of Parliament (SLD, 2004-present)  
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Respondents in Poland (continued) 
Respondent name  Respondent background 
Mariusz Maciuk  Member of the Legal Department of the President’s Office (expert for con-
stitutional law; 1992-present) 
Andrzej Olechowski  Presidential candidate (2000; 2010) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-1995) 
BBWR candidate for Prime Minister (1993) 
Janina Paradowska  Journalist, senior political editor at Polityka (1991-present) 
Marek Siwiec  Secretary of State/Head of the National Security Bureau, President’s Office 
(1996-2004) 
Robert Smoleń  Member of parliament (SLD, 2001-2004) 
Deputy secretary of State, President’s Office (1997-2001) 
Michał Strąk  Head of the Government’s Chancellery (1993-1995) 
Head of the Minister of State’s cabinet, President’s Office (1989-1990) 
Dariusz Szymczycha  Secretary of State/spokesperson, President’s Office (2002-2005) 
Editor-in-chief of Trybuna (1991-1997) 
Marek Ungier  Head of the President’s Personal Cabinet (1995-2004) 
Danuta Waniek  Head of the President’s Office (1996-1997) 
Campaign Manager for Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Defence (1994-1995) 
Member of Parliament (SLD, 1991-1995, 1997-2001)  
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Respondents in Slovakia 
Respondent name  Respondent background 
Miroslav Beblavý  Member of Parliament (SDKÚ, 2010-2013; independent 2013-present) 
Secretary of State, Ministry for Social Affairs (2002-2006) 
Anton Bódis  Spokesperson for the President’s Office (1993-1994) 
Prof Milan Čič  Head of the President’s Office (2004-2012) 
Chairman of the Constitutional Court (1993-2000) 
Author of the 1992 Slovak Constitution 
Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia (1992) 
Prime Minister of Slovakia (1989-1990) 
Pavol Demeš  Head of the foreign policy department, President’s Office (1993-1998) 
Oľga Gy￡rf￡šov￡  Programme Director and founding member at the Institute for Public Af-
fairs (IVO) 
Adjunct lecturer at Comenius University 
Erik L￡stič  Lecturer in Political Science at Comenius University, Bratislava 
Darina Malová  Professor of Political Science at Comenius University, Bratislava 
Prof László Miklós  Minister for the Environment (1998-2006) 
Ivan Mikloš  Deputy Prime Minister (1998-2006; 2010-2012) 
Minister of Finance (2002-2006; 2010-2012) 
Minister of Economy (1998-2002) 
Member of parliament (SDKÚ, 2006-2010; 2012-present) 
Marek Ryb￡ř  Lecturer in Political Science at Comenius University, Bratislava 
Peter Učeň  Political Analyst, International Republican Institute, Bratislava 
Milan Zemko  Head of the domestic politics department, President’s Office (1993-1998) 
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Appendix A1 – Variable description 
A1.1: Coding of independent variables 
Variable  Description of coding 
Direct elections  Dummy variable 
0=indirectly elected president 
1=directly/popularly elected president 
President’s first term in office  Dummy variable 
1=1
st presidential term 
0=2
nd presidential term 
Time until presidential elections  The number of months until the date of the next foreseeable presi-
dential election. When earlier elections were scheduled, the number 
of months is corrected from the month onwards in which the new 
date was announced. 
Time until parliamentary elec-
tions 
The number of months until the date of the next foreseeable parlia-
mentary elections (lower house only). When earlier elections were 
scheduled, the number of months is corrected from the month on-
wards in which the new date was announced. 
Fragmentation of parliament  The  effective  number  of  parliamentary  parties  as  calculated  by 
Laakso and Taagepera (1978). Every independent is treated as a one-
person parliamentary party in the calculation of the value. Further-
more, not the number of available seats but the number of currently 
occupied seats in parliament is used as the reference parameter to 
reflect changes in the legislature’s membership more accurately. 
Governmental seat share  Seat share of the government in the lower house of the legislature 
based on the number of currently occupied seats. 
Presidential seat share  Seat share of the president’s own party (also:  party president was 
member of at time of election if there were no other reasons but the 
presidency to leave the party) in the lower house of the legislature 
based on the number of currently occupied seats. Independent candi-
dates without clear party affiliation are coded as having no seats in 
the assembly. 
Cohabitation  Dummy variable 
1=cohabitation (no overlap between partisan affiliation of president 
and government; in case of independent candidates this category is 
coded when policy differences with the government were already 
clear at the time of/before the election of president or inauguration of 
government) 
0=neutral or unified relations 
Neutral president-government 
relations 
Dummy variable 
1=neutral relations (no or small overlap between partisan affiliation 
of president and government but no major policy differences known 
at time of/before election of president or inauguration of government; 
this category is the default choice for independent candidates) 
0= cohabitation or neutral relations 
Unified president-government 
relations(not used in analysis) 
Dummy variable 
1=unified relations (overlap of partisan affiliation of president and 
government; independent candidates who have shown significant 
policy overlap known at time of/before election of president or inau-
guration of government) 
0 = cohabitation or neutral relations 
No of bills passed  Number bills passed by parliament in a given month and presented to 
the president for signature. 
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A1.2: Variable description – Event count model of presidential vetoes 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Vetoes per month (dependent variable)  0.41  1.06 
     
Direct election  0.45  0.50 
President’s first term in office  0.72  0.45 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  2.95  0.89 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  3.15  0.88 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  1.59  0.40 
Governmental seat share  0.51  0.16 
Presidential seat share  0.12  0.16 
Neutral  0.35  0.47 
Cohabitation  0.26  0.44 
No of bills passed (log)  2.19  1.23 
N (observations) = 1738; n (non-zero counts) = 400     
 
 
A1.3: Variable description – Event count model of judicial review requests 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Review requests per quarter (dependent variable)  0.22  0.62 
     
Direct election  0.56  0.50 
President’s first term in office  0.68  0.47 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  2.99  0.77 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  3.15  0.79 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  1.52  0.36 
Governmental seat share  0.51  0.13 
Presidential seat share  0.17  0.18 
Neutral  0.28  0.45 
Cohabitation  0.23  0.42 
No of bills passed (log)  3.16  0.86 
N (observations) = 510; n (non-zero counts) = 78     
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A1.4: Variable description – Event count model of legislative initiatives 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Initiatives per quarter (dependent variable)  0.95  1.81 
     
Direct election  0.50  0.50 
President’s first term in office  0.71  0.45 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  2.97  0.79 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  3.13  0.80 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  1.48  0.37 
Governmental seat share  0.53  0.13 
Presidential seat share  0.14  0.17 
Neutral  0.30  0.46 
Cohabitation  0.25  0.43 
N (observations) = 277; n (non-zero counts) = 178     
 
 
A1.5: Variable description – EHA of presidential vetoes 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Time in days (dependent variable)  359.113      296.461 
     
Direct election  0.483   0.500 
President’s first term in office  0.722   0.450 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  2.930  0.901 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  3.151  0.889 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  1.599  0.404 
Governmental seat share  0.494  0.144 
Presidential seat share  0.131  0.153 
Neutral  0.324  0.468 
Cohabitation  0.261   0.439 
No of bills passed (log)  1.779   1.331  
Previous vetoes during episode (log)  1.010   1.010 
N (observations) = 2355; n (events) = 536     
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A1.6: Variable description – EHA of judicial review requests 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Time in days (dependent variable)  368.716  312.255 
     
Direct election  0.537  0.499 
President’s first term in office  0.685   0.465 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  2.974  0.888 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  3.126  0.904 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  1.516  0.370 
Governmental seat share  0.501   0.138 
Presidential seat share  0.159   0.172 
Neutral  0.284  0.451 
Cohabitation  0.255   0.436 
No of bills passed (log)  2.000   1.359 
Previous requests during episode (log)  0.251   0.581 
N (observations) = 1862; n (events) = 117     
 
 
A1.7: Variable description – EHA of legislative initiatives 
Variable  Mean  SD 
Time in days (dependent variable)  294.999  248.598 
     
Direct election  0.570  0.495 
President’s first term in office  0.739  0.439 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  2.934  0.890 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  3.118  0.920 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  1.482  0.365 
Governmental seat share  0.515  0.138 
Presidential seat share  0.144  0.176 
Neutral  0.314  0.464 
Cohabitation  0.244  0.430 
Previous initiatives during episode (log)  0.677  0.911 
N (observations) = 1170; n (events) = 204     
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Appendix A2 – Additional models and statistical tests 
 
A2.1: Negative binomial regression model of judicial review requests (no zero-inflation) 
Variable  Coefficient estimate        Standard error 
     
Constitutional factors     
Direct election  0.013   0.299  
President’s first term in office  0.223  0.300  
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  0.152  0.183  
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -0.289  0.150 * 
     
Political environment     
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.904  0.395 ** 
Governmental seat share  -2.330   1.080 ** 
Presidential seat share  -0.568   1.007  
President-government relations  0.382   
Neutral  0.382   0.392 
Cohabitation  1.366   0.319 *** 
No of bills passed (log)  0.301   0.170 
Constant  -0.381   1.341  
     
α (shape parameter)  1.644   0.563 
N = 510; n (non-zero counts) = 78 
Log pseudolikelihood = -260.26549 
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0: chibar2(01) = 23.13  Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors clustered on president-cabinet episodes. 
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A2.2: EHA of presidential vetoes – Test of the proportional hazards assumption 
Variable  rho  chisq   Prob>chi2 
Direct election  0.00496  0.012  0.9146 
President’s first term in office  -0.07332  2.836  0.0922 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  0.07949  4.656  0.0309 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  0.02162  0.177  0.6742 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  0.01973  0.190  0.6630 
Governmental seat share  -0.01111  0.097  0.7554 
Presidential seat share  0.02085  0.198  0.6566 
Neutral  -0.05083  1.355  0.2444 
Cohabitation  -0.00274  0.005  0.9457 
No of bills passed (log)  -0.06852  3.771  0.1522 
Previous vetoes during episode (log)  0.03386  0.651  0.4199 
GLOBAL  N/A  10.68498  0.4700 
 
A2.3: EHA of presidential vetoes – Model estimation with and without interaction with time 
Variable  Model 1 
(without interaction) 
Model 2 
(with interaction) 
Direct election  1.045 
(0.187) *** 
1.046 
(0.187) *** 
President’s first term in office  -0.002 
(0.116) 
-0.007 
(0.115) 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  -0.035 
(0.067) 
 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)*log(t)    -0.018 
(0.012) 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -0.110 
(0.046) ** 
-0.118 
(0.046) *** 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.275 
(0.161) 
-0.286 
(0.164) 
Governmental seat share  -1.383 
(0.475) *** 
-1.260 
(0.466) ** 
Presidential seat share  -0.519 
(0.418) 
-0.572 
(0.436) 
Neutral  -0.056 
(0.139) 
-0.057 
(0.137) 
Cohabitation  0.611 
(0.176) *** 
0.618 
(0.176) *** 
No of bills passed (log)  -0.341 
(0.047) *** 
-0.343 
(0.047) *** 
Number of previous vetoes in episode (log)  0.431 
(0.069) *** 
0.432 
(0.069) *** 
Number of observations  2355  2355 
Number of events  536  536 
Likelihood ratio test  215.9 ***  219.6 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 128 presi-
dent-cabinet episodes) 
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A2.4: EHA of judicial review requests – Test of the proportional hazards assumption 
Variable  rho  chisq   Prob>chi2 
Direct election  0.1276  0.688  0.407 
President’s first term in office  -0.0459  0.283  0.595 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  -0.0405  0.141  0.707 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  0.1063  0.668  0.414 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  0.0949  0.510  0.475 
Governmental seat share  0.0829  1.595  0.207 
Presidential seat share  0.0429  0.293  0.588 
Neutral  -0.0229  0.083  0.774 
Cohabitation  0.0114  0.010  0.921 
No of bills passed (log)  -0.0326  0.299  0.585 
Previous review requests during episode (log)  -0.062  0.648  0.421 
GLOBAL  N/A  5.351  0.913 
 
 
A2.5: EHA of legislative initiatives – Test of the proportional hazards assumption 
Variable  rho  chisq   Prob>chi2 
Direct election  -0.00828  0.054  0.871 
President’s first term in office  0.05791  1.396  0.237 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  0.12145  10.278  0.001 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  0.06379  1.229  0.268 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.04962  1.217  0.270 
Governmental seat share  -0.20399  21.049  0.000 
Presidential seat share  -0.15837  20.860  0.000 
Neutral  -0.15468  18.919  0.000 
Cohabitation  -0.18787  26.506  0.000 
Previous review requests during episode (log)  0.19389  23.628  0.000 
GLOBAL  N?A  43.374  0.000 
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A2.6: EHA of legislative initiatives – Model estimation with and without interaction with time 
Variable  Model 1 
(without interaction) 
Model 2 
(with interaction) 
Direct election  2.036 
(0.420)*** 
2.205 
(0.469) *** 
President’s first term in office  0.451 
(0.228)** 
0.374 
(0.261) 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)  -0.239 
(0.120)** 
 
Time until parliamentary elections (log)*log(t)    -0.044 
(0.017) *** 
Time until of presidential elections (log)  -0.097 
(0.079) 
-0.147 
(0.076) * 
Fragmentation of parliament (log)  -0.166 
(0.389) 
-0.814 
(0.380) ** 
Governmental seat share  0.245 
(0.719) 
 
Governmental seat share*log(t)    0.250 
(0.103) ** 
Presidential seat share  -0.357 
(1.078) 
 
Presidential seat share*log(t)    -0.373 
(0.160) ** 
Neutral  -0.211 
(0.392) 
 
Neutral*log(t)    -0.132 
(0.057) ** 
Cohabitation  -0.394 
(0.279) 
 
Cohabitation*log(t)    -0.146 
(0.038) *** 
Number of previous initiatives in episode (log)  0.348 
(0.114)*** 
 
Number of previous initiatives in episode (log) *log(t)    0.069 
 (0.017) *** 
Number of observations  1170  1170 
Number of events  204  204 
Likelihood ratio test  249.5***  245.9*** 
Notes: *** p<0.005; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 72 presi-
dent-cabinet episodes) 
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Appendix A3 – Detailed description of interviews
206 
 
This  appendix  provides  more  detailed  information  about  the  semi-structured  elite-
interviews  conducted  as  part  of  this  thesis.  The  project  was  registered  under  ID 
Z6364106/2012/02/61 with UCL Data Protection. It was exempt from ethic approval as 
respondents were a) elected or appointed public officials, b) candidates for public office 
or c) experts acting within their professional capacity, and because data from interviews 
was recorded, stored and used in such a manner that participants cannot be identified. 
Each respondent consented to the inclusion of their name in the list of respondents un-
der the condition of non-attribution state above. 
 
Location and time frame of research 
Interviews were conducted in varying locations in Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
vakia between March and September 2012. Respondents were free to suggest a conven-
ient location which was usually their office or workplace, in fewer cases cafés or restau-
rants. When the location was to be suggested by the author a neutral and mutually con-
venient location (café/restaurant) was chosen. Except for one telephone interview, all 
interviews were conducted in person. 
Time frame and location of interviews 
Country  Time frame  Locations 
Estonia  21/05/2012 – 19/06/2012  Tallinn, Tartu 
Hungary  02/04/2012 – 18/05/2012   Budapest, Budaörs 
Poland  05/03/2012 – 30/03/2012   Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin 
Slovakia  16/08/2012 – 15/09/2012  Bratislava, Bansk￡ Štiavnica 
   
                                                 
206 A more detailed discussion of the preparation of interviews and their implementation within Lieber-
man’s (2005) nested analysis framework can be found in K￶ker (2014).  
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Sampling frame and respondent sample 
In the study at hand, the main variables of interest concern the decision-making within 
the presidential office as well as the relations between presidency, government and leg-
islature. It follows that the target population had to comprise high-profile respondents 
from the presidential administration, the government, and parliament who were directly 
involved in the processes studied or otherwise possessed relevant specialist knowledge. 
The  sampling  procedure  then  combined  purposive  and  snowball  sampling  (Tansey 
2007; Beamer 2002).
207 The initial sampling procedure identified relevant elites from 
the abovementioned groups that were active during the selected episodes. At the inte r-
view stage – depending on the quality of rapport – respondents were then also asked to 
suggest  other  potential  interviewees.  To  fulfil  the  demand  of  multiple  and  varied 
sources to avoid bias (Berry 2002, 680), experts (national-level journalists, academics 
with particular expertise, and analysts) were also included into the sampling frame. The 
eventual sample of respondents that were contacted included all actors that could be 
identified as relevant or sufficiently knowledgeable based on the available information. 
 
Initial contact and language of interviews 
Contact with respondents was established using publicly available contact information 
via email and telephone. In a seven cases, third parties helped in the arrangement of in-
terviews  or  supplied  contact  information.  Interviews  in  Poland  were  conducted  in 
Polish; interviews in remaining countries were conducted in English and German. Inter-
view requests were sent in the same languages (except for Poland often in English and 
German to increase the chance of response). Two interviews in Hungary as well as one 
                                                 
207 As the aim of the interviews was to gain in-depth knowledge into specific processes this combined 
sampling strategy was the most adequate (Tansey 2007). Due to the small size of the overall population 
and the fact that response rates in elite interviews are very difficult to predict, random sampling would not 
have been feasible.  
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interview in Slovakia were conducted with the help of an interpreter or language media-
tor chosen by the respondent. 
 
Response rates per country and respondent groups 
The tables below summarise the response rates to interview requests by countries and 
respondent groups, respectively. Due to the small size of the sample and considerations 
with regard to confidentiality, I have refrained from breaking down response rates by 
both categories. The total sample size compromises all potential respondents identified 
in the initial sampling frame and those respondents that were identified and contacted 
through snowball sampling. Percentages may not add up to 100.0 per cent due to round-
ing.  
Response rates in different countries 
  Interviewed 
respondents 
n (%) 
Refusal 
n (%) 
Unavailable 
n (%) 
No definite 
response n (%) 
Total sample 
size n (%) 
Estonia  15 (42.8)  1 (2.9)  4 (11.4)  14 (40.0)  35 (97.7)* 
Hungary  14 (36.8)  1 (2.6)  4 (10.5)  19 (50.0)  38 (99.9) 
Poland  22 (66.7)  0 (0.0)  5 (15.2)  6 (18.2)  33 (100.1) 
Slovakia  12 (40.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  18 (60.0)  30 (100.0) 
Total  63 (46.7)  2 (1.4)  13 (9.6)  58 (42.9)  135 (100.6) 
 
Response rates in different respondent groups 
  Interviewed 
respondents 
n (%) 
Refusal 
n (%) 
Unavailable 
n (%) 
No definite 
response 
n (%) 
Total sample 
size n (%) 
Presidential 
Administration  29 (53.7)  1 (1.9)  7 (13.0)  17 (31.4)  54 (100.0) 
Government/MPs  17 (30.9)  1 (1.9)  5 (9.1)  31 (56.4)  55 (98.3)* 
Experts/Journalists  18 (69.2)  0 (0.0)  1 (3.8)  7 (26.9)  26 (99.9) 
Total  63 (46.7)  2 (1.4)  13 (9.6)  58 (42.9)  135 (100.6) 
* In Estonia, one interview with a respondent from the ‘Government/MP’ category had to be cancelled by 
the author due to unforeseen circumstances and no alternative could be arranged; this respondent is part 
of the sample size but not included in the other values and percentages.    
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Length of interviews 
Respondents were asked for twenty to thirty minutes of their time; the majority of the 
resulting interviews lasted between thirty-five minutes and one and a half hours; the av-
erage was 50 minutes. Four interviews lasted less than 30 minutes, in these cases the 
topic of the interview, possible questions and matters of confidentiality had been dis-
cussed beforehand so that the interview was entirely about the interview questions. The 
box plots below summarise data for the different countries and respondent groups. 
Interview length by country 
 
 
 
Interview length by respondent group 
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Appendix A4 – Presidential activism in the case study 
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Notes: ANO – Alliance of the New Citizen (Aliancia nov￩ho občiana); DÚ – Democratic Union (Demo-
kratická únia); HZDS – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko; later 
ĽS-HZDS); KDH – Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťansko-Demokratick￩ Hnutie); ĽS-HZDS – 
People’s Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Ľudov￡ strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slov-
ensko; previously HZDS); MOST-HÍD (Bridge – Party of Cooperation); NDS – National Democratic 
Party (Narodno-demokratická Strana); SaS – Freedom and Solidarity (Slobodo a Solidarita); SDK – Slo-
vak Democratic Coalition (Slovenska demokratická koalícia); SDKÚ – Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union (Slovensk￡ demokratick￡ a kresťansk￡ ￺nia); SDĽ – Party of the Democratic Left (Strana demo-
kratickej  ľavice);  SMK/MKP  – Party  of  the  Hungarian  Coalition  (Strana  maďarskej  koal￭cie/Magyar 
Koalíció Pártija); SNS – Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana); SOP – Party of Civic Under-
standing (Strana občianskeho porozumenia); ZRS – Association of Workers of Slovakia (Združenie za 
robotnikov Slovenska). 
a) The Prime Minister’s party is listed first. Presidents Michal Kov￡č and Rudolf Schuster resigned from 
party membership shortly after or before inauguration, respectively. Ivan Gašparovič remained member 
and honorary chairman of the extra-parliamentary HZD (Movement for Democracy - Hnutie za demo-
kraticiu). 
b) Article 87 III, IV of the Slovak Constitution [1992] allowed the government to request the president to 
return a bill with comments (a stipulation that was abolished during the 1999-2001 constitutional revi-
sions). In practice, the president only rarely returned the bill with comments. When he attached comments 
in addition to the government, these were treated as ‘vetoes by agreement of president and government’. 
The main table only lists vetoes issued by the president on his own initiative or a joint initiative after con-
sultation with the government. The table below shows vetoes requested by the government and vetoes 
issued by mutual agreement of government and president. 
Episode  Time period  Vetoes requested 
by government 
Vetoes by agreement of 
government and president 
Kováč – Mečiar I  03/1993 – 04/1994  3  1 
Kováč – Moravčik  04/1994 – 12/1994  1  1 
Kováč – Mečiar II  12/1994 – 03/1998  3  2 
Total    7  4 
 
c) Due to president Schuster’s illness in 2000 requiring hospitalisation in Austria, Prime Minister Mikulaš 
Dzurinda and speaker Jozef Migaš acted as head of state 3-31 July 2000 (Pisárová 2000; SME 2004). 
During this time, the government issued three vetoes which are not included under Schuster’s vetoes in 
the table. 
Sources: Orosz and Simunčov￡ (1998); Tavits (2008); Kipke (2010); Kováč (2012); Website of the Slo-
vak  National  Council  at  http://www.nrsr.sk;  Website  of  the  Slovak  Government  at 
http://www.vlada.gov.sk; Website of the Slovak Presidential Office at http://www.prezident.sk; Website 
of the Slovak Constitutional Court at http://www.concourt.sk. 
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Notes: AWS –Electoral Action Solidarity (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność); KLD  – Liberal Democratic 
Congress  (Kongres  Liberalno-Demokratyczny);  LRP  –  League  of  Polish  Families  (Liga  Polskich 
Rodzin);  SO  –  Self-defence  (Samoobrona);  PC  –  Centre  Party  (Partia  Centrum);  ZChN  –  Christian-
Democratic Alliance (Zjednoczenie Chrześciańsko-Narodowe); PChD – Christian-Democratic Party (Par-
tia Chrześciańsko-Demokratyczna); PiS – Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość); PL – Peasant Alli-
ance (Porozumienie Ludowe); PO – Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska); PPG – Polish Economic 
Programme (Polski Program Gospodarczy); PSL – Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe); 
SChL – Christian-Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Chrześciańsko-Ludowe); SLD – Democratic Left Alliance 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej); UD – Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna); UP – Labour Union 
(Unia Pracy); UW – Freedom Union (Unia Wolności). 
a) The party of the Prime Minister is listed first, the underlined party is the party of the president. 
b) No formal coalition was formed under Bielecki; nevertheless, his government was – with the exception 
of the PZPR – supported by nearly all parliamentary parties and groups. Parties listed are those which 
held portfolios.  
c) Pawlak was appointed by Wałęsa and passed the vote of confidence in parliament but failed to form a 
government. 
d) Belka fell short of a majority of votes in his first vote of confidence; nevertheless, Kwaśniewski ap-
pointed him again. 
Sources:  Leszczyńska  (2007);  Tavits  (2008);  Jasiewicz  and  Jasiewicy-Betkiewicz  (2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011); Ziemer and Matthes (2010); Website of the Polish Sejm at http://www.sejm.gov.pl; Webstie of the 
Polish  President  at  http://www.prezydent.pl;  Website  of  the  Polish  Constitutional  Tribunal  at 
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl. 